THE ISRAELI ACCOUNT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050001-0
14 December 1986
TNEIs~uAccou~r
BY JEFF
MCCONNELL
AND
RICHARD
HIGGINS
n October of last year, Uri Simchoni, then Israel's chief military attache in
Washington, sat in the White House situation room with US intelligence
officials. Hours earlier, the Palestinian hijackers of the Ach ills La u ro
cruise ship had taken off in an Egyp'~ plane to apparent freedom. Sim-
choni gave the Americans key information that enabled US warplanes to
intercept and bring the plane dow
i
Si
n
n
cily.
The next month, Jonathan Jay Pollard, a Navy counterterrorism analyst, was arrested
for passing US military secrets to Israel, in what became the most public intelligence
scandal ever to come between the two countries. Pollard, 32, is scheduled to be sen-
tenced next month. Although Israel continues to shrug it off as a "rogue operation," the
Pollard case has sparked debate in both countries over the extent of past and present
Israeli operations in the United States.
Such examples of cooperation and conflict run throughout ~US-Israeli relations. Thev
are especially evident in the ordinarily hidden realm of intelligence-gathering, and no-
where more so than in what the Central Intelligence Agency calls its "Israeli account."
For 35 years, the Israeli account has been the main channel through which the CIA and
the Israeli intelligence service, known as Mossad, have exchanged ?nnress~i ,,,,,ti e.,..~_.,._ ??
rlaaaifinri A~r~ ,,.. G... _.
matters of mutual concern.
But past and presort CIA officers say the account has another
side. "Everything in the relatiotship between intelligence services is
like adouble-edged sword," Stephen C. Millett. who bandied the Is-
raeli account for almost tzvo decades, said in a rare interview a few
weeks before his death this past spring. "On the one hand, there is
the frietdly aspect, But on the other, there is the counterintelligence
aspen - in which you try to get as much as you can and keep others
from getting things from you."
This is the story of the Israeli account. Pieced together from six
months of interviews with downs of current and former government
officials, moat of whom would not allow their names to be used it is a
story that has unfolded almost entirely outside the public view. It is a
drama in which the CIA's counterintelligence efforts have, at times,
overshadowed its friendly cooperation with Israel.
Understanding this helps snakes sense of the debate over Israeli
espionage in the United States. Like any drama, this story is in some
ways about the strong personalities involved. But more often, a re-
t7eas larger matter: strengths and weaknesses in US-Israeli ties.
obfectivity in .4mencan perception of Israel, and a possible shift m the
nature of the United States' intelligence relationship with Israel
L'S SECCRITY CONCERNS DATE BACK TO THE VERY BEGIN-
vngs of the CL4's relationship with Israel For almost 25 years, that
relationship came under the aegis of Jaates Jesus Angleton, the agen-
cy's legendary chief of counterintelligence from the late 1940s until
1974. A veteran of the wartune Office of Strategic Sernces..4rtgle-
ton led the postwar remnants of the spy organisation in Italy while he
was only in his late 20s. Working with the Jewish underground. he
helped Jewish refugees emigrate to Palestine. Those efforts would
give him a special stance among Israelis for years to come.
T!uee years niter the war, Angleton returned to Washington from
Italy and quickly took charge of counterintelligence in the CIA, the
organisation that evolved out of the OSS. His counterintelligence staff
was responsible for protecting CIA operations from detection.
Within the huge bureaucracy, Angleton was the quintessential in-
dependent operator whose blend of charm and forcefulness won him
great respect -and power. In late 1951, Angleton established a
formal liaison with Israeli intelligence and set up the Israeli account
within the counterintelligence staff. He was motivated in part,
sources say, by the belief that the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence
service, could provide a rich lode of information about Soviet oper-
ations.
Initially, Angleton handled the account personally in Washington.
His fast Israeli counterpart was Teddy Kopek. then a minister at the
Israeli Embassy, now mayor of Jerusalem. Kopek was enormously
to those who did not work on it at the CI,q This may no~have alwavS
been so. One former CIA officer tells a story. perhaps apocryphal. of
the early days of the account For a time, this man says, the work of
the staff handling Israeli operatiotu was out in the open, Itist ;fie that
involving any other country. -
Joe day, hoere~er. stiff mew
hers arrived u CU heatigttar-
ten to find that they ~, the
vanished, and~rha ~
be traaderred to other sec-
tions. OntY later did they learn,
~or'dntg to the story, that
'~~ had taltea Over.
