DATELINE WASHINGTON: GIPPERDAMMERUNG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504130007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE ~~D
CN PAGE _1~_
FOREIGN POLICY
Spring 1987
DATELINE WASHINGTON:
GIPPERDAMMERUNG
~` by Dove .11c.Llanus
In spring 198+, as Congress uas cutting off
Ct.a support for the rebels fighting to o~?er-
throw Nicaragua's leftist regime, n~~o C,.S. o~-
ficials journe~?ed to the guerrillas' camps in
southern Honduras. Their mission was m per-
suade the dispirited rebels, kno? n as contras,
to keep fighting. "?e'll find a wa~? m keep you
aline," rontra officials recall that one of the t~~o
men, C[.a Director of Operations in Latin
America Duane Clarridge, promised. .~ then
unknown member of the \ational Security
Council (`SC) staff, more junior in rank,
named Lieutenant Colonel Oliver \orth seo-
ended his message: "l'~~e got ~ commitment to
those gu~?s," he told colleagues in ~~ashington
after returning from the camps. "I told them
I'd come through for them."
\orth's commitment was no mere personal
crusade. Despite Congress's ban on l,.S. mili-
tan? aid to the \icaraguan rebels from mid-19N+
until October I8, 1986, the Reagan administra-
tion's reliance on the contra insurgenc~? as the
core of its police to~~ and \ icaragua did not di-
minish during that pericxi; on the contran?, it in-
creased. :fit the beginning of the period, in
mid-19ti+, Secretarc of State George Shultz eras
still ~~ filling to enter into direct talks with the
Sandinista leaders in Managua (if onl~~ as a tac-
tical mope for that year's presidential election
campaign, as some in the State Department con-
fessed after the talks collapsed). But b~? earl~?
l9Ni, President Ronald Reagan publicl~? pro-
claimed the rnntras' jungle ~~ar to be the most im-
portant front in a ,lobal struggle "to repeal .. .
the infamous Brezhne~~ doctrine, ~~ hich contends
that once a counts has fallen into communist
darkness, it can ne~-er be allowed to see the light
of freedom." .\nd b~~ the end of 19M6, once Con-
gress tinall~~ renewed the administration's man-
date to supple the contras ~~ ith arms and air-
planes, Reagan and Shultz flatl~~ ruled out nego-
noYLe .~1c.~1A~[:S corers forerggn policy for the l6'asb-
ington bureau of the Los .~ngefes Times.
nations between Managua and ?~ashington. The
focus of [,~. S. policy, Shultz said, ~~ as to enable
the rebels to "create ne? facts un the Uround."
Hou~ did the administration keep the contrus,
~~hose CL~-built army exceeded 11,1111(1 men, in
the field and fighting-or at least alive .end ;-s sil-
able-tor those ? years during ~~hich l.S. mili-
tan aid ~~as illegal- ~hhe ansu~cr ~~;rs a stratagem
chat ma~~ be unique in .~merican ti,reign-p,~lic~
histon?-a program that the president desper-
atel~? wanted-but that Congress had explicitly
rejected-uas kept ali~~e through a combination
of co~?ert aid solicited from other countries ,end
fund raising from prig ate citizens.
Uuring the critical period fmm 19H+ to 19Kh,
forth and other aides helped nr?anize and sus-
tain a net~~ork of pri~~ate fund raisers ~~ho
claimed to raise more than ~I~ million for the
rebels. More important, according to both [,.ti.
officials and contra figures ~~ho were incol~ed,
the administration impressed upon ~~.5. allies
that Reagan felt more strong)}~ about \ iraragua
than almost am' other foreign-police issue, and
se~~eral countries responded. Israel sold weapons
to the contras, and Israeli officials helped set up
the secret ~?.S. arms sales to Iran. Members ~~f
Saudi .~rabia's ruling elite, ostensihls~ acting as
pri~~ate citizens, pumped millions of dollars inm a
s~ stem that bought and shipped weapons to the
contras. The armies of Guatemala, E:I Sale ador,
and Honduras, the last two almost a hollt~ de-
pendent on [,?.S. aid, donated small arms, am-
munition, and facilities. Contra officials sa~? chat
the~? also recei~~ed direct contributions from
South Korea and ~raiwan. :fit one point, Shultz
and .\ssistant Secretan? of State for inter-.~mer-
ican :affairs Elliott .~brams solicited a 51(1 million
donation from the sultan of Brunei-paid into
private bank account in Genes a at the direction
of \orth but m~?steriouslc lost beti>re it could
reach its destination.
