A QUESTION OF TREASON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302110004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 22, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
I.
ARTICLE APPEARED
Or, PAGE
A
THE REBEL
22 November 1983
QUESTION
OF
nios: sensitive sources. Consider)
CF:le is.
Ray Cline's illustrious or notorious career in the clandestine
,Xorid had led in his mature years to the directorship of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) housed at George-
town University, and to The Association of Former Intelligence
Officer-, (AFIO).
Thanks to the background, then, of Casey, Allen. and George
Bush, as former director of CIA, it is now possible to grasp the
range and depth of the Reagan operation in 1980.
A memo has now surfaced, directed to Meese and Casey, refer-
ring to a White House mole. This has been laughed off by Reagan
and aides as the work of someone "who's read too many spy
novels." Elizabeth Drew, writing in the New Yorker, raises a
compelling argument against such wisecracks.
What if, she asks, there is another possibility? It was known that
the Reagan campaign was obsessed with the possibility that Car-
ter might. shortly before the election, obtain the release of the
hostages held in Iran. When Casey told a breakfast meeting of
reporters at the Republican Convention in Detroit, that the Rea-
gan people thought there might be "an October surprise," his
By Donald Freed
he Carter debate briefing book is the tip of -the
wrong iceberg. In the capacious Reagan drag-
net it was one small shiny object dredged up
from the murky depths of the 1980 campaign.
Reagan's secret operation-run by Casey, Al-
len, Clark-had as its target, not the debate,
but the Iranian hostage crisis-"the October surprise." Reagan
did not fear Carter's television persona in a debate-Reagan had
"the speech." He- feared Carter's executive power to launch a
daring rescue of the American hostages that he could not over-
come, that would re-elect Carter, that alone.
In the winter of 1980 Ronald Reagan's candidacy was flounder-
ing. He had lost Iowa to George Bush; New Hampshire hung in the
balance. Enter William Casey. Casey and Richard Allen huddle
with Reagan's closest advisers, Ed Meese and Judge William
Clark, and decide to pull out the stops. They decide to activate a
mole in the Carter White House, and other moles in the National
Security Council (NSC), and in the CIA. They decide to activate a
spy ring inside their own government-in diplomatic terms they
put into operation a coup de main. Is this scenario credible?
This network of moles delivered many secrets but none so
important as news of an "October surprise." Sensitive material
from the NSC began to flow to Allen. Secret information from CIA
and ex-CIA sources reached Casey. A top "control" or "agent-
handler" in Casey's ring was Stephan Halper, a "researcher"
from the Bush campaign. Halper's father-in-law was Dr. Ray
Cline, former Deputy Director of the CIA and a high Reagan
adviser. Halper, through Cline, had far-reaching access to the
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suggestion just seemed like good politics. Any successful move by
Carter would be seen as having been manipulated for the election.
At the time, Casey used the term "intelligence operation" to
describe the monitoring activity the campaign would conduct in
order to anticipate the "surprise." One aide told Elizabeth Drew
that some of the campaign leaders saw the Cuban missile crisis of
October. 1962, just before that year's congressional elections, as
a parallel for what Carter might do in October, 1980. "They knew
what happened on what day in October, 1962." this man said,
"and how the Congressional Elections were affected." It had al-
ready been reported that one Reagan campaign aide, Admiral
Robert Garrick (Ret.), had organized a network of retired military
officers to watch military bases for the movement of troops or
transport planes. Garrick confirmed this. The disclosure was at
once ludicrous and worrisome. When Carter attempted the rescue
mission that failed, in April of 1980, the ships and helicopters were
already in the area. A former Carter foreign-policy official says
that a vital requirement of that or any other rescue mission was
that it be carried out without any noticeable movement of troops
or ships from the united States. He and others say that there
were some contingency plans for another hostage-rescue attempt
but that it was never seriously considered, because, among other
things, the hostages had been dispersed from the American Em-
bassy. where they had been held.
Logical observers ask what the Reagan campaign could possibly
have done with information of a Carter rescue mission. To reveal
the plan or use the information for political gain would be treason-
ous.
This question leads to a series of related questions. Was the
CIA, for instance, loyal to Carter (as they had not been to Nixon)?
"Old boys" had blocked Carter's appointee, Theodore Sorenson,
to head CIA. This unprecedented rejection of a notable figure such
as Sorenson, forced Carter, in 1977, to appoint an outsider, Admi-
ral Stansfield Turner, to the directorship of CIA.
Turner removed about six hundred people from their jobs in the
area of covert operations: many of these people were placed in
other positions, about two hundred of them retired, and a few
were fired outright. This makes for a very unhappy network.
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2.
