THE GUERRILLA NETWORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: April 6, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STET
~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
P~ j....`.~~ IVGYV T VKI\ I ll'ICJ I'IHl]HL 11VC
6 April 1986
ry~~..THE GUERRILW
^ NETWORK
A REGION IN
CONFLICT
-T IS A WORLD THAT HAS ITS OWN CODES AND
knows no national borders. It has stopping points in Nicara-
gua, Cuba, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as in
the theaters of war in El Salvador and Guatemala. Almost all
its leaders are Marxists of one persuasion or another who be-
lieve that capitalism and imperialism are the causes of their
countries' problems. Far from being a passing political tash-
ion, their movement is deeply rooted in the troubled societies
of Central America and can be traced to leftist uprisings more
than 50 years ago. They are the armed left -the generation
that spent the 1970's preparing for revolution and is spending
the 1980's fighting it.
In one of the most volatile and closely watched areas of the
world, the actions of these guerrilla leaders and their allies in
Managua and Havana have an enormous international im-
pact. The role of the Sandinista commanders in the area's
conflicts, in particular, has long been the subject of intense
debate in the United States. Late last month, as the contro-
versy over aid to the anti-Sandinista rebels -known as con-
tras -raged in Congress, reports of attacks by Nicaraguan
Army units on contra bases within Honduras resulted in an
immediate Presidential order of s,20 million in emergency
military aid to Honduras.
Today, leftist guerrilla movements are active in EI Salva-
dor and Guatemala, and far smaller leftist groups can be
found in Honduras and Costa Rica. Virtually every study of
the region. including that of the Kissinger commission ap-
pointed in mid-1983 by President Reagan to
make policy recommendations on Central
America, has concluded that the revolu-
tions of Central America primarily have
been caused by decades of poverty, bloody
repression and frustrated efforts at bring-
ingabout political reform.
Consequently, those who fight do not
need great numbers of combatants to have
a substantial impact, since public discon-
tent runs deep. In El Salvador, the um-
breliaorganization of the rebels, the Fara-
bundo Marti National Liberation Front,
probably has no more than 4,000 fighters,
but it can count on several thousand un-
armed supporters to help them wage a de-
bilitating war against the Government. In
Guatemala, where the guerrillas are bat-
tered by a ruthless army counterinsur-
gency campaign, they are fielding about
1,500 fighters organized in tour main
groups.
The key commanders of these move-
ments probably number in the hundreds. A
few are of peasant origin, but most are
members of the urban middle and lower-
middle classes. Many appear to be ideal-
istswho were frustrated by,the overwhelm-
ing problems facing their countries. Until
the last year or so, however, little was
known about the lives of these leaders, haw they were.trained,
or the alliances between them.
Revealing information came to light a year ago with the
capture of Nidia Diaz, a commander of the Marxist Central
American Revolutionary Workers Party (a Salvadoran guer-
rilla faction). Miss Diaz had with her a diary that indicated
Salvadoran guerrillas had been sent to training courses in
Vietnam, Bulgaria, East Germany and the Soviet Union.
Recent months have also seen an increasing willingness of
former guemlla officials to divulge details
of their shadowy past. Several high-level
Sandinistas have left the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment because of what they describe as
their unhappiness with the Sandinistas' de-
pendence on the Cubans and the Russians
and their failure to establish a pluralistic
society. In the case of the Salvadorans, a
few commanders have been captured and
been persuaded to give up the fight; others
have been ousted over differences on how
the revolution is to proceed.
From interviews with these current and
former guerrillas (conducted separately
over asix-month period), a clearer picture
emerges of the connections between the
various leftist Central American rebel fac-
tions - a picture that reveals a guerrilla
movement that is anything but monolithic.
Details were offered, for instance, on the
arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Sal-
vador, on the role of Cuba in the planning of
the abortive "final offensive" in El Salva-
dor in 1981, and on the events leading up to
the almost Shakespearean murder-suicide
of two prominent leaders of the Salvadoran
guerrilla movement three years ago.
The story behind the brutal killing of
Melida Anaya Montes and the suicide of the
man implicated in her murder, Salvador
Cayetano Carpio, offers a rare glimpse of the frequently frac-
tious society of revolutionary leaders in Central America. In
this instance, Mr. Carpio's fiercely Stalinist stance pitted him
against many within his own group who sought greater unity
among rebel factions as well as a negotiated end to the fight-
ing, aposition that was strongly supported by Cuba and Nica-
ragua.
