ADMINISTRATION SPLIT PURSUIT OF U.S.-SANDINISTA PACT IS DEBATED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 8, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450005-6 STAT
ARliCLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A /
WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1984
ADMINISTRATION SPLIT
Pursuit of U.S.-Sandinista 'Pact Is Debated
By John M. Goshko
and Joanne Omang
Washington Post staff Writers
A proposal that the United
States seek direct accommoda-
tion with the leftist government
of Nicaragua reportedly has pro-
duced sharp divisions within the
highest levels of the administra-
tion.
At issue, according to the re-
ports, is whether the Reagan ad-
ministration should seek a direct
U.S.-Nicaraguan agreement that
would end American pressure on
the Sandinista government and
allow it a free hand in internal
policies in exchange for Nicara-
gua's ceasing aid to leftist guer-
rillas in El Salvador.
The alleged dispute has serious
implications for President Rea-
gan's reelection efforts as well as
for overall U.S. foreign policy. I
The debate has been held so
closely that while some senior
officials say it is a bitter battle
over Central America policy, oth-
ers deny that major changes are
contemplated. The issue is so
sensitive that some senior offi-
cials who initially confirmed that
there are disagreements later
contacted Washington Post re-
porters to minimize their earlier
remarks.
At the center of the controver-
sy is the negotiating channel re-
cently opened with Nicaragua by
U.S. special envoy Harry W.
Shlaudeman following the sur-
prise visit to Nicaragua by Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz
on June 1.
In recent days, at least one
highly placed administration of-
ficial has charged privately that
Shultz is leaning toward an ac-
commodation with the Sandinistas
despite fierce opposition to the
idea from Defense Secretary Cas-
par W. Weinberger, CIA Director
William J. Casey, national security
affairs adviser Robert C. McFar-
lane and U.N. Ambassador Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick. ?
Other senior officials, represent-
ing several government agencies,
said that Shultz's trip to Managua
and the decision to have Shlaude-
man begin talks with Nicaraguan
Vice Foreign Minister Victor Hugo
Tinoco was strongly opposed by the
administration's more hard-line fac-
tions.
Some of these officials also said
that the failure of U.S. efforts to
produce clear-cut results in Central
America is causing dissent within
the administration.
But, several senior officials who
spoke on the condition that they not
be identified said it is not clear how
high the dissent has reached within
the administration or that there is
evidence of Shultz advocating a re-
versal of existing policy.
Some said reports that Shultz
favors trying to make a deal with
Nicaragua might represent a "pre-
emptive strike" by those who are
suspicious of the Shlaudeman mis-
sion and who want to kill it or en-
sure that it cannot be used in ways
that they consider detrimental to
U.S. interests.
A direct U.S.-Nicaraguan accom-
modation would bypass the so-
called Contadora process that has
involved several Latin American
countries in trying to work out a
comprehensive peace agreement
subscribed to by all countries in
Central America. Current U.S. pol-
icy is to support anti-Sandinista
"contra" rebels and to isolate Nic-
aragua by strengthening El Sal-
vador, Honduras and Costa Rica
militarily and economically.
The United States has -been de-
manding that Nicaragua permit an
internal system of pluralistic de-
mocracy; sever its ties to Cuba and
the Soviet Union; halt its aid to the
Salvadoran rebels and other leftist
insurgency 'movements in the re-
gion, and substantially reduce its
large military establishment.
These points would be covered
under a comprehensive regional
agreement that the Contadora ne-
gotiations are trying to achieve. For
, that reason, the United States has
been prodding Nicaragua toward
" participating in Contadora fully and
in good faith.
The administration has said that
Shlaudeman's function is to give the
flagging Contadora process "a shot
in the arm."
Of the four U.S. aims, the issue
of "internal democratization" has
been regarded as especially impor-
tant by policy-makers advocating a
tough approach.
One senior official acknowledged
that administration dissent centers
' on that question.
The official said "there are some
in the Department of State who
have the view" that Shlaudeman
should pursue an agreement dealing
solely with Nicaragua's activities
outside its borders. According to
this view, Shlaudeman should offer
to end U.S. support for the "con-
tras" and other incentives like in-
ternational funding for Nicaragua's
hard-pressed economy in exchange
for an end to Nicaragua's support
for revolutionaries in El Salvador
and elsewhere.