Some of these people were what one former Carter official calls
".the cowboys-the ones who run around and do things." More-
over, Carter. in 1978, issued a charter designed to put reins on the
activities of the FBI and the CIA. Many of the former CIA people
who helped out in the Bush campaign joined the Reagan-Bush
campaign after the nomination. Among the people working with
Cline, Halper, et al. was Robert Gambino, who had been the CIA
Director of Security, a position that gave him access to the files of
people who had received high-level security clearances. All of
Casey's men were active in the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers national network.
Ms. Drew sums up well by saying that "it is known that the
Reagan campaign was extremely worried that 'Garter might do
something about the hostages. It is clear that these was within the
Reagan campaign a pattern and practice of obtaining sensitive
information from within the White House. Perhaps all this activity
amount4o separate pebbles; perhaps it forms-,a mosaic. In any
event, as far as is known, this sort of activity does not represent,
as some suggest, politics as usual. Of course them-have been 'dirty
tricks' before, and, especially in the pre-Watergate days, some
high-handed activities on the part of administrations-but that
was then. As of now, there is no sign that anything quite like this
has occurred before."
If the Casey-Allen spying had as its priority the sabotage of
Carter's hostage policy, was the Carter briefing book of any im-
portance at all? Yes. What is not generally recalled is that Carter
and Reagan were even in the polls in October, 1980, when the
crucially important debate was held. The debate was the climax of
the campaign. Reagan had to prove that he could do more than
smile and joke, that he was more than an actor. In short, Reagan
had to be briefed to destroy Carter in detail.
The debate was a fraud because Reagan had been stuffed with
stolen information. Just as he had stolen football plays while in
High School, and President Johnson's message on Vietnam to the
Governor's Conference in 1967, so Reagan had had stolen for him
the other side's signals in 1980. The stakes were high, the debate
was the key event of the race; Richard Wirthlin told Elizabeth
Drew that, "given the political environment, the election is going
to hang or fall on that debate."
Reagan's aides confided to Time magazine that the stolen docu-
ments "had included every important item Carter used on the air
... " David Stockman bragged in a speech that Reagan would win
the debate and the election because of the "filched" briefing
material.
Casey and Allen had been sucking up information right across
the Federal bureaucracy; the briefing material used in the debate
was one of their ancillary discoveries. Casey's campaign aide Max
Huge] was later rewarded for his efforts by being appointed to
head covert actions at CIA (but he was fired over charges of
improper stock-trading purchases).
During those few short months, March to October, in 1980 a
domestic "destabilization," of America by Americans, was shak-
ing the country, unknown to its citizens. To recapitulate: Casey
used the term "intelligence operation" to describe the monitoring
when he and Reagan's campaign Chief of Staff. Edwin Meese, met
with reporters at a breakfast during the Republican National Con-
William Casey' ran Reagan's intelligence system .
Pbolo br Vide World
1 Brzezinsky told the Post that the reports to him from NSC staff
members on each day's activities were "sometimes extraordinary
sensitive material of the highest nature ... any unauthorized dis-
tribution to anyone outside the White House would be very
serious."
The stealing of the debate material is compounded by the in-
volvement of journalists in the scenario. Coaching Reagan were
William Buckley, George Will, Evans and Novak, to name several.
These men were, in fact, acting as Reagan agents.
High Carter adviser, Jody Powell, had tried, with little success,
to identify the double standard applied to Carter by Reagan media
friends. Powell writes that:
"The problem is that Will also put himself over, in the spring of
1980 at least, as a reporter, telling his readers that he had heard
on both sides of the Atlantic that there would be an 'October
surprise' and that Carter would probably arrange the release of
the hostages just in time for the November election.
At the time, the possibility that Carter might succeed in bar-
gaining the release of the U.S. hostages from the Teheran embas-
sy was one that haunted the Reagan campaign. They saw what
happened on the very day of the Wisconsin primary, April 1, 1980.
Polls had been showing Kennedy running very close to Carter.
At 7:18 am on primary day Carter appeared on network TV to
announce a possible deal on the hostages. He won the primary by
20 points.
On no less than three occasions in Campaign '80 journalists
friendly to Reagan-Will, Evans & Novak, and Jack Anderson-
reported the possibility of an October surprise. The effect of such
stories, which had no foundation in reality, was preemptive down-
playing of an actual hostage release, by implying that it would
merely be part of a sordid campaign maneuver; in effect playing
politics with people's lives. So was Will being a reporter or a
political activist?
(I assume. incidentally, that the only real scandal on the part of
the Reagan campaigners would be if they were illicitly obtaining
classified information on the status of hostage negotiations. The
Carter White House had offered briefings-on these negotiations,
venfor. in Detroit in July 1980. A Republican official said use of
this term "alarmed" Meese and others in the-campaign and was
not repeated.
