POISED FOR THE PERSIAN GULF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402700011-0
A_S'_CL-E !-,PPS' RED
Oil PA'i
By Richard Halloran
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
1 April 1984
ROMPTLY AT 8:30 EVERY
weekday morning, Lieut. Gen. Rob-
ert C. Kingston, commander in chief
of the United States Central Com-
mand, strides into a briefing room at
his headquarters at MacDill Air
Force Base in Tampa, Fla., and asks
his staff to be seated. An intelligence
officer, standing at a lectern beside a
large wall screen, flicks a switch to
display a map of the region around
the Persian Gulf. He runs quickly
through the action of the previous 24
hours in the war between Iran and
Iraq. Another flick brings up a satellite photograph of a new Ira-
nian troop deployment. A chart provides fresh detail on the
115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, or the 25 Soviet ships in the
Indian Ocean, or Soviet advisers in Ethiopia. The context in each
case: threats to the industrial world's largest source of oil.
General Kingston, known in military parlance as "the CINC"
(pronounced "Sink"), asks a short question; the briefing officer
gives an equally short reply. An operations officer takes the
podium, brings up a list of American forces available to the Cen-
tral Command, and highlights several points oh their training. A
map of the Arabian Sea shows where an American aircraft car.
rier and other warships have moved within the last 24 hours. A
second map shows the disposition of American warships in the
Persian Gulf. General Kingston asks another quick question in
his Boston twang, and gets another quick answer.
A third briefing officer gives a succinct forecast of weather
that could affect military operations in the 19 countries within
the Central Command's area of responsibility. A public-affairs
officer takes three minutes to report on news that may affect the
command. General Kingston says, "Thank you," rises and
walks out to resume his duties as commander of the American
military force that will fight to protect the oil lifeline from the
Persian Gulf, if President Reagan so orders.
In its four years of existence, first as the Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force, and then, since Jan. 1, 1983, as the Central
Command, the force has become, in General Kingston's words,
?'a credible deterrent." Its assets, he points out, include the or-
ganiza:icn of his headquarters; the combat units on call from the
Arm}, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force; the positioning of
arms and equipment close to the operating area; widening ac-
cess to bases in the region, and the experience of 16 exercises in
the United States and overseas and two overseas operations.
In February 1983, a month after the command was formed,
President Reagan responded to warnings from Egypt and Sudan
that the mercurial leader of Libya, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi,
planed an air assault on the Sudan and a coup to overthrow the
Sudanese Government. The President turned to the Central
Command; 37 hours later, four Awacs radar and control planes
arrived in Egypt to monitor Libyan air movements for the Egyp-
tian Air Force.
The President also deployed the air-
craft carrier Nimitz off the Libyan
coast to make F-14 fighters available
for air cover. Administration officials
said at the time that Mr. Reagan had
let Colonel Qaddafi know he was pre-
pared to order the destruction of the
Libyan Air Force should the Libyan
leader persist. Neither the assault nor
the coup was attempted.
Similarly, the Central Command dis-
patched Awacs and supporting aircraft
to Egypt two weeks ago, after a Libyan
bomber attacked a city in the Sudan.
The mission was the same: to dissuade
Colonel Qaddafi from trying to over-
throw the Sudanese Government.
Even so, the command still has im-
mense obstacles to overcome. General
Kingston, a veteran of 16 campaigns in
the Korean and Vietnam Wars and
among the nation's most experienced
combat leaders, says bluntly: "If we
had to send a combat force into the Cen-
tral Command area, we would start
from almost zero in terms of combat
power and support structure."
The Central Command is 7,000 miles
from its area of responsibility. It has
few forces under its operational control
- and these only when deploying. Spe-
cial forces to operate behind enemy
lines are inadequate. The command
lacks sufficient air and sea transport,
and acquiring it is proving to be slow.
Access to other nations' military bases
is dependent on the political winds of
the moment; there is little long-term
logistical support. The command has
neither a communications annaratus
nor an intelligence network in place.
And the United States has no military
alliances with nations in the region the
command has been assigned to defend.
All this raises serious questions of
combat capability. Whether the Central Command could accom-
plish any particular mission would depend on the strength of the
adversary, the amount of warning time, and the speed with
which deployment took place. The command's basic tactic
would be a pre-emptive move - getting into position first in hope
of deterring an adversary's strike.
