CONTRAS DEBATE HOW TO WIDEN GROUP'S APPEAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790031-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: May 23, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790031-8
NEW YORK TIMES
23 May 1986
Contras Debate
How to Widen
Group's Appeal
By JAMES LaMOYNE
Special to The Now York Times
MIAMI, May 22 - Top Nicaraguan
rebel leaders are debating how to
broaden their political appeal in light of
a widespread perception that their
movement is dominated by those loyal
to the deposed dictator, Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, according to several
rebel and Congressional sources.
The issue, on which the rebels are
.deeply divided, is said to be a focus of
talks that began here a week ago. Also
under discussion at the talks, which are
sponsored by the Reagan Administra.
tion, is the question of how to insure
civilian control of guerrilla military
units, the sources said.
'Patently Misleading'
They said the debate among rebel of-
ficials had been spurred in part by the
perception that the main rebel army,
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force,
represents only the most politically
conservative sector of Nicaraguan
society and is dominated by former sol-
diers of Somoza's National Guard.
Apparently in an effort to enhance
the standing of the rebels, the State De-
partment recently made public a re-
port contending that most rebel offi-
cials are not former National Guards-
men, who are sometimes described by
critics as Somocistas for their ties to
the defeated dictatorship and their con-
servative political views. The report' was made public on Feb. 28.
"To continue to associate Nicara-
gua's resistance forces with Somoza is
patently misleading," Assistant Secre-
tary of State Elliott Abrams says in a
note that serves as the introduction to
the report.
But critics of the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Force, both inside and outside of
the rebel movement, disagree. They
say that the rebel army is still man-
aged by a small group of officials who
are far more politically conservative
than most Nicaraguans and that sev-
eral of these were either members of
the National Guard or had close ties
with the Somoza regime.
'The Style of Somoza'
"The problem is that the leaders of
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
seem to have a very narrow political
and ideological perception of what hap-
pened in Nicaragua," said Robert
Leiken, a senior associate of the Carne-
gie Endowment for International
Peace who monitors the rebel move-
ment and who is a critic of the rebel ar-
my's leaders. "They are concerned
with recovering the land and property
they lost. The politics they practice is
the style of Somoza relying on
cliques rather than institutions."
Such concerns have divided the three
leaders of the United Nicaraguan Op-
position, which was set up 11 months
ago in an effort to broaden the appeal of
the rebel movement and as a conduit
for United States aid. Two of the lead-
ers, Arturo Jose Cruz and Alfonso
Robelo, are demanding greater civil-
ian control of the rebel army. They are
reportedly being resisted by the third.
According to the report, the 41 for-
mer National Guardsmen in the rebel
command structure hold most of the
key positions. The five most important
military officials - the supreme com-
mander, Col. Enrique Bermudez, and
the heads of operations, logistics, intel-
ligence and personnel - were all for-
mer members of the National Guard
until six months ago when, the report
says, one was replaced by a nonmem.
ber, a shift that could not be confirmed.
In addition, the report says, the
heads of counterintelligence, air intelli-
gence, the rebel air force, medical
service and naval force are also former
National Guardsmen.
Directorate Lacks Power
Many lower-level combat command-
ers and service personnel are not for-
mer National Guardsmen, according to
the report, and a few senior combat
commanders are either former Sandin-
ista supporters or civilians.
But most of the officers commanding
the largest and most important rebel
head of the Nicaraguan Democratic' units are former National Guardsmen,
Force. according to the report, which in its
In an interview, Mr. Calero dis- analysis treats all commanders as
missed criticisms of the rebel army statistical equals, regardless of the
leadership as "political accusations." power they exercise.
In its report, which was made public Although the rebel army has a C.I.A.-
on Feb. 28, the State Department says selected civilian rectorate that that only 41 of 153 senior officials in the has rem n powerless, actor n o
Nicaraguan Democratic Force are for- i several rebel an merican o c a s
mer members of the N ti 1 G
a
d
ona war
.
The rest are civilians or former San-
dinistas, it contends, adding that the
vast majority of rebel foot soldiers are
peasants angered with the Sandinistas.
The report also contends that the rebel
forces are growing and now total about
20,000 men.
Report Called Misleading
Several rebel sources, as well as Con-
gressional critics of the rebel move-
ment, charge that the State Depart-
ment report is highly misleading. They
say that by focusing on statistics it fails
to examine or reveal the way power is
actually exercised in the rebel army.
The report also neglects to say that the
rebel army was formed from the rem-
nants of the National Guard by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, which then
helped select the top leaders.
'They can use the numbers to prove
whatever they want," said a rebel offi-
cial critical of Mr. Calero. "But the
fact is that a handful of people around
Calero make most of the decisions and
the top commanders are National
Guardsmeh."
