THE FRAGILITY OF DICTATORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: December 5, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760019-6
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JOSEPH C. HARSCH
The fragility of dictators
O NE trouble with dictators or tyrants is that
they seldom arrange for an orderly succession
to their rule.
There are exceptions. Gen. Francisco Franco ruled
Spain, absolutely, from 1939 to 1975. During the last
six years Prince Juan Carlos was the official Crown
Prince and became King on Franco's death.
To the surprise of almost everyone concerned, Juan
Carlos as King proceeded with great skill to dismantle
the political machinery of the dictatorship and guide
Spain to democracy. It was presumably not what Gen-
eral Franco had intended. It has worked.
A classic example of a dictatorship not providing
successfully for the succession was that of the former
Shah of Iran. When his regime collapsed, it did so into
a far worse dictatorship, that of the Ayatollah Kho-
meini. The Shah seemed to be such a splendid fulcrum
for American policies in the Middle East while he was
in full strength. But the United States was so closely
associated with him that his downfall brought with it
the exclusion of the US from Iran.
The memory of the story of the Shah is now stimu-
lating US policy toward President Marcos of the Phil-
ippines. Can the US disentangle itself from him in
time? The question is made acute by the expected but
nonetheless disturbing judicial whitewash of Philip-
pine Gen. Fabian Ver.
There . is little doubt in the minds of anyone who has
studied the records of the trial that former opposition
leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated by the
Army, which at that time (Aug. 21, 1983) was under
the command of General Ver. His acquittal is merely
more ammunition for the opposition. It proves in the
minds of most people in the Philippine Islands that
the Marcos dictatorship will stoop to anything to pro-
tect its own and perpetuate its regime.
Under vigorous prodding from Washington, Presi-
dent Marcos has now agreed to a special election in
February. The theory is that if only the moderate op-
position can be persuaded to put forward a single and
reputable candidate and if the elections are actually
fair and free, the result could be a legal shift to a new
and still democratic regime. That could defuse the ris-
ing communist movement.
Marcos was elected President of the Philippines in
1969. He declared martial law in 1972. He has run the
country ever since as his personal property. His wife,
Imelda, is reputed to have amassed a large fortune
during this period. So too have many of the people in
the group, including General Ver, that surrounds the
President.
The Reagan administration took off in 1981 in a
pro-Marcos mood. The Carter administration had
been criticizing Marcos for violation of human rights.
Vice-president George Bush went to Manila in June
1981 and toasted Marcos for his "adherence to demo-
cratic principles and to the democr tic processes." Mr.
Bush promised that the US would not desert him, and
he invited him to the White House.
Marcos came to Washington the next year for a
five-day official visit, and President Reagan on Sept.
16 gave him a White House banquet and praised him
as "a respected voice for reason and moderation."
By June 1983 Washington was beginning to have
doubts about the Marcos regime and its dedication to
the highest principles of democracy. US Secretary of
State George Shultz stopped off in Manila on June 25
and, at the inevitable formal dinner, referred to "the
very special relationship" between the US and the
Philippines. But members of his delegation informed
accompanying US reporters that one purpose of the
trip was to expand US relations with other political
leaders of the Philippines.
Last spring CIA Director William Casev sto
tion. On Oct. 12 Sen. Paul Laxalt, a personal friend of
President Reagan, made a special trip to Manila to de-
liver on behalf of the President "an extremely blunt
message of warning."
In other words, Washington is extremely worried
that the rising communist movement will sweep the is-
lands unless Mr. Marcos can be maneuvered into al-
lowing an honest election which will lead to a moder-
ate new regime. They are doing their best to maneuver
him out of the way before it is too late.
But, as often happens, it is difficult for dictators to
bring themselves to arrange for an orderly succession.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760019-6