The CIA's (]aodestioe Ser-
ves. wlach mortis atR espao-
ttage and other covet oper-
auoas, cooststs of separate
staffs - of ~vhtch ~ ~~-
mte~igence staff is am - a~ a
~8ecaon of geogi-+pb~ol dm-
staos, The geograp~ diw-
swn4 are Rather divided into
branches. and the brarrhes truo
desks.L F ~ o ~~m w~
signed a separate desk. and
each desk u sad to haod{e rts
v~vn cotmtty ..~+... -
L'ode: An8letoa, the !Near
East divisors d the CIA's C1an-
desaae Services had a desk [o
~a lean ~ in eHec~
Angletoo's special dot? lo-
side the agent., and thus oat
mQr a pet of ha wtmtermtelt??-
geoce staff. There wu oo di-
rect cotttact between CIA offi-
?~ baommq Lead nerd others
rrspaoshle fa other Mideast
camtrxt - a situation that lat-
e fed susgpo~ that Aagktnu
traced Im'ad favorably.
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Secmy was the essence d
the Israefi accamL By its na-
Uae, Angleton's camteiinte9i-
geace staff ways one d the
CU's most sertetive onmpo-
Heats Adding to the secrecy,
Mglreton bLdd the Israeli no-
ar'~g to a fotmrr cnlleagtre
Angletaa himself kept a bw
pry. e.~lly iIIVisibie arrt-
side the agency aad little known
even to CIA cdkagues.
To help with operations
concerning Israel, Angleton
hrarght in Stephen M~7lett, a
former OSS oo~Deagae who was
even mode iavi.9ble thaw Angk-
tan. Charles Rodcwe4 Md3eit's
broths-in-h~v and a Cambridge
resident, recalls the day M~ett
met his famr7y in 1960. "My fa-
ther asked him what he did for
a fivmg. 'I can't tell you,' was
Steve's reply ?,
Thrvoghorsi the 1950s and
'60s, MriDeett traveled widely.
honoring sea4itive matters for
Angleton. Israel was only one d
those matters. Accorrtmg to a
former member d the camter-
intdligence staff, Millett was in
regular contact with Jay I,ove-
stooe, the longtime head d the
international wing d the AFIr
CIO, who ~ called "a link man"
to the CIA in John Randagh's
recent book TTie Agency Ang-
leton had a number d agents in
Europe. woridng iadependeatly
of the Western Europe division,
a~ MiDeti was amble for
many d them.
But Israel was a prhanary re-
sponsibility, and some col-
leagues say that for many years
the Israeli accamt was basically
a two-man operation, wr~h only
Angleton and Mi11ett (and per-
haps Bertha Daseaburg, Angie-
ton's secretary) knowing its ful)
~'?
n the 1950s; the assumption
grew at the CIA that Angle-
tan's interests were Israel's
interests, and than the CIA had
adopted a hoods-off attitude to-
wand Mgleton rend LQ-ael Sev-
eral d Mglotoa's ooileagaes,
bowoever drsputr this, "Aogle-
tan cataialy wasn't going off as
a Hogue elephant," says a far-
mer high CIA affidal who over-
sanv Angletan's wort. Sam Pa-
pich, who bandied many cases
related w Israel as the FBrs li-
aison with the CIA from 1950
to 1970, says: "AD I can say is,
show me a case where AngJetnn
was taken is or averfy sympa-
thetic to Israel"
Several former CIA people
say they assumed that Angleton
was sympathetic toward Israel
beCaiLSe he Valued his Contacts
m the Lsraeli Bovernmeat and
wanted them t4 oontinne, and
bemuse be wanted the state to
remain noncommunist. Few,
however, are able to ate spedf-
ic uses where Angleton was
actually taken in or overly sym-
pathetic
One case that did emerge
invoh-es the US response to the
attack on Egypt is 1956 b'y Is-
rael, France, and Britain,
known as the Sues crisis Ac-
oor+d;ag to Robert Amory, then,
the CIA's deputy director d ~-
telligence, Washington first
learned d the imminent inva-
sion when a US military attache
in Tel Aviv reported that his
l?P ~~, a sevendy disabled
Israeli citizen. had been caged
eel thatea~ Amory cooc~ad-
general mobsbzation
was in effect and that an attack
da~ the Jewish Sabbath.