Clearly, the Central Command could handle the small Iranian
units of poorly trained and badly led Revolutionary Guards that
have been thrown at the Iraqi Army. Just as clearly, the com-
mand would be in deep trouble if the Soviet Union's 30 divisions
north of the Iranian border and in Afghanistan were to drive
south. What is less certain is how well the command would per-
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form in some crisis in between - whether it could assemble and
deploy enough troops to stop. say, a full-scale Iranian invasion of
Saudi Arabia.
THE CENTRAL COMMAND, ONE OF SIX UNIFIED, MULTI-
service United States commands, is responsible for military
operations, security assistance and training of foreign forces in
Southwest Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.
reinforcements and Powers Act. Allies
supplies. would have to be con-
A Presidential deci- sulted: The Europeans
sion would be only the are wary of any Amer.
first step. Congress ican move that might
would undoubtedly divert forces from Eu-
have a say under the rope, even though they,
much-disputed War
its area of responsibility covers an expanse larger than the con- and the Japanese, are far more dependent on oil from the
tinental United States, stretching from Egypt in the west to Persian Gulf than is the United States. Friendly nations would be
Pakistan in the east, from Jordan in the north to Kenya in the asked for access to bases and for permission to fly over their
south. Its primary mission was laid down in 1982 in Defense territory. The Soviet Union would be advised' that the United
Guidance, the Defense Department's secret marching orders: States seeks only to stabilize a turbulent situation. The Soviet
..Our principal objectives are to assure continued access to news agency, Tass, has already warned that American actions
Persian Gulf oil, and to prevent the Soviets from acquiring politi- in the Persian Gulf "are creating a grave threat to peace and in.
cal-military control of the oil directly or through proxies." ternational security."
In the late 1970's, plans for a force that could be dispatched to Once the order had been given, the Central Command's prob-
trouble spots had kicked around the Pentagon for several years. lems would begin. The command has enormous political and
The fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghani- military handicaps that make it different from the Atlantic, Pa-
stan, both during President Carter's Administration, brought cific and European commands, the Southern Command for Latin
the force into being. America and the Readiness Command that controls forces in the
Today, the Central Command's immediate concern is to be United States. -
ready to deploy forces should the war between Iran and Iraq Politically, the Central Command has no umbrella of pacts
jeopardize the oil fields around the Persian Gulf. Iran has threat- like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe or the
ened to retaliate for Iraqi attacks on its oil installations by clos- mutual security treaty with Japan. In its area of responsibility,
ing the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly nine million bar- differences in political outlook are profound. Most nations in the
rels of oil from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, region regard Israel as their main enemy, while the United
Kuwait and Iran are shipped each day, providing 20 percent of States sees the Soviet Union as the threat. Islamic nations do not
the non-Communist world's oil. American naval officers doubt want to embrace the United States, at least not in public, because of
that Iran has the mines to shut a channel 30 miles wide, very American support for Israel. The recent criticism of the Reagan
deep, and filled with swirling currents. But an air attack, or a Administration's Middle East policy by King Hussein of Jordan has
batch of free-floating mines, or an artillery assault on a passing jeopardized hopes for military cooperation with that nation.
tanker could send maritime insurance rates prohibitively high, Unlike the European Command in Stuttgart, West Germany,
scaring off ship captains and owners. or the Pacific Command in Hawaii, the Central Command's
"It's not so much Khomeini that's the problem," says one offi- Tampa headquarters is far from its area of operations. Unli
cer, "it's Lloyd's of London." To prevent those insurance rates those and other commands. Command `-- no forGa
from reducing the flow of oil, Administration contingency plans
provide for sweeping mines, escorting tankers with frigates. a es in area, and no estab-
flying air cover, or launching air strikes from an aircraft carries lished communications and intelligence structures.
in the Arabian Sea. "We have contingency plans to handle every- The Defense Guidance of 1983 acknowledged these shortcom-
thing from an energy shortage to the military situation," says an ings. It said: "We must acquire a reasonable assurance of
official in Washington. "We began the planning in November achieving United States war-fighting objectives in Southwest
and December, but we've gotten more serious about it in the last Asia by the end of the decade." That would include reacting to
three or four weeks." everything from insurgency to Soviet invasion.
