PENTAGON DRAWS UP FIRST STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING A LONG NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: May 30, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1982
Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy
For Fightng a LongNuclear War
5. Year Overall Plan Gives Insight Into Think
Of Admin istr ation's Senior Diefense Officials
WASEINGTON, May 2f9 - Defense
Deportment policy-makers, in a new
five-year defense plan, have accepted
the premise that nuclear conflict with
the Soviet Union could be protracted
and have drawn up their first strategy
brllhtingsuch awar. i
'Ia what Pentagon officials term the
ea
Adinhdstration.99 g for Se the
ci Defense Casper W. Wenbegsig
;
nature, the armed forces are ordered to
prepare for nuclear counterattacks.
against the Soviet Union. "over a pro!
tractedperiod."
The guidapee document, drawn up in
the Pentagon and reflecting Its views,
will form the bads for the Defense De?
partmears budget requests for the next
five fiscal years. The document was
also a basic source for a recent strafe-
gic study done by the National Security
Council, according to Defense Depart-
ment officials. That study is the founds-
pon of the Administration's overall
strategic position.
Debate ea Nuclear War
The nature of nuclear war has been a
subject of Intense debate among politi-
cal leaders, defense specialists and
military officers. Some assert .that
there would be only one all-nut mutually
destructive ea~a Others argue
nuclear war, wit# y
ex-
cAaages could be fought over days and
weeks.
The outcome of the debate will shape
the weapons, communications and
strategy for nuclear farces. The~
and military planners, having denied
that protracted war is possible, say that-
American nuclear forces "must prevail
and be able to force the Soviet Union to
seek earliest termination of hostilities
on terms favorable to the. United
States." The Pentagon considers a
"protracted" war anything beyond a
single exchange of nuclear weapons.
Those views on nuclear war are ex-
pressed in a 125-page unpublished docu-
ment that outlines the Pentagon's mili-
tary strategy in detail for the next five
years and generally for the ne=t dec-
ade. Providing the most authoritative
. DyRI0HARDHALL0RAl11-
.8 ",.~0Tb?NWTftk2hW:
insight to date into the Plans for Mmdtaneove Operadeos
of the Reagan In a conventional war, the document
defense strategists, it instructs the says, "United States forces might be re-
armed forces to devise plans for quired simultaneously in geographi-
ing the Soviet union at any level of coo- cd1Y separated theaters," such as Eu-
flict from insures to nuclear war. rope Southwest Asia, and Korea. In
I%-L- partjCUlar, the document says,-it is as-
Other M
i
a
n
The document makes explicit a strat-
egy under which the military forces
would be prepared to strike the Soviet
homeland and Soviet allies such as
Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea in the
even of a
the Soviet U>~conventional war with
The guidance document makes time
other main points:
Nuclear war -strategy would be
based on what is known as decapitation,
meaning strikes at Soviet political and
military ~ leadership' and ?communica-
gconvventianal war strategy would
give Priority to defense of the American
homeland, than to Westatn Europe and
the oil resources of the Persian Gulf.
Defense of Asia ranks lower, and forces
may be shifted from the Western Pa-
cific to other regions if needed.
9In peacetime competition with the,
Soviet Union, the West's trade policies
would put as much pressure as possible
on a Soviet economy already burdened
with
gqnilitaryspendigg.
military assistance would
beg1ven to China in an effort to keep
tiS~Smforces along the Chinese
.border
9Special operations, meaning guer-
rilla warfare, sabotage and psychologi.
cal warfare, would have to be im-
proved. Space would have to be ex-
ploited for American military needs.
9Readiness of existing forces and
building ammunition and other stock.
piles to sustain those forces In battle
would be given priority over buying new
Weapons and equipment. The American
defense industry would have to be mod-
arnized.
!A lack of funds means that the five.
Year goal will probably not be reached,
strategy and forces would have to be
as flexible as possible to meet a wide
range of threats.
sandal mat the Soviet Union be can.
fronted with-the prospect of a major
conflict should it seek to reach the ou
resources of the Persian Gulf." _
Isaneocswar in differerrt parts of the
world. President Reagan's national se.
Curity lsweek ttha , William P. Clark, said highly mobile American
d would not strike of at
from one target to
another.