In public, the administration repeatedl~~ de-
nied that it had "solicited" contributions from
pri~~ate donors or foreign go~?ernments. But see -
eral officials acknrncledge that after the C[.~ pro-
gram aas ended, the 1SC ~~as gi~?en an appar-
entl~~ unprecedented mandate to encourage pri-
~?ate aid to the contras energeticall~?-if not to
solicit indi~?idual donations specificall~?. "~~'r
operated carefull~? within the lain to encourage
Continued
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pri~~ate and third country assistance to the
contras," said an \SC official a hu ~cas directl~~
im~ol~~ed. "Thee ~~ere perfectlc legal actions. Ile
didn't talk about them in public, but there ~cere
gcxxl reasons for that: either the donors ~c anted it
handled yuietl~? ur for the securin of the contras'
operations. "
fhe secret ti,reign aid operation ccentuall~
caused ;rear embarrassment t? Reagan and his
staff, first ~~-hen one of its air cargo planes ~~ as
shot dou n over \icaragua ~c ith three .\mericans
aboard, and later ~~ hen Justice Department in-
~estigan,rs discovered that \orth had diverted
profits from the secret sale of arms to [ran into
his \ icaraguan accounts. It put the ~aurw~ under
umvanted scrutim? and linked their effort to the
debacle of the administration's secret arms sales
to Iran. But on balance, the administration con-
sidered its excursion into private ti,reign aid a
success because the ~n,rrru army survived.
"11'hat's kept the resistance alive has been private
help," .\brams said in October Ic)Hh. "Some
vert?, cer~~ brave people have been willing to actu-
ally bring this material into \icaragua ...God
bless them, because then ~~ ere fighting fur
freedom in Central .\merica and keeping the op-
tion alive while Congress made up its mind."
[n Congress, both Republicans and Democrats
said they were unhappy that the administration
had resorted to "a wink and a nc,d." as Senator
Patrick Leahy (D.-\~ermonu put it, "as a way of
~~etting around our ti,rci~,n pulic~ ur the la~~." ".\
~c ink and a nod, hell," \brams replied. "11 e
think it's been tine."
Seekin{r Outside Help
\t the rvx,t of the administration's Ir)tt~ deci-
sion n, seek outside funding for the ~nrrtrus lay
ts~ a contradicu,n events. [~he first seas the CL\'s
relative success from lc)N_' until Ic)~~ in building
a \ icaraguan rebel arms that shoo ed promise-
at bast to officials in Ilashingn,n-uf gradually
becoming an effective guerrilla ti,rce. Che second
uas Congress's lytt~+ decision a, block am? fur-
theraid to the guerrillas after the Ct.a had already
spent some SSO million on their behalf.
Reagan entered the Il bite [douse in l c)N l de-
termined to reverse the spread of leftist revolu-
tion in Central .\merica. Che Sandinistas, with
help from Cuba, several Lain .\merican coun-
tries, including democratic Costa Rica, and a
broad swath of \ icaragua's middle class, had al-
read~' toppled the corrupt regime of .\nastasio
Somoza Uebavle; no~c the ne~~ ~(anagua regime
uas sending arms and supplies to \larxist guer-
rillas in E:I Salvador righting to unseat another
C..S.-backed ~,rnernment. ~[~hen Secretary of
State .\lexander [ laig. Jr., called ti,r quick action
to present "a ucll-orchestrated international
communist campaign" from taking over all of
Central .\merica and \Irxico.
Haig proposed a nasal blockade of both (:uba
and \icaragua to stop their suppc,rt t~,r the Sal-
~ adoran guerrillas, but neither the Joint (:hiefs of
Staff our am one else in the new Reagan cabinet
embraced the idea. Still there .vas little enthu-
siasm ti,r negotiations kith the Sandinistas ei-
ther. In .\ugust I')lil, the administration sent
then \ssistant 5ecretar~ ut State for f~~~~-.\mer-
ican .\ftairs [~homas Finders to Managua to offer
the \icaraguan regime a deal, but E:nders's dip-
lomatic opening began kith a demand that the
Sandinistas end their support for the Salvadoran
guerrillas "as the sine qua non ti,r am' dialogue."
The Sandinistas viewed that us an unrcasonablc
precondition, and neither side pursued the still-
born dialogue much further.
~[~he remaining option .vas covert support ti,r
the rebels..\c the time, scattered remnants of
Somoza's defeated \ational Guard were ha-
rassing the Sandinistas, but their pursuits were
closer to banditr~~ than insurgency. In molding
them into a militan? force, the administration's
t~,rmal objective uas to pressure the Sandinistas
into halting their aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas,
but mane officials wanted to see ~yhether the
contrus a,uld grow into a ti,rcc large enough to
turn the tables on (:uba and the Sus iet C. nion-
u, repeal the Brezhnev Doctrine, as Reagan
would put it later. fhe initial program, launched
~~ ith a pre,idential directive on \ovember ' ~,
I')N I ..vas :mall: just under )'U million to fund a
training and supply project administered hs the
militan intelligence services of .\rrentina's mili-
tan junta. But under the direction of then c:I,~
Director t1 il[ia~ m (;asc~s and Clarridge, both the
rebel army and its mission grew rapidly.