At Central Command headquarters, an intelligence secti
scrutinizes indicators an warnings rom the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Defense Iritelrgence Agency and National Se-
curity Agency. A Combat Capabilities Assessment Group per-
forms as a "fire brigade," running a constant check.on crises,
not only around the Persian Gulf but in the Sudan; in Somalia
and Ethiopia, with their continual skirmishes; and in Oman and
Yemen, where Soviet-backed Yemenis have been probing the
Omani border. Operations and logistic sections rework contin-
gency plans. "There is nothing so perishable," says one officer,
"as a contingency plan."
In the field, prudent commanders take up slack to be ready if
the bugle sounds. But before soldiers climb aboard air trans-
ports, at least one nation in the command's area of operations
-would have to invite the-United States to send forces. President
Reagan has said the United States will not intervene on land
without such an invitation, because of the fierce political opposi.
tion that would arise otherwise. Moreover, says an officer in the
Tampa headquarters, rines who could under-
"an invitation is a mili-
tary necessity." The
Central Command has
paratoopers or ma-
take a "forced entry,"
but that would be hard
to execute - and even
harder to sustain with
N ANY CONTINGENCY, AN EARLY ALERT WOULD
be critical. With a five-day warning, an Air Force
fighter squadron and a battalion of 800 Army para.
troopers could be in the region within 48 hours of the or-
der to go; B-52 bombers could be in action in the same
time. By the end of a week, two more battalions of
paratroopers and a brigade headquarters would bring
the total to 3,000 soldiers. How quickly an aircraft car-
rier, with its 70 to 90 planes, and a Marine Amphibious
Unit of 1,800 marines could get to the scene would de-
pend on where they were when the signal was given. A
carrier is almost always in the Indian Ocean, but Ma-
rine units come and go.
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After that, things would slow down because of insuffi-
cient airlift and sealift. It would take two or three weeks to bring
in two more brigades of paratroopers and support units from
Fort Bragg, N.C., to fill out the 82d Airborne Division. The first
of the 12,000 marines in the Seventh Marine Amphibious Bri-
gade, which includes infantry, artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft
and combat support units, would begin to arrive in a week from
Twentynine Palms, Calif. So would ships from the island of
Diego Garcia, 2,000 miles to the south, with weapons, ammuni?
tion, food and supplies for the marines. But it would take several
weeks for the entire brigade to arrive, depending on air trans.
port. More than a month would be needed for the Army's 24th In-
fantry Division, with its armored personnel carriers and tanks,
to arrive by ship from Fort Stewart, Ga.
General Kingston, who won the Distinguished Service Cross,
the nation's second-highest decoration, in Vietnam, would soon
move his headquarters from its nondescript box to a forward
base. To lessen the handicap of distance, the Central Command
in December placed a forward headquarters aboard the.com.
mand ship LaSalle in the Persian Gulf.
But General Kingston does not hide his dissatisfaction with
that arrangement. He told Congress last year that "a forward
element afloat sends the wrong message to our friends and foes
alike." What was needed, he said, was a forward headquarters
ashore. That, he said, would "send a clear signal of United
States resolve," providing "the right kind of presence at a mini-
mum cost to the taxpayer and maximum benefit to the nation."
Instead of permanently assigned troops, the Central Com-
mand has a force list of 300,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and air-
men from which it can draw.
A ground force would come from three Army divisions and
from a brigade of helicopter gunships. The Army's new, mobile
light division will be available later.
The Marine Corps would furnish a ground division and an air
wing plus an infantry regiment and an air group.
The Air Force has designated nine tactical fighter wings, a
Strategic Projection Force of B-52 bombers, an airborne warn-
ing and control wing of Awacs radar and supporting planes, and
reconnaissance and electronic-warfare units.
The Navy would provide three aircraft carriers, a surface
group probably centered on a battleship, five maritime aerial
patrol squadrons, and ships from the Middle East Force.
General Kingston, who once commanded the Special Forces,
or Green Berets, would use some of those soldiers, plus Army
Rangers, Air Force special-operations units and Navy Seals to
infiltrate behind enemy lines.
