SHULTZ JUSTIFIES SCARING QADDAFI BY USE OF PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302630024-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 3, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/13 CIA-RDP90-00965R000302630024-5
ARTICLE
AON PAGEM.
Shultz Justifies
Scaring Qaddafi
By Use of Press
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Oct. 2 ?
1111iii _,'Secretary of State George P. Shultz
said today that Washington was free to
take whatever actions might cause
trouble for CoL Muammar el-Qaddafi
because the United States was "pretty
darn close" to a state of war with
Libya.
In a news conference, Mr. Shultz
refused to comment on a report that
the Reagan Administration had en-
gaged in a campaign of deception
against Colonel Qaddafi in August.
. But he seemed to confirm the report
by his answers, in which he praised the
use of deception if it would cause prob-
lems for the Libyan leader.
Although Mr. Shultz did not explicitly
confirm or deny the existence of a "dis-
information" campaign, the tone of his
remarks conflicted with statements by
White House officials, who said the
Government had not planted any false
reports in American newspapers.
Mr. Shultz said the United States was
able to carry out any deception be-
cause of what he described as a tend-
ency in the American press to exagger-
ate the importance of naval move-
ments off Libya.
"Frankly, I don't have any problems
with a little psychological warfare
against Qaddafi," Mr. Shultz said.
"We do have various things going on
that are difficult for him to know ex-
actly what they mean, that perhaps
keep him off balance," he said.
Mr. Shultz said there were signs that
Libya was responsible for the hijacking
of a Pan American World Airways
plane in Karachi, Pakistan, last month.
In ? discussing relations with Libya,
Mr. ,Shultz compared the situation to
World War II and quoted Winston
Chutchill as having said, "Inetime of
war, the truth is so precious, it must be
atiended by a bodyguard of lies."
The quotation became the title of a
boolc, "Bodyguard of Lies," by Anthony
Cave-Brovm, about the use of deception
in World War II.
When a reporter remarked that Mr,
Shuttz's remarks seemed, in effect, a
declaration of war, the Secretary said,
"I think that insofar as Qaddafi Is con-
icerned, we don't have a declaration of
ware, but we have something pretty
darn close to it."
NEW YORK TIMES
3 October 1986
" pknow of no decision to have people
go alit and tell lies," he said. "I think,
however, if there are ways to make
Qadliafi nervous, why shouldn't we?"
Mt. Shultz, who has taken the lead
within the Government in urging the
use of force against Libya, seemed to
takei the offensive during the news con-
ference.
Calls Qaddatl a 'Menace'
S:king of Colonel Qaddafi, Mr.
Shu said:
" sofar as he is concerned, we think
he is a menace. And we want to see the
activities of Libya stop. So exactly
what we are, and intend to do about it, I
don't think it is appropriate for me to
say. But we have shown that we are
willing to take direct action. We have
shown that we have applied a very
broad range of sanctions to his activi-
ties."
As an example, Mr. 4tBiltz said. the
Government has learned that the Press
often focusts on secret shin move-
ments. and has therefore decided to
use this tendency to cause Col9n?ad-
daft to fear he may be invaded.
"It is very easy," Mr. Shultz said.
"You people in the news business enjoy
not allowing the U.S. to do anything in
secret if you can help it.
"So, if the fleet moves from one place
to another, you are determined to re-
port it even though we might want to
have it operate secretly. Itis very diffi-
cult for that to happen. So we can abso-
lutely bank on the fact that if the fleet
does something or other, you will
scream. Qaddafi will hear it, and the
fleet may, or may not, be getting ready
to do something."
In August, one of the concerns of
Colonel Qaddafi were naval maneuev-
ers by the United States with Egypt off
Libya.
The Washington Post quoted Mr.
Shultz as having said in jest at one
point that he hoped Colonel Qaddafi
might get AIDS.
He declined to confirm this, saying,
"I have no comment on statements
that somebody who probably was not
there may incorrectly attribute to
somebody who was there."
At one point, a journalist said that
the report of a decision to disinform
was "a very serious charge."
"Why is that a charge?" Mr. Shultz
replied. "If I were a private citizen
reading about it, and I read that my
Government was trying to confuse
'somebody who was conducting terror-
ist acts and murdering Americans, I
would say, 'Gee, I hope it is true.' I
don't see why you think this is a
charge"
; He said that although he knew of "no
decision to have people go out and tell
! Iles," he had nothing against taking
saps to make Colonel Qaddafi "nerv-
ous."
"If there are ways in which we can,
make Qaddafi nervous, why shouldn't
we?" he said. "And I described one of
them. That is not deceiving you, but
just using your predictable tendencies
to report things that we try to keep se-
c ret.
"So we label it a big secret and you
will find out about it and you will report
It. You know that. The higher the classi-
fication, the quicker you will report it.
So you are predictable in that sense."
nprinqcifiRci and Approved For Release 2012/11/13 CIA-RDP90-00965R000302630024-5