U.S. BUGGED EGYPT GOV'T

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403720047-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: October 12, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403720047-8
VgRTi~ E~~'A'tED
GN ?AGE
'UNTOLD STORY
OF SKYNAP COUP
tiEW YORK POST
12 October 1985
~VASI'~1GTON --
President Reagaa'a~~
dramatic decison to in-
tercept the sea~acicers
of the Achille Lauro
Was based on super-so?
~histicated electronic
spying on the Egyptian
,government.
While President Hosni
ldolabarak was telling the
wtorld that the four
~e-leatinian terrorists al-
.~sady had flown out of
Cairo, U.3. officials knew
:Qxactly where they were.
In a massive eavesdrop-
ping operation. the U.S. in-
tercepted almost all tele-
phone calls and radio mes-
sages made by key Egyp-
tian ofilcials concerning the
terrorists.
The extent of the spying -
aad of earlier U.S. plans to
lead a rescue raid on the hi-
jacked liner - emerged
today amid details of how
the U.S responded to the
terrorist challenge.
U.B. authorities gave this
account'
Reagan approved the gen-
4s'al outlines of the plan to
capttu'e the pirates mo-
ments before he delivered a
speech Thursday to em-
ployes of a Bars Lee bakery
in Chicago.
The President acted after Na?
tinnier ~~?r+ty Adviser Robert
I~~ I ave him "hard intel?
li t tg attonal
Security Agencv and sraeli intel?
Ilg nee. that t e gv~tian govern-
was tr in to smu a the
four a est ratan terrorts ou o
the countrv.
On the basis of intercepted tele-
phone converaationa, the U.S. and
Israelis concluded that Egypt
planned to transport the Palestin?
ions tmm a naval base near Port
Said. Egypt, to an airtleki near
Cairo - possibly for a Nght to Al?
g'~~
Some lntelli once
ca a at the 1 a i~r.
v w ive that
tee one conversati ns involv_inj
"Between NSA and the Israelis,
the ent re area was w r a
ran in n e enc oiflc~al
gat
~ don't think there was a per'
son involved in this who could
have sneezed without us knowing
about it," he acid.
The information way being
relayed through a giant U.S. ils-
tening post operated by the ultra
secret NSA in Cyprus as well as
through Navy EC?2 spy planes
which wen dispatched later to
monitor air traffic and radio
transmisatons.
The intelligence picked up _ by
r]dP~ F+T._er_ yacuLr~f clennars
w orate that at 4:00 .m.,
w was returntng_to the
White Howe a oard Air Force
ne c ar ane was a e to give
ea an mtnu es advance
wa ra t a t o tiara p ane
was t n o .
t~me, Reagan gave the
green Ilght for the operation to
begin.
"Go ahead. Let's execute." Rea?
can told McFarlane.
''Let's make sure we stay nn top -
of it."
The President's decision capped
a series o[ steps that began
shortly after the 23,000-ton Italian
cruise liner Achille Lauro was hi,-
iacked Monday in Port Said.
Earl in the crisis sources said
an n erase asset
u ., m~ u of re resentatyes
rpm e e o rat chiefs of
st a at ono ecurtt un- _
c an e a e a ea a by
deputy l~at onal ecurity~Adviser
~ m. o n o n, ex er.
e rst p are of'Efie U.S. strat-
egy was to insure that no country in
the Mediterranian let the ship call
on Its shorn - a move which kept
the hijcckers from getting rein'
torcementa, splitting up the hos-
tages or receiving additional food.
fuel and ammuruuon supplies
The U.S. also made clear to all
nations involved that there would
be "no consideration." whatsover
to any nation pressuring Israel to
release fi0 Palestinian prisoners
as demanded by the Palestinian
Liberation Front terrorists who
had seized the liner.
The first phase was a success.
After strong warnings from Rea-
gan. Syrian President Hatez
Asaad refwed to allow the Palea?
tinians to bring the Achille Lauro
into Syrian waters.
The ship -and the highjackers
-were isolated.
Wednesday night, in the second
phase, an elite U.S. commando
team made up of units from the
DELTA force and Navy SEALs
flown in from the U.S., was pre'
pared to join Italian "[,eacher-
heads" and British SAS comman?
dos in the rescue operation.
The plan was to strike at night
from special aubmariwere eboacd
copiers that already
warships that had been stalking
the Achille Lauro.
Hours before the operationt ~
to have been launched, Egyp
Italian and PLO negotiators
struck a deal with the hijackers -
guranteeing them safe passage
nut of EQVDt in return for the sur-
render of the ship.
U.S. officials say it still is un?
clear whether the Egyptian gov?
ernment knew about the murder
of wheelchair-bound New Yorker
Leon KlinQhoffer.
After his death was confirmed.
?5e Egyptians rejected strong
~J 3. protests about safe passage
:cr the hijackers.
According to sources close to the
negotiations. ~tubarak - in meet'
fogs ?~?ith tough talking U.S. Am?
bassador ,Nicholas Veliotes - in?
listed repeatedly that "he had
given his word," and could not re?
nege on his deal without ruining
his standing in the Arab world.
Late Wednesda ni ht Reagan
.;rdere . intelligence a?encies
to track the movements of the hi?
L3ckers because it had _become
~?lcar that "the Egyptians were
Iyin? to us." a source sold,.
Thursday, the President was in
Chicago, delievering the final
speech of his "fall offensive," on
tax reform.
It was nbout noon when ytcFar-
lane informed him, in a holding
room, that the Egyptians planned
to smuggle the four Palestinians
out of the country.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403720047-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403720047-8
Mf.. +4
With White House Chief of Staff
Donald Regan, a White Howe
military aide and Secret Service
agents present, McFarlane gave
Reagan the recommendations of
Poindexter's workforce.
"The community of advisers
proposed ...whether we might
? consider whether we might not be
able. if as reports indicated, this
aircra[t left, to divert !t," McFar?
lane said.
"The proposal or that concept, if
you wil4 was considered by the
President at the [ii'st stop and. to-
gether with the rules of engage-
ment that would apply if he were to
approve such a concept." he said.
He provided one or two ele-
ments of guldence on the concept
and on the rules and approved
them in principle and then.
through the day, he was kept ad?
vised on what we were hearing
about the possiblities of move-
ment of the slrcraft."
As soon as Reagan gave instal ap?
proval. the Pentagon was notified
ands :nessags wu relayed to the
commander of the aircraft carrier
USS Saratoga, which had been in
the Agean Sea near Albania.
Re an gave the final order at 4
p.m. Irom Air Force One after
word was relayed to McFarlane
that the Egyptain 737 was about
to take oft.
Immediately, four F-14s and
support aircraft were scrambled
and flew to a point south of Crete
where they waited for the Egyp-
tian plane. The interception took
place at about 5:30 p.m.
McFaralne, describing Reagan's
demeanor during the crisis, said:
"The president's mood through-
out was one of wanting as full a
set of facts as he could have, ask?
ing very sensible questions about
risks, possible gains, about the
possible attitudes of and assist-
ance to be offered by other coun?
tries as well as the what-its, if the
expected scenerio did'nt play out;
and a very prudent regard for
these risks."
"As he was bHe[ed, he obviously
was very interested in staying
very much informed in a very
timely way and asked often.
'Where does it stand now.' "
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403720047-8 _