B.' IyK3 the ~nutrus' ranks had suclled to more
than ?,UUtI men, and their best units were
roaming freely across \icaragua's northern and
southern borders. Che administration thus
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reached another turnin? point. It could attempt
to negotiate with the Sandinistas, using the
rebels' modest success as a bargaining chip, or it
could escalate the war effort with increased para-
militarv action by the Cl.a. Enders propc,sed a
"too-track" stracegv of negotiating chile main-
tainin_q pressure through the tontrus, but others-
rhietly Casey and then [..5. permanent repre-
sentative to the 1, Hired \";,bons cane Ihirkpat-
rick-believed paramilitary action could lead to
the Sandinistas' collapse. F':nders resigned in
flay; soon after, the C[.~ launched a major esra-
lation of the scar. including speedtx,at-borne sah-
otage raids, a combined sea and air attack un the
port of Corinto, and the mining of three harbors.
\lost of the operations ~cere beyond the nu,trus'
ability and ~yere run directly by [,.5. personnel,
including the mining of the harbors and t~~o air-
support missions in ~yhirh .\merican helicopter
pilots exchanged fire a ith Sandinista ,round
forces. "~Chere a ere some operations that u c
didn't even know about until afterxxards," said
E?:dgar Chamorro, a member of the ~artru leader-
ship ~yho later turned against the oar.
Congress often did not kno~y either, and
Casey's sketchy style of describing his operations
to the E{ouse and Senate intelligence committees
became the Ct.a's do~cnfall. In \pril IcIK~, the
leaders of the Senate Select Committee un Intel-
ligence discrn~ered that .\mericans had been di-
rectly imolyed in the minims c,f the harbors and
other hair-raising operations against \icaragua,
and concluded that they had been deliberately
deceived. .\ bipartisan majority concluded chat
the program ryas out of control and cut off the
funding.The last of the CIA's 5t';(t million ran nut
by June Icl~-~.
But, it am thing, Reagan's commitment to the
rontrus had gro~c n. "\1 e have a moral responsi-
bility to support am one a ho aspires to live in a
true democracy," he said in Jule. B~ early IyNj,
he ~yould describe the contras in heroic terms:
""the freedom fighters of \ icara_gua ...are the
moral equal of our founding fathers and the brace
men and ~comen of the French resistance. \1 e
cannot turn axcay from them, for the struggle
here is not right versus left, it is right versus
His aides' answer to the conflict a ith congres-
sional yie~ys Has to seek a reversal of Congress's
decision while exploring alternative means of
keepins,* the contras alive. E:cen beti,re the Ct.~'s
funding was finally cut oft, officials say, then na-
tional security ad~~iser Robert .\IcFurlane ordered
a study of the acallable options. Congress had
barred am "agency c,r entity involved in inrelli-
gence activities" from ;pending money "u hick
could have the effect of supporting, directlc ur
indirectlc. military ur paramilitary operations in
\icaragua." Houeyer. the lass did not explicitly
prohibit soliciting aid t~,r the ~artrus from other
countries; nor did it make clear a hether the CSC
staff a as an "intelligence entity" included under
the ban un aid. Some policy papers, reportedly
including a memorandum from \urth, sug~,ested
taking full adt anta~n? of those loopholes.
:~ program that the president des-
perately wanted-but that Con-
gress had explicitly rejected-was
kept alive through a combination
of covert aid solicited from other
countries and fund raising from
private citizens.
~IcE'arlane and Shultz, mindful of the need to
regain the confidence of Congress, elected to be
more careful. They aslreed that the administra-
tion could encourage ti,reign countries and pri-
cate donors to help the contras, but decided that it
should not solicit specific donations. "Nrv,yidcd
E . S. funds are nut used, u e du not discourage
other countries from prucidin_g support; nor have
eye disroura~lcd legal pri~?ate C.~.S, contribu-
tions," then State Department spokesman R.
John llughes explained later that year. "Uh-
yiously, there ~c;u consideration of options ur ,II-
ternatiyes in the ,~oyernment. but the derision
~cas taken not to play .cn active role in soliciting
either private tundin~, .,r third country support.
and the fart is the (..5. ~,o~ernment has not done
that."
But others a ere nut as rautiuus. "["he man put
in charge of the private aid program uas \orth,
~~ ho had impressed superiors ~yith his zeal un be-
half of the c'o,tU'us. \ot only ~~as the \SC staff
under nu obligation to report its activities n,
Congress (unlike the Ct:>J, officials said \orth
and his colleagues reported their operations only
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to the national securin~ ads iser, ~c ho freyuentl~
elected not to inform others. festimom before
congressional committees investigating the Iran
arms sales revealed, tier example, that Shultz bud
been unaware of several of the solicitations, in-
cluding the aid given by Saudi \rabia. (;,,sea
and the CL~, on~the other hand, not only ~cere
arc-are of the operation, but also prop ided impor-
tant logistic support in delivering the aid. \nd
once the t9H~F election campaign .. as over,
Reagan himself joined the fund-raising effort,
publicly addressing several groups .,f conser~ a-
rive donors and all but asking for donation,.
