HOW CIA-AIDED RAIDS IN NICARGUA IN '84 LED CONGRESS TO END FUNDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040017-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 6, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040017-6
6 ".arch 1985
Tree Contra .fight administration policy, congressional per the people.' " a U.S. official says. And Mr.
decisive role, and
sonalities came to play a bers fir. Clarridge's
the fight took on an institutional si ifi amerce remem
'~? CIA-Aided Raids once for Congress that made it the most mentioning that the Americans were will.
emotional debate on an ? forei the to sink ships to stop the arms flow.
1 gn-policy is- As the CIA assumed greater control of
In Nicaragua in 84 ,f Led since Vietnam. the ed 1 war in 1953, the agency morel on two.
The mining operation in 1984 symbol- I sometimes corf:icting, tracks. It sought to
ized a larger militar, escalation that never 1 1,4 t k-
L(-) ~Ila r unC1s "a? rrrm political backing at home. It
yielded a propaganda victors for Nicara-
gua. and in Congress it, left a legacy of
Pu: flClalS Help Insurgents mistrust that haunts the CIA and covert
operations today. The congressional over-
RaisePrivate Funds Here: sight process was damaged by misleading
testimony and news leaks, and the biparti-
The Role of Rep. Boland ssanship that had governed the two Intelli-
gence Committees since their founding fell
apart.
Searle, Exxon's Ships Away the The administration do decisions leading to
of the oil' terminal had their
roots in the spring and summer of 1983.
By DAVID Rrx,t:RS "Everybody saw that these guys Ithe San.
And DAVID IGNATIUS dinistasl were in the process of consolidat-
?~.'.' c~rrer.r Of THE "'ALL STREET JOURNAL
ir.g the revolution," an administration offi-
.,rrned speedboats and a helicopter cial says. "And we needed to stop it." Yet
.',ranched from a Cent
l
ra
Intellige
nce
Agency "mother ship" attacked Nicara
,ua s Pacific port, Puerto Sandino, on a
tT~c-r:.'?ss New Year's night in 1984.
-A weei. later the speedboats returned to
rt: the cis terminal. Over the next three
r~tcaths, they laid more than 30 mines in
PL!-:7:c, Sandino and also in harbors at
Corinto and El Bluff. In air and sea raids
on coastal positions. Americans flew-and
fated from-an armed helicopter that ac-
companied the U.S.-financed Latino force,
while a CIA plane provided sophisticated
reconnaissance guidance for the nighttime
attacks.
The operation, outlined in a classified
CIA document, marked the peak of U.S. in-
volvement in the four-year guerrilla war in
;icaragua. More than any other single
event, it solidified congressional opposition
to the covert war, and in the year since
then. no new money has been approved be-
yond the last CIA checks drawn early last
summer.
Fund-Raising help
roots guerrilla mover e --- ,_
I nt. Yetet, r; crews
ngl\ impatient with the pace of the Con-
~ras. a wanted to make ouick, direct at-
tacks against Nicaragua with forces re-
cruiled elsewhere in Latin America and
trained and financed by the U.S.
Contra leaders say the CIA training im-
proved their forces, but the insurgents re-
sented what they regarded as CIA interfer-
ence in their operations. At the same time,
CIA paramilitary officers were upset by
the ineffectiveness of the Contras. A bridge
at Corinto was repeatedly targeted, for, ex- II
ample, but missions failed. As the insur
rency force grew-doubling to about 15,000
during 19S3-the CIA began to use the
guerrilla army as a cover for its own small
"Latino'' force. Guerrilla radio broadcasts
gave credit to the anti-Sandinista move-
ment, but the raids were carried out now
by non-Nicaraguans from such countries
as Bolivia and Ecuador.
Increasingly, economic targets were
picked by the Americans, and the most ce-
lebrated attack, by armed speedboats,
came Oct. 11, 1983, against oil facilities at
Corinto. Three days later, an underwater
pipeline at Puerto Sandino was sabotaged
by Latino frogmen. The message wasn't
lost on Exxon Corp.'s Esso unit, and the in-
ternational giant informed the Sandinista
government that it would no longer provide
tankers for transporting oil to Nicaragua.
The CIA's success in scaring off a
ma-
jor shipper fit well in its mining strategy.
r C-
a June assessment by the CIA and otherniversits Russian Instiitute told mem-
Uy'd a
U.S. intelligence agencies was highly skep- ber of the Joint Chiefs staff that the
tical of the Contra insurgency, and in late scheme came to him from his knowledge
July the House voted for the first time to of mining tactics in the Russo-Japanese
cut off CIA funding for the program. War.
A Slipped Cove
Th
r
e weeks before th J
eanuary 1984 min.