Robert Garrick, who was in charge of plans and policy for Rea-
gan's campaign, said the campaign intelligence group's informa-
tion came chiefly from a network of retired military officers who
monitored the movements of U.S. troops and transport planes at
various air bases across the country.
A former high-level campaign adviser to Reagan said that one of
the campaign chiefs. Richard V. Allen, received copies-of portions
o daily staff reports that had been sent to Carter's adviser on
National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinsky.
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3.
but the Reagan team turned them down, doubtless not wishing to If, as Anderson claims, he has documents showing that such
be implicated in failure. If there really was a high-level Reagan orders were issued, those documents were forgeries. "If someone
mole in the NSC, he would have been truthfully telling the Reagan I on the NSC staff confirmed the authenticity of these documents,
team that there was no change of an October surprise, and that all much less described the President's motives for the non-existent
negotiations on the hostages had ground to a halt. But perhaps the orders, he was lying," according to Powell.
mole did say this and the Reaganites rejected it as potential disin- As the first Anderson columns about the politically inspired
formation. You simply can't tell, at that level of paranoia.)" invasion orders were appearing, Washington Post Defense Cor-
Again, the "October surprise." Except that the hostage rescue respondent George Wilson became the target for the second disin-
attempt came in April, and it was not a surprise to the Iranians. We I formation effort. Wilson was contacted by an anonymous source
shall see that Reagan's "media assets" (Buckley's term of clandes- who claimed to work for the CIA. For several weeks this source
tine art) worked at two levels. First there was "disinformation." tried to sell Wilson a variety of stories, all damaging to the Carter
The media was being used, unwittingly. That explained, for exam- I administration. One described a CIA study, supposedly done in
ple, the Los Angeles Times' misunderstanding about the heavy connection with the April attempt to rescue the hostages, that had
cost to the Reagan regime that the discovery of the pilfered de- predicted that the effort would result in 60% casualties among the
bate hook brought. hostages.
This seems particularly true when the relatively unimportant Wilson was interested, but insisted that he needed something
fruits of the effort that have come to light thus far are weighed more substantial before he could write such a story. In mid-Sep-
against the potential cost to President Reagan of the present FBI i tember, he received through the mail what appeared to be the
and congressional investigations into possible White House "something more" that he had requested: A copy of a CIA study,
"moles;" the removal of national security documents; the pilfering dated March 16, 1980, entitled "Oplan Eagle Claw Loss Esti-
of Carter's debate briefing book; and allegations thai "sexual fa- mate." The document stated that 20% of the hostages would be
vors" were exchanged for information. _ killed or seriously wounded during the assault on the compound,
What first made Carter's aides suspicious was the glaring ap- another 25% during the effort to locate and identify the hostages
pearance of"6sinformation." Quoting Carter advisel:'Lloyd Cut- and another 15% during their evacuation to the waiting
ler: "In all their talk about the October surprise; here was a helicopters.
certain element of disinformation or misinformation-In October, That document was a forgery. In the words of former Deputy
Evans and Novak ran a story that I had just been to Geneva CIA Director Frank C. Carlucci, the man who supposedly ordered
making a secret trip and a handshake deal to bring the hostages the study, "I have been unable to find anything in this alleged CIA
out just before the election. It was just made up out of whole cloth. document that is either accurate or which approximates any mem-
I had not been in Geneva, except in May." orandum we prepared."
The column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, a special Wilson was persuaded by Carlucci's analysis, which listed a
"inside report" timed for release to subscribers a few days before series of flaws and errors in the document, and wrote no story.
the election, said Carter had decided to "compel" transfer to Iran The third and by far the most vicious portion of the disinforma-
of the frozen assets and hand over $1 billion in gold "at once." tion campaign was launched on Capitol Hill in early September.
The 'column also reported a "deal exchanging American hos- Allegations were spread by Republican Senate Staff Members
that David Aaron, Deputy to National-Security Adviser Zbigniew
tages for military equipment vital to the Iranian war effort" and Brzezinsky. had been responsible for the arrest and execution of a
spoke of war material of various sorts being transferred from valuable American spy in the Soviet Union. The charges were
military warehouses to the Philadelphia Navy Yard for transfer to proved false, but not until after the election. In the meantime, the
Iran. staff members succeeded in provoking a full-scale investigation by
"Roly is an old friend," Cutler said, "and when I reproached the Senate Intelligence Committee and in leaking word of the
him, he indicated that it had come from an impeccable source, supposedly secret investigation, along with Aaron's name, to sev-
which I understood to be in the Reagan campaign. Whether it was eral news organizations, including the New York Tines
disinformation-planting stories or making them up-or whether On September 23 the New York Times, persuaded that journal-
they had some sort of intelligence operation which brought in the ists were being used, blew the whistle on the smear campaign. A
wrong intelligence, I could not say." week later, Cable News Network Senior Correspondent Daniel
President Carter's aide Jody Powell has documented the disin- Schorr. writing in the New Republic, concluded an in-depth analy-
formation campaign, with some specificity, for those like Reagan sis of the affair by describing the attack on Aaron as "a classic
who first called the entire affair "much ado about nothing." piece of covert action that left the desired taint of suspicion."
