ANOTHER CHANCE FOR VICTORY IN ANGOLA

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000402800002-9
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 11, 2012
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 11, 1985
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OPEN SOURCE
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402800002-9 MTICLL nr-fA oN PAGE - WASHINGTON TIMES 11 December 1985 Another chance for victory in Angola its ni- of Samora er l agar its anti-Communist munist guerrillas) will will only make the MPLA more mdepen- SMITH HEMPST~ Back in 1981, when this observer witnessed the fall of the Angolan town of Mavinga to Jonas Savimbi's' anti-Communist guerrillas, he re ported that the United States had a golden opportunity to strike a heavy blow against Soviet adventurism in Africa by aiding the rebel forces. True, the 1976 Clark Amendment forbade such assistance to Mr. Savimbi, who has been fighting the puppet MPLA government and its Cuban mercenaries since Angola achieved its bogus independence in 1975. But, as this reporter pointed out to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker,' there is more than one way to skin the Angolan cat: Morocco's pro- Western King Hassan was helping UNITA, and American aid could have been funneled through him. Four years - and that opportu- nity - have been wasted. Mr. Savim- bi's 60,000 men are still fighting, and without a dime of American help. Mavinga, despite a major Russian- led offensive, is still in the hands of UNITA (the National Union for the, Total Independence of Angola). So is Jamba, Mr Savimbi's headquarters, despite a heavy Communist attack. And Mr. Crocker and the cunc- tative George Shultz are still dreaming up reasons why the United. States, now that the Clark Amendment has been repealed, shouldn't help UNITA. Each of those reasons holds about as much water. as a sieve. Sending Mr. Savimbi so much as a blanket, they suggest (repeating their argument for helping the equally Marxist Mozambican gov- their 35,000 Cuban surrogates. S--- mce Soviet officers are in oper- ational control of all Angolan units down to the battalion level - and other Warsaw pact na- tionals run the country's railroads, fisheries, and collective farms - it is difficult to see how Angola could be more dependent than it is on the Kremlin. Angola's arsenal of Soviet mili- tary hardware - S00 tanks, more than 100 fixed-wing aircraft, and about 2S MI-24 helicopter gunships - is conservatively valued at $1.S billion. But aid to UNITA, protest Messrs. Crocker and Shultz, could upset the delicate multilateral negotiations aimed at securing the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola in ex- change fora pullout of South African forces from Namibia, and indepen- dence for that benighted country . Sure. Mr. Crocker, by his own ad- mission, has spent 80 percent of his time for the past five years on those negotiations, to the detriment of American interests elsewhere in Af- rica. And what is there to show for it despite a two-day meeting in Lusaka only last month? Zero. But, the State Department's hand- wringers point out, those awful South Africans are helping Mr. Savimbi. If we send aid to UNITA, we'll be getting in bed with Pretoria. Those awful South Africans are helping Mr. Savimbi for their own reasons, and he accepts their help for his reasons. American aid to UNITA could only lessen Mr. Savim- bi's dependence on South Africa, which he would dearly love. (Be- sides, we're already in bed with those awful fellows: we have to have their minerals). But, posit the cookie-pushers, aid- ing Mr. Savimbi would only widen the Angola conflict. You bet it would: if we sent UNITA a few hundred hand-held, ground-to-air missiles and an equal number of anti-tank weapons, Mr. Savimbi would take the war right up to the gates of Luanda, the Angolan capital. And would that be such a bad thing? i/ Mr. Savimbi's demands are as simple as they are reasonable. He's not asking to be handed control of Angola on a plate. All he's asking is reconstitution of the tripartite MPLA-UNITA-FNLA coalition gov- ernment in accordance with the Al- vor Agreement under which Angola was granted independence, to be fol- lowed by free elections. In short, he's asking America - and the world - to give democracy a chance in Angola: he'll abide by the verdict of the ballot box. Such a solution is, of course, anathema to the Marxist MPLA gov- ernment, because they know they would lose a free election and UNITA would win it (FNLA whil i e t , still exists under its longtime leader, Holden Roberto, no longer is a major factor in the equation). rt is precisely why the Cuban rouought some into Angola before independence, are there: to protect the MPLA from the people of An- gola. And that is why they will stay there until they are routed on the battlefield by Mr. Savimbi's forces. Claude Pe er the veteran FI r- ida Democrat has introduced lie in a ruse to Drovi e million in humanitarian aid to [JNITA. alone the same lin the help earmarked for the Nicara an ce esi en ona ea- ft aren t avors MM That is absolutely the bare mini. mum the United States ought to be doing to help Mr. Savimbi, who has paid his dues over the past decade in the global fight against Communist tyranny. Smith Hempstone is a nationally syndicated columnist. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402800002-9