"The contras need to know that the 1. aired
Stares supports them with more than just pretty
~~ orris and gcxxi a ishes.?' he told one group. '?11 c
need your help on this, and I mean each of you
-irnulved, active, strong and vocal. \ncl uc
need more. ?'
\t another point, after two \mericans had
died in the crash of a contru helicopter inside \ ic-
aragua. Reagan praised .\mericans who yolun-
reered to tight for the rebels as heirs to "a ~~ ell
established tradition" that he traced to the
\braham Lincoln Battalion of the Spanish cis it
war and the early volunteers of 1lorld \~ar Il.
the details of the priyare aid effort arc ,till o~-
scure, but its basic outlines have became clear.
C. sing \orth's office in the Esc staff as a
clearing-house, the contras' civilian leadership.
aided b~ several retired C.S. military officers,
sought money, supplies, and ~yeapuns from both
private donors and foreign governments. Ofti-
cially, neither \'orth nor anyone else in the ad-
ministration could "solicit" aid. But the de~ini-
tion of acceptable activity alloyed forth to speak
on the contrw' behalf before private fund-raising
events, officials im olyed in or_7anizing the eycnts
later said. .>nd more important, \"orth helped
recruit the contras' two most important fund
raisers, John Singlaub, a retired arm.' major gen-
eral, and Richard Secord, a retired air force
major general. Singlaub, a colorful and plain-
spoken veteran of special operations in .\sia, rook
charge of fund raising among [,~.5. consercari~cs
and anticommunists abroad. Ti, the discomfort .,f
the \t'hite House, Singlaub freely described to
reporters his contacts~uith \orth. "I made a
point of getting word to the ~\'hite House and to
the agency," he said in one television larva ic~c .
"~the~ sau chat ue ?ere doing, and from time
to time, t ~c ould get ;t 'Gc,od job, Jack, appreci;ur
what you're doing.' "Secord, a ho had managed
the administration's sale of airborne u:crnint; ,end
control system (.at~'.~CSI aircraft a> Saudi \rahia
in 1'I?iI. ~~as more discreet. \ca,rding to rebel
officials, he approached both Saudi and Israeli
?tticials on the io~urrt,' behalf and e~cntuall~ he-
came amore important source of help than e~cn
\orth. ILater, in I~N6, Secord also ~~ould turn
up in the center of the administration, attempts
to secure the release of .\merican host,tgei in
Lebanon through the secret ,ale .,f ~c capon, ro
Iran.that second unorthodox initiative, though
it developed independently of the rnatra project.
quickly became entwined cyith it. [~he .,imc
people ~cere running both operations, using-if
only t~,r conyenience? sake-the same S~yiss
tank accounts and some of the same cargo air-
planes.) -
~~ ithin the ~~nited States, the rebels tapped
conscryative donors. ~yho responded to Reagan',
call. Former Geasun' Secretan 11'illiam Simon
organized one efti~rt, a bleb raised an estimated
~3(IU,t)IIU. Singlaub, president of an organization
called the [,.5. Council for 1\orld Freedom, ur-
,Janized another. His supporters included the
~[exas oil heir \elson Bunker Hunt and the Colo-
rado beer magnate f nseph Crwrs, although both
men denied giving am' monec directl~~ to the
rebels. Cuban-.\merican ;roues in Miami held
fund-raising events of their ou n..\nd the leader
.,f the largest rebel group, .\dolto (:alero.
launched frequent campaigns among well-heeled
donors. including a visit m the IyH~ Republican
\ational Cumention in Dallas, -texas. \t one
point, (:glen, even offered backers the purchase
~,f "\irara,~uan Libern~ Bonds' at S;Il,uiuc
apiece-to he redeemed, he said, only half-
puckishly. ~~ hen the cartras reached \lanagua.
It i, impc,ssible a, estimate a irh any accuracy
hrnc much money the ~oatras raised in the l aired
States. Substantial sums of money, much in
rash, a ere moving through \orth's ,mall office
in the OId F:~erutiye Onice Building neat to the
11 hire House..\t oar point in late IVtt.- or early
I~>>{~, the tlambu~ant \orth thecae open his of-
fice safe m show colleagues a sum of cash that hr
told them ~~ as ~ l million for the corrtrru. "~1~~ im-
pression was that it a as private donors a ho gage
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him the monee," slid one of the CSC officials
seho seas there. 5inglaub and others haee offered
estimates at a u,tal-ranging From ~lU million a,
~'~ million, but haee offered no eeidence m sup-
port their claims.