Although Cuba appears to remain the chief adviser and pa-
tron of Central American leftist guemlla leaders, the Soviet
Union is seen by many rebels to have abrogated its revolu-
tionary role. "Revolutions are like people," says a Honduran
leftist. "They lose passion. Russia is old, bureaucratic and
corrupt. "
!`.n:~tinUed
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
RECRUITMENT
AND TRAINING
ter the world of the armed left of Central America, there are
many reasons for men and women becoming guerrillas.
Often, these reasons are highly personal.
Salvador Samayoa, a former Minister of Education in Ei
Salvador, is now one of the leading officials of the rebel Popu-
lar Liberation Forces, the largest Salvadoran guerrilla
group. He began thinking of taking up arms, he says, after
watching the Salvadoran Army open fire on a demonstration
in 1975. "That marked me," he says. "It was grotesque to see
students shot like dogs in the streets." Mr. Samayoa is un-
likely to have been the oNy one affected by such violence.
Since the 1970's, Salvadoran Government security forces
have killed thousands of civilians in an effort to wipe out left-
istsympathizers.
Other guerrilla leaders almost appear to have been raised
to join rebel ranks. Plutarco Hern~rtdez Sancho, who now
runs a small farm in Costa Rica, is not well known today, but
until he lost an internal power struggle in 1979, he was one of
the top Sandinista military
commanders in the revolt
against the Nicaraguan dicta-
tor Anastasio Somoza De-
bayle. Mr. Hern~ndez's
family was active in the Com-
munist Party in Costa Rica -
his father was a Congress-
man -and Mr. Herndndez
remembers a childhood filled
with political meetings and
demonstrations. "I never had
any doubt that I would be a
revolutionary fighter," he
says. His cousin, Eduardo
Sancho Castaneda (better
known by his nom de guerre,
Fermin Cienfuegos), is the
leader of a guerrilla faction,
the Armed Forces of National
Resistance, in El Salvador.
Salvadoran rebels inter-
viewed recently said they en-
tered guerrilla organizations
through student or trade-
union front groups. Peasants
were recruited directly from
their villages. Those who
demonstrated their commit-
ment to the revolution and a
capacity to lead rose to be-
comesenior commanders.
Guerrillas with leadership
potential were first offered
basic military training (rifle
use, squad tactics, indoctri-
nation techniques) at hidden
camps in their own countries.
Most of them later appeared
to receive more specialized
training abroad - in Cuba,
various Eastern European
countries and Vietnam. Ac-
cording to a number of for-
mer Sandinistas, some San-
UST AS THERE ARE MANY WAYS TO EN-
dinista commanders went to
North Korea for officer train-
ing in the early 1970's and a
few went to Palestine Libera-
tion Organization camps in
Beirut in 1969.
The Soviet Union seems to
play a limited role in the re-
gion. In the past, it has coun-
seled orthodox Communist
parties to avoid military ac-
tion and to assume power
through alliances with "pro-
gressive" political parties.
With the Russians becoming
a major supplier of weapons
and other aid to Nicaragua,
and with the Communist par-
ties in El Salvador and Guate-
mala joining in the fight
against Government forces,
that policy may have
changed. But many rebels do
not appear to have forgiven
the Russians for their past
reticence.
Cuba is still a revolutionary
icon. For older guerrilla lead-
ers, Cuba offered the first evi-
dence that it was possible to
fight the United States and
win. "For the first time,
young Communists could see
a revolution triumph, a revo-
lution that spoke Spanish,"
explains a Honduran leftist
who fought with the Sandinis-
tas. Ayoung former Sandin-
ista official was overcome
with emotion when he went to
Cuba three years ago to dis-
cuss relations between the
Sandinista Government and
the Cuban Communist Party.
"It's a question of soul, of
myth," he says. "Cuba sym-
bolized the success of social-
ism and the defeat of the Yan-
kees."
Rebels say that Cuban em-
bassies serve as refuges and
bankers for Central Amer-
icanleftists traveling abroad.
In addition, say several for-
mer rebels, almost all the top
Sandinista commanders and
most of the very senior rebel
officials in El Salvador and
Guatemala have received ad-
vanced guerrilla training in
Cuba. The courses given
range from intelligence gath-
ering to instructions in rural
and urban guerrilla warfare.
