MOZAMBIQUE:THE ISSUES FOR US POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403150002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 31, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403150002-0
ARTICLC
ON PAGE r ._
CHRISTAIN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 October 1985
Moeambiqm: the issves for US policy
By Robert S. Jaster
THE recent White House meeting between Presi-
dent Reagan and Mozambican President Machel
points up a dilemma for US policy that transcends
the immediate issue of Mozambique. Are there circum-
stances in which the United States should support a
Marxist regime? Or should it always support the oppo-
nents of such a regime, whoever they are?
The Reagan policy is to encourage Mr. Machel to
lessen Mozambique's dependence on the communist bloc
and to move his country toward the West. Critics say the
US has no business supporting an avowedly Marxist re-
gime that has a history of close political, economic, and
military aid links to the Soviet Union. Which view better
reflects the political realities in Mozambique? What is the
current situation there?
In the past couple of years the Machel government,
disillusioned with the results of prior efforts to link Mo-
zambique to the communist states, and with the abject
failure of socialist economic policies at home, has turned
back toward Africa and the Western democracies. It has
joined the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank. It is playing a major role in a long-range regional-
development program which is backed by the West but
shunned by the communist states.
Internally Mozambique is breaking up its East-bloc-
managed state farms and parceling them out to private
farmers. A new investment code seeks to attract Western
capital. Mozambique's 1984 mutual-security accord with
South Africa led to commercial and economic agree-
ments that will further link the two economies and bring
in substantial private capital. _
In other ways, too, Machel has shown growing inde-
pendence of the USSR. He has sought Western military
instructors for the Army, and has called oil neighboring
Zimbabwe for troops to guard Mozambique's far-flung
transport lines from guerrilla attack. The USSR opposed
Machel's non-aggression pact with Pretoria. So, appar-
ently, did three hard-line Marxist Cabinet members who
were dismissed after the accord. And despite the Soviet
boycott of the 1984 Olympics - a boycott in which the
communist states joined - Mozambique fielded a team
of athletes at Los Angeles.
Mozambique, like Yugoslavia, Algeria, and other
states that were once close to Moscow but no longer are,
is charting its own independent course. The regime's
The Machel government, disillusioned with
efforts to link Mozambique to the
communist states, and with the failure of
socialist policies, has turned back toward
Africa and the Western democracies.
steps to move away from the Soviet camp, and to in-
crease economic, political, and security ties to the West,
are clearly in the interests of the US.
What abut Machel's foes, the Mozambican National
Resistance (MNR, or Renamo)? First of all, it is not a le-
gitimate national movement. Renamo has no political
base or deep roots among the people. It has yet to offer a
coherent political program. In fact the MNR was created
by the Rhodesian in cece service in 1976 from a
Rroun o ozam scan re lore vex arjps
from the Portuguese colonial forces, who had fled Ma-
zambiaue as the Portuggu pulled out Armed and
trained by the Rhodes Ana the MN
zR Wa sent into
ambi ue to
~" a "N esia from Mozambican camps
When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, nam 's
forces fled to u ?Mc-a. There the came under a new
paynmn aster rate of me nce,
w @E3EEE an su eir activities un at
least the s rip of 1984, when qqpflk Africa an ozam-
bi ue s a mutu non- sion a n
however, South Africa acknow at it has contin-
ued to assist the MNR, in violation of that accord.
MNR saboteurs and guerrilla groups operate in every
province of Mozambique. Until the government's recent
military successes, Renamo had virtually isolated the
capital from the rest of the country. Yet the regime has
survived not only the MNR's depredations, but several
years of disastrous drought and economic mismanage-
ment. The MNR appears no closer to toppling the gov-
ernment now than it was a few years ago.
For the US the options seem clear. It can join South
Africa in arming and financing the MNR "contras,"
thereby aborting Machel's moves toward the West,
assuring the USSR of growing influence and involving
the US with a group that has no claim to legitimacy in
Mozambique. A second option is to do nothing, leaving
the field open to heavy-handed competition between the
Russians and South Africans. Or the US can continue to
encourage Machel's recent efforts to link Mozambique
more closely to the Western community of nations.
Robert S. Jaster, African politics writer for
London's International Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies, is author of a book on Namibia published by
Harvard's Center for International Affairs and IISS.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403150002-0