SOVIET SPY ELUDED A TRAP SET BY FBI AT WALKER'S ARREST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330066-2
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 10, 2012
Sequence Number: 
66
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 11, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330066-2.pdf90.97 KB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330066-2 LTICLZ SPY ON PAGZ WASHINGTON TIMES 11 July 1985 Soviet spy eluded a trap set by FBI at Walker's arrest By Bill Gertz THE NMSH NGTON TIMES The Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion just missed a chance to arrest a Soviet espionage a ent on t e night it arrested John walker Jr.. ra former high-ranking U.S. intelligence offi- cial s. By this official's description of the events of that night, the FBI "lost" Mr. Walker - later charged with spying for the Soviet Union - for nearly three hours before he made a "drop" of secret documents in a rural area in the Maryland suburbs. The Soviet espionage agent, if caught in the act of picking up the documents, might have given U.S. agents an opportunity to offer him political asylum or eras "turn" him to become a U.S. agent within the KGB - the Soviet intelligence agency, The former official, an expert on Soviet esDiona?e operations. spec- ulated that Soviet intelligence agents supporting the operation rier that he had been seen and was bein followed the . The Soviet courier did not attempt to "service the drop" - spy parlance for making a clandestine pickup. "The basic point no one is addressing is the fact that a KGB agent was seen in the area, but did not service the drop - that's the key to it;' the former official said. The Soviets would never leave a drop site "hanging" - holding secret information - unless they were sure a problem had developed, he said. Court papers filed at the time of Mr. Walker's arrest May 20 show that FBI agents assigned to follow Mr. Walker tried unsuccessfully to fol- low the former Navy warrant officer as he drove evasively near Potomac, Md. "This activity was observed for approximately one hour, at which time surveillance detection was lost;" FBI agent Joseph R. Wolfinger testified in a court affadavit. Mr. Walker's whereabouts were unknown for the period between 5 p.m. and 7:45 p.m. on May 19. Another court affadavit reveals that FBI agent Robert W. Hunter "was in radio contact with and monitored the surveillance activity of FBI agents who were surveilling John Anthony Walker, Jr." intelligence procedures for ser- vicing a drop site what the Soviets consi ere a valuable, 20-year espi- on e agent "would not be handled lightly or casually," the former o i- cial said. 1 ie Soviets concentrate their vast intelligence assets in this coun- try to protect their couriers and agents, including extensive counter- surveillance agents and eiectrogi-C listening devices he asserted The former official said t e* FBI's loss of Mr. Walker's whereabouts could have caused FBI agents to use radios that would have been picked up by Soviet countersurveillance agents and monitors posted in the vicinity. FBI spokesman Manuel Marquez would not comment on FBI surveil- lance techniques in the Walker case when asked about the use of radio communications and the lapse in tracking Mr. Walker. "When the Soviets run a case for 20 ears, they use ever inte f- ence asset in their service to pro- tect it" the former official said. Among the assets avai la e to the KGB for running U.S. agents are the large number of Soviet diplomatic and consular personnel, a network of "illegal agents" with no diplo- matic status, and large radio listen- ing devices on the Soviet Embassy roof in Washington and at a house on Maryland's eastern shore. In a speech earlier this month, P sident Reagan urged the strengthening of U.S. counterintelli- gence efforts against an es ima ed 2,500 Soviet personnel in the United S=s. He said "30 to 40 percent" of the Soviet personnel are known or suspected intelligence operatives, but exerts assert that all Soviet per- sonnel serve as s ies. It is possible the attempted doc- ument transfer May 19 was timed to coincide with the passing of a Soviet spy satellite capable of picking up radio communications that would have alerted the Soviet courier to the FBI's monitoring. Special Agent Hunter noted in his. affidavit that "a Soviet national assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington was seen, during the course of the surveillance, in the same area where the surveillance -of Mr. Walker] was being con- ducted." No explanation was given in the court paper as to why the suspected Soviet agent did not follow through with the secret rendezvous. The Soviet national was reported to be Vice Consul Aleksey Tka- chenko, who left the United States four days later. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330066-2