7?he . [ loner [ aitishes
Raising monee in the [. aired States had a Ic~,al
defect. [~he State [~epartmcnt ++arncd the ~.5.
fund raisers that it probable uas illegal to bue
++eapons ti,r the rebels in the C.~nited States..\s a
result, the ~ontrus' most important fund-raisin,
effort +ccnt on aserseas.
Singlaub pmcided one set aF contacts ,u
chairman of the 1lorld .\nti-Communist Lea~,uc
(te.~CLI, a little-known or~,anization ori,~inalle
decelaped under the ,ponsorship of South-horca
sad Tai~can to or~_anizc uv,rlds~ ide opposition a,
the communist gosernment of the People', Re-
public of China. ~1:~CL'; member; included
prominent rightists from South .\merica sad
11 extern Europe :u well as \sia. ~[~hrough ~c u:~,
Singlaub boasted, he could tap into sources of
funds in t~eo dor.cn countries. Co,uru officials
have said thee +ecre told that Singlaub obtained
militate aid for them in both Seoul and I:cipci,
although no details have surfaced. [~he retired
general also helped the rebels obtain S.\-- anri-
aircratt missiles :tad. +ehen the missiles proved
balke in tropical humidite, arranged to hire a
Portuguese trainer to instruct the guerrillas .,n
the importance of keeping their launchers cle:,n.
In Latin .\merica, Calrro and ether ~arn?u
leaders alreade knee officials in some countries.
Conser~ atiec political parties in \ enezuela sad
other countries raised some monee, (:alcru told
associates. But more important cm the ~~round-
especialle in the first fc~~ months after Congress
cut off Ci.~ funds-++,cs material aid from several
armed ti,rces, including the armies of fa Sal-
~-odor, Guatemala, ;tad [ Ionduras. " [ he impc,r-
tant help is coming from the militate there," ;t
senior rontru aFticial said in stn inter~~ic+e in late
IcJH~. " l~hee tell us that the civilian leadership of
their countries doesn't kno~c gee are getting it."
On the other hand, iontru officials frcyucntl~
complained in prie:ue that officers in f [onduras
;tad El Salvador seemed as intent an profiting
from their presence-through preferential
supple contracts ;tad simple ~bribere-as in
helping their insurgence succeed.
(.~ontra leaders report that Israeli arms dealers
supplied them ~t ith weapons, including arms
captured From the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion in Lebanon and presumable held in ,meern-
ment stacks. [ he ~ontrus rehuc cu ,~~ +~ hether
then hate reccieed outright official aid Fram f e-
rusalem, but the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence heard evidence that Israel did con-
tribute some weapons in rest~,nse n, a t_ .5. re-
yucst. [~he rontrus' must important ,cid rclation-
;hip, ho~eeeer, has been +cith Saudi \rcbia. [ie?-
~,innin`; in I')Ki, ~,5. and ~o,rtru official; ,as,
Saudi monee helped Secord bue ,crms and build
,, prieate air ti,rce to drop missiles u, ,~ucrrilla
units deep inside \"icaragua..\n initial c,timatc
l,e the staff aF the Senate intelligence committee
put the Saudi aid at 5311 million nr mare.
[?he Saudi gu~ernment has denied strenuousle
,cne official role in the rontru supple sestem. In-
stead, as in the case of Israel, the slid has came
from prieate citizens ~ehose relationship a ith
their a+en government, if am, is unclear. \luch
of the monee appears to have been funneled into
5~eiss hank accounts user a bleb bath \orth and
Secc,rd had ;ignaton~ pc,scer. \nather account,
nose under imcstigation as a possible conduit tar
aid to the crurtrus. reportedlc u;ts controlled hs
the business manager of Prince \lohammed bin
F?'uhd, a son of Ding Eahd.
Saudi .\rabia has little interest in Central
\merica. But the Saudis +eere taken aback bs the
difticultc then encountered in seinnin? amgres-
;ianal appra+.al fur the .~tt:~CS, +chirh were in-
tended to defend the kingdom against Iran. [?hee
appear to have felt ;ame pressure n, demonstrate
that there acre ;ame issues outside the \liddle
E?::tst ++here Saudi ,tctians could ,env l.S. in-
terests and pcrh,+ps thought that \icaragua, ,c
cause drer to Rca~,an. ++as ideal. \nd the tian-
dinistas' ++armth u,++ani lean ,ind I.ihea, the t~+o
countries matt troublr;omr to the Saudi mon-
arche, did little tr, endear them to Ris;tdh.
Despite all these efforts. ~ontru funds ,tad sup-
plies be~_an to run out bs the middle of I')rir,.
Paradasicalle, according a, both (:alcra ;tad
\brams, port of the problem uas the manner in
?hich Congress decided to renew CL~ funding
ti,r the rebels. "Che f {case and the Senate ap-
prueed a neu, SIUU million aid Fund in .\pril but
did not make the monee aeailahle until October.