Although careful reporters were able to spot and largely to foil Those responsible for the Aaron smear were members of "The
two of the disinformation efforts, a third was a spectacular suc- Madison Group"-established, according to columnist William
cess, resulting in a series of columns by Jack Anderson that ap Safire, to "embarrass, bedevil and defeat" the Carter administra-
peared in hundreds of newspapers around the country. I tion. The group of ultra-reactionary Senate Staff Members main-
In August 1980, Anderson says he was presented with docu- tained a liaison with the Reagan campaign, through the Heritage
ments showing that Carter had ordered an invasion of Iran to take Foundation.
place in mid-October. This "tentative invasion date" was con- The mole propaganda concerning Aaron is now understood for
firmed, according to Anderson, by someone working with the what it was-disinformation to protect the Reagan mole that was
National Security Council in the White House. According to the functioning in the NSC. Powell summarizes the affair in this way:
columnist, his NSC source also said that the President had issued Question: What other dirty tricks did the Reagan campaign
the order "to save himself from almost certain defeat in Novem- perpetrate?
bur." From August 18 through August 22, Anderson.wrote and Hint: The notebook was stolen not from the campaign head-
distributed five columns based on this information. quarters but from the White House. Fewer than a dozen people
In fact, no such orders ever were issued. and the idea of launch- ever saw it. The person who took it almost certainly had access to
ing a second rescue mission never was seriously considered or j other information even more valuable to the Reagan campaign. It
discussed. Although a contingency plan was prepared as a matter 1 is logical that he (she?) would risk copying and sneaking out a thick
of course, conditions never arose that were even remotely consis- notebook but ignore more important information that could be
tent with its use. passed over the telephone?
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'Question: Who else in the Reagan campaign was involved?
Was the mole paid in cash? With a job? A pat on the head?
Hint; Baker and Gergen have only the vaguest recollection of
the whole incident; they don't even know who handed them the
notebook. (Presumably it was left under Gergen's pillow by the
tooth fairy.) Baker described to Barrett how he agonized over the
"ethical dilemma" presented by the stolen material, but now says
that he didn't even try to find out who was responsible so that he
could make sure that it didn't happen again. If you can swallow
that. take a friend along the next time you buy a used car.
Question: Did Reagan know that he was using stolen material?
Hint: Baker, Stockman and Gergen swear that they never told
their boss anything. Remember, however, .that both camps
viewed the debate as the most crucial event of the campaign. At
that point. pollsters from both sides saw the race as a dead heat. If
you can believe that Reagan was never told that what he was
hearing in the rehearsal was the genuine stuff, not just someone's
best guess of what Carter might say, take two friends and a lawyer
to help you with that car.
So we do have espionage in the classical sense from the Reagan
campaign. Elizabeth Drew's question stilt burns-to what end?
Election is the wrong answer. Frustrating the "October surprise"
could not have involved premature disclosure and, thus, treason.
Could it?
We are now obliged to approach the threshold question of Rea-
gan's "October surprise." In the light of the Reagan camp's "ob-
session" (their word) with Carter's handling of the Iranian
hostage crisis, and the revelation that William Casey had woven a
web of "domestic espionage" (N. Y. Times'term) to catch Nation-
al Security Council information, the basic question arises: was the
Iranian crisis, to the Reagan forces in 1980, what the Paris peace
talks were to the Nixon campaign in 1968 and 1972; matters of
the highest national security that could be manipulated in order to
gain political power (as we now know Nixon did in both '68 and
'72)?
The obligatory question is: what were the Reagan-Casey agents
(the retired intelligence and military officers) looking for? And if it
was information about a hostage rescue (admittedly the only event
that could stop Reagan) what would Reagan have done with it?
What could he have done without exposing himself to charges of
criminal -opportunism that threatened American lives? Could or
would the Reagan-Casey-Allen spy ring disclose prematurely or
blow the rescue operation, the operation that would rescue, as
well, Jimmy Carter's chances for re-election?
