THE IRAN OPERATION: 'HARD QUESTIONS THAT NEED ANSWERS NOW'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830049-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

? STAT
j Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830049-5
ARTICLE APP ARED NEV YORK TTNiIy',S
ON PAGE 1 MAY 1980
Pentagon's selection of its landing site
for the first step of the mission. That
site, in the midst of a vast salt desert
more than 200 miles southeast of Tehe-
ran; was - as we now know - also ad-
jacent to a highway. As the Pentagon
explains it, the intelligence planners
for the rescue had known In advance
that the highway was in regular use
but had analyzed the "rhythm" of
traffic, as one official put it, and con-
that time raises questions about some
of the assumptions made by the rescue
planners about the culture and people
of Iran.
One Iranian now living In the United
States who still maintains close ties to
the Government. in Teheran specu-
lated that the desert landing site had
been reconnoitered and selected by a
former member of Savak, the ousted
Shah's secret police, who is now work-
ing undercover in Iran for United
States intelligence. "The Americans
still go back and talk to the same pea
pie who have been telling them what'
they want to hear," the Iranian said..
"The old Savak officers have. never un-.
cluded that the six C-130 aircraft and
six helicopters necessary for the mis-
sion could rendevous and refuel with.
out being observed. It was sheer bad,
luck, a "complete aberration," a sen-j
for official said, that an Iranian tour
bus happened along just as the first.
C-130 landed. The 44 passengers on the
bus were rounded up and would have
been flown out of Iran it the mission
had gone ahead.
It should be said that, so far, there is
no evidence that the mission was
aborted for any reason other than that
given by the White House -the break-
down of three helicopters. But how
quickly would the disappearance of
those 44 Iranians have been noticed?
Wouldn't anxious family members
have begun asking questions? United
States Government officials indicated
that no one considered the bus passen-
gers to be a serious hindrance to the
operation, since the desert area was
known to be heavily trafficked by
smugglers and thieves, and, as one of-
ficial said, "People just would have
thought the bus was hijacked."
Other Intelligence officials who were
not directly consulted on the mission,
however, said that the highway in
question served as one of the roads be-
tween Yezd, a city of 100,000 people,
and Meshed, with a population of
300,000, some 400 miles apart,-and that
there was regular bus service between
them. In addition, Meshed, along with
Qum, is one of the major religious
shrines In Iran -a holy city. There Is
a constant flow of worshippers to
Meshed, where one of Islam's most
important religious leaders, the
Eighth Imam, is buried. Most of those
pilgrims travel at night across the salt
desert in an obvious attempt to escape
daytime heat.
The selection of that desert site at
opinion. A lot of people are mouthing
off because they're angry about being
cutout."
''he Iran Operation: `Hard Questions
That Need Answers Now'
WASHINGTON -Ii had the appeal
of any good Hollywood thriller. Our su-
perbly trained commandos sweep into
the United States Embassy in Tehe-
ran, snatch the hostages and flee to
safety - rescuing America's honor
and extricating Jimmy Carter from
the Rose Garden.
Was it possible? O- was it doomed
from the start?
The overall Carter Administration
rescue plan apparently won't be made
known for weeks or months - it then
- pending reviews by Congressional
investigating committees and the
Joint Chiefs of-Staff. Until then, the
President has put himself in the posi-
tion of saying, in effect, to the Ameri-
can people and the world : "Trust me. I
had a secret plan to end the war." We
last heard that during the Nixon Ad-
ministration.
Some details of the raid are being
leaked daily and, of course, Washing-
ton is abuzz with rumors. At this point,
less than one week after the aborted
mission, there are hard questions that
need answers now.
To begin with, was the Central Intel-
ligence e Agency brought fully Into the
planning of the rescue operation?
Some of my intelligencesources whose
information has been highly reliable in
the past complain that planning for the
rescue was tightly controlled by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the top level of
the Defense Intelligence Agency - to
the exclusion of the C.I.A.'s full exper-
tise. A senior Administration official,
told of the complaint, responded
sharply: "I don't think more than two
or three people in the entire Agency
knew enough to have an informed
By Seymour M. Hersh
derstood the revolution. It's a year
after it happened and they are still in a
daze.'.