-U.S. offic;ais are Quietly helping the in. Against this background. Duane Cl - trig operation were among the darkest for
st gen s raise private funds to keep alive idge, then head of the CIA' Latin Ameri- the administration in Central America.
the Contra program the CIA began to fi- can division, met with Contra leaders in The Salvadoran elections had been post-
nance in 951. As he throws himself person- Honduras in July. He traveled under the as the from December to March, and even
poned ally into the fig;it. President Reagan faces code name of "Mr. Maroni," but his cover as the mining began, the CIA was planning
broad pa l;c opposition to U.S. involve sli covert financial and political support to
ment in efforts to topple the Sandinista re- i m n
pped der,aa gbit ruff, likeable milibtar mat, , head off right wing candidate Roberto
,..me. The level of private contribution sod addressed him by his nickname ',Dewey ?? d'Aubuisson.
far-between $5 million and $10 million- Edgar Chamorro, a former Contra leader, The mother ship
used in the mining op-
can't match the support formerly provided remembers being bemused at the logic of eration is vessel by sources a piy the CIA And in Honduras, a guerrilla an American named Dewey Maroni. similar Fate chartered to oan oil-field udth a seridce configuration
n
base throughout the war, the Tegucigalpa I Mr. Clarridge sought to boost spirits by I
and toying
ship e-r:ment nervously awaits a new con- stressing President Reagan's with a long. at stern section where
;-`'sszonal an's personal in-
Vote on funding
this season. terest in the guerrillas' progress, but his helicopters could land. To conceal the
rise and fa;l of the CIA's Nicaragua underlying messao wa ship's identity, the CIA is believed to have
is a story of war abroad and "He told them. 'F u have to lbeomore lik changed the also o have ve repainted d the regularly; ship
the
at home. In the absence of a clear ~:.ency may
guerrillas, you have to swim in the sea of
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040017-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040017-6
during a February break in the operation.
-.,e ship used in the mining was larger
than an earlier version that launched the
?ober attack on Corinto, and the CIA
war,ted the larger size to accommodate a
second helicopter.
A CIA document recounting the opera-
:ion lists 'wo helicopters, both believed to
fie Hughes .500s: one was flown by CIA-
ervised scar ag?,;ans. the other by
.mericans. A Fairchild Merlin IV, a twin-
:i,_nne propeller plane equipped with for-
,,vuird'ook;ng infrared radar, flew offshore
imernutional airspace. Some of the
srt,eduoats. armed with mortars and nma-
chine guns, were converted from smug-
boa:s confiscated by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration.
Thr second helicopter gave the CIA bet-
tor command and control over the opera-
tion but also heightened U.S. involvement.
At least once before, an American helicop-
,er had entered Nicaraguan airspace to ex-
tract a Latino commando, but in the 1984
raids. the U.S. pilots directly fired on Nica-
rag-man positions. according to the CIA doc-
ument. interviews with U.S. officials, and
S:ndi:usta military records.
Ships Hit
Administration officials still express
surprise and some annoyance that insur-
ance firms like Lloyds didn't increase
rates high enough to stop shipping to Nica-
ragua. Late in March the speedboats fired
around Corinto in a further effort to scare
eft cargo vessels. "This was the largest
display of weapons fire ever to occur at
Corinto,'' the CIA reported later, adding
that the operation served to warn cargo
essel crews of hazards of being in Nicara-
guan ports.
Though the threat posed by the explo-
sives-some as large as 300 pounds-was
later played down, at least five interna-
tional ships hit mines, and the CIA re-
ported serious damage to a Dutch dredger
and Cuban freighter and the sinking of at
least four smaller Nicaraguan patrol
boats.
The mining ultimately hurt the adminis-
tration's own policy, and despite President
Reagan's authorization of the operation,
;here is still debate among his advisers as
how thoroughly the move was consid-
ered. Two administration sources say that
Secretary of State George Shultz was sur-
prised by news reports of the mining, prob-
ably because he missed a discussion of the
program by a top-level committee of the
National Security Council. Other State De-
partment officials remember the mining
only as one item on a list of covert opera-
tions.
"It was neither illegal nor immoral, but
it was incredibly destructive," contends a
U.S. official who supports the Contras. "It
was perfectly clear that it would involve
third parties whose ships would be hit. It
couldn't have been better designed to un- i year later, and the situation oecame so
dermine our policy." poisoned that the CIA sometimes fed dif-
This impact was immediate in Con- ferent information to the two panels in an
gress, yet from the outset, the administra- effort to track increasing news leaks.
tion had underestimated the depth and From Mr. Casey's standpoint. Congress
character of the opposition it faced. Just as got cold feet. Legislators had initially ap-
Mr. Casey symbolized the CIA, Rep. Ed- proved the paramilitary program, the CIA
I ward Boland came to stand for his Intelli- complained, and then abandoned it when it
pence Committee and the House. A former became a political embarrassment. But
county registrar of deeds. the Massachu- -,en some agency officials concede that
setts Democrat instinctively avoids con- Mr. Casey, in his pique toward Congress.
frontation. His 1982 legislation forbidding may have been his own worst enemy.
U.S. funding to overthrow the Sandinista For all sides, the public disclosure of
regime was intended as a warning to the
administration. In challenging Mr. Boland.
the CIA provoked a man whose alliances
and credibility in Congress made him
uniquely able to defeat the agency.
