HIJACKING POINTS UP U.S. PROBLEMS IN HANDLING VIOLENCE BY SHIITES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302500012-2
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 31, 2012
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 17, 1985
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302500012-2
AMIE APPEARED
WP AG
Hijacking Points Up U.S. Problems
In Handling Violence by Shiites
WALL STREET JOURNAL
17 June 1985
/5 By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER
staff Reporter of THE WAI.l. STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON ? The hijacking of a
Trans World Airlines jet underscores
Washington's difficulties in dealing with
Shiite Moslem violence in the Middle
East.
With the Reagan administration ner-
vously watching as the jetliner shuttled
over the weekend between Algiers and Bei-
rut, senior U.S. officials said privately that
the hijacking may, at last, prompt a deci-
sive U.S. response. But similar promises
have been made in the past. Yesterday.
President Reagan, who held a 75-minute
emergency meeting with top advisers,
warned the hijackers holding at least 30
Americans that they should "see that for
their own safety, they'd better turn these
people loose."
Despite a tough-sounding new antiter-
rorist policy outlined in April 1984 that
called for preemptive and "pro-active"
measures, the U.S. hasn't yet done much
to prevent terrorist acts.
Experts outside the government said
the lack of U.S. action has encouraged ter-
rorists to believe that violence against
American citizens and interests can be
taken without fear of reprisal. Thus, these
analysts contend, incidents like the week-
end hijacking may be used to disrupt any
progress toward Middle East peace and to
warn Arab moderates, such as Jordan's
King Hussein, that they can't depend on
U.S. protection.
Ironically, President Reagan ran for of-
fice in 1980 against the image of a weak
Jimmy Carter unable to act against the
taking of U.S. hostages in Iran. In the past
five years, U.S. experts said the same
Shiite forces have turned Iran into a ter-
rorist base, driven the U.S. and its allies
from Lebanon and now are bent on ending
the American presence in the region.
'Costs and Benefits'
Because the U.S. hasn't yet responded
forcefully, this goal "is a rational conclu-
sion," says Michael Ledeen, a government
consultant on terrorism and former State
Department special assistant. "This isn't
the psychology of madmen; it is the psy-
chology of costs and benefits."
Mr. Ledeen and others believe the U.S.
must take retaliatory actions. "No one
thinks you can eliminate terrorism totally
by retaliating," Mr. Ledeen said. "But the
hope is to limit it, to have full public sup-
port. to increase morale at home and
thereby to deter a certain amount of it."
The Reagan administration, however,
currently appears only to have bad op-
tions. Its friends in the region, such as the
Algerian government and moderate lead-
ers of the mainstream Amal militia in Leb-
anon, may try to help privately, but they
can't afford to be seen assisting the U.S.
A direct commando operation, although
clearly under consideration, would be all-
but impossible without help from the gov-
ernment or militia groups controlling the
Beirut airport, where TWA flight 847 was
still stranded last night. (Sources in Beirut
estimate there are up to 8,000 militiamen
in or near the airport.)
Administration hard-liners have been
urging the U.S. to follow Israel's example
of harsh anti-terrorist reprisals. However,
the Israelis lately have been big losers to
Shiite terrorism, which has forced them to
withdraw from Lebanon and exchange
over 1,000 prisoners, mostly Palestinian,
for three captured Israeli soldiers?an ac-
tion bemoaned by an Israeli official over
the weekend. Now, the hijackers are de-
manding the release of over 700 Shiite pris-
oners held in Israel.
Groups Are Fragmented
Further, the growing fragmentation
among Shiite militants in Lebanon makes
it increasingly difficult to gather intelli-
gence and obscures possible retaliatory
targets. One U.S. official said privately
that the latest hijacking appears to be the
work of "Musa Sadr people," suggesting
that the hijackers are followers of a Shiite
leader who founded the Amal militia in
Lebanon during the early 1970s and later
disappeared during a trip to Libya. The
group that hijacked the TWA flight, there-
fore, is apparently different from the Is-
lamic Jihad organization that has claimed
credit for other anti-U.S. terrorist opera-
tions.
The Shiite terrorist organizations also
appear to be made up of groups of com-
partmentalized cells whose members don't
know operational plans or members of
other cells. Such secrecy ensures that ter-
rorists who are captured have little infor-
mation to give their interrogators. Without
such information. the U.S. can, at best, re-
act to operations but loses the weapon of
preemptive strikes.
A recent U.S. effort to take tougher
measures backfired badly. The US, de-
cided last December to train the Lebanese
Dewdeme Bureau, the army's intelligence
arm. in anti-terrorist methods. But the pro-
gram encouraged Lebanese operatives to
stage a car-bomb attack last Marcp
against Shiite religious leader Mohammad
Hussein Fadlallah, whom U.S. officials rt-
gard as a key Shiite terrorism figure. Th
operation killed about 80 bystanders, o Ar
missed the target. U.S. officials insist they
weren't involved in the botched operation,
which produced embarrassment here and
reduced the appetite for such ventures.
The incident also points up the difficul-
ties of finding reliable allies, or proxies, to
carry out anti-terrorist actions as the situ-
ation in Lebanon continues to deterio-
rate.
But blame for the lack of a coherent
and active anti-terrorist policy also lies
with Washington. The Pentagon, especially
theviiformed services, remains suspicious
otsplatal4orces like the Delta Force anti-
terrorist unit. And Defense Secretary Ca-
spar Weinberger, who appears to some
critics to be more enthusiastic about ac-
quiring military hardware than using it,
remains skeptical about some of the tough
anti-terrorist measures being pushed by
others in the administration, particularly
Secretary of State George Shultz.
Last fall, in a speech of the growing
threat of terrorism, Mr. Shultz warned:
"We cannot allow ourselves to become the
Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over
whether and how to respond."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302500012-2