Tie Iranian added, with obvious bit-
terness, that testimony given early
last year at people's tribunals after
the overthrow of Shah Mohammed
Riza Pahievi had shown why some
Savak agents would have been famil
iar with the desert area selected as the
initial American landing zone: Savak
considered the area a safe place for
tossing anti-Shah political prisoners
out of helicopters.
s
Most of those I interviewed do not
believe it was possible for American
intelligence agents to have penetrated
the relentlessly vigilant student mili-\
tant group that had direct control of i
the 50 hostages -inside the United
States Embassy. Nonetheless there is
little doubt that a combination of satel-
lite reconnaissance, electronic inter-
cepts and careful on-the-scene ooser-
vation by agents could generate
enough specific information to pro ide .f
analysts with a fix on which building in
the large embassy area was housing
which hostages.
The American effort to establish
firmly the location of each hostage
was a major one for the intelligence
community, and, it should be noted;
one of the obvious reasons why the stu-
dent militants limited any'contact be-
tween the hostages and other Western-
ers. Similarly, there Is no reason to
doubt that the commando team knew
how to defuse the mines and explosive
devices that are said to ring the inside
walls of the embassy.
Even some of the staunchest critics
of the rescue effort have suggested in
interviews in recent days that the com-
mandos, save for the loss of helicop-
ters, could have penetrated the em-
CONrIrlu v
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830049-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830049-5
2
bassy grounds by quickly overpower.
ing the few revolutionary guards who
would have been posted outside in the
early-morning hours of the planned at-
tack.
But how' to escape? Whatever the
Plan - whether by helicopter extrac-
tion, by truck to a secondary location,
or perhaps through a tunnel system
that may exist under the embassy
grounds - the commandos inevitably
would have found, themselves. in a
fierce battle.
A number of Americans have com-.
plained that the Carter Administration
does not fully understand the extent of
popular support throughout 'Iran for
the militants' act.'.on in seizing the hos-
tages.
"The strategy did not take into acs
count the passion of. the people and
their willingness to act - their spon-
taneity," said one American.with wide
experience in post-shah-Iran. "It's a
foolish and unreal strategy." He told
of having been In Teheran late last
year when the national television sta-
tion presented documents indicating
that one of the hostages had served as
a spy- "Within 30 seconds,I beard a
roar from across the city," the Ameri.
can said. He went to his hotel window,
he said, and watched as. thousands of.
Iranians climbed' to their rooftops,
shouting, "Allah Ahkbar"("God is
great"). He went on: "And now you
have a mass population that's armed
- automatic weapons are as common
as M & M's at a movie- theater."
Speaking of last -week's aborted mis
sion, he said, "As soon as the gunfire
at the embassy started, the people
would come running.''
All of this raises a final series of
questions about anticipated casual-
ties.
What were the odds of rescuing all of
the hostages without serious injury or
death? What were the odds, as calcu-
lated by the mission planners, on re-
turning with, say, 25 of the hostages?
Is there any evidence that has not been
made public indicating that President
Carter acted out of fear that some-or
all -- of the hostages were nearing a
life-or-death situation?
And why. did not the Government
warn, the American reporters and businessmen In Iran - said to number
more than 300 - to evacuate before
authorizing the rescue mission?
It seems clear that if the operation
had been successful, all Americans in i
the country could have faced serious
and perhaps extreme reprisals. Some,
perhaps, would have been taken hos-.i
tage. It. seems clear that with eco-
nomic sanctions and other steps hav-=.
ing been consistently threatened in re-
cent months, Mr. Carter could have or-
dered all newsmen and businessmen
to leave Iran weeks ago without neces- 1
sarily jeopardizing the cover of the l
operation.
Perhaps the failure of the operation
will be as instructive for Jimmy Car-
ter as was the Bay of Pigs for John F.
Kennedy in April 1961. ..'
Theodore C. Sorensen, in his 1965
book on the Kennedy Presidency,
..Kennedy." revealed that the same
advisers who had urged the President
to authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion
also were urging him in May 1961 to
expand the war in Laos. "But now,"
writes Mr. Sorensen, ."the President
was far more skeptical of the experts,
their reputations, their recommenda-
tions, their promises, premises and
facts." Mr. Sorensen recorded Mr.
Kennedy as exclaiming months later:
"Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened
when it did. Otherwise, we'd bein Laos .
by now - and that would be a hundred
t11VfPC ~i/nrea .sz~K. .
for The New York Times, is writing a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830049-5