He recxds that he went to no-
tify CIA director Allen Dulles
and that Angleton walked in
soon after DuIIes and Amory
~ ~g about the matter.
Amoy and Angleton strmgly
disagreed over Amary's predic-
tion, with Angleton insisting
that his Lrae]i eonhcts ~ j~
told him these would be m at-
tack on Egypt. Ensperated,
Amoy recaps that be fioa~y ~-
sisted to Dopes: "~~ yen
[rust mY PenPle end me, or you
trust this co-opted Israeli
agents.
Amory says he bebeved that
Dupes agreed with him. But
two days later. as press reports
d a possrble Lsraefi attach on
Egypt began to come ia. Dupes
conveyed Angleton's version to
a special meeting called by
President Dwight Eisenhower.
aceo:+ding to docroreats recent-
ly cmcovered at the F.ismho~ver
L'brary in Ahrlene, Kansas. Ac-
cor~ng to the minutes d that
the troop movements scald be
senpty a ..probing actin" and
not an achml attack. "Which
proves w me that soimetime m
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[~'~7 AnSktan gnt hart to
him and resold rt," says may,
who aoly recently learned the
contorts d the nrm~ra, and
who believes that Angleton was
deed and not duprriCitoas. Ang-
leton. who is is his late 60s and
fives oaiside Wash>ogtoq rr-
fnaes to commrnt abort any
matters related to L4rad.
espite the lingering
doubts about Angletan's
posture toward Israel.
farmer CIA empbyees say his
rmit toot aaythurg bat a hwd.~
~f amr+noch to that camtry.
One intelligence veteran who
saw CIA reports
1950s and 1960s saysd t
eel States coodrrcted both "ho-
man and commcmications inteIIi-
See operatroas
?? against Isra-
eL Hnmaa operations involve
agents who copal infonmatiion
against a country without that
ooantry's lmvwiedg~ aomurrmi-
catioas operations invdve the
interception d cable traffic and
other deciroarc signs. In the
. tens mt~'i8'mae veR-
eran says, these operations
those directed at other ~~
tries.
In the interview this past
spring, Angictan's deputy Ste-
_ d ~mte~
bat said that against Lgrad
they were fewer in
number than those Israel
mounted against the United
States. There was less need for
US opentioas against Israel
than for L4raeifi e$orts ~
may. Mt~ett said, ate,
Hoge yopera inside Israel
was difficult. "Israel is ranch
smaller thaw the United States,
rts people more tightly knit. Ev-
erybody knows each other."
This made human mteffrgence
operations inside Israel difficult.
The United States appar-
ently relied heavily on commo-
nications intelligence. Accord-
ing to a former government of-
fidal who handled Israeli mat-
ters, the United Stales brute
Lsrad's codes -the rules that
govern the way messages are
en~yPLed - soon after the
cwmtry was created.
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In Angleton's time, commu-
nications-intercept operations
were coordinated among Angie.
ton's Israeli desk, the National
Security Agency, and the CIA's
Division D, its liaison gait with
the NSA. Two former emPloY-
ees of the NSA recall its "He-
brew desk, ^ which they say was
like the CIA's Israeli unit - se-
frvmvother ~~ Separated
Midd>e East. handbag the
bile the United States
was conducting its es-
pionage operations,
the Israelis were also mounting
the United States. au7stide their
liaison with the CIA. Asa re-
sult, the United States stepped
up its counterintelligence ef-
forts and took measures to pro-
test the security of its commu-
nications. Those efforts -
which included suppressing
some reports for fear they
would fall into Israeli hands -
contributed to the US intelli-
gence failure in the months be-
f ~ ~ Sun crisis in 1956.
