ONE POLICY REAGAN COULDN'T SELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230008-7
ONE POLICY REAGAN COULDN'T SELL
BY GEORGE GEDDA
WASHINGTON
ASSOCIATED PRESS
24 April 1985 ELLPIR
President Reagan waged an intense, 10-week campaign for a resumption of
military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels but the showdown votes by the House and
the Senate indicate he won few converts to his cause.
Congress said no to Reagan's military aid proposal Tuesday night even though
he put his own prestige on the line in a concerted lobbying effort that depicted
resistance forces in heroic terms and the Sandinista government as a foe to be
feared.
The Senate approved a restoration of aid to the rebels only after Reagan
promised that none of the funds in the $14 million assistance proposal would be
spent on arms and ammunition. Instead, it will be used only for basic needs such
as food, clothing and medicine. A short time later, the House rejected the same
proposal.
The Senate-passed measure is sure to be diluted even further once a
compromise settlement is worked out with the House, where there is strong
sentiment against all forms of direct aid to the resistance forces.
Reagan began the campaign for aid on Feb. 16 when he called the Contras "our
brothers." He continued the fight for his policy right up to the eve of the
vote.
There are many reasons why Reagan fell far short of his goal: TOO MANY
DOUBTERS=
Reagan was unable to convince enough members of Congress there was a direct
link between American national security and the situation in Nicaragua. His
warnings that communists would be on the march right up to the American border
unless they were contained in Nicaragua generally have fallen on deaf ears.
TEPID LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT=
Reapan found himself in the position of being more concerned about Latin
American security than the Latins themselves. No hemispheric president backed
Reagan on the issue of U.S. aid to the Contras. Costa Rican President Luis
Alberto Monge voiced support for that policy last week but later backed away.
PARTISANSHIP=
Some Democrats appeared to see the Nicaragua aid proposal an irresistable
issue on which to "get even" with Reagan after suffering one demoralizing
setback after another at the president's hands on other issues. VIETNAM LEGACY=
Twenty years ago this week, the United States dispatched 20,000 Marines to
the Dominican Republic because of suspicion of communist involvement in a
political uprising. And now, 10 years after the Vietnam debacle ended at a cost
of 50,000 U.S. servicemen, Americans remain extremely wary about undertaking
foreign commitments. INCENTIVES OR DISINCENTIVES?:
The administration felt the Sandinistas would be flexible only if pressured
militarily by the Contras. Many in Congress believed that strategy led to a
hardening of Sandinista policy. MINING THE HARBORS=
Corriinusil
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230008-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230008-7
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Tnr administratinn policy in Nicarabua never rPcove7ec from tnP
CIA -sponsored mining_ of Nicarabuan harbors a year ago. Since the U.S. role in
the mining became public Knowledoe, Congress has approved no funds for the
Contras. NATURE OF THE SANDINISTAS=
Some in Congress, including Sens. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, and John Kerry,
D-Mass., viewed President Daniel Ortega as a misunderstood democrat rather than
a Marxist autocrat. MEANS VS. ENDS=
Reagan faced widespread doubts that $14 million in aid to the rebels would
solve his Nicaraguan problem. His critics believed the small amount of money
being sought was a prelude to requests for larger sums and to steadily
escalating warfare. IMPATIENCE=
The administration felt that to the extent the Sandinistas talked about free
elections, non-intervention and protection of fundamental liberties, it was the
result of Contra military pressure. The Congress felt this degree of progress
was too modest to justify continuing aid to the rebels. THE MORAL ISSUE=
The administration believes it is not immoral to intervene in a foreign
nation if the objective is to prevent intervention elsewhere by that country.
Many in Congress think otherwise. LACK OF EVIDENCE=
There was continuing skepticism about administration claims that Nicaragua
was systematically supporting the Salvadoran insurgency. Where's the proof, the
skeptics asked. The administration, citing the need for confidentiality, kept
the evidence to itself. CONFUSION=
Was the admininstration supporting the Contras to help them overthrow the
Sandinistas, to pressure the Sandinistas, to interdict arms bound from Nicaragua
to El Salvador? Was Reagan supporting the Contadora peace process fully or was
he just giving lip service to it? Rightly or wrongly, many found the
administration's responses to these questions inconsistent or unconvincing.
RHETORIC=
For all its shortcomings, Nicaragua is not a "totalitarian dungeon," as
Reagan described it. Moreover, the United States has friendly relations with
countries far more repressive than Nicaragua. CONTRA IMAGE PROBLEMS=
The Contras were subjected to far more media scrutiny than the Sandinistas
were at the time of the 1979 revolution. Few examined the Marxist connections of
the Sandinistas then but many examined the links _ at time exaggerated by
critics _ of the Contras to the deposed rightist dictatorship.
Reagan has said he will never abandon the Contras but his options appear to
be limited. Congress made that clear Tuesday night.
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302230008-7