~pid1Al18d
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In the intervening ~ months, to the irnrtrus' dis-
tress, other donors concluder{ that help ~~as no
longer needed.
The ,elution ~t as to u,licit nc~c funds from an
unlikcl~ u,urce: Brunei. ['he sultan receives no
[,.5. ,rid, cnjoc; ,t ,ub;ctntial prig;ttc ti,rntnc,
and has frcels e~pres,cd a desire h,r ,t clu,cr rela-
tienship ~~ ith the 1, nited States. ~' (he diuu;-
,ions ~~ ith the ~,o~ crnment of Brunei ~~ ere cun-
ductc~i b~ \s;isetnt Secrctan \hrams, but a ith
m~ .wthorit~ c~plicitls," Shultz ;;rid. " l here's
nothing illy,*;tl about it. [ here's nothing im-
pmper~about it. (>uite the contran : it a us the
police of the [. nited Sate, to prop idc hu-
manitarian assistance and to permit the Depart-
ment of St;tte n, ,olicit ttmds." In late ,ummcr
I'rKh, the utltan tran,ferred ,ome ~ 111 million a,
one of the S.. i;, accounts under \orth'; central.
\ccording to \br;uns and other official;. ho~~ -
c~er. the nu,ne~ never reachal the routru~, and
red-faced State Departtncnt official; cannot trace
\ccording re \tn,rne~ (~cncral E?'.d~~in \Iccse
III, \orth m ors;t~~ the ~li~ cr;iun .,f nu,nec from
the administration's ,ecret ,ale of ~~ eapuns to
Iran: "In nc~ course .,f the arms transfer ... cer-
tain monies ~~hich ~cere received in the transac-
tion beas~ eon represent,ttis es or Israel and repre-
,entati~es of lean acre taken and made acailablc
to the ti,rces in Central \merica ~~ho ;tee op-
posing the Sandinista ~rr,~ernment there." ~lecse
initially estimated the di.-erred monec at beturen
lU million and 5311 million, but other officials
and congressional im~estigators later concluded
that the rorrtrus bcnetitai from perhaps ~N. ~ mil-
lion of chat.
\n ,tceurate c,timatc of nc~ ,um collected
through thc,c ~ ariuus ,chemc> is probably im-
po,;iblc to produce. But \br.tms. in an inter-
~ ic~~ , e,timatcd that the ;nnrru~ needed mughl~
~'~ million per year mcrcl~ to ,tas aline, beti,re
,pending am mene~ en guns or ammunition. In
l'I>;h the [. nited States pros ided that ,upport,
but in I'JK: that level of aid had to come from
?utside. \s for ~~eaponr~, administration uffi-
cial; ;aid chat ~.5. intelligence estimates of the
equipment that arrived in the iorrtrus' camps
;tarred ~t ith a minimum of 5lu million in each of
the ' ~~ears I'ltii and i')H6. 1~hhose figures do not
include the ~ lU million donated b~ the sultan of
Brunei or the estimated ~f3. ~ million from the
[ran arms deal, most of a hick apparently ~~ ent
astra~.J hhe result is an imprecise but con,cr~,t-
ti~e estimate of at least 5+> million in pri~,ttc er
co~~ert aid.
In addition. during fiscal ~ car I'1H~, the ~r,nn~u.+
recei~rd ~?- million from the State I)epartmm~t
a, pay fur nonlethal supplies-dubbed "humani-
rtrian ,rid" b~ the administration, but ~~ bleb in-
cluded such military materiel as trucks .tnd uni-
ti,rms. Che rebels also recci~ed at Icast 71~ mil-
lion from the C[.\ in little-noticed ti,rms of ,crrcr
aid that Congress yuietl~ permitted: 'i III million
in broadly defined intelligence assistance. ~ ~ mil-
lion in communication equipment and training,
and at least S ~ million ti,r pulitirtl ;tctis {tics.
~[~he total resources a~ ailable to the io,rtrus thus
came to at least SHn million rner 'sears-more
than the c[.~ has acknos~ lodged spendin, on the
rebels during the more than ' ~ cars .,f its initial
cu~crt par:tmilitar~ program from I'~KI until
1'lri+, In short, the secret aid cfti,rt produced ,t
;igniticant amount of support-enough tr, main-
tain the iorrrrus as a potential threat to the S;tn-
dinistas, but cleari~ not enough to enable them to
o~erthms~ the regime.
