NICARAGUA TRICKERY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302350006-6
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 24, 2012
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 9, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000302350006-6.pdf83.44 KB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302350006-6 ARTICLE . ON PAGE ? 3 WASHINCTON POST 9 April 1985 Philip Geyelin Nicaragua linckery House Speaker Tip O'Neill shouldn't have ment lays down its arms and enters negotia- called President Reagan's new "proposal for tions to restore democratic principles and peace in Central America" a "dirty trick." processes in Nicaragua. After 60 days, the The president's Easter-oriented effort to president would be free to apply the "covert" rescue $14 million for a "covert" counterrevo- money to military purposes unless both sides lutionarv effort in Nicaragua is tricky. But it ask him not to. How this would play out, as- was offered as a policy, which means you have every right to take it seriously as the adminis- tration's best shot at what it perceives to be a mortal threat to U.S. security. Looked at that way, it comes off as shallow, shortsighted, reactive and apocalyptic. "If we provide too little help" to the "brave members of the democratic resistance" in Nicaragua, what then? The president's answer has to be quoted to be believed: "Our choice will be a communist Central America, with communist subversion spreading southward and northward. We face the risk that 100 million people from Panama to our open southern border could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes and threaten the United States with violence, economic chaos and a human tidal wave of refugees." ' If that strikes you as a bit much, consider the alternative the administration says will result if Congress will only pay up: a Sandinista regime either changing its Maridst-Leninist spots and sum ing the Sandinistas reconsider their instant rejection, is impossible to predict. The proposal may be appealing enough to win over Congress ?without resolving anything in Nicaragua. So what is the answer? The best critiques I've heard of the Reagan proposal came before it was unveiled. One was a statement from the Inter-American Dialogue, a private group with bipartisan U.S. membership, combined with prominent figures from Latin America and Canada. The other was from the Republican chairman of the Senate Intelligence Commit- tee, Dave Durenberger of Isirmnesota? in a late last month to the National Press lub. Both stressed the sanctity of "non-interven- tion"?for Nicaragua. Both concluded that any durable solution to the region's security problems would have to be regional rather than unilateraL "Regional collective action is a tool we have simply overlooked thus far," said Durenberger, whose "first principle" was that any long-term - negotiating a return to the original democratic commitment to policy. . ? must avoid principles of the revolution, or being somehow , confrontation over peripheral issues. . . .If the president makes a $14 million program the cen- terpiece of his policy, he will only stolce the fires of controversy in this country.' Leaving aside the difficulty of organizing an ef- fective regional solution to Central America's se- curity problems, the distinction made by both the Dialogue and Durenberger between aspirations. and realizable objectives goes to the heart of supplanted (we don't say "overthrown"). The chances of the former being scarcely worth weighing, success would seem to depend on the contras' carrying the day. The presi- dent's own military advisers concede that would take "years"?even with U.S. support. ? The administration speaks seriously of planting democracy overnight in a society that suffered for decades under the repression of the what's wrong with the administration's approach. Somoza dictatorship. If the necessary ingredients It is all very well for Ronald Reagan to wish for a for that outcome are readily at hand (tradition, democratic Nicaragua, a reduction in Nicaraguan,. experience, trained leadership, discipline, eco- - armed forces, the removal of all unsavory ele-: nomic resources, institutions), you have to won- ments. der why the original Sandinista revolution was so But an effort to achieve all this by blatant, uni- ? swiftly betrayed. ' lateral U.S. intervention in Nicaragua's internal The president would promise to use the coy- , affairs works against a regional will to resist any ? eted $14 million only for "humanitarian" sup- external intervention by Nicaragua in its neigh port of the contras while the Sandinista govern- bors' internal affairs. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302350006-6