The training there is over-
seen by the Department of
Special Operations of the
Cuban Army and the Depart-
ment of the Americas, headed
by Manuel Pineiro. A close
confidant of Fidel Castro, Mr.
Pineiro (whose nickname is
Barba Roja, or Red Beard)
draws on two decades of revo-
lutionary experience in the
region and probably has had
a profound influence on a
whole generation of guerrilla
commanders, many of whom
he knows personally.
How senior commanders
are selected for training
abroad is still a mystery. But
there are telling examples of
such training in the recent
past and some indications of
how it continues today. A
year ago, Salvadoran Army
commandos captured the sen-
ior rebel official Nidia Diaz
after intercepting a guerrilla
patrol. The diary found in her
backpack listed 33 Salvado-
ran guerrillas who had been
sent to training courses in
Vietnam, Bulgaria, East Ger-
many and the Soviet Union in
1984 and 1985. Miss Diaz her-
self was slated to go to Viet-
nam for training.
Asked to comment on the
diary, a current senior Salva-
doran guerrilla official said,
"It is true that we have sent
some small groups to various
countries for training. Most
of them are socialist coun-
tries because they are the
ones willing to help."
It is likely that the training
offered rebel leaders today is
similar to that given to top
Sandinista guerrillas, like
~Rtln'!^r,
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4 3 .
Mr. HernSndez, in the late
1980's and 70's. A promising
young Communist Party ac-
tivist in Costa Rica in 1965,
Mr. Hernandez was selected
by party leaders to attend
Moscow's Patrice Lumumba
University, which was estab-
lished in 1960 to offer tree
higher education to third-
world srudents as well as
Soviet srudents. Most of those
who attend, says Mr. Hern~n-
dez, are chosen by their local
Communist Party. But only a
gua, receiving radio instruc-
tions from Havana that, he
says, took him all night to de-
code. His Honduran class-
mate became the Sandinis-
tas' chief of counterintelli-
gence. Two other stuaenis
from Patrice Lumumba.
Henry Ruiz and Josh Valdiv-
ia, also became Sandinista
commanders and are senior
officials in Nicaragua today.
Guerrilla commanders
sleep with a pistol beside
them. They say they expect to
be tortured if they are caught
by Government security
forces and, if they survive,
they expect to spend years in
jail. Many say they have had
friends and relatives killed by
the army or police.
Paranoia is an inescapable
part of life. A Honduran left-
istwho lived underground for
several years describes his
morning ritual: "Each day
when I got up, I went to the
window and checked the
street. I remembered every-
thing going on there and I
noted anything abnormal.
After I bathed, I checked the
street again and after I~in-
ished breakfast I checked it
again. When I left the house, I
put a towel in the window to
tell comrades I was not home.
After walking a block, I
stopped to tie my shoes and
see if anyone was following ,
me. I had previously srudied
every shop and cafe along the
street and I knew which ones
had a rear exit, which ones
had a bathroom window I
coWd jump through if I had
to." Despite these precau-
tions, the Hondttran was cap-
tured by Somoza's National
Guard while working for the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
Over time, such a life leads
many rebels to develop an us-
versus-them view of the
world that is defined by tear
of discovery and a belief that
they are making a supreme
sacrifice for the common
good. A former Sandinista re-
calls his feelings during the
years he spent carrying a
hand grenade 24 hours a day
while he organized clandes-
tine cells in Managua. "We
hated people with normal
lives because we were mor-
ally superior," he remem-
bers. "We risked our lives
and we knew we had the
power of life and death."
Even aher the war was won,
he found it almost impossible ~
to adjust. "It was two years
before I could make love to a
woman. Fearing human con-
few of those third-world stu-
dents become guerrillas. The
vast majority complete their
college courses and return
home to find jobs.
Mr. Herngndez and a group
of fellow students from Cen-
tral America were different.
They decided to form a study
group in Moscow and to spend
the long winter evenings dis-
cussing ways of bringing
about revolution in their ~
homelands. (Thirty of the
Latin students, recalls Mr.
Hernandez, were expelled in
1968 when they led a demon-
stration against the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia.)