The "debacle in the desert," as the aborted rescue mission of
April 1980 would be called, doomed the Carter presidency once
and for all. Did the Ayatollah's military and police have advance
warning? Did someone sabotage the top secret plans to rescue the
American hostages? Further, did the constant Reagan campaign
charge that Carter was "weak" force his hand in a rescue scheme
that was probably doomed to fail? Most alarming, according to
Carter aide Hamilton Jordan, was the March 29, 1980 disinforma-
tion. A professionally forged, very clever letter purporting to be
from Carter was given to Khomeini through "channels." The
letter apologized for all past U.S. "crimes against Iran." The story
of the letter was leaked to the British News Agency Reuters and
then released to the world press. The ploy worked, the American
media refused for weeks to accept Carter's protestations of forg-
ery. By the time it was realized that someone had foisted a forgery
on Khomeini, another dirty trick was wrecking Carter's desperate
attempt at keeping the rescue mission secret.
On Sunday, April 20, 1980, the Washington Starplayed a long,
vivid siory-"the hostages can be freed"-by one Miles Cope-
land. The Carter White House and National Security Council were
aghast. They knew who Miles Copeland was.
Miles Copeland was so high in the secret world of the Central
Intelligence Agency that he had been the American liaison to
Colonel Nasser and Egypt during the most sensitive period of
Middle Eastern maneuvering in the 1950s. Copeland, in his book
Game of Nations, discussed in detail the "zero-sum" techniques
used by CIA to "destabilize" governments-as in Iran where
Copeland had been a master player in the 1953 coup which re-
stored power to the Shah.
Copeland, then, had intimate knowledge of Egypt, Iran, and
Oman and the oil Sheikdoms (where his own private intelligence
"P.R." firm operated for giant oil consortiums). This is important
because Egyptian, Iranian and protectorate sources figured vitally
in the secret hostage negotiations and rescue plans, these same
sources had been Copeland's for many years past.
Oman was a primary channel in the flow of information about
the rescue. Carter, in his memoirs, stresses again and again the
almost incredible lengths to which the President's White House
and National Security Council (NSC) were going to keep the raid
secret. But Reagan had a "mole" and, it is becoming -credible to
believe a "back-channel"-Miles Copeland and his various firms
and fronts of "old boys", referred to in his own Star4rticle. The
Carter White House was also concentrating on Oman
"My persistent anxiety was to maintain secrecy.'however, I
was soon forced to share the news with one other head of state,
when I received information about disturbing stories originating
with a former British officer in Oman, who was.employed by the
Sultan.
"He had reported to British officials in London that we had
planes in Oman (which was true) and that they were loaded with
ammunition and supplies for the Afghan freedom fighters. The
British and Omanis were getting nervous, and I had to send War-
ren Christopher to London to brief Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and Foreign Minister Peter Carrington about the true
purpose of the planes. Christopher was careful not to ask them for
any comment, but simply informed them about our plans for the
rescue."
Copeland had worked with British intelligence since World War
II and his MI-6 assets in Oman are the best there are, according to
his colleagues. The ship movements for the rescue were in the
Gulf of Oman, the transport planes supporting the ship in the Gulf
of Oman were flying out of Egypt. There was nothing for Casey's
retired watchers to watch in the United States. Casey's eyes, and
Copeland's, were watching from the Middle East, the source of
the back-channel.
Finally, Copeland is an almost legendary figure in Iran. He re-
fers to every level and area of the country continually and it is
clear that his contacts in the "Savak" are still alive. Copeland had
helped to set up the notorious, murderous, secret police of the
Shah in the first place.
According to authoritative accounts, although the joint Chiefs
of Staff had told Carter categorically after the hostages were
taken that no rescue effort was feasible, the military had done a
complete turnaround in the intervening months. They knew ex-
actly where the hostages were (a fact they hadn't been certain of
at the outset), they had evolved a plan of operation in which they
believed, and they had a force in training to execute it.
Copeland starts out his astounding "speculative fiction" by
saying:
! "Early last December, a young chap from a certain government
agency made the rounds of us old timers, 'unofficially and off the
record.' to ask whether we thought an 'Entebbe-type' or SWAT-
i type raid on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was feasible. His inten-
tion was to elicit a resounding 'no' so as to justify President
Carter's policy of 'restraint' when pressure was building up to get
the-hostages home by Christmas."
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'Copeland, code-name "Mr. Lincoln," now disclosed that he and
"Safford", "The Weasel," "Masterson," and "The Whistler"
were all somehow involved in the military planning for some kind
of surprise rescue. The Weasel, et al., Copeland assures us, are
the kings of covert action, from O.S.S. days with William Casey.
Shortly after being approached by the government, Copeland
states that he and the other old boys did, in reality, work out a
rescue scenario. If one compares the "Copeland plan" with what,
in fact, we know the Carter plan contemplated, the most serious
questions arise.
