PITFALLS IN AIDING THE ANGOLAN REBELS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403150001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403150001-1
ARTICLE APPEA":]
ON EA
WALL STREET JOURNAL
11 December 1985
Pitfalls in Aiding the Angolan Rebels
Covert aid to Jonas Savimbi's Unita,
the durable insurgent movement in An-
gola. is likely to be approved by the Rea-
gan administration. However, actual dis-
bursement of the aid probably will be de-
layed until January, in hope that talks with
the Marxist regime ruling Angola lead to
an agreement on the withdrawal of about
35,000 Cuban troops stationed there. Such a
delay is welcome, in that it will provide
more time for Washington to ponder ex-
actly what its goals are in Angola and how
best to achieve them.
Mr. Savimbi is an astute and competent
Africa
by Robert Jaster
guerrilla leader. For almost 20 years he
has kept Unita intact, fighting first against
the Portuguese colonial forces and since
1975 against the Marxist government. Mr.
Savimbi also has attracted a great deal of
foreign support, and not only from South
Africa, which provides direct support for
his guerrillas, but from such diverse
sources as China, Morocco and Zaire.
Should the U.S. also get involved?
'the last CIA intervention in Angola's
affairs, in 1975, was a disaster. With no
clear objective, and with little understand-
in of Angolan politics or of the ou
com peting for wer, t the U.S. stumbled
into the midst of a civil war for which it
was woefully un re ar Has anything
been learned since then? Are the political
and military realities understood? Is there
now a clear and attainable objective?
If the goal is to see Mr. Savimbi in-
stalled in power in the capital of Luanda; a
massive and long-term U.S. military com-
mitment would be required, and even that
would not be enough to ensure success. An-
gola is larger than the entire U.S. eastern
seaboard from Maine to Florida and
roughly four times the size of Vietnam. It
has few roads or railways. Cut by deep
river gorges, Angola's mountains are ideal
guerrilla terrain. Unita could survive there
indefinitely, even without external assis.
tance. But an offensive to take the capital,
about 700 miles from Mr. Savimbi's strong-
hold in Angola's southeast corner, is an-
other matter. Mr. Savimbi himself no
longer talks of taking Luanda. Indeed, re-
cent government counterattacks almost
reached his headquarters at Jamba. Only
a series of heavy strikes by the South Afri-
can Air Force turned back the offensive.
If the U.S. objective is to bring about
the departure of the Cuban combat troops,
who serve as the government's major de-
fense against attacks by Unita, logistical
aid to Mr. Savimbi would be counterpro-
ductive. Unita's impressive guerrilla capa-
bilities have enabled it to deny the govern-
ment control over the economically impor-
tant central plateau, and to stage hit-and-
run raids throughout most of Angola. The
threat posed by Unita is made far more
serious by South Africa's demonstrated
willingness to intervene militarily on Mr.
Savimbi's behalf. Since withdrawing last
April from Angola's southern border area,
South African forces have returned on sev-
eral occasions, either to attack the Nami-
bian guerrilla movement Swapo's staging
areas in Angola or to assist Unita. As long
as Angola feels threatened by Unita's guer-
rilla activities or by attack from South Af-
rica, it will not agree to a Cuban with-
drawal. The greater the threat posed by
Unita, the greater will be the government's
dependence on Cuban troops and Soviet-
supplied weapons to remain in power.
The independence of the Angolan gov-
ernment is a subject of dispute, but it is
likely the Angolans want to be rid of the
Cuban combat brigade, whose mainte-
nance costs absorb the bulk of the coun-
try's oil revenues. In earlier triangular
talks with the U.S. and South Africa, the
Angolans offered a phased Cuban with-
drawal, subject to South African pledges to
implement the long-stalled United Nations
settlement plan for Namibia. and to firm
safeguards against South African attacks.
Thus Angola tacitly accepted the U.S.-pro-
posed linkage of a Cuban withdrawal to a
settlement of the Namibian problem.
Recent events, however, have hardened
the Angolan and South African positions,
and brought a suspension of serious talks.
South Africa's internal troubles and its de-
teriorating relations with the U.S. virtually
rule out any near-term South African con-
cessions on Namibia. The Angolans, too,
have taken a hard line, in part because
they believe the current unrest in South Af-
rica will weaken Pretoria's bargaining po-
sition. Congressional repeal of the Clark
amendment, which banned U.S. aid to An-
golan guerrillas, further cooled Angola's
interest in resuming the talks.
Yet there is no real alternative to nego-
tiations. It is highly unlikely that the Ango-
lans can be forced to send the Cubans
home, or the South Africans to leave Nami-
bia. Nor can Unita or Swapo, both of which
are legitimate national movements, ulti-
mately be denied a political role in their
respective countries. Only a broad regional
settlement involving South Africa, Angola,
Swapo and Unita will lead to a resolution
of these issues. Since there are no regional
institutions through which these parties
might be brought together, outside media-
tion will be required. In South Africa and
other African countries the U.S. is widely
regarded as the only choice to take on this
task. Therefore, when the opposing sides
are ready to resume talks, as in time they
must, the U.S. must be prepared to play a
leading role. It cannot do this if it has be-
come a party to the conflict.
Mr. Jaster is a fellow at London's In-
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies,
where he writes on African security mat-
ters. His book on Namibia was recently
published by Harvard University Press.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403150001-1