The years at Patrice Lu-
mumba let the future revolu-
tionaries form friendships
with other young leftists, says
a Honduran who srudied with
Mr. Hernandez and who was
formerly a leading Sandinis-
ta. "It let us see the state of
the revolutionary movement
around the world with sru-
dents from 82 countries"
A number of the Central
American students returned
home to join the still-fledgling
Sandinista National Libera-
tion Front because they be-
lieved the Somoza dictator-
ship could be beaten. The
Cubans offered to help by
training a handful of rebels.
At a seven-month intelli-
gence seminar in Cuba, the
Honduran learned how to re-
cruit spies, to maintain se-
curity, to establish secret co-
munications and to interro-
gate prisoners. Plutarco
Hernandez went through
basic military training in
Cuba and, in 1971, took a
grueling officer command
and staff course in North
Korea, where he met Kim Il
Sung. He returned to Central
America to become one of the
chief Sandinista military
commanders inside Nicara-
DAILY UFE OF A
6IlERRILLA
FTER COMPLET-
mg their training,
rebel leaders begin
the arduous and dangerous
work of organizing a rebel-
lion. Their tasks include set-
ting up political platforms
and arranging arms ship-
ments. It is agrim life.
"The brush strokes with
which clandestine life has
been painted, this aurola of
romanticism, do not corre-
spond to reality," says
Toms Borge Martinez, one
of the most hard-line and also
one of the most eloquent San-
dinista commanders, in the
course of a long conversation
in Managua. "In Nicaragua
... a man in the underground
lived in very inhospitable
places, in very poor houses,
suffering diarrhea, with all
you owned beside you.
A weeklong stay with El
Salvador's Popular Libera-
tion Forces guerrillas in the
heart of their operational
zone in Chalatenango Depart-
ment offered a close look at
the continuing hard-scrabble
life of rebels in the field. The
guerrillas lived on beans, salt
and corn tortillas. They slept
in hammocks, it they were
lucky enough to own one, and
bathed in rivers. Most were
covered with scars from innu-
merable fly, flea and mos-
quito bites. A rebel doctor
said that during his four
years working with rebel
combat units, he had been im-
mobilized several times with
chronic infections of intes-
tinal parasites. He said he
was 35, but he looked past 40,
and he knew it. "War ages
you," he said, running his
hand through prematurely
graying hair.
COnYillued
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
' '-_--_--'- ---'--__-- ?- ....,~ wor~ceu m uiC ~m~au uaaa~ ?
tact, I cut off that kind of
emotion."
A deep commitment to the
revolution is necessary to en-
dure such physical and emo-
tional hardships. The guerril-
las in Chalatenango spoke of
la mistica - a combination of
esprit, elan and absolute be-
lief that is their inspiration. It
is no easier to explain that
devotion than it is to analyze
other human commitments
based on faith.
Perhaps because their com-
mitment is reinforced by
years of struggle, few vet-
eran rebel commanders have
defected or voluntarily quit
the tight. A few have been
captured and then coerced or
convinced to give up the fight.
Several have been ousted or
have chosen to leave aher los-
ing power struggles, and
some of the bitterest critics of
their past comrades are from
this group. Many "retired"
guerrillas, now in civilian
life, refuse to discuss their
past for tear of compromising
their friends or aiding oppo-
nents of revolutionary
change, which they still sup-
port.
INTERNATIONAL
CONNECTIONS
Z ~ HEN REVOLU-
,`V~ lion in Central
America became
not just possible but probable
in the late 1970's, Fidel Castro
offered stepped-up assist-
ance, but he first demanded
that the rebel factions in
Nicaragua, E1 Salvador and
Guatemala put aside their
differences and become uni-
fied guerrilla movements. ~
This insistence led o the
forming of rebel fr)~mts in
these countries betWten 1979
and 1980.
A number of lef~st rebels,
however, c cite the Cubans
for being and for
their relu ce to back a
revolution ecisively until
they believ it stands a good
chance of case. They point
out that ubsns never of-
fered the 1 el of aid to the
Guatemal rebel movement
that they g e to the Salvado-
cans and thtSandinistas.
In Nicaragua, the Cubans
were willing to risk a major
when it became obvious that
a popular insurrection was
under way and the United
States would not intervene.
As the Sandinistas were
about to make their final push
on Managua, Mr. Herndndez
says he helped two Cuban
military advisers slip into
Nicaragua. Two other
Cubans stayed in Costa Rica
near the Nicaraguan border,
where, with the acquiescence
of Government officials, they
oversaw the unloading of
weapons flown in every night
from Cuba.