Hamilton Jordan quotes his boss, Jimmy Carter; at a National
Security Council luncheon meeting on April 11, 1980:
"As you know," Carter continued, "the first week the hostages
were seized, I ordered the joint Chiefs to develop a rescue plan
that could be used in dire circumstances. A team of expert para-
military people now report that they have confidence in their
ability to rescue our people. Before I make up my mind, I want to
know your reactions."
The President might say-or even believe-he hadn't made up
his mind, but I knew he had.
"Harold," he said. "I'd like for you and Dave Jones to outline
the plan. the risks. the problems-and the prospects for success."
So secret was the meeting that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
only learned of the decision to proceed with the rescue after April
11, because he had not been in Washington for the meeting. On
April 20. Vance read the Copeland story in the Starand, perhaps,
because of it demanded to know how much was true! (Carter tells
trance the plan. Vance is very upset because it is too late, the "go"
order had been given on the 18th. On April 21, Vance submits his
ietter of resignation to Carter.)
Vance had not known, but the NSC had. We know now that the
Reagan-Casey spy operation had sources or "moles" in that NSC.
Besides moles, there is strong indication that Casey, Copeland,
and the old boys had deep back-channels all along from MI-6 and
old CIA "assets."
Copeland knows that he is in a minefield with his speculation,
and attempts to cover himself.
"Before proceeding. it must be stated that President Carter has
not confided his intentions to me, nor has this article been cleared
by the CIA or anyone else. It has, however, been agreed to by my
old colleagues, who wish to be associated with it."
Copeland then proceeds to discuss how he and other CIA agents
"turned" the crowd when the agency orchestrated the overthrow
of the democratically elected government of Mossadegh in 1953.
We now know from the Carter memoirs and other sources that
that is precisely what the U.S. plan to rescue the hostages envis-
aged. and that CIA street agents were in place and ready to go into
action when the violence around the embassy should reach the
stage of mass confusion.
If we compare what President Carter and his aides have written
and said about the rescue plan, one conclusion is inescapable.
Reconnaissance
Carter: We had blueprints of our embassy buildings in Tehran,
of course ....
Much more important, we received information from someone
(who cannot be identified) who was thoroughly familiar with the
compound, knew where every American hostage was located,
how many and what kind of guards were there at different times
during the night, and the daily schedule of the hostages and their 1
captors. This was the first time we knew the precise location of
the Americans.
Copeland: Already we have detailed maps of the embassy
compound.
We will need to know more, however, about where and how the
prisoners are kept, where the booby traps, if any, are planted, how
the patrols work, what arms and munitions there are, how food
and medical supplies are delivered ....
Recruitment of Agents
Carter:.Our agents, who moved freely in and out of Tehran under
the guise of business or media missions, had studied the degree of
vigilance of the captors.
Newsweek-May 12: For weeks beforehand, American intelli-
gence agents, some posing as European businessmen, had infil-
trated Iran to ease the way for the commando raid. Some agents,
presumably in Tehran much longer, may have penetrated the
ranks of the militants guarding the hostages at the U.S. Embassy
Newsweek-May 12: A senior U.S. official told NEWSWEEK
that excellent intelligence had been turned up on the Tehran em-
bassy-"virtually from the inside." Writing in the London Daily
Telegraph, respected defense correspondent Clare Hollingworth
claimed that more than 100 American agents still were operating
in Iran last week. "Iranian members of the teams," Hollingworth
wrote, "managed to 'bend' several of the captors, who then be-
came 'moles' inside the embassy. These 'moles' were ready and
willing to assist in the escape."
Copeland: Considering what we might offer ... and considering
that there are sometimes as many as 40 of them (students) away
from the compound out on the town or spending the night at their
homes, this is an easier feat than it might appear (recruitment).
Considering the number of prospective agents-and, to the
CiA pro, every one of those students is a potential agent until
proven otherwise-the law of averages is on our side.
Cover
Carter: (The) trucks our agents had purchased would be removed
from a warehouse on the outskirts of Tehran, driven to a point
near the mountain hiding place. and used to carry the rescue team
to the city. At a prearranged time, the rescue team would simulta-
neously enter the foreign-ministry building and the compound,
overpower the guards, and free the American hostages .... (The)
helicopters would land at the sites, picking up our people and
carrying them to an abandoned air-strip near the city.
Communication between the Pentagon and the rescue team,
using satellites and other rally facilities, would be instantaneous. I
would receive telephone reports from David Jones and Harold
Brown (from the Pentagon) _
Copeland: There will be a "staging area" somewhere within
helicopter range of Tehran at which brush-up training will be
given the two teams.
There also will be a point ... known as the ... "penultimate
position," from which the attack actually will be launched.
