A CLEAR PLAN TO HANDLE TERRORISM STILL ELUDES DIVIDED REAGAN CAMP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 20, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040019-4
*R?IGLE APPEARED
IN
Policy Vacuum
A Clear Plan to Handle
Terrorism Still Eludes
Divided Reagan Camp
Some Doubt Value of Force;
Priority of Saving Lives
Leaves U.S. Few Options
Successes Go Unpublicized
By DAVID IGNATIUS
Staff Repo rter of 'Fur WALL STRACUT JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-Ronald Reagan. for all
his tough talk, has failed to develop a co-
herent anti-terrorism policy.
The impotence of the U.S. policy has
been dramatically demonstrated by the hi-
jacking of TWA Flight 847. The seeming in-
ability to develop a long-run strategy for
dealing with such terrorism largely re-
flects the intractable nature of the ter-
rorism problem itself, which is as frustrat-
ing for Mr. Reagan as it was for Jimmy
Carter. But some experts say it also stems
from such mundane troubles as bickering
among cabinet officers, foot-dragging by
.
bureaucrats who are skeptical of anti-ter-, the current crisis. But administration offi-
rorism efforts, and gung-ho schemes that
have backfired.
For example. the Pentagon has been
consistently skeptical about retaliation and
delayed for months developing what one
official calls a "menu of targets." That list
is finally available, but it is of limited use
because it emphasizes targets in Iran. The
U.S. assumed that the next terrorist act
would come from the same Iranian-backed
group that was responsible for earlier ter-
rorist attacks against the U.S. But the hi-
jackers of Flight 847, it appears, aren't
part of that pro-Iranian faction.
Terrorism experts criticize the wide
gap between the administration's rhetoric
and action. But "I don't think anybody has
discovered an anti-terrorism policy that
works," says former Undersecretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger. "The Is-
raelis haven't. We haven't. We are all fac-
ing a new kind of warfare and we don't
know how to deal with it."
Different Strain
One problem is that the terrorists of the
1980s are different from those of the 1970s,
some experts say. The gunmen now are
mostly Shiite Moslems, rather than Pales-
tinians. And the techniques used against
WALL STREET JOURNAL
20 June 1985
Palestinian terrorism a decade a to-such
as inte i ence penetration of their o ra-
tions and harsh retaliation against e11r-
petrators-may not work against e
terrorism, officials say they proba-
bly lost any chance for a quick rescue mis-
sion to free the Flight 847 hostages after
the first 48 hours. Such a move was dis-
cussed but was ruled out because of techni-
cal problems. There is a continuing debate
within the administration, however, over
whether the U.S. should apply force if the
crisis drags on.
"The U.S. could mount a raid of sub-
stantial size-because that's what it would
take-and go into Beirut after the Amal
leadership and the people who perpetrated
this," says one senior administration offi-
cial involved in managing the crisis.
Few Options
But President Reagan seems deter-
mined to seek a peaceful resolution of the
crisis that saves the hostages' lives. "I
could get mad enough now to think of a
couple of things we could do to retaliate,
but I would probably be sentencing a num-
ber of Americans to death if I did it," Mr.
Reagan said at his news conference Tues-
day night.
Richard Helms a former ambassador
Iran and former (;1A director. applauds
Mr. Reagan for showing restraint in an ex-
asperating situation. He explains: "The
President. at this stave, has no useful mili-
tary options-in fact. few options of any
cials agree that as long as saving hostage
lives is the top priority, the U.S. will have
limited options in handling terrorist inci-
dents. A tougher policy would require the
U.S. to subordinate the welfare of the hos-
tages to broader national concerns-a
painful step for any U.S. president.
Yet "these aren't attacks just against
the victims, they are attacks against the
U.S. and its interests," argues a senior
official who advocates a tougher line.
New Concern
What worries some U.S. officials most
at the moment is the possibility that the
pro-Iranian "Islamic Jihad" faction, which
wasn't part of the initial hijacking, has
taken control of some of the prisoners and
will use them to bargain for the release of
17 of its members held in Kuwait. Officials
fear that this group may hold the three
TWA crew members still on board and
seven people with "Jewish-sounding
names" who were removed from the
plane, plus seven Americans kidnapped
earlier in Beirut. The fear is that Islamic
Jihad might seek to trade these 17 Ameri-
cans for the Shiite prisoners in Kuwait and
might kill them if any of the Kuwaiti pris-
oners are executed.
Mr
Reagan may yet find a solution to
Quarrels within the administration have
hindered development of a coherent anti-
terrorism strategy. The reaction to the Oc-
tober 1983 bombing of Marine headquar-
ters in Beirut, for example, was a case
study in bickering and indecision.
Shortly after the bombing, U.S. intelli-
gence identified a terrorist target in Leba-
non's a taa VaElley. sere was a top evel
debate on Now.983, two weeks after the
bombing, about whether to attack the tar-
get. But President Reagan was leaving
that day on a trip to Korea, so officials de-
cided to postpone a decision until he re-
turned a week later.
When he got back, disagreements be-
tween the State Department and the Penta-
gon over the operation continued, and the
U.S. at the last minute backed out of plans
for a joint reprisal raid with France. The
French went ahead on their own on Nov.
