NICARAGUA REBELS, IN RETREAT, VIEWED AS A REDUCED THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 6, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790040-8
ARTICLE AFf- ? iED NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE 6 March 1986
Nicaragua Rebels, in Retreat,
Viewed as. a Reduced Threat
By JAMES LeMOYNE
$pcW to no MW Yost nom
TEGUCIGALPA, Honduras, March 41
- The main Nicaraguan rebel force is
in its worst military condition since its
formation in 1982, according to several
Western diplomats and senior guerrilla
officials.
The officials, interviewed here in re-
cent days, said the Honduran-based in-
surgents will need extensive training,
new tactics and a possible change of
commanders if they are ever again to
pose a significant threat to the Sandin.'
ista Army.
The guerrillas' mass retreat has
raised questions about their fighting
ability even if they should receive re-
newed American military assistance.
Forced Out of Nicaragua
As many as 10,000 Honduran-based ;
rebels, constituting most of the United
States-backed guerrilla force, have
been forced out of Nicaragua in recent
months by supply shortages and im-
proved Nicaraguan Army tactics and
more sophisticated armaments as well
as the insurgents' own ineffective
strategy, diplomats and rebel officials
say.
Many of the those who commented on
the rebels' decline noted that it cornea,
paradoxically, when dissatisfaction
with the Nicaraguan Government is
growing at home and abroad. But the
rebels have been unable to take advan-
tage of this discontent to become a
broad-based movement capable of
challenging the Sandinistas.
"I felt I was look ft at a paralyzed
army, maybe a defeated army," said a
rebel official who visited the largest
guerrilla camp last week.
"This is going to take more than $100
million because they are no match for
the Sandinistas," added the officer, one
of the moyement's most senior offi-
cials. He was referring to the $70 mil-
lion in military aid and $30 million in
nonlethal help that President Reagan is
asking congress to provide to the
rebels.
Interviews with rebel officials, diplo-
mats and political leaders in Honduras
and Costa Rica over the last three
weeks have left an impression of a
poorly led guerrilla force that has
stumbled after three years of on again,
off again United States backing, inter-
nal disputes, inadequate training and a
record of human rights abuses, as well
as little political direction and faltering
public appeal.
Several of the sources had expresses
optimistic views of the guerrillas' abil-
ity as recently as last year.
In 1984, before Congress cut off mili-
tary aid, the rebel forces operated in
one-third of Nicaragua. Today, all but a
very few have retreated into Honduras,
and there is only one remaining active
front, in Chontales Department south-
east of Managua.
Col. Enrique Bermudez, the top mili-
tary commander of the main guerrilla
group, the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force, has blamed a shortage of boots
and other supplies for the rebels' re-
treat. But such explanations have exas-
perated American officials, who say
that in fact the rebels are demonstrat-
ing that they cannot fight a guerrilla
war.
Several American and rebel officials
say they believe the American-backed
effort against the Sandinistas could col-
lapse this year.
1986 is the year of definition," a sen-
ior guerrilla official said in an inter-
view. "One way or another, this can't
go on as it has before."
Sandinistas Relocate Peasants
Some of the rebels' problems can be
roc to the origins o t e movemen ,
i
was first or aniz in 1 w
the he o f f entr n e i ence
`Agency and Argentine Army inte r-
aence otticers.
Reagan Administration officials said
at the time that the rebels' chief objec-
tive was as the interdiction of arms
supplies from Nicaragua to El Salva-
dor. The Administration later said the
rebels' objective was to "pressure" the
Nicaraguan Government into introduc-
ing democratic reforms and entering
into negotiations with the insurgents.
But rebel leaders have long made it,
clear that their aim is the overthrow of
the Sandinistas.
The rebels appear to have more sup-
port than their harshest critics con-
cede. They have been described as lit-
tle more than mercenaries, but in fact
most combatants are conservative
Roman Catholic peasants from north-
ern Nicaragua who reject the Sandinis-
tas' leftist program and who have
volunteered to fight against it.
They have been able to win enough
support in the countryside to lead the
Sandinistas to forcibly relocate tens of
thousands of peasants in the last year
from mountainous areas of northern
Nicaragua to keep them from aiding
the guerrillas.
But the rebels have failed to attract
the support in urban areas and among
the middle class that would enable
them to build a political movement, as
well as an army, able to reach into the
towns and cities.
Instead of growing at the rate of 1,000'
men a month, as senior Administration
officials repeatedly claimed, the rebels
concede that their forces are barely
growing at all. Instead of fielding an
army of 20,000, as Administration offi-
cials also claimed, the rebels probably
number fewer than 12,000 combatants,
according to several rebel and diplo-
matic officials.
Ex-Guardsmen Are Leaders
The Reagan Administration has
twice changed the rebel civilian leader-
ship, seeking more appealing spokes-
men. But the fact that the rebels are
widely seen inside Nicaragua and
abroad as a purely military force led
by former members of the defeated
Nicaraguan National Guard and civil-
ians who were loyal to Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, the Nicaraguan
dictator, has been a persistent obstacle
to improving their popularity. %
The rebels' most influential military
commanders are in fact former Na-
tional Guardmen. And a number of the
civilian leaders were strong supporters
of the Somoza regime. Their past as-
sociations have kept more moderate
anti-Sandinista exile organizations
based in Costa Rica, including the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance led
by Eden Pastora G6mez, from uniting
with them.