The ooooern was not ua-
famded, TcJepbOOe taps were
discovered in the home of the
US military attache in Tel Aviv
in 1956, according to a 1979
CIA counterintelligence staff
report on Israeli espionage
found by L'niaa an~itants is the
US Embassy in Tehran.
Stephen Koczak, a former
foreign service affroer ~~
to Tel Aviv, saps ~ situation
was worse than that. According
to Koczak, Donald John Sanne,
the CIA's man in Israel from
1953 to 1956, informed his suc.
cessaor, Ham1d G. Wes, that
~e Peres m the CIA station in
the US Embassy in Isracj were
tapped. Koczak says that
Sanne, in the months before
leaving, also told his successor
that Koczak and Williams were
cadre smv~ by the Israe-
lis.
But of even greater concern
to the CIA and the State De-
partment was the Possibility of
theft of diplomatic communip_
ttons. Because the US Embassy
in Tel Aviv refused to send cer-
tarn messages out of fear these
messages might find their way
to the Israeli Embassy in Wash_
ington, events preceding the
Suez crisis were inadequately
reported, Koczak recalls, For-
eign service officers sought to
avoid controversy, and the
CIA's men, Same and Williams,
would not risk offending the
State Department with their
own differing reports.
3.
There was particular con- in the intelligence bureau. There, Koczak alleges.
tern over leaks from State De- he watched Sonnenfekit disclose to a group of
pariment intelligence, accord- Israelis information from classified CIA and State
ins to several sources. The CIA Departimeat cables detailing S~sitive diiscussians
took an interest in such ca.~es between US and Lebanese ~~ on arrange-
because State Departmtat ana- meats for the landing of US troops.
lysts, as consumers of CIA and Koczak made this alle
NSA intelligence, were in a po- ny to Congress is 1973 and rtiott to sworn testimo-
sition to compromise the ecru- rated on it in recent interviews.~becameeclear
city of the entire intelligence to me then," Koczak told Congress. "that this
CO~~' was ? ? .part of the whole problem as to why the
One set of allegations from American embassy in Israel felt so totally iase-
the late 1950s involved Helmut [nth ed the informs .
Sonnenfeldt, a Soviet intelli- tron went back so fast
genre that ].,' Koczalr later found out, he says.
analyst for the State De- Sonaeafe>dt did not have
Partmeat who later became a Ong ~ Ply ~ coca P~ clearance for
key National Security Coimc~7 meeting ~~ for '
aide to Heart' Kissinger and Reached in Washin after the fact. rat his
who is now a guest scholar at fekit denied Kocialc's ~ n last month, Sonnen-
the Brookings Institution. gallons, as he did when
_ they were fast made public in 1973. He said that
turning o CIp ~he~ad carters ~eY had been investigated thorn
q they had had no impact on hiss ~Y and that
from his tour of duty in Tel ubsequmt career.
Aviv, Harold Williams co~cced Koczak says he told his story to Williams, who
Koczak, who had returned to was ~~ and took it back to CIA headquar-
the United States from Israel ~' Accarthag to two sources, one investigation
the Year before. According to of SO?~~~ ~ducied by the FBI and the
Koczak, Williams told him that Jvs~ce at the behest of the CIA,
besides the security breaches ~n~ but was suspended when the CIA
that had troubled the two in Te! ~ State Department balked at declassifying the
Aviv, there were other leaks of allegedly compromised cables, as they would
information, that the Israeli have needed to do for any public hearing,
government had the leaked in- Other such episodes involving the CIA and
formation, and that one of his the State Department were ated in interviews.
problems was communicating The counterintelligence staffs secret 1979 study
information to Washington, on Israeli intelligence listed "collection of infor-
Wc7liams told Koczak that nation on secret US policy and decisions" as sec-
some breaches of nail among Israel's intelligence priorities.
security con-
cerned the US intervention in
Lebanon in Jury 1958. Koczak Y the 196Gs the Israeli account had
recalled an incident he had ob? changed in subtle ways. No longer a two-
served around that time. Koc- n~ operation, it had taken over an office
zak had been invited to a d0~ ~ ~ from Angleton's. But Angleton's
at the home of an Israeli whom ~~~P pocket" approach is said to have continued,
he had known while in Tel Aviv ~~$ Millett left and was replaced by Harold
and who was they assigned to
Washington, Most of ~ others ~dDes~pite~e independence in Tel Aviv that
invited were Israelis. Since ?? Koh Williams "was not totally
Koczak was then with the Ger- m on the [Israeli) thing when he was in Washing.
