FORGOT ABOUT CALLING IT 'IRANGATE'; THE TIMES AND CASES ARE DIFFERENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402970003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 30, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402970003-0
.46.1111
30 November 1986
Forget about calling it `Irangate';
00
the times and cases are diff
erent
S By Nicholas M. Horrock
W ASHINGTON-Ronald Reagan will not be
appearing in a rerun of Watergate.
The allusions to Irangate, Northgate or
trauumma leadinthe notion of a g to the abdicationofYana American
president, are unfair to Reagan, to the nation and to
an understanding of what really is happening in
Washington.
The cases are different. The act that sparked
Watergate was a common burglary of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters by
men working for the President of the United States.
Richard M. Nixon was running for re-election and
the burglary was carried out for partisan political
Nixon said the national
United States. issues
didn't know of the
the
burglary in advance, and it soon became clear that
the White House was doing everything to stymie the
investigation.
All sorts of claims and counterclaims flowed from
that burglary, but the core never disappeared; A
domestic crime had been committed for the
Personal advantage of the president and an intricate
web of lies and obstructions were woven to hide it.
Now men who work for President Reagan have
been accused of taking the profits from secret
shipments of U.S.-made arms to Iran and directing
the money to support a covert war against the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Reagan says he
didn't know about it and has ordered a criminal
investigation of the actions of his White House aides
and sweeping review of how the National Security
Council carries out its role.
The contra war was been supported by Congress,
albeit through secret committee approval, from 1982
until 1984 and was again underwritten by Congress
last summer. At this juncture, the actions under
investigation seem to be in pursuit of an effort to
keep that war alive until congressional support again
could be secured.
The times, too, are different. Watergate broke as
the nation swam in sea of doubt and despair. The
Vietnam war was drawing to its sad finale. The
rancor in its path left distrust of many of the
nation's institutions, not the least of which was the
presidency. Three national leaders, including a
president, had been assassinated in the previous
decade. Fear and suspicion stalked the land.
Now, 15 years later, there is no thirst in
Washington to return to a time when an American
president was held up to ridicule on nightly
television. Even some of Reagan's sharpest critics,
such as Sen. Sam Nunn [D., Ga.], are cautious
about how far to carry the Iran case.
Part of their caution may be simple prudence:
Ronald Reagan is a popular and respected president
and Israel, the helpmate in the Iran case, a potent
Political force on Capitol Hill.
But part of the caution is the
sense among members of Congress
that the American people don't
want Ronald Reagan and the
Presidency trashed. One veteran
congressional aide, who was a
Watergate investigator, argues key
they "want things fixed and they
don't
destroyed t yeyerything ing !to fix it.,,
.,,
~~o really is involved here is a
whether a deco
can fight a Cold War and maim
the institutions of freedom.
It is a continuation of the debate
joined at another set of
congressional hem
ngs in the 1970s
during the investigation of the
activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Those inquiries found national
security agencies, swollen to
enormous size, rambling through
the world with such ill-conceived
operations as the Bay of Pigs
invasion and the exploding cigar
~~' thought up as a way to kill
and
their execution
ften were carried
out in such secrecy and under such
hidden lines of authority that even
the men who authorized them
didn't know whether the operations
were useful or wise.
It was hard to- draw the line
between foreign operations and
those at home. Programs to
burglarize the homes of foreign
agents for intelligence information
had segued into burglarizing the
homes of Americans with
unpopular political views.
Murder of foreign leaders became
the subject of routine planning in
intelligen wagencies ~and undeclared
American the support of the
People neither had been
sought nor received-were engaged
in without restraint.
Reacting to public outcry,
Congress imposed restraints. But
the espionage agents and covert
operators never have ceased their
efforts to be free of those bonds.
Ronald Reagan entered office
convinced that American
undercover operators must be freed.
He Picked William Casey, a New
York lawyer with a buccaneer's
car= on Wall Street and a tour in
Precursor, the Office of
Strategic Services, to head the
intelligence agency.
By 1984, the CIA was feeding
arms to Afghan rebels, secretly
guerrillas, backing insurgents in
Ethiopa, bucking up Moammar
Gadhafi's enemies in Chad, mining
harbors in Nicaragua and helping
anti-Vietnamese forces in
Cambodia.
But Congress was anxious. Even
those who supported the orthodoxy
of maitaining a strong line against
the Soviets around the world-men
such as Sen. Barry Goldwater [R.,
Ariz.]-were critical of the ability of
the C`IA and the wisdom of many
of its plans.
More and more of the planning
for secret operations was drawn
into the realm of the National
Security Council at the White
House, where congressional
oversight and reluctant bureaucrats
could not follow. Few in
Washington know how far this has
gone, what 'lion are afoot,
what ues were used or what were broken.
The outcome
may mar the record
of Reagan's extraordinary
presidency, but it is unlikely to
drive him from the White House
before his term is ended. It is
equally unlikely to permanently mar
the respect and affection he has
won from many Americans.
Reagan may tome to doubt the
value of covert operations and a
foreign policy conducted by
espionage agents. The President
already may see the pitfalls in that.
If he is correct that he was never
told about proceeds from
Iranian arms to supply
Nicaraguan contras, then he may
recognize that obscure men
operating witho' it his authority can
destroy his administration and
damage the nation.
He may discover that when vast
amounts of money and material are
moved without clear agreement
within the government and without
judicious planning, the money may
be stolen and the material
misdirected He may learn that
many in government may not be
motivated by the same patriotism
that motivates him, and that when
allowed to operate outside the law
they can run amuck.
The outcome of this new
Washington theater piece may
include criminal indictments, show
hearings and new espionage tales.
But what really is in question is
whether it will result in new
restraint on a president's power to
operate without the knowledge or
support of the Congress and the
American neoole
Nicholas Horrock is The Tribune's Washington
editor.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402970003-0