As a peacetime complement to mili-
asserts ahatyt ~U guidaum and
its
allies should, in effect, declare eco-
nomic and technical war'on the Soviet
Union.
It says that the United States should
develop weapons that "are difficult fort
the Soviets to-counter, Impose dispro.
Pate costs, open up new areas of;
major military camped aM obso-lesoe previous soviat Investment.
"
A More Det611W Plan
guDeesspite Its sometimes arcane Ian. j
Year 1984-1988 Defame Guidon ce,"pro.
vides a better understanding of the
thinking of military planners in the
Reagan Administration than earlier
documents, which were either routine i
public statements or revisions of 'the'
Carter Administration's strategy.
In many parts of this document, the
Reagan military planners started with
a blank sheet of paper. Their views on
the possibility of protracted nuclear
war differ from those of the Carter Ad.
ministration's military thinkers,. as do
their views on global conventional war
and particularly on putting economic
pressure on the Soviet Union.
basic vguid nce Paper represents the aws of Mr. Weinberger and his
deputy, Frank C. Carlucci, as well as
those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior
field Commanders, civilian policy plan.
nets and technical specialists.
The document was a basic source for
the recent strategic study done by the
j'n7%rrT, Ti Tr ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6
2
National Security Council, according to
Defense Department officials. The
study was the foundation of the Admin-
istration's overall strategy as described
by Mr. Clark in a speech May 21. But
the tone of his address was more re-
strained than the guidance document.
How Paper W W He Used
In the Defense Detphaertment, the docu-
Ment will de fo' p~edp~ams in the military
budget, such as procurement of weap-
ons, operation and maintenance and
the size of the armed services for the
:live years beginning Oct 1,7i61.
Those programs will be scrutinized
by the Office of Management and Budg.
et, then by the President before they are
sent to Congress for debate and appro.
priatlon of funds. The President, of
course, could reduce any of them if the
United States negotiated an arms re-
duon agreement with the Soviet
Union. -
armewide-ranging d forces document directs
open up now areas
.the of weaponry, particularly in ,
where it proposes the "prototype deve-
~ including weapons destroy
Soviet satellites.
At the other end of the scale, the plan
says that "we must revitalize and en-
hance special-operations forces to
project United States power where the
use of conventional forces would be
C tun, inappropriate or inufreoapsii-Eastern E.
Specialoperations its a euphemism for
guerrillas, saboteurs, commandos and
similar unconventional forces.
Priorities in the Document American forces to be able to "render
The saner asserts that American ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet-
need better communications and military and political power
forces
t
t
"
B
aunts "through a- protracted conflict period
ale document says that "meeting our and afterward, the capability to inflict
pig goal during this-year. pro. very levels of damage" on Soviet
gram period is probably infeasible" be. The nuclear strategy cause of overall budget restraints, the communications, so the President amend
long time it t produce weapons his senior military advisers could con-
and
readiness the of current urgent t Deed
forces. the trol a nuclear exchange and not be lim-
ited to one all-out response to Soviet at-
It therefore sets priority on reuniting tack.
and training, acquiring arms for exist- Communications and
building
ammw forcesand other a sable items to a vide the capability to execute ad hoc
minimum of a 60-day supply. There is plans, even subsequent to repeated at.
now less than 20 days' supply of many tacks," the document says. "In particu-
items. lar, these systems should support thg
Beyond the concepts, the document is reconstitution and execution of stratev
laced with new directives on specific gic reserve forces, specifically full"
items: communications with our strategic sub. .
9Deplayment of the advanced Vi. marines." Communications with sub='
dent II, or D5, ballistics missile to be marines today are considered slow and
launched from submarines would be cumbersome. ~.:
moved up a year to 1988. That could
bring into question the development of
the missile, since it would become
available at best only two years earlier.
ant it Prepares
. Wain-
e
d
i
f
ra
or
p
a
var
etv o
new com-
3
munica on
and e says
11112M
servigm
lh_ould a a
re__
ce
resources
The Rapid Deployment Force,
whose mission would be to defend
United States on sources around the
Persian Gulf,* would have up to five
Army divisions, two Marine divisions
and air - wings, 10 Air Force tactical
fighter wings and two B-52 wings, and
three Navy aircraft carriers and es-
corts, a force considerably larger than
previously contemplated.