man division of State Depart_ ton, a CIA friend of Williams says, "Hai did a
meat intelligence. he was re- 8~d ~ in g dog-today affairs, but he
reatiud that he was,heki at arms' length by Ang-
>etoa. Whether he cared. I don't know...
gtured to obtaui prior
~.~ f ~t to socialize
hers, and he did so.
"'Ibese were personal as weIl
with whom I
~~~ wrth said later. Z
lens, thesr ~?~
ly figs-they knew mY friend-
t w
owo
k
w
nenfeld
h
r
ed wi
th h
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The counterinteWgence aspect persisted as
well, and despite the expanded offices, the ac-
count was kept small and compartmented. Even
inside the camterintelligence staff. there was
strict secxecy. One source recalls that the Israeli
files, kkated is the Israel officx, were one of sev-
eral "special coIIectioos" is camterinte]]igence
with ressCricted access. The central regtstty was
fiIled with a number of "blind cards"; each con-
tained no mace thaw a name and an instruction
that directed researchers to one of these collec-
tions. Access to information is the Israeli files
was thus carefully monitored.
By this time, a seauity measure allowing Daly
na~n-Jews to work on Israefi matters had been ap-
plied to the CIA's analysis and covert operations
components. Jesse Leaf, a Jewish analyst who
headed the Iraq desk during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, says that even though his university
training had been in Israeli politics, the CIA
would never have put him on the Israeli desk.
The concern went beyond security. "They
dtida't want judgments tbtally Prejudiced in favor
of Israel.,' says Leaf. Asked if this would have
been a concern in his case, he says, "Probably,
yea But there is no objectivity in the agency any-
how."
There were disputes between the CIA and
other government branches when the CIA
blocked the appointments of American Jewish
military attaches to the US Embassy in Te! Aviv.
"The ambassador would accuse us of anti-Sem-
itism," aformer CIA officer recalls, "but we
would say, 'Appointing this man would be unfair
to you, Mr. Ambassador, to him, and to his coyn-
try.' " If the appointment went through, the for-
mer officer says. the CIA believed the attache's
cr~bility, his kryalty, and his own peace ad mind
would be jeopardized.
Former CIA director W~7h'am Colby says that
these seciuity measures were taken to faditate
baison with Mossad and Arab intelligence ser-
vices. `The idea was that ...you had to assure
each side that its information wasn't going to the
other side - in other words. the Arabs weren't
getting the benefit of information about the Is-
raelis and vice versa." Colby says.
A former US diplomat in Tel Aviv says the
CIA man there gave a different account. "He said
[the Israeli operationl was kept small to prevent
penetration or pressure from American Zion-
ists."
One Angleton associate also disputes Colby's
version. "What Arab intelligence services?" he
asks. "I've never heard of any. Colby was being
discreet." Aclmowledging that such a statement
might be construed as anti-Semitic, he says,
' `The Israel desk was compartmented to keep Is-
raelis [Mossad liaison officers] from wandering
through the halls of CIA."
A former CIA officer argues that these ar-
rangements were to the benefit of the Israelis as
well as the other parties concerned. He illus-
tzates his point with the example of one US am-
bas,9ador to Lsrael who became so supportive of
Zionist causes and so identified with support ror
Israel in the minds of his superiors is Washington
that his advice on matters pertaining to Israel
came to be disregarded, losing Israel as effective
advocate.: `But you could never convince the Is-
raelis of this," he adds.
I t was under Williams' tenure as head of the
Israeli desk that the CIA launched its most
sensitive investigation of Israel ever. an inqui-
ry to determine if the Jewish state had acquired
nuclear weapons. By early 1967, according to
W~iam Dale. then the seodn~g US
mat is Tel Aviv, the embassy had cooch~ that
Israel "had or would in the very near future
have" them. The CIA's investigation was kept
secret, however, from the embassy and most of
the rest a~f the government.