The choice of this latter is highly important. It-or they-must
be near enough to the. target to allow for a thrust lasting less than
one minute and, at the same time, it must be part of the "peoples-
cape" in the immediate area.
This (staging area) may or may not be the same as the "field
headquarters" where some communication assistant will monitor
the operation keep Washington informed ....
Safe Haven and Evacuation
Carter: From there (the abandoned air strip near Tehran), two C-
141s would fly all the Americans to safety across the desert area
of Saudi Arabia.
We also planned the procedure (after the mission was complet-
ed) for notifying Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, whose territories
would be used or crossed during the mission.
Copeland: There are several well-stocked areas near Tehran to
which our helicopters may flee in a very short time with minimum
danger of being followed ....
This (use of foreign airspace or landing areas), or course, is a
matter for our State Department. For present purposes, it need
only be said that our government has more-friends in the Middle
East than is commonly suspected.
l,tkic r,Y is . t.+.:1./,?
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4.
Anesthetization
Newsweek: There was speculation that the Americans intended
to use nonlethal gas to neutralize the embassy guards.
Copeland: This step, which security considerations prevent me
from describing in any detail, consists of measures to incapacitate
all resistance.
(It) includes such measures as ... the use of stunning or nause-
ating but otherwise harmless gases ...
. Secrecy of Mission
Carter: "On April 18, 1 had quite a discussion with my closest
advisers about how to deal with the congressional leadership on
the Iran decision. Fritz (Mondale) led the argument for minimum
advance notice and maximum secrecy. Cy (Vance) took the oppo-
site tack, maintaining that we should advise the Democratic and
Republican leaders in the House and Senate. I agreed with Fritz
Copeland: Unfortunately, this whole plan, whether executed
separately or as part of an overall military assault, has a weakness
... It is that our government can take no.action which does not
have the full support of the people and of Congress. _
There is a sad quote in Jimmy Carter's journal for April 21st.
"We listened carefully to all news reports, but heard only one
other indication of a leak. In monitoring radio broadcasts all over
Iran, we heard-a story from up near the Iraqi border of an attempt-
ed rescue n .ion. It turned out to be a repeat of a'conjectural
story which had run earlier in the Washington Star=no damage
was done."
But the damage was done. Copeland dwells on CIA assets in
Iraq, in his article. The Iranians have made clear that they had
advance warning. That only the mechanical problems in the desert
that aborted the full raid, prevented the police and military from
slaughtering the American hostages, agents, diplomats, all. By
Sunday, April 20th, according to Carter, Radio Iran was broad-
casting Copeland's story: the "surprise" was spoiled-Iranian
double-agents had remained loyal to the Ayatollah as had West-
err-trained military men. Repeat: according to the highest Iranian
sources the rescue of the hostages had been blown. Were the
Iranians bluffing when they insisted that the raid never could have
succeeded, was doomed in advance?
There is 2 final, strange piece in the puzzle. During the hostage
crisis, in 1980, U.S. army intelligence set up a special unit in Iran.
deed, they even had a map of the spot. It was discovered in the
papers of Mahmoud Jaafarian, a pro-Shah counterinsurgency
strategist who was executed after the revolution ... Jaafarian told
his captors that the staging site had been secretly built by the CIA,
with the Shah's knowledge, for possible emergency use."
Carter's plan to rescue the hostages had even more odds
against it. William Casey's law firm, Rogers and Wells, represent-
ed the "Pahlevi Foundation" a huge conduit for the Shah and his
family specializing in narcotics and overseas covert acts. The foun-
dation was riddled with agents who had served with Casey and
Copeland in the OSS and after, throughout the Cold War.
Mary McGrory, the Pulitzer Price winning columnist, speculat-
ed in the Washington Post, "what would the old soldiers have
done ... ? Would they have told the public that Carter was plan-
ning a coup to rescue the hostages ... at the risk of endangering
the lives of those involved?"
Somehow, the Iranians did know. Rescue team leader Charles
Beckwith, himself, told Newsweek that a number of CIA agents in
Teheran had pulled out, so that if the rescue had gone forward the
Americans would have been compromised and at total risk.
We now know from the New York Times book on the aborted
mission that within a week of the embassy takeover, "Brzezinski
convened in his office the first in a series of high-level secret
meetings of what came to be known as the 'Military Committee'
... The Military Committee, which met two or three times a
week also laid the plans for the rescue effort that was finally
launched the following April." Among those the group consulted
was H. Ross Perot, the flamboyant Dallas millionaire, who ten
months earlier, had employed former Green Beret officers in a
successful raid that freed two of his Electronic Data Systems
Corporation employees from a Teheran jail.
Perot had worked closely with Casey and many of his "old boy"
aides over the years-so here is still another potential back-chan-
nel to the Reagan operation.