17. There never has been any American re-
taliation for the bomb that killed 241 Amer-
ican Marines.
Some of the administration's problems
involve the technical difficulties of operat-
ing so far from home. For example, the
U.S. couldn't move its special "Delta
Force" commando unit to the Middle East
quickly enough last Friday to strike in the
first few hours of the hijacking, when a
rescue mission would have had the best
chance of Success. The only way to be
ready in the future, officials say, would be
to keep a unit stationed permanently in the
Mediterranean, rather than at Fort Bragg,
N.C.
In hindsight, U.S. officials wonder
whether they should have bombed the run-
way at Beirut to prevent the TWA flight
from landing there-where it would be
hardest to mount a rescue operation.
Lack of reliable intelligence also con-
tinues to hinder the U.S. Former CIA offi-
cials say the ro em stems from a ec me
in the number of American penetration
agents inside terrorist groups-especially
inside the Shiite groups that pose the main
problem-and from strained relationships
wiM many of the Arab virovernments that
could Drovide inside information.
One former CIA official contrasts the
current hiiacking crisis with a successful
anti-terrorist operation in 1972. The CIA.
e recalls, received information from a
ence servicce that Pal-
frieen 1Arab in e '"
estinians Plann to ifack a TWA ie t
bound from Rome to Tel Aviv. The CIA
alerted the Italian police, who grabbed the
terrorists in a Rome airport lounge as they
passed weapons to a colleague arriving
from Benghazi- Libya. The TWA plane
made its trip without mishap.
Continued
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040019-4
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040019-4
The administration has tried in recent
months to push wary CIA and mi tart' o i-
cials into tougher anti-terrorism roams,
including clo r links with other nations'
spy services. But these efforts have some-
times backfired.
Preemptive Strikes?
The example, resisted for
months the areuments by some adminis-
tration hard-liners that the U.S. should
mount preemptive operations. The a enc
viewecTsuc tactics as perilously close to
assassination, a tac c that n
the CIA into disrepute in the 1970s. Reluc-
tant v the agency last December endorsed
a new presidential roam that would
have the CIA train the Lebanese and other
frilly Arab intelligence services to pre-
emot terrorists.
The plan proved a disaster. The Leba-
se service- i e a rest of the coun-
n
try. had largely disintegrated by ear ix this
year. Some of its members decided to un-
dertake a preemptive operation of their
against
own in a car bomb attack March
Shiite religious leader med Hussein
Fadlallah
missed Sheik Fadlallah but killed about 80
others. The CIA insists it didn't have any
involvement in the o ration and didn't
train those who carried it out. But in the
uproar that followed the m ing, the
agency retreated from the an to train
aTsr r eem tive operations.
Administration officials believe that de-
veloping a sound anti-terrorism policy has
been difficult because elements of such a
policy go against the American character.
"Our virtues are frequently our vulnerabil-
ities." contends Noel Koch, a deputy assis-
tant secretary of defense who helps super-
vise counterterrorism planning. _ "The
value we place on an open society is ex-
ploitable. Our respect for human life4s ex-
ploitable. And so there is question of how
to maintain these values and yet defend
ourselves. There are no happy choices
available."
Unpublicized Successes
U.S. officials Insist that the anti-ter-
ronsm a ort isn't as bad as it looks. ey
point to better transport capability for
beta Force: better command and control
procedures that reduce the layers of Pen-
tagon bureaucracy involved in military op-
erations: and better an ing of intelli-
gence information, including a new stem
that allows anti-terrorism officials to moni-
tor raw intelligence immediately
ms
and assess what in tion is new and
ant.
important.
Officials also claim that the U.S. has
helped avert some terrorist operations, in-
cluding a recent plot to kill Libyan dissi-
dents in the U.S., a plot to blow up the
American embassy in Cairo and attacks
planned against American facilities in Leb-
anon at the time of the U.S. presidential
election and inauguration. -
"The problem isn't with the administra-
tion, it's with the nature of terrorism,"
says Robert Oakley, the coordinator of the
State Department's anti-terrorism pro-
gram. "Given the nature of the problem
and the way terrorists operate, we won't
always succeed in deterring terrorism, and
often when we do it can't be publicized.
The public is going to be more aware of
the failures than the successes."
The toughest problem of all, officials
say, is developing a long-run strategy to
contain the explosion of Shiite terrorism in
the Mideast that has followed the Iranian
revolution. Israeli anti-terrorism methods
that were developed in the 1970s to deal
with Palestinian terror don't help much
now, they say.
"Shiite terrorism is much different than
Palestinian," says Fadi Hayek, the spokes-
man for the Christian "Lebanese Forces"
militia in Washington. "It isn't a political
and nationalist movement, it is a religious
and transnational movement. It has roots
and bases in various countries, which
makes it difficult to spot. And because the
Shiite community has little political struc-
ture, there aren't any pressure points."
Penetration and other intelligence-gath-
ering techniques don't work well with the
Shiite groups because of their loose struc-
ture, and intimidation tactics don't work
well because the Shiite fighters are in-
tensely motivated. The Palestinians, in
contrast, tend to have well-structured lead-
ership and frequent morale problems.
Because the Shiites are sometimes
eager for martyrdom, Mr. Hayek notes,
"the usual mechanics of political negotia-
tion don't apply."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040019-4