Sustaining a formidable force near the Persian Gulf with a
steady flow of reinforcements, fuel, ammunition and supplies
would be even more difficult than getting it there. Maj. Gen. Wil-
liam E. Klein, a staff officer with the Joint Chiefs, told Congress re-
cently that "the size of the force we could send to Southwest Asia is
limited by our capability to support it."
"Probably the most pressing
need we have is for more lift -
airlift and sealift," General
Kingston says. "Seven thou-
sand miles one way is a long
commute."
It takes a CS Galaxy 14
hours to fly from the East
Coast to Oman at the mouth of
the Persian Gulf. Cargo ships
carrying the bulk of the heavy
equipment would take 31 dayrs,
if the Suez Canal were closed
and they had to sail the 12,000
miles around the Cape of Good
Hope.
Once troops and supplies ar-
rived, mobility would be hard
to achieve. The entire region,
General Kingston points out,
"has just two-thirds of the
paved-road mileage found in
the state of Florida."
D
As a substitute for bases
under United States control,
American diplomats have pio-
neered a new concept for the
Central Command, persuading
several nations in the region to
give American forces access to
their military installations, in
most cases, the United States
pays for expanding and im-
proving those bases.
After long negotiations, the
United States has gained ac-
cess to the Sidi Sliman Air
Base in Morocco as a way sta-
tion. The Administration has
obtained a Congressional ap-
propriation of S2 million for
this fiscal year to improve that
base, and has asked for $3 mil-
lion for the fiscal year that be-
gins on Oct. 1.
American forces have sev-
eral times used the Egyptian
military airport at Cairo West
for maneuvers. But getting an
agreement to build a large
base at Ras Banas, on the
shore of the Red Sea, has run
into snags. American and
Egyptian negotiators have
agreed that Egypt will put up
$49 million for construction
j and the United States another
$49 million, but for a project
less ambitious than originally
planned.
In Oman, Sultan Qabus bin
Said has opened airfields at
Seeb and Thumrait to Amer.
ican forces, and has agreed to
allow the United States to
stockpile war materiel there.
He has also permitted the
United States to use the island
of Masira as a transfer point
for supplies flown In by large
planes, then taken by boat or
smaller planes to ships at sea.
The Administration got $60.4
million in 1983 for construction
in Oman and another $28.6 mil-
lion for this year, and has
asked for $42 million for next
year. Included wotfld be hard-
ened shelters for fighter planes
at Seeb and temporary accom-
modations for American per-
sonnel at Thumrait.
Programs for improving
bases in Kenya and Somalia
have been completed, at least
for now. The United States
spent $57.9 million between
1981 and 1983 in Kenya, largely
on port facilities. Another $54.4
million was spent in Somalia
during the same period,
largely to refurbish the air and
naval base at Berbera built by
the Soviet Union before Soma-
lia broke off military relations
with Moscow in 1977.
The British island of Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean is
vital to the Central Com-
mand's logistic, naval and air
support. Of the 18 cargo ships
that would immediately supply
American forces deployed to
the Persian Gulf, 15 are based
at Diego Garcia. To escape ob-
servation by Soviet spy satel.
lites, each vessel occasionally
slips into the shipping lanes of
the Indian Ocean, where it be-
comes indistinguishable from
the 5,000 ships plying those
routes. Another ship is based
at Subic Bay in the Philippines,
yet another is stationed at
Guam, and a third cruises
around the Mediterranean,
loaded with Air Force ammu-
nition.
Over the last four years, the
United States has enlarged the
airfield at Diego Garcia to ac-
commodate B-52 bombers.
Warehouses, repair shops and
communications facilities
have been built. Submarine
tenders call to service under-
sea boats. The United States
spent $57.9 million to improve
the naval and air bases in 1983,
and it is spending another $90
million this year. The request
for fiscal 1985 is down to $22.9
million, as the program nears
completion.
Saudi Arabia has so far held
the Central Command at arm's
length, offering no access to
oases and witholding permis-
sion for American forces to
maneuver there. But the Saudi
Government has been building
a complex of bases far beyond
its needs or its ability to oper-
ate. American planners be-
lieve those bases would be
made available in an emergen.
cy.
To compensate for the lack
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of treaties, General Kingston
has begun to build a relation.
ship with each nation in his
command's operating region.
