TOP REAGAN AIDE DEFENDS THE USE OF COVERT ACTION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 26, 2012
Sequence Number:
15
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 14, 1984
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4.pdf | 147.24 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
TOP REAGAN AIDE
DEFENDS THE USE
OF COVERT ACTION
AN 'INTERMEDIATE OPTION'
Adviser Calls C.I.A.'s Secret
Central America Activities
an Alternative to War
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
? SpmWtonieWmWmialum
WASHINGTON, May 13? President
Reagan's national security adviser
said today that covert action in such re-
gions as Central America was increas-
ingly necessary to give the United
States an alternative between going to
war and doing nothing when a friendly
nation is under attack.
His comments constituted one of the
strongest Administration justifications
for thejaElLvizjiting_saraisimuLL
Central America under the supervision
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The security adviser, Robert C.
McFarlane, said Americans have to
wrestle with the question of "should we
or should we not have some intermedi-
ate option of policy, covert action?"
"The real issue which is being chal-
lenged by people on the Hill and pub-
licly is should you do these kinds of
things at all, and I think we ought to
come to terms with that," he said,
referring to the sharp Congressional
opposition to covert activities.
No Plans to Send G.I.'s
In an appearance on the NBC News
program "Meet the Press," he said his
personal view was that the United
States should use such covert activi-
ties.
While repeating that the Administra-
tion had no plans to send United States
combat troops to Central America, Mr.
McFarlane did not rule out the possibil-
ity that this could happen if Congress
fails to give the aid the Administration
says is necessary to let the Salvadoran
Government survive a predicted in-
crease in rebel activity in the fall.
py Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4
NEW YORK TIMES
14 May 1984
United States aid in Central America
falls under three broad headings. The
first is direct, public support in mili-
tary and economic aid of friendly na-
tions such as El Salvador and Hon-
duras. The second is covert backing for
anti-Sandinista rebels based in Hon-
duras and Costa Rica who have been
fighting the Nicaraguan Government.
The third is the presence of United
States forces in the area to demon-
strate the ability to respond directly.
Seeking Public Support
Senior Administration officials have
said that Mr. McFarlane has been a
leading advocate among Mr. Reagan's
advisers for concentrating on gaining
public support for both the public and
covert aid programs.
Mr. McFarlane has told associates
that the public has to be educated to the
fact that there is a "gray area" be-
tween "total war" and "total peace,"
i and that the United States cannot af-
ford to give up covert activity.
, Mr. McFarlane, in fact, had let it be
known _privately that he pressed Mr.
Reagan to deliver a speech Wednesda_y_
on Central America in part to secure
mere_ Dads for the_ LIA._a_ctigps_jn
Nicaragua. which have been_stronglv
.0moacgd_ip CengresS.
The critiosm increased when it was
disclosed that thehad been in-
nlYed.. _the raittini_s4.1licaragun
harbors.. Administration officials have
said that the miningimmelat theand
of March and that it wpuld not be re-
sumed.
Programs of covert action in Nicara-
gua are in danger of ending, Adminis-
tration officials have said, because of
lack of money. Congress has not passed
a request for $21 million for the anti-
Sandinista guerrillas and there is a
strong possibility it will not do so.
Mr. Reagan, while condemning Nica-
ragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union for
their activities in Central America, did
not directly mention covert activity in
his speech. He concentrated on the ,
need for Congress to approve the mili-
tary aid sought for the Salvadoran Gov-
ernment.
The next day the House, in a sym-
bolic vote of support for Mr. Reagan,
narrowly approved a bill that would
allow House committees to appropriate
up to $129.4 million for the fiscal year
that ends Sept. 30, and $132.5 million for
the 1985 fiscal year. It did so without at-
taching the conditions that had been op-
posed by the Administration, but also
without approving any aid for the anti-
Sandsta rebels.
That bill is an authorization, not an
appropriation measure. The vote was a
way of sending a signal to the joint
House-Senate appropriation confer-
ence committee that is to meet this
weelL
The bill approved Thursday was dis-
tinct from the pending and more im-
portant requests for wiiat the Adminis-
tration calls merger y aid for El Sal-
vador and for the Nicaraguan rebels.
Those funds depend on the House-Sen-
ate appropriations conference, which
will discuss requests for $32 MilliOn in
military aid for El Salvador and $21
million for the Nicaraguan rebels.
Both were passed by the Senate in
early April, but have not been voted on
by the House. Because the House last
week approved the other El Salvador
aid request, it is expected that the con- ,
ferees will approve substantial emer-
gency aid for El Salvador.
Nicaraguan Request
There is less of an emergency char-
acter now to the $62 million Salvadoran
request because the Administration
has used a special feature of law to allo-
cate $32 million in military aid to El
Salvador. The major question is
whether the President's speech urging
a fight against Communism in Central
America has convinced to approve the
$21 million for Nicaragua.
Mr. McFarlane rarely speaks on the
record to reporters, preferring to keep
his remarks anonymous. But hte has ap-
peared
particular Administration poll-
on television interview shows to
cies, as be did today.
He said today that American
lntei-
had'cked inf
Cubans had decided to rouzlily dou-
that the
ble" the violence being carried out by
;.? ts in El Salvador who
e . , . would result 1
In a "Tet-like" rebel offensive this fall
In El Salvador, referring to the heavy
attacks by the Communists in South
Vietnam during the 1968 Tet holiday ,
period.
Mr. McFarlane said that "we believe
twinckeu.,11-.. the+ ma., ars., ?11,, c?-0.-- ?
Continued
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4
2.
ran Government is going to be able to
deal with that is to prepare the army in
terms of training and equipment and so
forth, to be able to pre-empt it."
Mr. McFarlane repeated that "the
United States has not, is not now, I
don't anticipate will plan in the future
for the involvement of U.S. troops in
combat in Central America."
"Our expectation is the Salvadorans
can do the Job if they're given enough in
the way of resources," he said.
Mr. McFarlane was asked if the
United States was not being drawn into
a situation analogous to that in Viet-
nam, where American involvement
that was limited to aid and advisers
grew into direct combat participation.
"Only if we don't do enough right
now to enable the Salvadorans, Hondu-
rans to dolt themselves," he answered.
"Now, it's important, whether it's in
Central America or somewhere else
that we choose carefully problems
where there is still a possibility of re-
trieving it before there is any need for
U.S. involvement."
He said that if not enough aid is sup-
plied, "then we are assuring that later
on they will lose."
Defending Interests
When he was asked if this did not
mean logically that the United States
would send in troops, rather than
"lose" in El Salvador, Mr. McFarlane
said: "The United States at all times
and today will defend its interests.
That condition simply doesn't exist
today and I'm confident we can prevent
Its occurrence."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4