SOVIET PRESENCE ASTRIDE THE SOUTHERN SEA LANES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160021-6
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE a2 U
28 February 1986
Soviet Presence Astride the Southern Sea Lanes
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay-Trade mis-
sions to South America from the Soviet Un-
ion and East European countries have
been increasing in recent years. Industrial
machinery is offered, above all for energy
production (hydroelectric turbines, compo-
nents for nuclear-power stations, genera-
tors for thermoelectric plants), in ex-
change for raw materials. A third of Ar-
gentina's exports go to the Soviet Union,
including most of its beef sales. Aeroflot,
the Soviet airline, has offices in Lima,
Peru, La Paz, Bolivia, and Buenos Aires,
Argentina, and is planning to establish sev-
eral more, although commercially the
The Americas
by Alphonse Max
South American routes are unprofitable.
Fishing rights within the 200-mile, offshore
economic zone have been in force between
the U.S.S.R. and Argentina for several
years. The Soviets obtained generous con-
cessions (especially from the military gov-
ernment that ruled Argentina from 1976 to
1983) for servicing their ships in Buenos
Aires and the southern ports of Bahia
Blanca and Comodoro Rivadavia. Uru-
guayan and Argentine ports also serve as
supply stations for Soviet vessels bound for
the Antarctic.
All this good will is looked on with some
trepidation by those suspicious of Soviet
motives. Besides the worry that a growing
dependence on Soviet-bloc trade may give
the Soviets some control over the internal
structure of Latin nations, the Soviets'
global intentions are also suspect. Civilian
aircraft are often used by the Soviets for
intelligence purposes, and most of t eir
ships are equipped with sensitive elec-
.
tronic snooping gadgets
The significance of the southern sea
lanes in a world where the land mass is
concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere
has long been recognized by the Soviets.
Of particular interest to the Soviets is
the Antarctic continent, which is sur-
rounded by all three oceans but whose
northernmost land tip is closer to the South
American mainland than,to Africa or Aus-
tralia. The U.S.S.R. maintains six perma-
nent and several temporary stations in the
Antarctic; some of them (including the
Polish base Arctovsky) are located in the
territory disputed between Argentina and
Chile (and, in part, Britain). The icy conti-
nent is of such interest to the Soviets not
only because of its strategic location but
also because the Soviets conduct various
scientific experiments there, including
many with military applications.
In the 1970s, when the last Labor gov-
ernment held power in Britain, the Krem-
lin approached the British about the possi-
bility of erecting a base for fishing
trawlers and cargo ships on the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands; these islands would be
extremely valuable as a relay station for
Soviet ships to and from the Antarctic.
However, Moscow's discreet inquiries were
rebuffed by Britain.
When Argentina occupied the islands in
1982, the Soviets rhetorically defended and
supported the "fascist dictatorship" in the
hope that, if the Argentines achieved sov-
ereignty over the islands (as well as the
smaller islands in the South Atlantic that
they also claim) they would view Soviet
plans more benevolently. Although the So-
viet Union took no active part in the war, it
offered to deliver arms and military sup-
plies to the Argentines-an offer that was
not accepted. The military government re-
ciprocated the Soviets' "good will" by re-
peatedly defending the Soviet Union in the
United Nations and elsewhere against ac-
cusations about human-rights violations.
The development of the dispute between
Chile and Argentina regarding three small
islands in the Beagle Channel-which al-
most blossomed into a full-fledged war in
December 1978-was also followed closely
by Moscow. Argentina's military leaders
concluded that in case of a war with Chile,
the Soviet Union would side with Argen-
tina; support of its trading partner would
have meant an even greater Soviet pres-
ence in South America.
The long-standing Beagle controversy
was settled peacefully in 1984, perhaps par-
tially because the military men in Argen-
tina had lost political power to a democrat-
ically elected civilian government. This
was a major setback for Soviet strategy in
the South Pacific.
The Soviets have suffered other set-
backs in their South American political
strategy, including the 1984 election of a
conservative president, Leon Febres Cor-
dero, in Ecuador. Such failures have
spurred them to redouble their efforts in
the waters of the Southern Hemisphere.
In June 1984, the Argentine undersecre-
tary of maritime resources. Hector Rubin
Praverseo, stated that 130 Soviet and Pol-
ish fishing vessels were active in the zone
of exclusion around the Falklands. In May
1985, the minister of fishing for Peru, Is-
mael Benavides Ferreyros, stated that
Russia was operating more than 250 fish-
ing and factory ships along the Peruvian
coast. The presence of more than 200 Pol-
ish, Soviet and Cuban ships along the Pa-
cific coast of Ecuador, Peru and Chile was
also described in an article in the July/Au-
gust 1984 issue of Progresso magazine.
Of course, Moscow will hardly decide to
invade South America by sea. But with its
growing presence in the seas surrounding
the half-continent, and possible new air
routes and additional port facilities
(whether they are called supply stations,
fishing bases or whatever), as well as its
increasing participation in vital infrastruc-
ture works, the Soviets' presence in the
South Atlantic and Pacific deserves our
close attention.
Mr. Max is director of the Institute for
International Studies in Montevideo.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160021-6