9United States forces would improve
their "capability to assist friendly oil-
producing nations in the repair, resto-
ration or defense of their oilfields and
producing facilities."
9Tbe Navy and Air Force would work
together and fight Soviet operations tMips, o defend se
la aAir Force provtddliaagg intelligence from
Away radar aircraft and flying bomb.
era armed with antlship missiles.
meat wi Marine arming arriers, the Lanes
that are the aerial mainstay of the Brit-
ish forces around the Falklands, with
9A now is would be placed on
military aid to friendly nations. A Spe-
cial Defense Acquisition Fund would be
established to order and stock weapons,
including aircraft, that could be sent to
troubled allies or other friendly nations
in an emergency.
A Long Nuclear War
In developing a strategy for fighting a
ggproorretrractedcynuclear war,. Mr. Wei nber-
went beyond
Preaideat Car1pshes Presidential D
ttve . 59, which focused American nu.
dear strategy on attacks on specific
military and political targets.
The new nuclear strategy calls on
s
ure.
ruc
ut it goes on to require the
assured destruction of "nuclear and
conventional military forces and indus-
try critical to military power." Those
? forces must be able to maintain,
Concerns About the Sea
The guidance plan provides refin',
ments in nuclear doctrine. It says'thaf
nuclear weapons intended for strategic
strikes at the Soviet homeland might be
used for attacking targets, such as mili+;
tary bases, in areas such as Easteri>?
Europe. That appears to be an allusion' i
to cruise missiles launched from sub-_
marines.
Moreover, the document says, the
Soviet Union might be tempted to start
a nuclear attack on the United States
Navy in the belief that the conflict could
be limited to the sea. "Therefore," it .
says, "it will be United States policy
that a nuclear war begimdng with
Soviet attacks at sea will not neces-
sarily remain limited to the sea."
The military plan says that develop-
ment of ballistic missile defense sys-
tems to defend the United States
against Soviet nuclear attack would be
accelerated. It also says that the United
States might seek a revision in the anti-,
ballistic missile treaty if deployment of
the MX intercontinental missile re-
quired it.
In conventional arms, the document
says that "United States conventional
forces; in conjunction with those of our
allies, should be capable of putting at
risk Soviet interests, including the
Soviet homeland."
The armed forces are directed to pre-
pare specific strategies for meeting
Soviet aggression. In Western Europe,
it says, "First priority will be to stan
the initial Warsaw Pact thrust with
minimal loss of territory." That rejects
a strategy of trading space for time to
permit allied forces to build up for a
counterattack.
The paper calls for sea and air trans-
port capable of lifting six Army divi.
sions, half of a Marine division and air
wing and 60 Air Force tactical Suter
sluadrons to Europe within 10 days.
That would be impossible with current
transport.
Moreover the document says, "em-
phasis will ie given to offensive moves
against Warsaw Pact flanks to force di-
version of Pact resources from the cen-
tral front." The northern flank rests an
Norway, the southern an Turkey.
Furthw, "to exploit political, ecx-
nomic and military weaknesses within
the Warsaw Pact and to disrupt enemy
rear operations, special-operatic s
forces will conduct operations in East-
ern Europe and in the northern and
southern NATO regions," the document
says. Particular attention would be
to eroding
re Eastsport e EEurope. the
Soviet
Persian Gulf Strategy'
As outlined in the paper, the strategy
for Southwest Asia, including the Per-
sian Gulf, directs American forces to be
ready to force their way in, if neces-
sary, and not to wait for an invitation
from a friendly government, which has
been the publicly stated policy.
CONTLNUEJa1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6
. I %
It also shows that the primary ob'
tine of American military power in that
region would be to stop Soviet infiltra-
tion or invasion, and not necessarilyr to
bead off the invasion of one nation by
another olcialll(sugg has
ally bee~
Reducing Soviet access to technology`
from the United States and other non-I
Communist countries has long beettt
ieg
h
?
s T e'
nd
e P
IMM
t
d
an
t
that. It also reflects an.intention tome,
cute a technical strategy designed td
erode Soviet eomoaalc strengt>t. _`Y.,~!
should impose "costs on the'Soviets
to acoomplisb-some of,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700051-6