Is it coincidence that on April 9. 1980 the students holding the
embassy vowed "to destroy the hostages immediately" if the U.S.
began "ev,-n the smallest military act against Iran"?
The New York Times, too, quoting "informed sources" report-
ed on the rescue plans with words that had been anticipated in
Copeland's article. The Times' maps also amplified Copeland's
predictions.
Rescue Team
"Intelligence Support Activity" (ISA) was so secret that it operat- New York Times: Rescue teams move to warehouse on out-
ed. virtually under an illegal status. It has since been disbanded. skirts of Teheran for last-minute briefing by American infiltrators.
However, in 1980 CIA Director Stansfield Turner did not know of Copeland: It is essential, however, that for both internal and
the existence of ISA, but Reagan campaign director William Casey external reasons, the rescue team must have a definite mercenary
did. According to a former Carter associate, the ISA "smells" like character and be a discreet combination of Qashqais, Kurds and, of
a back-channel of Casey's. course, Farsis.
The coincidence between Copeland's version and official plans Escape
revealed by Carter, Jordan, Powell and others, is too great to let New York Times: Troops break into embassy, cut telephone and
pass. Copeland and the official sources agree: disguise will be used;
l
e
ectricity lines
false communications will be employed to confuse the authorities;
agents pretending to be media people would infiltrate the con- One group neutralize Iranians; another frees hostages and evac-
pound during the excitement. Further, Copeland chatters along uates them by helicopters from embassy grounds or nearby An.
jadki soccer stadium.
about cover stories when, in fact, it is Copeland's Starpiece that is
ripping to shreds what Hamilton Jordan describes as "a disinfor- Copeland: Once the embassy has been entered and the defenses
mation campaign that will relax the Iranians." 1 neutralized, "Team A" will have on its hands a lot of confused
There was more than mechanical problems at "Desert One," defenders and very sleepy hostages.
where the mission began. The commander of the operation, By then, our 3 helicopters ... will land at designated points, and
Charles Beckwith, let it be known that there was a sudden and the attackers will begin leading the hostages ...
suspicious rate of traffic that night in the desert. In Washington, Meanwhile "Team B , will have taken control of all commu-
According to Time magazine:
"One of the many ironies of the entire mission was the fact that
the C-130s were heading for a remote spot in the desert that the
Iranians had feared might some day be used by U.S. forces. In-
Does this sinister evidence tally with Ronald Reagan's record
on campaign covert action, and his attitude toward Iran? In 1979
Reagan charged the revolt in Iran "could have been halted" if the
U.S. had not "appeased student rebels." A familiar Reagan theme
sounded on the first day of his campaign.
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7
Pressed by reporters, Reagan said, "there were certain leaders
who could have been separated from their followers and they
weren't." He said such a separation, by throwing the student and
Islamic leaders in jail, "would have been justified because they
were inciting riots and causing death and destruction."
When a reporter pointed out that Iran's jails were full of leaders
of anti-Shah factions, Reagan replied: "I don't know about that. I
just know what people on the scene told me." He declined to
identify them.
So much for the candidate's sources "on the scene;" were they
now his campaign back-channel' Reagan sideslipped further ques-
tions and concluded his press conference with what was later
exposed as an outright lie:
Reagan criticized former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and
actress Jane Fonda by telling a story he said was first told to him
by a former prisoner of war. "The young man's shoulder and arm
were crushed, and they tied his arm to a wall until he agreed to
meet with Ramsey Clark and Jane Fonda in Hanoi," Reagan said.
The crowd booed Clark and Fonda.
Reagan's stale attacks on anti-war critics aside, the press con-
ference was revealing, though the candidate did not say on that
day-as he had before-that "espionage in a political campaign is
not a criminal act."
What did Reagan know about the rescue mission, and when did
he know it? How much more does Charles Beckwith know? Rea-
gan rewarded Beckwith for his "failure" by giving him the top job
of the 1984 Olympics security and anti-terrorism responsibility.
Copeland's article appeared in the U.S. 96 hours before the rescue
began, and in Iran it was broadcast repeatedly up until the day
itself-why are those who blame researchers and the freedom of
information act for "emasculating covert action" silent on this
shocking leak? Is the Copeland piece the crown jewel of the Casey
"intelligence operation to monitor an October surprise" (Casey's
words)?
This question is as terrible as those asked of Nixon and Kissin-
ger about the manipulation of the Paris Peace Talks for political
gain. A terrible question of treason. 0
Donald Freed is a prize winning histori-
an. His Secret Life of Ronald Reagan
will appear in January Freed's play The
Last Testament of Richard Nixon is cur-
rently being staged in New York.
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