Some of the CIA's information came from
Jewish America who. after visiting Israel, r~mn
to believe that Israel was devekypaing weapons
that required a supply of highly enriched urani-
um. according to sources who studied the matter
in the late 1970s. Dale recxIIs that two Jewish
Americans, one a scientist, once came to the em-
bassy in Tel Aviv to report their dismay at what
they had seen in Israel and their dismay over Is-
raeli requests that they not teal US officials,
These two Americans, Dak recalls. said Israelis
had told them that "their fast loyalty, as jaws
[should be]to Israel."
According to several sources, sensitive in-
strurnents were secretly sent to Israel to test air,
soil, and water samples around Israel's nuclear
reactor at Dimond, not far from the southern end
of the Dead Sea, where the CIA believed that the
weapons program was based. Physical evidence
of the material was reportedly obtained.
In early 1968, the CIA concluded that Israel
had gone nuclear. The mystery was where Israel
had obtained the highly enriched uranium. since
Israel was not known to be able to produce it.
Attention focused on the Nuclear Equipment and
Materials Corporation, or NUMEC, of Apollo.
Pennsylvania, a manufacturer of highly enriched
uranium that had a curious history of poor record
keeping, laz secant}', ~g iuanium, and close
ties to Israel
.,The clear consensus in C]A was (that] NU-
A~C material had been ...used by the~Israelis in
fabricating weapons ' Carl Duckett, then the
agency's deputy director for science and technol-
ogy, told ABC News five years ago, "I believe
that all my senior analysts agreed with me."
The CIA asked the Justice Department to in-
vestigate NUMEC for a variety of reasons, ac-
cording to sources. One involved the intelligence
question of whether uranium had in fact been di-
verted to Israel. Another was the counterintelli-
gence question: If uranium had been diverted to
Israel, who in NUMEC or the US government had
committed a security violation?
There was a third concern, Angleton's staff
was worried "that this was something they didn't
know about, and that this lack of knowledge could _
be dangerous," says a source who later inter- 4.~...-~
4'
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viewed Angleton in connection with an investiga-
tion into CIA handling of the NUMEC affair.
"They believed that i~ormation could be com-
promi.9ed to the Soviets if they did not control
it."
There was even suspicion within the CIA,
based in part on FBI electronic intercepts, that a
high official of the Atomic Energy Commission
had aided the Israelis. The suspicions ,were never
proved. But the matter was taken seriously. If
such a story were true and would have come out,
says one Angleton colleague, it
would have put pressure on the
Arabs and greatly contributed
to instability throughout the
Middle East. Moreover, he
adds, "the Soviets would be
able to prove the US gave Isra-
el the bomb.,,
tding Williams with
these issues and later
succeeding him was John
Hadden, whose work on NL'-
MEC has been commended by
Richard Helms, then director of
the CIA, and others who
worked with Hadden. One
solace recalls a memo prepared
by Hadden, "a S-foot memo on
NUMEC that just kept getting
added to." Says another col-
league, "Hadden was disturbed
because of what he thought was
the free hand the Israelis had in
the US." Contacted at his home
in Maine, Hadden refused to
discuss matters related to the
CIA.
But others interviewed say
Hadden and his colleagues came
to suspect that the Mossad had
a number of "cells" around the
country for collecting scientific
and technological intelligence.
These "cells" were thought to
be run from Israel and insulated
from one another in case any
one was discovered.
According to congressional
investigators familiar with the
case, one theory at the CIA,
never proved, was that Zalman
Shapiro, NUMEC's founder and
former president, was a key
player in such a cell. Although
there are no documented cases
of Shapiro passing any classed
information to Israel, he toured
the United States soliciting and
receiving information from sd-
entists friendly to Israel, ac-
cording to FBI documents and
other sources. The FBI report-
edly monitored a meeting of sd-
entists at Shapiro's home in
Pittsburgh at which a suspected
Israeli agent asked the saen-
tists to get certain information.
