COVERT ACTIONS: DEBATING WISDOM AND MORALITY

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640054-1
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 20, 2012
Sequence Number: 
54
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 8, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640054-1.pdf147.31 KB
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STAT 61 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640054-1 NEW YORK TIMES 8 April 1983 IrrriCLE APPEA1ED 'N PAGE 4'/J' ..? STAT Covert Actions: Debating Wisdom By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to me New York nom ? - WASHINGTON, April 7? The lat- est disclosures about the Reagan Ad- ministration's covert prograai in Cen- tral America have raised -old ques- tions about the wisdom and morality of secret American involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. It is a debate that has been waged - off and on for years here, where se- crecy and intrigue are a part of life. Should the United States secretly fi- nance paramilitary activities against another government? . Specifically, should -the. United States finance covert military actions against thtiNicaraguan Government, as it is doing now, or should it restrict itself to the above-board effort io bol- ster the military, economic and politi- cal structure of El Salvador, which is threatened by insurgents who the Ad- ministration contends are directed and supported from Nicaragua? The dispute recalls debates after disclosures of American involvement in such places as Cuba, Laos, Angola, the Congo and Guatemala. It has only just begun to be heard on Capitol Rill. But it is causing concern for many Ad- ministration officials trying to galva- nize public opposition to those seeking to overthrow the American-backed Government in El Salvador. `The Moral Imprimatur' "U.S. actions against Nicaragua un- dercut the moral imprimatur upon which U.S. policy in El Salvador is based," Representative Jim Leach; Republican of Iowa, asserted on the House floor Tuesday. "In El Salvador, we stand foursquarely against those who are armed and financed from abroad and who would shoot their way into power. In Nicaragua, we stand foursquarely with such forces, and are in fact the financiers of anarchy." The Reagan Administration, at least until the most recent unraveling of its covert support for anti-San ? forces in Nicaragua, has not seen a0- thing inconsistent with opposing in- surgents in El Salvador and backing insurrection in Nicaragua. Both courses are consistent with the Na- tional Security Council's two-year projection on Central American policy through 1984, which was written last year and made available Wednesday. It said, "In the short run, we must work to eliminate Cuban-Soviet influ- ence in the region." The projection also expressed satis- faction ists "are under increased pressure as ianri Mnralifv, that in Nicaragua the Sandin - a result of our covert efforts and be- cause of the poor state of the econ- omy." It said at another point that in this period there should be "signifi- cant covertoactivity." But the document also pointed up continued "serious difficulties with U.S. public and Congressional opinion which jeopardizes our ability to stay the course." It said there should be "a concerted public information effort" to meet this problem. The document did not seem to _recognize the quandary that in the past befell administrations involved . in covert backing for paramilitary Foreign Relations Conamittee, tried to talk President 'Kennedy out of going ahead with the covert American-spon- sored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. In a memorandum to Mr. Kennedy that listed many arguments against the operation, Senator Fulbright said that "to give this activity even covert sup- -port is of a piece with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which the United forces: that once a large-scale covert operation has become known, the American public has tended to ques- tion the American intervention in an- other country's affairs rather than to criticize the activities by Communists or others that provoked the United States actions in the first place. Debate on Covert Activity For years, the value and morality of American covert support for armed intervention in another country has provoked bitter debates in Washing.: ton.Dir. Leach, making the case for those 'who oppose such action, said that by doing what it condemns the Communists for doing, the United States was lowering itself "into the gutter with the violence-prone revolu- tionaries we so loudly condemn." Twenty-two years ago, Senator J. W. Fulbright, then chairman of the Torn limos States is constantly denouncing the Soviet Union in the United Nations and elsewhere." Yet Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, argued publicly and privately that however distasteful clandestine mili- tary operations were to a democracy, the United States could not afford to give the Communists a monopoly in the "back alleys of the world." Daniel Arnold, a retired Central In- telligence Agency senior official in Asia, speaking at a symposium on covert action in December 1980, justi- fied paramilitary covert action by asking: "Is it more moral for the United States to stand aside while Soviet-backed forces subvert a society than to covertly intervene to support the far more benign forces with which -we share a common interest?" The special Senate committee that investigated the American intelli- CONT,INUF-D Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640054-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640054-1 .2 . gence community 1111976 looked into coven paramilitary action and con- cluded that "the evidence points to- ward the failure of paramilitary ac- tivity as a technique of covert action." 'Great Potential for Escalating' "They are difficult, if not impossi- ble, to conceal," it said, warning that such operations "have great potential for escalating into major military commitments." It said that of the five paramilitary activities studied by the committee, only one appeared to have achieved its objectives. That could have been the use of Cuban exiles in the 1960's to maintain the Congo ? now Zaire ? government in power. One Administration official, who said his viewa did not represent those of the policy makers, said today that there was a legitimate question as to whether the Administration should allow itself to be supporting covert military operations. He said that the fact that the covert operation had been "more or less ex- posed" had allowed the Communists to divert public attention away from the insurgency in El Salvador. "I think it was a mistake by Haig to give up the high moral ground," he said, referring to former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., who was the primary official involved in launching the clandestine operation. This official said that even in Guate- mala where the C.I.A., in 1954. helped the right-wing army officers over- throw a civilian government, the "vic- tory- in the long run was costly to the United States because it provided con- tinual grist for those accusing the United States of "imperialism" in Latin America. Another official said that his con- cern was regardless of whether re- ports of covert operations in Nicara- gua were correct, they "titillated" the press and made it difficult for the Ad- ministration to publicize the reforms of the Salvadoran Government and to focus on the activities of the Nicara- guan-backed insurgents in El Salva- dor. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640054-1