Un the battlefield, the iontrus ,uccecdcd in
launchin, sc~eral relati~el~ limited ~,ucrrill,t
campaigns during l'1H;, including one that
nearly cut \ icartgua's main east-u est high~~ a~
from Managua to the riper port of Rama. During
l~ltfb, the rebel effort largeis ;puttered, but ,e~-
eral contra units continued to roam thmughour
the countn'; ccntrtl mountains. Cho Sandinista
von ernment ;aid that the inrurus killed I ,U I'~ ,irn -
ernment soldier; in I'1Hh, although it al,o
claimed that the rebels' losses ?ere tar higher. \,
ti,r troop ,rrent~th, the i~,rrrru; claimed almo,t
_'t),UUII men at the end of I'~xFi, but the Sandin-
istas charged that their ranks had d~~ indled o,
h,l)IJI~. In sum. nc~ iv,rtr~rc our only ,ur~i~cd the
'-~ ear ban on ~ . S. military atd. but also main-
tained organizational cohesion and wme ahilin,
albeit limited, to ,trike .u militan and ecunomi~
targets.
Berrdirt~ th. e Lu w
From that standpoint. the administration', c~-
periment in stimulating outside aid ti,r a pro~,rim
Congress cut off must be counted a success. But
did the administration ~ iolate the la~~ er the con-
G
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504130007-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504130007-5
tidence of Congress .,n the ~t a+ ? {?~mm I'~K~
thmu~h ly~th, the administration regularl+ i;-
sued apparentl+ categorical statements dcn+ inr
direct imelcemrnt in fund-raising efti,rts. "\lr
.lid not ;elicit funds or other ;uppers h,r militar+
or paramilitar+ arti+ities either from \mericans
.,r third parties," \Icl ;trlane as;urrd the f louse
Permanent 5rlrct Committee on Intclli,*rnrc in ?t
letter dated September ~, l'IK~.
But .\hrams and other officials later ackno++l-
rdged that the administration had ,lcti+el+ en-
cuuraged private ,rid. "1\e ga+e public ,lppru+al,"
\br,tms told reporters accompan+in, him en .l
trip to F.I Sal+ador. "11e think it is right .lnd
proper that .\merirans should help the freedom
fighters. I don~t think it'; a +~iul;uion .,f rhr Ll++ to
;a+ chat ++r think an ,lcti+it+ is ,t tine acti+it+."
\nd ;r+tr;tl officials a hu ,poke on condition
that rhr+ not be quoted h+ name arkno++lcdgcd
that the CSC had .ought in an organized ++a+ n,
stimulate contributions from other countries.
"F+er+ mertin_g that ++;u held nn unofficial aid to
the contras ur e+rr+ approach that ?,u made n,
other _*rnernmcnts i; bring pla+ed as if it ua; il-
legitimate." complained an ?sc official ++ho u;l,
imol+cd. "It wasn't. \obod+ has ~i,und .t sin,~lr
+iolation of rhr la++."
Chrre is, in fart. no la++ c~pressl+ prohibiting
the president from asking ocher ~,o+ernmrnts .,r
pri+atr citizens to don;rte mone+ or suns to a ta-
+oritr ti,rrign project. \lan+ ntenlhers of Con-
gress helie+e~l that such a b;tn ++;u implicit in the
la~+ s shoe had pas;rd. I he administration dis-
agrced. but kept its disaurecmcnt secret.
In Ivx~, ++hen Congers, authorized rhr State
Orpartmrnt to gi+r the cwtn~us ~'- ntilliun in
nonlethal "humanitarian aid,'? Rcpresentati+e
Lee l {amilten I I).-Indi:ula), then chairman of the
f louse Pcrm,ulent Select Committre? .m Intelli-
~_rnrc. ti,rmall+ assured the 1 louse that under rhr
hill, "no other department .,r a~,enr+ in+ol+ed in
intelligence acti+ities ++ith rhr lintired c~crption
.,F rhr Starr [kpartmrnt ma+ enga~,e in ,ln+ t+ pc
.,f ;elicitation h,r the runty;u." But thi, under-
standing ++as part of rhr renterc?nrc rununitter
report accompun+ ing the hill, not the lain itself.
\frer the ~ontrus' ,error funding ++,ls re+rllai. ,l
unior CSC official dismissed rhr idea that rhr
I'1N) last prohibited ;eliciting militar+ aid as
"absurd." "Congress had the oppurtunin to pass
a procisien like that, and it didn't." hr said. \
Stare Department anal sis of the la~+ produced
in [)rcembrr I')H(i agreed that nu clear pruhlhi-
tion existed. and it asserted that ,ul+ attempt t?
enact one "could rai;r ;ignific,uu consritutional
questions of intrusion intr. e~ecuti+c po++rrs .m.l
function,." \nd other officials .segued that, in
,tn+ case. ,t ban en the acti+ities et "Illtelh~,elle'C
agencies" did not ,tppl+ to the Esc staff.