Several senior Sandinista
officials have admitted they
offered to help the Salvado-
ran rebels with their revolu-
tion soon after Anastasio
Somoza was ousted. Accord-
ing to a number of former
Sandinista guerrilla com-
manders, the Nicaraguans
were paying off a debt they
had incurred in 1978. At that
time, the Salvadorans had
managed to amass a remark-
able war chest estimated at
more than S80 million from
kidnappings, and they de-
cided to invest =10 million in
the Sandinista revolution.
The money was handed over
in Costa Rica, in cash.
After the Sandinistas came
to power, they allowed the
five rebel groups in the Salva-
doran guerrilla front to set up
their propaganda, communi-
cations, financial and logis-
tics offices in Managua. Men
who had worked for three
leading Sandinistas -Julio
I.bpez, chief of the Sandinista
Directorate of International
Relations; Bayardo Arce
Gaetano, then the head of the
political commission of the
National Directorate, and
Toms Borge - say that
these officials helped oversee
several arms shipments to
the Salvadorans. Mr. Borge
denies playing such a role.
(Several former Sandinistas
say that Mr. LGpez's director-
ate, which is modeled after
Cuba's Department of the
Americas, serves as the for-
eign ministry of the Sandin-
ista Front, charged with
maintaining ties to other
guerrilla groups. )
The Sandinistas offered
other assistance as well. Ac-
cording to two former Sandin-
istaofficials, aCentral Amer-
ican -who had previously
as a Cuban agent specialtzmg
in the workings of Congress
and the American press -
moved to Managua where he
carried out the same task for
the Sandinistas. He briefed at
least one high-level Salvado-
ran rebel delegation that was
sent to lobby in the United
States. "He told them how to
approach a particular Con-
gressman, what illusions to
appeal to, what his likes and
dislikes were," says one of
the former Sandinistas. "He
also advised them on how to
talk to the American press..,
There was also cooperation
closer to home. A Sandinista .
official who worked in the
Nicaraguan Embassy in Hon-
duras in the early 1980's says
he secretly met Salvadoran
rebels there to exchange in-
telligence about the Hondu-
ran and Salvadoran armies
and to arrange arms ship-
ments to El Salvador. The
Salvadorans, he says. bribed
Honduran Army officers to
let the weapons pass overland
to EI Salvador.
As El Salvador slid to the
edge of full-scale revolt, Cuba
became an important source
of weapons and advice. Ac-
cording to a number of for-
mer senior Salvadoran and
Sandinista officials, Cuba
helped arrange for the supply
of at least li0 percent of the
weapons that enabled the Sal-
vadoran guerrillas to equip
an army in record time.
American military officials,
who say they have checked
the serial numbers of cap-
tured rifles, report that many
are guns the United States
left behind in Vietnam.
Few of the arms shipments
to El Salvador by way of
Nicaragua have been inter-
cepted by Salvadoran or Hon-
duran troops. A former San-
dinista official who says he
helped arrange such ship-
ments describes one method
of eluding detection. Rebel
accomplices in Panama,
Costa Rica and Nicaragua
placed guns in sealed trucks
with a manifest describing
the cargo as industrial goods
bound for Mexico or Guate-
mala. When the truck crossed
into El Salvador, rebel units
there "hijacked" the cargo
by previous arrangement and
removed the hidden weapons.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
ripe for the "final offensive,"
recall two former Sandinista
officials, top Cuban officials
- including Fidel Castro and
Manuel Pineiro-took part in
strategy sessions with San-
dinista and Salvadoran com-
manders. The Cubans and
most of the Nicaraguans and
the Salvadoran rebel com-
mand believed that the San-
dinista-style insurrection
could be repeated in EI Salva-
dor, and that it was important
to act before Ronald Reagan
became President. Eden Pas-
tore G6mez, then the Sandin-
ista Deputy Minister of De-
fense,disagreed.
He argued that conditions
in El Salvador were very dif-
ferent from those in Nicara-
gua. In a manner that has
since been duplicated in the
Philippines, the Sandinistas
had led a largely middle-
class insurrectia? against a
family dictatorship. In El Sal-
vador, however, not only
were the guerrillas waging a
war against a military dicta-
torship and having to reckon
with a potent Salvadoran
Army, but they could not
count on the support of the
middle class. Mr. Pastore
predicted disaster. The offen-
sive was launched in January
1981. Mr. Pastors proved cor-
rect.