The Nicaraguan Democratic Force
is managed mainly by three men:
Adolfo Calero, Colonel Bermudez and l
Aristides Sanchez. According to sev-!
eral rebel sources, their leadership isl
based on the long Latin tradition of per-iI
sonal loyalty rather than loyalty to an'
organization or broader principles.
"It you criticize the top people they
take it as a direct attack on their per-
sonal power," said an influential Nica-
raguan exile who has lobbied in Wash-
ington for the rebels and who thinks
they should be given American aid.
"It's dangerous to confront them,"
The Background of Leaders
Mr. Calero the former mans er f
the Coca- o a com an cars
is a businessman w o act ve y e
Mr Somoza tat the same time
maintained ties wit t e acco
in to several NiCaraffURn M le
sources r. %finclieZ is a large o re
wner who was an a backer of Mr.
Somoza. His brother ue ,
is also a7e_a_CffiW re civilian
The main backers or umse an
leaders are Nicaraguan exiles in
Miami, many of whom were loyal sup-
porters of Mr. Somoza or who profited
from his Government.
Colonel Bermudez served in the Na-
tional Gus as did the most erful
rrii its ie com w rem
1 him. a colonel was Mr. Siomoza- s last -fil
tnTtarv a c o a ~.
acco tore sources cross
ties wit A.
Between 1931 and 1984 he helped
oversee a rebel counterintelligence
unit commanded by Ricardo Lau, an-
other former National Guardsman,
that two American officials say killed
dozens of people suspected d being
leftists.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790040-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0403790040-8
Mr. Lau is described by American
and Honduran officials as a fanatical
rightist and hired killer. The Honduran
Army reportedly forced him to leave
Honduras late in 1984, but Colonel
Bermddez and Mr. Calero have de-
fended him in interviews and say they
have no reason to condom his actions.
In an effort to improve the rebels'
political appeal, the Reagan Adminis-
tration backed the formation of a now
rebel front, known as the United Nica-
ragum Opposition, last . DO
bi within group has left the
guerrilla army eaasatWly in the hands
of its old leedacs.
Sandiaistae an Emde t Fee
Besides their many internal prob.
lems, the rebels also have been badly
set back by the efficiency d the Saedin-
ista security forces. The Sandinista po-
lice have arrested many guerrilla
porters, rebel
ials and Western diplomats.
c
And the 100,000?man Sandinista
Popular Army and militia, trained and,
advised in the field by Cuban a4aen,
have learned to deploy veteran coen-
teri y battalions rapidly by
helia~ have been backed by
gunships and mobile rocket batteries In;
a lethal combination of tactics and firs
Power.
This materiel, slon; with automatic
weapons, mortars and long-range artil-
lery, have been Sin-Had bloc by the Soviet
Union and Soviet Countries.
The rebels have been squeezed to a
point where, for the first time in three
years, they have not even tried to dis-
rupt the economically vital coffee har-
vest in Nicaragua despite the fact that
many coffee farms lie just across the
border from guerrilla bases.
Both Western diplomats and rebel of-
ficials say the guerrillas need supply
planes to re-equip troops inside Nicara-
gua, surface-to-air missiles to use
against helicopter gunships and mor-
tars to counter Sandinista artillery.
But even more important, they say,
will be thorough retraining in how to
wage a guerrilla war and new tactics,
including a political program that the
rebels understand and can explain to
Nicaraguans they meet inside the coun-
try. Even with such help, diplomats
'estimate it could take two years for the
rebels to become an effective fighting
force.
To highlight the Nicaraguan guerril-
las' incompetence, several diplomats
noted that leftist guerrillas in El Salva-
dor, with probably fewer than 6,000
men and no secure bases or supply
lines, have wrecked the economy and
badly blooded the Government army.
But they are politically committed
fighters who have organized public
support and waged a war based on
'genuine grievances.
The Nicaraguan rebels have been
handicapped as well by factors beyond
their control, especially prolonged erude cut-
offs in their supplies. Conss
American military aid to to a rebels in
1964, forcing them to scrape by on pri.
vate donation for a year until Con-
gress granted them $27 million in
nonlethal aid to be spent by the end of
this month, mostly on food, boots, uni-
forms and medicine.
The help has been slow in coming,
the rebels say, and was suspended by
the Honduran Government last Octo-
ber in an effort to press the United
States to make concessions on a num-
ber of economic and political issues, a
tactic that Honduras could repeat at
anytime.
Despite such difficulties, rebel offi-
cials say that they do not lack guns and
bullets and that the shortage in other
gear is now being made up in part by
supply flights from El Salvador using
insistence on receipts for rebel pur-
chases has kept the guerrillas from
taking the easier step of buying di-
rectly from the Honduran Army, which
would gladly sell to them, according to
sources here.
Western diplomats say that Amer.
ican nonlethal assistance has had the
unfortunate effect of encouraging the
guerrillas to sit in their camps, where
they receive American-bought food, in-
stead of marching into Nicaragua to
fight. A senior rebel official echoed the
criticism, saying nonlethal help that is
not matched by military aid is a curse
rather than a blessing.
"It gives us enough to hang on, to
prolong this so that more Nicaraguans
die," he said bitterly. "But it doesn't
give us enough to end it. I'd rather have
no aid at all than only receive this so-
called humanitarian aid."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0403790040-8