But those ,tegument; ++ere ne+er r;liscd durlrn,
Con,ress?; debates in l'IN~ ,tnd I'~~~. In;tca+I.
administration officials manru+crcd yuirtl+ t?
maintain their legal freedom of mrnrmcnt. 11 hen
Senan,r Claiborne fell lU.-IZhude IsLlndl at-
tempted urban solicitation of countries that r?r-
cei+r l,.S. uid or hug (..~. ++eapuns. the 1l bite
f {ouse ++urkcd ;urccs;full~ to dilute the pro+ l-
sion to prohibit solicitations that made 1..5. ,ud
conditional on the third cuuntn'; help for rile
~artrus. But e+en then, the administration nt?tdr
nu public issue et the point, and some mcmhcr~
of the conference et,mmittrr that handled the hlll
++-ere una++-are of the implications .,t the rhan~_c.
11 hether the administration + iulated the letter ~ ~f
the fain h+ soliciting third countries t?r ,rid to the
~ontrus. it ;rems clear that it deliher;tte(+ dreei+cd
Congress ;shout its actions, and thrrrb~ e+ tided
the intent of the la++. " {'beer is a +lucsnon
++ hether the administration + iolated rhr under-
standing ++hirh ++e helie+e e~i,trd on thls
matter," F lamilu,n said mileil+.
Some 11 bite {louse officials arc centcmptuou~
?,f rhr complaint. " \II this talk .thou[ the? intent .,f
Congress or + iolating the la++ is ;t hunch .,f non-
st of the leaks chat
did occur came from (..5. officials or the ~o,rtru.+
themselves.) .\nd Congress's intelligence com-
mittees ran into the problem of executive pri~i-
le?e. ~~ hen they attempted te, yuc,ti~m \?rth
,ilx,ut allegations surrounding his ~~urk in I'1Hi,
\IcEarlane refused to allow his aide to testih.
~1cEarlane also told the lla~hr,r~ta, Pnst that \urth
~~as "like a son of mine." "He's nut a rutiue ele-
phant," ~IcF'arlane said. "He acts at someone else's
direction." In Septemlkr 19H:. ~kFarlane told the
committees that CSC staff members had given the
~arrrus political ads ice, but denied am sulirit:uiun
of funds. "[ can state kith deep [xrsonal cum ic-
tiun that at nu time did I ur am memlx:r of the
~sC staff ~ iolate the letter ur spirit of the laic," he
~~ rote in a letter to Hamilton.
"l'm nut sure ~~ hat more ~~ e can do," [ (am-
ilton said later. "Reporters keep telling me that
this is going on, but they ~~ on't tell me ~~ ho the
sources are." ~[~here ~c as, he pointed out. nu
single clear act in violation of the laic in the
whole affair.
The contras' most important aid
relationship has been with Saudi
:~rabia.
Onl~? when the Sandinistas ;hot duun one .,f
Secord's cargo planes on ()ember ~, IyH~, did
the secret supple system begin to unravel seri-
uusly. Three crew members died in the crash; a
ti,urth, Eugene Hasenfus, parachuted to earth.
Incredibly, the crew had carried a u ealth of com-
promising documents on the flight, including
papers that identified two of the crew as em-
ployees of Southern .\ir Cranspurt. Inc., the
Miami cargo firm that once belonged to the Ct.~;
flight logs giving a record of operations ut the
tontrut' secret air wing; and lists of other people
imolced. E{asenfus told intenie~yers that the
flights had been run from the Salvadoran air
force base at [lopango, under the scrutiny of both
Salvadoran and .~merican officers. ~Che chief of
the C.~. S. militan advisory group in San Sal-
~ ador, he said, had visited crew members at their
"safe house" to complain that they ~yere spendin,*
tcx, much money-an odd concern if the cargo
effort was ~yholly private. .end the sate house
yielded telephone records that led directly to the
offices of both Sccurd and \urth.
1t that point, the private aid pipeline began a,
do up. [~he airplanes at Ilopangu disappeared;
the pilots came home to \liami and k iuusn,n.
f3ut in a stroke of luck ti,r the ~,~,rtrd;. I lascnfu~'.
plane a ent du~~ n unl~ V day s beti,re the nc~~ .
511)11 million aid fund became a~a,L,hlr. " III
these questions about private aid just arcn t rclc-
~ ant any more," a St,ue Department official .cr-
,~ucd hnpefull~. "\mc it', the lnited lt,ltc~
Congress ~~ hich is funding the contra,."
!n l\ashingn,n, the private aid project, .,I-
thuugh nut necessarily illegal, raised ne~~ yues-
tiuns about the Reagan administration'; compli-
ance ~~ith Congress's attempts to regulate l.S.
pulic~ in Central .~merica. Che use:..f ~5c staff
members to cam out a,~ert operations ~~as a
nog el deg elopment. Che task a ent ~~ ell bey and
the functions ti,r ~c hich the CSC ~~:cs urigin;dl~
designed and ~~ as, in the eces of roam , hey and
the capabilities of the council's small staff. I;ut
the decision to assign the project to the ~s