CASTRO SAYS AID TO REBELS IN EL SALVADOR WILL CONTINUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302050039-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 18, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302050039-3
r7"174F-.77:ARED
WASHINGTON TIMES
18 April 1985
Castro says aid to rebels in
El Salvador will continue
By Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Fidel Castro's top intelligence
operations officer recently made
clear Cuba would continue its aid to
the Salvadoran Marxist rebels and
otler insurgent forces in Latin
America despite conciliatory ges-
tures toward Washington, according
to U.S. intelligence sources.
That on-going support of anti-
Western insurgencies comes at a
time when Cuba's growing economic
problems forced it to soften its
image toward officials in the United
States, West Europe and Latin
America, according to the same
sources.*
., In a previously,' unpublished
report made available to The Wash- I.
ington Times, Manuel Pineiro?..
Cuba's chief of subversive activities'
in the Western Hemisphere; is
quoted as conveying this informaf.,..
lion to a visiting U.S. official two'
months ago. - -
- U.S. intelligence analVsts. con- ?;?
elude that Cuba will do nothinp toT
undercut either the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua or the Marxist
:-
rebels in El Salvador and will con,.
tinitgaitsrmin and traininn
'.in Chile and Guatemala.'
The analysts also believe that
Castro's .recent-interest: in negoti-
ations is a tactic designed= to pre- .
:2serve a Salvadoran insurgency now ?-?
. ' -on the defensive and to buy time for :.
--. the Sandinista rulers in Managua.-
?;.-..,, :-.., They also believe it ' gives ;-..the ,
f. Cuban' dictator-. Iii..veneerl.;;of
::-statesmanship'" which provides him -
- e. self-assumed 'right" to 'judge
'',Whicirs' governments in., -Central. -
14:America are legitimate:- ,!_'.'-','4,F.--:r..-;:!-?-4--ti,f.?
r-Meinwhile,' Havana's-.economy,
"which last year showed signs of life_-_:_
i..-- after two slow years, stumbled again
and Mn Castro last December called
for more exports, fewer imports and.
held out the prospect of .15 more
years of austerity.
A major reason for the Cuban dic-
tator's switch was heavy pressure
from the Soviet Union. Officials
from Moscow last summer attacked
the Cuban economy as wasteful and
unrealistic.
Soviet officials told Havana that
! 20 years of food rationing was an
embarrassment to the socialist
cause, and criticized Cuban hard-
currency purchases of machinery
from the West rather than from the
Soviet bloc.
Analysts believe, however, that the
new measures while reducing eco-
nomic growth will not achieve Mr.
Castro's ambitious new targets, 1
I especially greatly increased exports
I to Western countries.
1 Mr. Castro's prescription of more
' austerity comes at a time when a
Cuban government poll shows sharp
discontent with the quality and
availability of housing,
transportation, restaurants and
other services, the analysts said.
American intelligence indicates
the Soviet Union has in recent years
backed its displeasure over Cuban
economic performance with a level-
ing off of aid from $4.7 billion in ?
1982, to $3.8 billion in 1984.
- Analysts point out that Cuba's new
economic problems impel Mr. Cas-
tro to adopt a new diplomatic
strategy designed to lessen his isola-
tion in Latin America with improved
:relations with Argentina, Brazil,
j'eru and Uruguay. All four countriej.
- Ihad recent elections in which the
\winners are to the left of their pre-
decessors. . .
Mn Castro also met recently with
a stream of high-level Western visi-
tors, convincing each in turn of his
willingness to negotiate all differ-
ences between Washington and
_
Havana, according to the same
sources.
Analysts believe the Cuban dicta-
tor has successfully been raising
1"unrealistic hopes of weaning him
away from the U.S.S.R.," while "per-
petuating the myth that Cuban-U.S.
frictions are solely the result of
Washington's intransigent hostility."
. He is also reported to have con-
vinced in January three foreign min-
isters from the so-called Contadora
group ? Colombia,- Panama,
Mexico, Venezuela ? that he had
upbraided' the Nicaraguan coman-
dantes for being too intransigent in
settling Central America's prob-
lems. _
Mr. Castro is said to have
informed Guillermo Lingo, chief of
the political arm of the Salvadoran
rebels, to form an "alliance" with
President Jose Napoleon Duarte.
Analysts also believe Mr. Castro
may attempt less orthodox diplo-
matic measures such as trying again
to settle the 5-year-old Iran-Iraq war
in the hope that peace will bring con-
struction contracts from both coun-
tries providing jobs for Cuban
workers and add to his international
stature.
U.S. analysts warn, however, that
-they see no evidence that the Castro
regime would make any concessions
-
that would prevent the Sandinistas ?
from assuming unchallengeable
power in Nicaragua or would under-
cut the political and military.
strength of El Salvador's guerrillas.
' 'U.S. analysts believe that while
Mr.. Castro pushes his diplomatic
offensive, he may be more "judi-
ciotiC. in launching new insurgent,
cies: Other forms- of meddimg,
including the training of trade union
officials, and backing favored politi-
cians with cash, however, are not
ruled out. - -
- Analysts, however, are concerned
that the Cuban dictator's tactic of
I apparent reconciliation with the
United States will help him to
improve rapidly relations with other
Latin American countries ? many
. of 'which have had non-existent or
strained relations, with Havana
- ,since the late 1970s.
According to the report, the 1
Cubans will attempt to "stampede"- 1
Latin American leaders into full:
relations with Cuba by playing on..
' their fear that U.S. reconciliation"
1 with the Cuban regime will leave
k them behind facing left-wing opin-
ion at home.:
But analysts also 'hold out the
prospect that relations could worsen
if Radio Marti incites the Cuban peo- .
. . -
ple? to revolt. .?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302050039-3