THE CARPIO
INCIDENT
HE COSTLY MIS-
T judgment increased
the resistance of some
key Salvadoran rebel leaders,
especially Salvador Cayetano
Carpio, to a heavy reliance on
the Cubans and Sandinistas.
According to a close aide, Mr.
Carpio set up his own con-
tacts with Vietnam, Algeria
and Libya. In 1981, during a
meeting in Havana, he re-
portedly told Fidel Castro to
go to hell because he felt the
Cuban leader was meddling
too much with Salvadoran af-
fairs.
Another rebel who resisted
Cuban and Sandinista influ-
ence was Dr. Fabio Castillo,
founder of the Central Amer-
ican Revolutionary Workers
Party faction. The most
prominent leftist in Salvado-
ran electoral politics, Dr.
Castillo had been a member
of the leftist junta that ruled
El Salvador in 1961 and had
run for president in 1966.
Frustrated by the ferocious
attacks on his party, he be-
came aguerrilla organizer in
1972. ' `The Cubans are arro-
gant," says Dr. Castillo, who
now lives in retirement in
Costa Rica. "Why should we
fight United States domina-
tion only to accept Cuban
domination?"
The growing dispute among
the Salvadoran guerrilla
commanders on the future
course of the revolution and
who should lead it ignited old
enmities within the Central
American left. The Salvado-
ran rebel movement was born
from a schism in the Commu-
nist Party in the late 1960's
over whether to follow Cuba's
example and begin an armed
rebellion. The Communists,
following the line laid down in
Moscow, called fora "peace-
ful transition to socialism."
The leader of the dissidents -
who believed that a revolu-
tion could be waged and won
in El Salvador -was Mr.
Carpio, who happened to be
the party's general secre-
tary.
In 1969, he resigned, excori-
ating his fellow party mem-
bets as "bourgeois reform-
ists." Within a decade, he ap-
peared to have proved his
point by surfacing as Coman-
dante Marcial, the leader of
the Marxist Popular Libera-
tion Forces and what was
becoming a broad-based
revolution. In late 1979, the
Communist Party belatedly
joined the revolt when it ap-
peared close to success, but
Mr. Carpio reportedly
treated his newest ally with
disdain.
Over the next few years,
the United States bolstered
the Salvadoran Army, in-
sisted on elections and called
for some reforms. Had it not
been for this intervention, the
guerrillas might well be run-
~ ning El Salvador toaay.
American pressure on the
Salvadoran Government not
only blunted the rebellion,
but, say several rebels,
caused Cuba and Nicaragua
to become concerned that the
Reagan Administration was
on the verge of retaliating
against them. They counseled
that it was time to consider a
negotiated end to the fighting.
resisted the counsel. In late
1982, at the age of age 62, Mr.
Carpio was the most re-
spected guerrilla leader in
Central America, a formida-
ble man who had been fight-
ing Salvadoran dictators for
40 years. Both he and Dr. Cas-
tillo suspected that the Salva-
doran Communist Party was
lobbying for negotiations. Mr.
Carpio's reaction, recalls a
senior rebel official, verged
on the irrational. His dislike
of Jorge Shafik Handal, the
Communist Party leader,
was intense.
But demand for greater
unity and negotiations found
wide support among most of
the Salvadoran rebel com-
manders. As the debate inten-
sified, Dr. Castillo was ousted
from the Central American
Workers Party. In January
1983, Cayetano Carpio was
stunned to find that the cen-
tral committee of his group
had agreed, almost unani-
mously, that his views had
also become obsolete. "The
truth is, Cayetano had the
concept of an orthodox Stalin-
istparty that he would lead,"
says Salvador Samayoa, a
senior official of Mr. Carpio's
faction who knew the aging
rebel leader well.
Mr. Carpio apparently be-
lieved his chief opponent was
Melida Montes, the second-
highest-ranking official in his
group. A 54-year-old former
schoolteacher with a keen
mind for politics, she had
come to support the demands
for new tactics. On April 6,
1983, she was found brutally
murdered in her safe house in
Managua, stabbed 83 times
with an ice pick by unknown
assailants. (Miss Montes had
just returned from a visit to
Cuba, en route to a party con-
gress in E1 Salvador and a
final showdown with Mr. Car-
pio.)