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Such an agreement might win
Nicaragua's approval, would cer-
tainly please the Democratic ma-
joiity in the House, which has been
increasingly hostile to Reagan's
Central America policy, and would
be "politically great for a day or
two," the official said. But, the pre-
vailing view within the administra-
tion has been that such an approach
would be unacceptable in the long
run because an unchanged Marxist
government in Nicaragua would be
a "regional sanctuary" for Cubans,
Soviets and other Soviet-bloc per-
sonnel, and that eventually "could
mean thousands of troops over the
borders," the official said.
Another senior official said he
believes that the White House has
no choice but to continue pressing a
reluctant Congress to appropriate
$21 million for continued funding of
"contra" activities. If the "contra"
movement is perceived as having
failed because Reagan had aban-
doned efforts to help it, the pres-
ident would be vulnerable to
charges during the election cam-
paign that he had acquiesced in a
new "Bay of Pigs."
Conversely, the official contin-
ued, if Congress continues to balk
at providing money for the "con-
tras," Congress would take the
blame.
As a result, the official said, while
there are negative implications for
Reagan during this election year
whichever way he goes on the is-
sue, the majority view within the
administration is that Reagan's best
course is to continue pressing for
the funds. '
However, he and other officials
said dissenters argue that the Con-
tadora process is failing, that key
U.S. allies in Central America such
as Honduras and Costa Rica are
coming dangerously close to desert-
ing the U.S. effort to isolate Nica-
ragua in favor of making "a separate
peace" with the Sandinistas and that
the United States might wind up
without allies or proxies in the re-
gion.
If that happens, according to this
argument, the United States could
find that the only way to keep the
U.S.-backed Salvadoran govern-
ment of President Jose Napoleon
Duarte from losing, the civil war
would be through a constantly deep-
ening U.S. military commitment to
El Salvador that could lead to direct
involvement of U.S. troops.
To avoid that possibility, which
could be politically disastrous for
Reagan, the argument continues,
the United States has to make a ,
deal with Nicaragua that would end I
Sandinista support for the Salvador-
an rebels, even if it means dropping
U.S. demands for democratization
of Nicaragua. .
, According to the officials, the
Proponents of that argument are
centered mainly in the State De-
partment at "the career bureaucrat
working level."
What is unclear from different
accounts of the debate is wheth-
er?and to what degree?Shultz
has come to agree with their posi-
tion.
Some senior officials said they
have seen no sign that Shultz en-
visions Shlaudeman's mission in
terms other than its publicly stated
purpose of trying to help the Con-
tadora negotiations progress. They
also said that Shultz, in internal dis-
cussions, has spoken in what one
called "eloquent terms" about the
need for continued U.S. support of
the "Contras."
However, others said they have
detected what appears to be
Shultz's increasing disenchantment
with Contadora. They also said
' Shultz believes that the external
debt problems troubling most of
Latin America potentially pose a
greater threat to international sta-
bility than anything else in the re-
gion and that failure to bring the
tension in Central America to more
manageable proportions impedes
tackling the debt situation with
greater urgency.
"Shultz would not have gone to
Nicaragua merely as a symbolic
gesture. It's simply not his style,"
one official said. "If he went, it was
because he had some hope that it
might lead to something substan-
tive. The question is just what it
was that he had in mind."
One point of agreement among
officials queried is that Shultz's trip
to Managua caused a major fight
within the administration. They said
his flight from El Salvador, where
he attended Duarte's inauguration,
to Managua for a meeting with San-
dinista leader Daniel Ortega was
kept secret until the last minute
largely to circumvent "fierce oppo-
sition" from opponents of separate
dealings with Nicaragua.
The officials said the loudest op-
position came from Constantine C.
Menges, the Central America ex-
pert on the National Security Coun-
cil staff, and added that Menges
was backed by McFarlane, Wein-
berger, Casey and. Kirkpatrick.
What one official called "a similar
explosion involving the same cast of
characters" occurred last month
when the administration was debat-
ing whether Shlaudeman should
travel to Mexico to meet with Ti-
noco for the first time.
According to the officials, the
Mexico meeting was a? "highly pre-
liminary and tentative affair." After
Shlaudeman Teti-filed and reported
to Reagan and his key advisers, the
officials said, the president empha-
sized that the United States will
continue, for the present, to regard
the Contadora process as the main
forum for negotiations on Central
America.
But, they added, while that is
likely to remain the case for at least
the immediate future, there clearly
is uneasiness among some that an
effort is under way to engineer a
change of direction. '
Staff writers Murrey Marder.
and David Hoffman contributed to
this report.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302450005-6