STRENGTH IS WEAKNESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000503820009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000503820009-8
ARTICLE. APP
ON PAGE
ABROAD AT HOME
Anthony Lewis
Strength
Is
Weakness
BOSTON
Nothing --Ronald Reagan has
done as President has so trou-
bled Americans as his bargain-
ing for the release of hostages in re-
turn for arms. shipments to Iran.
That, at least, is the feeling I get from
conversations with people who have
admired and supported the Presi-
dent.
Here, after all, is a politician whose
central image is one of strength and
confidence. Here is the President who
made us proud again, the man who
can stand up to the Russians. And
here is the candidate whose over-
whelming victory in 1980 was due in
good measure to the asserted "weak-
ness" of 'Jimmy Carter in dealing
with the. hostage situation in Iran.
The Iran affair is full of puzzles.
But at the center is the puzzle of Ron-
ald Reagan His firmly declared
policy was not to negotiate with ter-
rorists for. hostages. Why would he
violate that principle? Why would he
invite more hostage-taking by people
who will. see a chance to exchange
hostages for arms or some other quid
pro quo?
Of course there are humanitarian
interests here. Of course the Presi-
dent wants to see the Americans still
held in Lebanon set free. But every-
one can understand that no humane
object is served by a deal that makes
other Americans potential targets.
The first reaction of the White
House when the story came out was
to blame the press for printing it.
NEW YORK TIMES
13 November 1986
Publication might endanger hostage
lives, it was said.
Editors are almost always ready to
withheld or delay stories that might
endanger a life - in a kidnapping, for
example. But it was impossible to
suppress this story, because it had al-
ready broken into the open in Beirut. i
Moreover, unlike a kidnapping,
paying this ransom would involve
larger consequences. Here are just
some of them:
I. The consequence for the terrorist
problem as a whole. The United
States has been calling for worldwide
action against governments that sup-
port terrorism President Reagan's
decision to bomb Libya signaled a
tough line.
Yet now the 'President takes a soft
approach to Iran, the very model of in-
spiration to terrorism. Even the Rev.
Benjamin Weir, a former hostage, said
last weekend that he regretted the
"trading of arms for hostages."
2. The consequence for relations
with our allies. Britain, seemingly fol-
lowing Mr. Reagan's Libyan policy;
took decisive action when it found evi-
dence that the Syrian Embassy was
behind the plot to blow up an El Al
airliner flying from London. The Brit-
ish broke relations with Syria.
Britain spent much diplomatic
capital urging its colleagues in the
European Community to join in a
united stand against Syria. When the
French held back, many Americans
were critical of what they called
France's , shortsighted and selfish
position. But Mr. Reagan's deals are
of the same kind as France's, and
leave our Mends in Britain embar-
rassed and angry.
3. The consequences in Iran. The
larger reason for the secret contacts
in Iran, White House apologists ex-
plain, was that the succession to Aya-
tollah Khomeini is now starting to be
disputed. The United States wants to
get in touch with more moderate ele-
ments and help them. Whether one
element in Iran is more moderate
than another remains to be seen. In
any case, the United States is not very
good at maneuvering its favorites
into power. In the zealotry of Iran,
any party seen to have America on its
side would be a sure loser.
4. The consequences for the Middle
East. If American arms tilted the
Iran-Iraq war toward Iran, the inter-
ests of the United States and its
friends could be disastrously dam-
aged. A victorious Iran would very
likely try to overthrow existing gov-
ernments in Kuwait, the Persian Gulf
sheikdoms, even Saudi Arabia.
5. The consequences for our govern-
mental processes. President Reagan
has often gone around the regular
channels of government in order to
avoid constraints and accountability.
He has supplied and encouraged se-
cret wars in Nicaragua and Angola
through the C.I.A.
This adventure went around the
C.I.A., avoiding even that modest bu-
reaucratic safeguard against folly.
Secretary of State Shultz and Secre-
tary of Defense Weinberger were ig-
nored or overridden. The President
and a handful of his personal aides, not
subject to Senate confirmation or Con-
gressional control, were on their own.
That last consequence may be the
worst. We have had Presidential ad-
venturism before in our history. But in
the nuclear age, for a President to
skirt all the assumptions of our consti-
tutional system - the checks and bal-
ances - is a frightening precedent. ^
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000503820009-8