FAHD & REAGAN: AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040020-2
WALL STREET JOURNAL
11 February 1985
INTERNATIONAL
Fahd & Reagan: An Enduring Relationship
By DAVID IGNATIUS
Stc ff Rc;,orter of THE WALL STREET JOt'RNAL
1'1'ASHINGTO1\-The two men are as
different as the countries they represent: a
cautious Bedouin monarch from the Ara-
bian desert and a self-assured ex-movie ac-
tor from California. Yet their meeting
today at the White House illustrates the
surprising durability of the U.S.-Saudi rela-
u reship.
King Fahd, echoing the theme of a gen-
eration of Saudi leaders, will urge Presi-
dent Reagan to solve the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. He'll emphasize that Mr. Reagan-as
a strong, second-term president-has a
special oplcrtunity to fashion a lasting
Mideast settlement. But the Saudi mon-
arch won't be surprised when Mr. Reagan
repeats the outlines of the current, low-key
American Mideast policy.
The most important fact about the Fahd
visit is that it doesn't involve a crisis. The
Mideast situation is relatively calm these
days, at least compared with the turmoil of
the past several years, and both sides are
cautioning that today's meeting won't pro-
duce any startling announcements about
oil, the Palestinian problem. arms sales, or
the other issues that have troubled the two
countries in the past.
Maturing Relationship
The modest expectations suggest that
the U.S.-Saudi relationship-after years of
extravagant hopes and bitter disappoint-
ments for Washington and Riyadh-is ma-
turing slowly toward something more sta-
ble. "We have a whole lot of interests in
common," says a State Department offi-
cial. "We know it and they know it."
The U.S.-Saudi relationship has been
marked by frustrations. The Saudis have
long hoped that the U.S. would pressure Is-
rael, and impose a settlement of the Pales-
tinian problem; the Americans have ex-
pected the Saudis to use their financial le-
verage to pressure Syria to play a more
moderate role in the Mideast. The failure
of both gambits illustrates the limits of
checkbook diplomacy.
Each nation has often felt mistreated
and ill-used by the other. Americans won-
dered during the 1970s why the Saudis, if
they were so friendly, often sided publicly
w^th the radical Arabs on oil issues and
Mideast tiplomacy. The Saudis, in turn,
wondered why the Americans weren't
more appreciative of their quiet efforts to
rest ain oil prices and Palestinian ter-
rorism.
There have often been maddening dif-
ferences in style. The Saudis tend to be
oblique, indirect, eager to avoid direct alli-
ances or confrontations. The Americans
King Fahd and President Reagan
like things clear, open, spelled out in w: it-
ing. A State Department official tells a
story that illustrates the cultural conflict.
Several years ago. the story goes, the
American ambassador in Riyadh was in-
structed to obtain a precise answer from
King Fahd about an energy issue. In two
meetings, the king offered a polite but non-
commital response. When the ambassador
pressed the question a third time, the king
finally gave a definite answer, but eight
months elapsed before he granted the am-
bassador another appointment.
Through all the Mideast turmoil and
frustrations of the past decade, there has
been a-surprising continuity in the U.S.
Saudi relationship. One important reason,
says U.S. officials, is King Falid's role in
sustaining a pro-American policy.
American officials recall his first offi-
cial visit to the U.S. in 1974, when he nego-
tiated the basic framework of the U.S.-
Saudi security relationship with then-Sec-
retary of State Henry Kissinger and other
American officials. During one sensitive
meeting, he agreed to work with the U.S.
to help friendly groups in the Islamic
world-an understanding that has since
meant covert Saudi funding for pro-West-
ern forces in Somalia, Oman, Afghanistan
and elsewhere.
In 1977, then-Crown Prince Fahd visited
Washington for meetings with President
Carter. John West, at the time American
ambassador to Riyadh, recalls that in an
effort to establish a personal bond with the
Saudi leader, President Carter took him
upstairs to meet his daughter, Amy, asking
her: "Do you want to be hugged by a Saudi
prince?" She apparently did and the 1977
visit was a big success.
The Saudis tried hard during the oil-
crisis years to be friendly toward an Amer-
ica they didn't always understand. Dir.
West recalls that in 1979, when oil prices
were skyrocketing, Crown Prince Fahd
waited until July 4 to announce that the
Saudis would boost oil production to maxi-
mum capacity-a special Independence
Day present for the U.S.
The Reagan administration has been
trying to arrange a Fahd visit to the U.S.
for four years. Dir. Reagan met briefly
with the Saudi leader in Cancun, Mexico,
during the October 1951 North-South eco-
nomic summit. But the scheduling prob-
lems of arranging a U.S. visit illustrate the
difficulty of dealing with the skittish
Saudis.
Plans for a September 1991 visit were
canceled because of the Senate debate
over the sale of AWACS radar-surxeillance
planes to the Saudis: a proposal or a sum-
mer 1982 visit was dropped o owing N e
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The same on-
again, off-again pattern continued in re-
cent months until this week's visit was fi-
nally set.
Credit for finally arranging King Fahd's
trip goes to the Saudi ambassador to Wash-
ington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who has
lobbied nearly as hard for the U.S. in
Riyadh as he has for the Saudis in Wash-
ington. Prince Bandar, a former air force
pilot and son of the Saudi defense minister,
believes the U.S.-Saudi military relation-
ship is crucial for Saudi security. Prince
Bandar seems to have the king's ear; by
one account he talks with the Saudi mon-
arch two or three times a day.
What Saudis Want
King Fahd wants to influence American
po.icv during his trip,. He wants a stronger
American role in the peace process. a U.S.
Commitment tale p prevent a sudden fall
in oil prices. z tighter embargo on Western
arms shipments to Iran. more U.S. covert
fyndinc for the Afghanistan rebels. and
eyentually daliverv of 40 additional F-15
fishters for the_ Saud: air force.
But while the Saudis still look to the
U.S. as a friend and a superpower, they
may be losing some of their illusions about
the ability of any American administration
to make dramatic changes in the Mideast
or anywhere else. King Fahd noted last
week how modern realism can undermine
romantic illusions, when he discussed with
a group of visiting Americans the possibil-
ity that a Saudi astronaut might travel on
the U.S. space shuttle.
The Saudi monarch remarked that, in
the era of space travel, it has become awk-
ward to use an old Arab proverb that the
face of a beautiful woman is like the
moon.
,Now that we can travel to the moon,
we can see that it has crevices," he ob-
served.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040020-2