Mr. Pineiro flew from
Havana to help handle the
crisis. Mr. Carpio was, at the
time, in Libya, preparing to
cover his tracks fora clandes-
tine return to El Salvador. In-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403790035-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000403790035-4
formed of the killing, he also
flew to Managua, apparently
grieving, to join Nicaraguan
President Daniel Ortega
Saavedra and Toms Borge
in a final military salute as
the casket holding Miss Mon-
tes's body was lowered into
her grave.
But within days, convincing
evidence was found - ac-
cording to senior Sandinista
and Salvadoran rebel offi-
cials -showing that one of
Mr. Carpio's closest follow-
Prc, $agpjip Ra~ia~ Sided
by a handful of accomplices,
had committed the murder.
There was also evidence that
Mr. Carpio had either or-
dered Miss Montes's assassi-
nation, or had strongly sug-
gested it. Mr. Borge and sen-
ior Salvadoran rebels deny
that the Cubans played a key
role in the showdown that fol-
lowed. But they concede that
they ordered Mr. Carpio to
take an extended rest in
Cuba.
Mr. Carpio's aides say he
was also ordered to divulge
information on the independ-
ent support network he had
built for his rebel group. It
was too much for the fiercely
independent guerrilla leader.
"They said he should go to
Cuba to take a rest, but he
knew people had been jailed
in Cuba," says one of Mr.
Carpio's followers. "For us, ~
the independence of the revo-
lution was vital, vital. We
thought this was the triumph
of the Cuban-Communist
line." Rather than comply,
Mr. Carpio went home and
shot himself in the heart.
Mr. Carplo - a rebel leader
who was known as the "Ho
Chi Minh of Central Amer-
ica" - was summarily
buried inside a Sandinista
Army base. "I felt profoundly
moved at how this man with
such a striking revolutionary
history was being buried
practically in silence, in se-
cret, granted nothing more
than the tears of those closest
to him," says Mr. Burge, re- ~
callinrt his former friend.
Mr. Carpio's followers were
purged from the rebel move-
ment. Several were taken to
Cuba, where they were inter-
rogated by Cuban and Salva-
doran rebel officials. As
many as 300 guerrillas left
the movement. Most now lead
civilian lives in Mexico, Eu-
rope and Nicaragua. A few,
invoking Mr. Carpio's name,
have formed a small splinter
group that still operates in
San Salvador.
As his critics had predicted,
the removal of Mr. Carpio al-
lowed the rebels to rapidly
improve their military coor-
dination and to maul the Sal-
vadoran Army on the battle-
field. The guerrillas also
agreed on a comprehensive
peace proposal to end the
fighting, and began forging
closer political ties. They
even declared their intention
to form a single Marxist-
Leninistparty.
Those triumphs have now
faded in El Salvador. After
the United States invaded
Grenada in late 1983, the San-
dinistas asked most Salvado-
ran rebels to leave Managua.
These rebels have now been
allowed to return, but the
Sandinistas also outraged the
Salvadorans by temporarily
cutting arms supplies to
them, according to captured
rebel documents.
On the battlefield, the war
in El Salvador has become a
long test of endurance be-
tween the guerrillas and the
American-backed army.
A GUERRILLA'S
VOICE
L EONEL GONZALEZ,
who looks to be in his
40's, is a softspoken
guerrilla leader who chooses
his words with care. Like
Melida Montes, the murdered
Salvadoran rebel official
whom he supported, he is a
former schoolteacher, and,
he says, he was politicized by
the despair and poverty he
saw among the children he
taught. Mr. Gonzalez played
a key role in the discussions
that led to Mr. Carpio's down-
fall and is now supreme com-
mander of the ousted leader's
Group.
For the moment, Mr. Gon-
zalez's guerrilla unit is in a
Salvadoran peasant village
on the edge of guerrilla terri-
tory. It is a forbidding land -
harsh and rocky, the trees
and brush in various shades
of brown now that the rainy
season has ended. Resting
against a stone wall, an M-16
automatic rifle beside him
and surrounded by the cen-
tral committee of his guer-
rilla group -all seasoned
guerrilla commanders - Mr.
Gonzalez talks of the long war
that lies ahead.
"We will take advantage of ,
the discontent here," he says
quietly, "and offer the alter-
native of the F.M.L.N.,"
referring to the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation
Front. "The roots of this
crisis have not disap-
peared." ^
James LeMoyne is chief of The New York Times's bureau in
San Salvador.
L.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000403790035-4