That view is supported by several
visits to rebel camps by reporters over
the last three years and by a careful
reading of the State Department study.
Instea Mr. Calero rules through a
handful of followers, most of whom are
related to him, the same sources said.
The ke rou includes Mr. Calero's
brot er Mario a eror. a era's
brot er- n- aw, Enrique nc ez a
r. nc ez s roer st es An.
c ez as we as o one ermu ez.
ese area v ew as extreme ti-
ca conservatives n e caratttian
leaders by the C.I.A., which financed
them.
Brothers' Role Barely Noted
Mr. Calero. the former manager of
the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Nicara-
gua, was a ongtime conservative oppo-
nent OTtne somoza W,Rffrhe
alsomaintain close ties tote C.I.A.
in icara ua for severa years an op-
posW tTie an nistas rom the outset,
ar in em asMaarxists, acco ng
UL-several re _ an ongressional
sources.
The SAnchez brothers, Enrique and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790031-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790031-8
Aristides, were large landowners who
were among the most committed back-
ers of the Somoza dictatorship. The
State Department report barely men-
tions them or their dominant influence
on the army as aides to Mr. Calero.
Colonel Bermudez served as military
attache in Walsh in ton under General
Somoza. He too As close C.. jigs,
accordin tottrebel officials and is an
extreme o ica conservattve.
Colonel Bermudez re to on another
.National Guard officer, Ricardo Lau,
to set up counterintelligence operations
that Honduran officials say used death
squads to kill dozens of people sus-
pected of being leftists in Honduras.
Mr. Lau, who was one of the most
feared men in Honduras, was forced by
American officials to leave the rebels a
year and a half ago, but Colonel
Bermudez continues to defend him.
- While it is true that the rebel army is
mostly made up of peasants with real
'grievances against the Sandinistas, the
A leading Nicaraguan banker, he went to
Georgetown University and worked for the Inter-
American DevelopmentBenk in Washington ...
He supported the Sandinista revolution and was
a major force in persuading the middle class and
foreign countries to bads It also ... From 1980
to 1981, a member of the governing Sandinista
junta ... From June to December 1981,
Nicaraguan Ambassador to Washington; he resigned to protest
Sandinista policies. . . A presidential candidate in 1984 elections in
Nicaragua but in the end refused to run, charging that the election was
flawed ... Joined UNO and became a rebel political leader in 1985.. .
Now viewed as the most politically moderate rebel leader in the group
... He is willing to negotiate a political settlement with the Sandinistas
and believes the revolution has brought some good to the Nicaraguan
people.
Ado fo Calera Portocarrero
Graduated from Notre Dame University ... A
member of the old Conservative Party in
Nicaragua that opposed the Somoza
Government ... He was manager of the Coca-
Cola bottling plant in Nicaragua and at the time
of the 1978-79 Sandinista revolution was jailed
for leading a strike of businessmen against the
Somoza regime ... At the same time, he
opposed the Sandinistas because he considered them Marxists ...
According to several rebel and American sources, he maintained close
contact with the Central Intelligence Agency for several years ...
When the C.I.A. selected a new civilian leadership for the guerrillas
based in Honduras in 1982, he left Nicaragua and became political
head of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force rebel army ... He continues
to hold that position while serving as one of the three co-leaders of
UNO ... Viewed as a political hard-liner who believes the Sandinistas
must be overthrown militarily.
AHonso Robelo Cajll.JJas
A highly successful Nicaraguan businessman
who founded the Nicaraguan Democratic
Movement, a political party made up of moderate
businessmen opposed to the Somoza
dictatorship ... He supported the Sandinista
revolution and served on the first Sandinista
junta, but resigned in 1980, charging that the
Sandinistas were Marxists and that Cuban
influence in Nicaragua was growing ... In 1982 he went into exile in
Costa Rica where he joined forces with the rebel leader Eden Pastora
Gomez and helped manage C.I.A. support for him ... He later split with
Mr. Pastore and in 1985 joined UNO.
pace with which it has grown is disput-
ed. American officials in Central
America estimate that, rather than the
17,000 to 20,000 that the State Depart-
ment report contends it has, the Nica-
raguan Democratic Force has no more
than 12,000 armed men and probably
fewer than 10,000.
But even its critics say they believe it
could recruit numelous volunteers to
fight the Sandinistas if it were able to
broaden its political appeal and re-
ceived adequate American financing.
Followers of Mr. Cruz and Mr.
Robelo say that it is not possible to
radically change the rebel military
command in the middle of a war.
A senior American official said Mr.
Robelo and Mr. Cruz would have to
show that they are willing to spend
time with the rebel army and take the
risks that Mr. Calero and his followers
have taken in forging the only rebel
fighting force that has proved willing to
challenge the Sandinistas.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790031-8