ADMIRAL'S MEMORIES HAIL CODE-BREAKERS IN WWII

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302550006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 30, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302550006-4
i it LE APPEARED.
ON PA6
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 Decembcr 1985
Admiral's memoirs hail
code-breakers in WW II
Author tries to set record straight on
Hypo' officer in Battle of Midway
By Prlsr adw
st.n wdw d n,. Gxbd.n s, . Moi1I r
1Ned M ua
Forty years after the end of World War U, it is increasingly dear
that theft of enemy messages was crucial to the United States vic-
tory over Japan.
This "theft" was accomplished by men and women who ana-
lyzed intercepted radio communications, cracked codes, and
squeezed out secret information on such things as ship movements
and attack targets. -
Such radio intelligence gave the US invaluable advantage during
the Battle of Midway, according to a new book drawing on recently
declassified documents. But the man who broke the Midway se-
crets was promptly reassigned to a post of less responsibility so
others could take credit for his work, charges the book.
Furthermore, US bureaucratic infighting may have earlier
helped the Japanese achieve complete surprise in their raid on
Pearl Harbor, according to "And I Was There," the memoirs of the
late Rear Adm. Edwin Layton.
Last month, the Navy belatedly recognized the contributions of
one of the most skilled radio intelligence officers of World War II,
Capt. Joseph Rochefort, by posthumously awarding him the Dis-
tinguished Service Medal. Captain Rochefort had twice been
turned down for the decoration during his lifetime.
It was Rochefort, officer in charge of Pearl Harbor's "Hypo"
code-breaking station, who puzzled out the fact that the Japanese
intended to attack Midway Island in June 1942. With that fore-
knowledge, Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet,
set a trap that crippled Japan's naval forces.
Unfortunately for Rochefort, high-ranking intelligence officers in
the US had insisted the Japanese would strike elsewhere. "Wash-
ington concluded the target would be, variously, the Aleutians, Ha-
waii,- the- West Coast, or the Panama Canal," says Capt. Roger
Pineau, co-author of "And I Was There".
Proved wrong, these headquarters officers were unhappy
"They set about manipulations to prove they had been
right all the time," says Captain Pineau. "In the course
of that they ordered Rochefort back to Washington on
temporary duty." Rochefort ended up commanding a
floating dry dock, while the officers in question - nota-
bly a pair of brothers named Joseph and John Redman
- solidified their bureaucratic hold on naval intelligence,
says Pineau.
This incident shows that while radio intelligence was
invaluable during World War II, it was also beset by ter-
rific intramural battles that reduced its effectiveness. Ad-
miral Layton, chief intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet
from 1940 until Japan's surrender, wanted to make this
point clear in his memoirs, according to his co-author
(Capt. Pineau was himself a radio intelligence officer in
World War II, and a longtime friend of Layton.)
Such Navy turf wars may have inadvertently helped
Japanese forces in their Dec. 7, 1941, surprise raid onr
Pearl Harbor Fbarful of security leaks, Navy headquar-
ters in Washingtow withheld crucial informaton from
Pearl Harbor. forces in the months preceding the attack.
Given access to this data, most of which came from
"Magic" decodes of intercepted Japanese diplomatic
messages, Pacific commanders would have smelled out
Japanese intentions, argues "And I Was There."
One message, from Tokyo to the Japanese consulate
in Honolulu, asked spies to draw up a grid map of Pearl
Harbor, so that information on ship anchor locations
could be passed quickly and accurately.
"You don't ask for information like that casually."
says Pineau of this "bomb plot" message.
The officers in charge of Pearl Harbor forces at the
time of the Japanese attack - Army Lt. Gen. Walter
Short and Adm. Husband Kimmel - were forced into re-
tirement shortly thereafter. Layton, who as fleet intelli-
gence officer was there during the attack, believed all his
life that both Short and Kimmel had been made
scapegoats.
The fault instead was institutional, believed Layton, a
matter of poor lines of communication and bad analysis.
But for the quickly-called panels of inquiry, to say so
"would not have been good for the war effort," points out
Pineau. "So they let two men take the rap."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302550006-4