Highly Placed Friend
The personal background of Mr. Bo-
land's friend and former Washington room-
mate, Speaker Thomas O'Neill, added to
the emotion of the debate. Rep. O'Neill's
late aunt had been a Maryknoll nun, and
Maryknolls working in Nicaragua today
visit him in Washington. Among his boy-
hood friends was a Marine who was
wounded while serving with the American
force that occupied Managua a half cen-
tury ago. "I remember him talking about
the poverty he saw,'' says Mr. O'Neill.
Everything we did was for the protection
of American industry down there."
Congressional opposition was quietly en-
couraged by senior career CIA officials
who were unhappy with the program and
the risk of damage to the agency. Congres-
sional scrutiny focused on the size of the
insurgency and the U.S. command and
control. In the Senate, a secret staff report
in early 1983 raised major questions about
the direction of the program, and while re-
porters were fascinated with the details of
operations, members tended to look more
at management and total numbers.
"The thing that impressed the commit-
tee the most was the regular and constant
increase in the number of Contras being
supported," says a senior Democrat. "The
members didn't pay as much attention to
the activities as to the numbers."
Journalists' Role
This distinction reflects an ambivalence
in the congressional process. The commit-
tees wanted to be kept informed, but above
all they hoped to avoid embarrassment.
They initially gave some license to the
CIA, but this trust broke down as Mr.
Casey sought to limit information, presum-
ably as a way to limit opposition.
When reporters were first allowed to
travel with the insurgents in early 1983,
their stories brought the war home and
embarrassed House supporters. They saw
the CIA as further manipulating informa-
tion on a supposedly "secret" war. Much
the same reaction came in the Senate
when the mining operation was revealed a
manual last fall represented a low point.
Democrats seized on the issue in the last
weeks of the presidential campaign, and to
cut its losses, the administration con-
ducted a quick investigation. Relatively ju-
nior officers in the CIA were disciplined
for what was seen as a management disas-
ter, and the agency's morale was badly
hurt.
The more lasting question that troubles
both supporters and critics of the program
is what happens to the Contras now. Sup-
porters don't want to abandon the Contras.
dooming their movement to failure. But
many fear that they can't succeed without
U.S. intervention. "You're either going to
be in a position of saying 'Bye. Bye Birdie'
or 'Here Come the Marines' " says a Sen-
ate Democrat.
For now the program is surviving on
private contributions raised with the help
of American officials. Adolfo Calero, a sil-
ver-haired opposition leader and Notre
Dame graduate, travels seeking contribu-
tions from wealthy conservatives and oth-
ers. He is helped in small ways by the ad-
ministration. "Adolfo Calero has been in-
troduced to people in various countries
who are sympathetic to the cause of de-
mocracy," says a U.S. official confirming
the U.S. fund-raising help. "These people
have decided, after being introduced to
him, to contribute. Mr. Calero then pro-
vides them with information."
Enrique Bermudez, the military com-
nmander of the U.S.-backed Fuerza Demo-
cratica Nicaraguense said at a press con-
ference yesterday in Washington that the
Contras would keep fighting even if Con-
gress doesn't renew funding, but he said
the group would ''adapt to the situation'by decentralizing its forces and avoiding
large operations. He also said the FDN
would seize territory inside Nicaragua and
declare a shadow government if that would
convince Congress to loosen the purse
strings.
Mr. Calero estimates that more than $5
million has been raised privately since CIA
funding was cut off. He says a Washington
law firm is researching the possibility of
selling private bonds to finance the war.
The private funding compares with the es-
timated $1.2 million the CIA had been pro-
Continued
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 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040017-6
don'_ have
_??c,~~r: Sues Cr ,r2"ISDOr-,at1Gr. to rnount
J:.-.,a:rled -
^-?a:.CIS
tc be a ae:,ilera :N car.a a
rno vernen:?'? sans a U.S. official.
mere also s the cancer that Honduras
C std Rlca. worried L' at the U.S.
a:ta:J:s by 'ne
C_~.5 the S,:..d:r:S:as and CJ SE :'ey.
:.-e Liar:ras.
- :e ?resider: Reaoan's acpea:
;.:e? rc mere Is uncertain:%
rea.IZe
CE~.. _-acies c:'e-- -
a '-, - =r. Cale,, sa s. ' :;Iere
E VOo Ce. Is not
::r'E'` there was the cancer of a cutc'ff. I
cor': feel betravai as such."
h s no:,-,e .r Hey B!SCa171e. ~R- Cna.
m r-rc Inc f^
Ccr,,, a official, saes
'VJe were )us: the fro:.. 1 felt we
E-` rnani-,Watec. used as 2 f2 u
G are reading
i:r,ow Lr,E 'as: charier."
,: C:.=. ;,ease a-ers :.angiev.
?
C.arriCD- been transferred tc head hE
Es: urcooea,. c:.aior,. His
5:::. carr-,nn a hamper S:ic e.- e?:1G!1'.
are U.S. of Grenz
dz and one pro
-
:^ 1ng ''Y.:ara~ a Ne::. nas a placebut a co:Jeague s2VS agency
affiCa!S as) ed nl:n to bac,: ti In its para ng
ace-sc the S:1ckers wGa1Cn`t be seen.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403040017-6