Critical to that effort have
been deployments of American
forces for training with local
troops.
The most visible Central
Command exercises have been
three Bright Star maneuvers,
most recently last summer,
when 26,500 American soldiers,
sailors, airmen and marines
were deployed to Egypt,
Sudan, Somalia and Oman and
nearby waters. B-52 bombers
flew from bases in the United
States to make bombing runs,
paratroopers jumped with
Egyptian paratroopers, and
Marine tanks churned ashore
through heavy surf into Soma-
lia. For the first time, the de-
ployment included a combined
Egyptian-Sudanese-American
maneuver.
A less-publicized exercise
has been Shadow Hawk, in
which American air-defense
soldiers train with Jordanians
in Jordan. Marines have made
amphibious landings in Kenya
and Oman, communications
teams have drilled in Oman,
and Special Forces units have
trained in the Sudan. The big
exercise this year, called Gal-
lant Eagle, has been scheduled
for the deserts of California
this summer, while another
Bright Star deployment to
Egypt and other nations is
planned for 1985.
General Kingston empha-
sizes personal relations. Last
year, he spent five days in Jor-
dan, where he met with King
Hussein, and another five days
touring military bases in Saudi
Arabia. He also visited Egypt,
Sudan, Somalia, Kenya,
Yemen, Oman and Bahrain.
The relationship between the
Central Command and the
countries of the region is fur-
thered, General Kingston be.
lieves, by the command's role
as the agency for administer-
ing American security assist.
ance in the area. In 1983, the
United States provided $7.7 bil-
lion worth of assistance in mili-
tary sales, government-fi-
nanced arms shipments, mili-
tary construction, training,
grants, economic support for
Lieut. Gen. Robert
Kingston, head of the
Central Command, at his
headquarters in Florida.
In Its first four years, the
force has carried out 16
exercises, Including one
last year In Egypt
and become, In the
general's words, "a
credible deterrent."
military programs, and com-
mercial arms exports to 14 of
the 19 nations in the Central
Command's operating area,
plus Morocco. That nation is
outside the command's area
but is crucial to its line of com-
munications. The sum will go
up to an estimated $9.1 billion
this year and to a projected $11
billion in 1985.
Right now, most of the com-
mand's contingency plans
focus on American troops. In
the future, planners would like
to work with their counter-
parts in the region.
Four years ago, officers in
the Rapid 'Deployment Joint
Task Force had to start almost
from scratch to acquire data
on the ethnic mixtures, reli-
gious complexities and geogra.
phy of a region of snow-capped
mountains and deserts with
130-degree temperatures.
Good maps have been hard to
come by. Weather informa-
tion, vital to military opera-
tions despite technical ad-
vances, was lacking. When
American helicopters flew into
Iran on their aborted mission
to rescue the American Em-
bassy hostages, pilots ran into
huge dust storms, about which
they had not been warned.
For intelligence. the Central
? uiniand has no network of
listening posts to intercept
radio and telephone transmis-
4iorL. It lacy places to out
sensors that can find, through
r dar ~r infrared deteStion.
movements of tanks, missiles
and aircraft. The command
lacks agents to gather infor.-
mation that satellite S)hntn-e
are unable to nick up - for .Q
.
stance, how many aircraft in-
side a hangar are fit to fly.
Similarly, the Central Com- j
mand does not have the com-
munications by radio, telex
and telephone that are com-
mon to other commands. The
entire apparatus for communi-
cating with units in the field
and with Washington must be
carried when the command de-
ploys.
When the Central Com-
mand's forerunner, the Rapid
Deployment Force, was
formed in 1980, critics scoffed
that it was not rapid, had little
to deploy, and was not much of
a force. The critics have been
less vocal recently, as the Cen-
tral Command has started to
make progress. General
Kingston touched on that in a
recent address in London, say-
ing: "Four years ago, if the
President had directed us to
send a military force to this
area of the world to protect the
vital interests of the United
States, its friends and its allies,
no one could have told you
what forces would go, in what
order, how long it would take
them to get there, how they
would be sustained or who
their commander would be."
"Today," he concluded, "I
can answer all of those ques-
tions." ^
Richard Halloran, a member of The Times's Washington bu-
reau, covers military affairs.
,
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