Recently released FBI docu-
ments on the NUMEC investiga-
tion reveal that in September
1968, Shapiro met with a dele-
gation of Israeli officials, includ-
ing Rafael Eitan, a high Mossad
officer. Eitan was reported last
year to have headed LEKEM,
the scientific intelligence unit in
the Israeli government that
handled Pollard, the Navy aaa-
fyst convicted of spying for Is-
rad earlier this yea.
Resdred at hi home oataide
Pittsburgh, Shapiro chaDenged
the CIA theory "Where did I
tour?" he asked. "What infor-
mation did I send and reaive;Y'
He said !x had had a meeting
"with a soeatific
but would mt identify the sttb-
ject divcussed because he did
not "want to help tecroristy,"
He said be did not recall meet-
ing Eitan bat stresxd that he
would not have ]mown Eitan's
bacltground and that the FBI
does malts clew that if he
did meet such a person, "it was
not done smreptitioasty."
"Do you think if these was
any troth to nay of the stuff
that I'd be walking the
streetsY' he asked
Israeli scientific attaches
also came under suspicion of be-
ing Moesad agents using their
pasts as a cover. One such atta-
che. Avraham Hermoni, was rr-
ported to have been in contact
with NLTMEC officials and to
have aocampanied Eitan on his
1968 visit to NUMEC.
Despite cactnnstantial evi-
dence. no violations of the law
were proved. FBI investigations
into the activities of NLTMF,C,
Shapiro. and the alleged "cxDs"
are said to have ended by 1'71.
Government invgtigators
who later talfred to Hadden and .
~ Pmt a Pmt of
disappoiatme~t witlbn the CIA
over the Fars inestigatio~r.
The CIA feh that the FBI took
a 1aw~nforcemeat approach to
the investigation ir~tead ~ a
moor poeve~tive, e1ii.
gmce approach. '"The FBI is a
ffitiooal Police fora,'. one CIA
partidpasrt b sad to have oom-
piaioed. "We have nu domestic
camteriateibgeace."
And despite thee: high re-
gazd for Sam Papich, the FBI
tiaieon man, these was a strong
feeling among CIA ofSoQS and
others worloog with them that
F81 daxta 7? Edgar Aovves
had caved is to patitipl pres-
sures in waiting un~ 1968 to
investigate NZTMEC and late in
conch~iag the investigation
withart intfictmmb. Says ooe
former CIA officer, "There
were political limitations on
how far the FBI could go."
I n 1972 Hadden left the CIA
Former colleagues say that
Hadden was more involved
in the inner workings of the Is-
raeli acconnnt than Harold Wil-
liams had been. Still, some
things were apparently kept
even from him. Two former as-
sociates say he had "crises of
confidence" with Angleton
from time to time, although
other sources, including investi-
gators who interviewed Angle-
ton and Hadden about NUMEC,
say that the two had high re-
gard for each other.
The next year CIA veteran
William Colby took over as di-
rector of the agency. Angle-
ton's tenckncy to conceal his Is-
raeli contacYS from everyone
else, even those who worked
with him, contributed to an ear-
ly ded.4ion by Colby to seek
changes in the Israeli account.
In his autobiography, Honorable
Men. Colby wrote: "The segre-
gation of the CIA's contacts
with Israel, which inevitably ac-
companied Angleton's secretive
management style, from its offr
cers working in the Middle East
as a whole and to a considerable
extent the analysis. was impos-
sible at a time when the Middle
East had become one of the
credal foreign-policy problems
of the United States.
"So I resolved to move the
Israeli account from the Cam-
terintelligence Staff. I
hoped Angleton might take the
hint and retire.
"But he dug in his heels,
and marshaled every argument
he could think of to urge that
such an important contact not
be handled in the normal bu-
reaucratic machinery. ?'
Initially, Colby Yielded be-
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050001-0
c~
caa9e. be says, he "feared that
Anl~etan's professimal ;ategri-
ty and personal intensity might
have led him to taioe dQ+e mea-
sores if I fasted the iawe."
Bnt Colby became more
adamant, he wrote, when ht
was "shoclted" to learn after
the Yam Kippur War in October
1973 that the CIA station in Is-
rad was not allowed to oommir
iricatte with stations in neighbor-
ing Arab countries. "I had come
t0 the ODOChL90d that I was trot
~g my lob ... rmless I iasst-
ed that I, rather than Mgleton,
make the decisions abort Israeli
rehtions and coanterintelli-
ge~,.
