ANOTHER CHANCE FOR VICTORY IN ANGOLA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000402800002-9
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 11, 2012
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 11, 1985
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402800002-9
MTICLL nr-fA
oN PAGE -
WASHINGTON TIMES
11 December 1985
Another
chance for victory
in Angola its ni- of Samora er l agar
its anti-Communist munist guerrillas) will
will
only make the MPLA more mdepen-
SMITH HEMPST~
Back in 1981, when this
observer witnessed the fall
of the Angolan town of
Mavinga to Jonas Savimbi's'
anti-Communist guerrillas, he re
ported that the United States had a
golden opportunity to strike a heavy
blow against Soviet adventurism in
Africa by aiding the rebel forces.
True, the 1976 Clark Amendment
forbade such assistance to Mr.
Savimbi, who has been fighting the
puppet MPLA government and its
Cuban mercenaries since Angola
achieved its bogus independence in
1975. But, as this reporter pointed
out to Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs Chester Crocker,'
there is more than one way to skin
the Angolan cat: Morocco's pro-
Western King Hassan was helping
UNITA, and American aid could
have been funneled through him.
Four years - and that opportu-
nity - have been wasted. Mr. Savim-
bi's 60,000 men are still fighting, and
without a dime of American help.
Mavinga, despite a major Russian-
led offensive, is still in the hands of
UNITA (the National Union for the,
Total Independence of Angola). So is
Jamba, Mr Savimbi's headquarters,
despite a heavy Communist attack.
And Mr. Crocker and the cunc-
tative George Shultz are still
dreaming up reasons why the United.
States, now that the Clark
Amendment has been repealed,
shouldn't help UNITA. Each of those
reasons holds about as much water.
as a sieve.
Sending Mr. Savimbi so much as a
blanket, they suggest (repeating
their argument for helping the
equally Marxist Mozambican gov-
their 35,000 Cuban surrogates. S---
mce Soviet officers are in oper-
ational control of all Angolan
units down to the battalion
level - and other Warsaw pact na-
tionals run the country's railroads,
fisheries, and collective farms - it
is difficult to see how Angola could
be more dependent than it is on the
Kremlin.
Angola's arsenal of Soviet mili-
tary hardware - S00 tanks, more
than 100 fixed-wing aircraft, and
about 2S MI-24 helicopter gunships
- is conservatively valued at $1.S
billion.
But aid to UNITA, protest Messrs.
Crocker and Shultz, could upset the
delicate multilateral negotiations
aimed at securing the withdrawal of
the Cuban troops from Angola in ex-
change fora pullout of South African
forces from Namibia, and indepen-
dence for that benighted country
.
Sure. Mr. Crocker, by his own ad-
mission, has spent 80 percent of his
time for the past five years on those
negotiations, to the detriment of
American interests elsewhere in Af-
rica. And what is there to show for it
despite a two-day meeting in Lusaka
only last month? Zero.
But, the State Department's hand-
wringers point out, those awful
South Africans are helping Mr.
Savimbi. If we send aid to UNITA,
we'll be getting in bed with Pretoria.
Those awful South Africans are
helping Mr. Savimbi for their own
reasons, and he accepts their help
for his reasons. American aid to
UNITA could only lessen Mr. Savim-
bi's dependence on South Africa,
which he would dearly love. (Be-
sides, we're already in bed with
those awful fellows: we have to have
their minerals).
But, posit the cookie-pushers, aid-
ing Mr. Savimbi would only widen
the Angola conflict. You bet it would:
if we sent UNITA a few hundred
hand-held, ground-to-air missiles
and an equal number of anti-tank
weapons, Mr. Savimbi would take the
war right up to the gates of Luanda,
the Angolan capital. And would that
be such a bad thing?
i/
Mr. Savimbi's demands are as
simple as they are reasonable. He's
not asking to be handed control of
Angola on a plate. All he's asking is
reconstitution of the tripartite
MPLA-UNITA-FNLA coalition gov-
ernment in accordance with the Al-
vor Agreement under which Angola
was granted independence, to be fol-
lowed by free elections.
In short, he's asking America -
and the world - to give democracy
a chance in Angola: he'll abide by the
verdict of the ballot box.
Such a solution is, of course,
anathema to the Marxist MPLA gov-
ernment, because they know they
would lose a free election and
UNITA would win it (FNLA whil
i
e
t
, still exists under its longtime leader,
Holden Roberto, no longer is a major
factor in the equation).
rt is precisely why the Cuban
rouought some
into Angola before
independence, are there: to protect
the MPLA from the people of An-
gola. And that is why they will stay
there until they are routed on the
battlefield by Mr. Savimbi's forces.
Claude Pe er the veteran FI r-
ida Democrat has introduced lie in a ruse to Drovi e
million in humanitarian aid to
[JNITA. alone the same lin the
help earmarked for the Nicara an
ce esi en ona ea-
ft
aren
t avors MM
That is absolutely the bare mini.
mum the United States ought to be
doing to help Mr. Savimbi, who has
paid his dues over the past decade in
the global fight against Communist
tyranny.
Smith Hempstone is a nationally
syndicated columnist.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402800002-9