INVASION CAPS 4 YEARS OF TENSION BETWEEN MINISTATE AND THE U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 26, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450021-8
STAT
fiP
? FP Invasion Caps Caps 4 Years of Tension
Between Ministate and the U.S,
WASHINGTON POST
26 October 1983
By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staf f Writer
The invasion yesterday of
Grenada caps a four-year history of
tense relations between the world's
foremost superpower And a -.moun-
tainous eastern Caribbean island
ministate so tiny that one almost.
needs a magnifying glass to -find, it
on most maps.
Underlying the Reagan adminis-
tration's publicly stated reasons for
the invasion is long preoccupation
with what it regarded as Grenada's
role as a Cuban and Soviet surrogate
working to spread subversion
through the Caribbean region.
That has been a matter of concern
through the administrations of two
U.S. presidents. On two occasions?
under President Carter in 1979 and I
then under President Reagan in
1981?the United States considered
.1 launching covert intelligence oper-
ations against Grenada. This sim-
mering anxiety finally came to a
head last week, when Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop and several of his
key aides were executed by an insur-
gent military group.
The Reagan administration, in
particular, has been preoccupied
with Grenada. In two major policy
speeches last March, the president
singled it out as a threat to U.S. na-
tional security and charged that a
controversial airfield being built on
the island with Cuban help "can only
be seen as [Soviet and Cuban] power
projection into the region . . ."
The roots of this concern go back
to March 13, 1979, when Bishop and
a group of young militants calling
themselves the "New Jewel Move-
ment" overthrew, a notoriously cor-
rupt government and installed a
Cuban.allied leftist regime in the
form& British dependency that has
a population of 110,000 and a land
area twice the size of the District of
Columbia.
From the outset, most U.S. policy
makers regarded Bishop as an un-
abashed disciple of Cuban President
Fidel Castro. Bishop's coup, coming
at a time that the United States was
beginning to grapple in-earnest with
leftist insurgencies on the other side
of the Caribbean basin in Nicaragua
and El Salvador, touched off fears in
Washington that an island-hopping
ripple of turmoil emanating from
Grenada would create yet another
arena of friction and competition
between the United States and
Cuba.
A minority of :U.S. officials and
others sympathetic to Grenada's in-
economic and social problems
always has contended that the sus-
picion of Bishop was an overreaction
and that his radical, anti-American
rhetoric never was matched by ac-
tions that could be regarded as a
serious threat-ui U.S. interests. _
There even were signs that after
an unofficial visit here last June,
Bishop was trying to improve his
relations with the United States. in
fact, while no one knows what really
caused last week's bloody events in
Grenada, there has been consider-
able -speculation that Bishop's death
resulted from a --power -struggle
touched off by militantimembers of
his 'movement fearful that he was
becoming too moderate.
This revisionist view of Bishop as
_moderate within the context of
Grenada's internal politics .appears
to have provided part of the justi-
fication for the United States and six
Caribbean countries to band togeth-
er in the invasion against what Rea-
gan yesterday called a "brutal group
of leftist thugs."
The controversy over Grenada
always has been linked to concern
about the potential volatility of the
chain of islands stretching 2,000
miles through the Caribbean Sea
between the Bahama islands and
Trinidad.
The smaller islands, in particular,
chronically have been unable to sup-
port their populations. During the
late 1970s, as Britain began cutting
back its financial aid to its former
dependencies, these ministates
began to experience leftist agitation,
labor strife and other forms of con-
frontation with government.
As a result, U.S. officials have
been concerned for some time that
the pattern of upheaval tormenting
Central America could be repeated
in the islands.
Grenada became the symbol of
that fear when the new Bishop gov-
ernment in its first week sought U.S.
aid, was warned by a U.S. envoy
against possible relations with Cuba,
then immediately turned to Havana
for arms, military advisers and other
aid.
At the time, a U.S. envoy was dis-
patched to deliver a protest. The
Grenadans angrily rejected the
American "interference," and rela-
tions began under an instant chill
that was to persist until the present.
The United States conducts its
relations with Grenada through the
U.S. ambassador in Barbados, who
also is accredited to several of the
smaller islands. But the Carter ad-
ministration permitted its ambassa-
dor, Sally A. Shelton, to visit the
island only twice; when the Reagan
administration replaced her with
Milan D. Bish, it deliberately re-
frained from . seeking to have him
accredited to Grenada.
The Carter administration, after
? deciding not to try covert action, I
adopted a policy of arms-length hos-
tility. Its most specific action was to
refuse help for Bishop's ambitious
plans to build a new airport. capable
of handling large jets. -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450021-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450021-8
The United States feared that the
airport could serve as a refueling and
staging point for transport ferrying
Cuban troops to and from Africa
and arms destined for leftist guer-
rillas in Central America.
However, Bishop could point to a
series of studies by international
lending institutions arguing that the
airport was essential to development
of Grenada's trade and tourism. He
also was able to note that, in addi-
tion to Cuba, other countries, includ-
ing the members of the -European
Economic Community, were aiding
construction of the airport over U.S.
objections.
When the Reagan administration
came into -office, the level of 'U.S.
hostility. increased markedly. It, too,
considered a covert operation but
was dissuaded by objections from
the Senate Intelligence Committee
and fears of-a hostile reaction among ,
Caribbean countries friendly to the
United States.
The administration has resorted
to other measures, such as trying to
bar Grenada from using U.S. funds
donated to the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank and excluding Grenada
from participation in its Caribbean
Basin Initiative.
? Reagan also expressed his alarm
over Grenada's course in his two
speeches earlier this year. On March
10, he ridiculed the argument of a
"so-called expert that we shouldn't
worry about Castro's control over
the island of Grenada?their only
important product is nutmeg."
He added, "It isn't nutmeg that's
at stake in the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America. It is the United States'
national security."
Then, in his so-called "Star Wars"
speech March 23, the president
showed An aerial photograph of
Grenada's airfield construction and
said: "The Soviet-Cuban militariza-
tion of Grenada can only be seen as
power projection into the region
. . . .
The first hints of a possible
change came with Bishop's visit in
June. He repeated his past warnings
that the United States intended to
invade Grenada, and he ridiculed the
idea that the United States had to
send a "spy plane" to obtain photos
of the airport, noting that it regular-
ly is photographed by thousands of
American tourists.
In the main though, he listened
carefully to the concerns of Amer-
ican sympathizers about the repres-
sive tactics of his government and
promised improvements, including
holding elections. He also made clear ,
repeatedly that he wanted a dialogue ,
with Washington.
After much hedging, an obviously
reluctant administration finally gave
him a 40-minute session with Wil-
liam P. Clark, then Reagan's nation-
al security affairs adviser. According
to U.S. sources, Clark rejected Bish-
op's proposal for a joint U.S.-
Grenada commission, but held out
the possibility .of greater American
flexibility if the tone of Bishop's
rhetoric became friendlier.
Bishop is described by American
friends as having returned home de-
termined to respond in a way that
would test the administration's sin-
cerity. And, in the months since,
U.S. officials acknowledge that the
anti-American quotient in his gov-
ernment's rhetoric had softened no-
ticeably.
But whether it actually -would
have meant improved relations is a
question Made moot by events that
began last week with his death and
culminated with the invasion.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450021-8