Colby offered Angleton a
'.separate status,.. which ia-
chtled being a ooa~altam on,
bat no longer in dnrge of, the
liaison with Israel Angleton
ttaned bias down and retired.
Colby succeeded in taking
the Israeli accoant oat of Angle-
to~n's hands. thereby getting rid
of Angkto~n's secretive style,
"hip-pocJtet" appr^oacb to Is-
raeli matters. However, with
Angleton also went the elabo-
rate security measures sur-
raaidaig the accamt.
The Istadi desk was moved
into the CIA's Near East Divi-
sion. and cifr~ers responsible
for Lwad both at headgtoarters
and abroad now freely commu-
nicate with their colleagues
working on other co?tries.
Sometimes the Mossad even
oondris'ts joiaL operatiooe with
CIA field ads is Mideast
camtries other than Lyrae! -
contacts that were ~mheard a~f
under Angleton. Instead of
tiag the Israeli ac-
co~nt. the CIA has made it hlte
every other atria is the division
- seporatdy respanedilie for its
awn secuaity and oooatamtel~-
gence. CIA ties with Arab
states are protected not by
compartmentiag the accoaaL
bat by ad hoc roles that control
the flow of iafamation to 11fos-
sad Hasson officers. J~ em-
pb9een of the US gaveTnment
now may worst at the U5 em-
bassy is Tel Aviv.
For the most part, the tran-
sition was made smoothly.
"Where was a less severe inter-
ruption than many who were ia-
volved at the time women
there would be," said as officer
who has worsted on Israeli rmt-
ters since Angleton's depar-
ture.
Yet the transition was not
made without at least aoe possi-
ble disruption. reflected by dif-
ferences of opinion over the re-
cent Pollard case. Under Angle-
ton, the essence of counterin-
telligence, according to one
source. was institutional mem-
oi'Y' "overview and continuity."
The split over Pollard suggests
that in the case of Israel, some
of that continuity may have
been lost.
Veterans such as Stephen
Hallett, with long experience on
Israeli matters. emphasize that
Pollard was "part of a pattern."
They point out parallels to the
past: that Rafael Eitan, Pol-
lard's handler, visited MJMEC,
that in both uses allegations
were made about Israeli science
attaches, and that Pollard stole
classi5ed US dociunents as oth-
ers before him have been ac-
cused of doing.
BY contrast, current CIA of-
ficers and recent retirees tend
to call the Pollard case an aber-
ration and to play down ariy
links to the past. The changes
Colby instituted seem to have
led to a decrease in the CIA's
concern with securitS, measures
aga~t Israel as well as with
the history of intelligence con-
flicts with that nation. They re-
flected a "reevaluation of the
total relationship between the
US and Israel ...including the
intelligence aspect," as a for-
mer CIA officer who handled Is-
raeli matters during the Carter
administration puts it. He and
others suggest that the grooving
sUategic i;i~ between the two
~~ since the early 19?Os,
including intelligence cooper-
atio4 have led many CIA offi-
cials to devalue - s~ R,~d
say overlook -the sig~~ce
raelm Indeed, ~ ~
President Rea-
gan s secret diplomatic initia-
tive" with Iran. in which the
CIA helped arrange arms ~p-
ments via Israel to Iran in ex-
change for efforts to help free
American hostages in Lebanon,
is but one example of how heav-
dy the United State now reliq
e~C00~~ ~h Lsraeli in-
g~ce services to furthe1 its
goals in the Middle Fast
It is in this CO~t, ovithorit
continuity and overview, that
the Pollard case can ~ viewed
as a blunder, an aberration, or,
as one former official recently
involved Willi Israeli matters
puts it. a "flash ~ the p~ ? ~
JEFF MdONNlI1,. MHO LtVFS IN s~RVTCLE. WRITES ~ROI'7 vAnnr -,.~
ISSUES RICHARD HIGGQI3 LS A MFJ~L>t OF THt GL08E STAFF LL iEC, 2:
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050001-0