'CONTRAS' CLOSE TO DEFEAT AS SERIOUS FORCE, SANDINISTAS SAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 7, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920016-3
ARTICLEAP ED CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ON PAGE I...... 7 March 1986
`Contras' close to defeat as
serious force, Sandinistas say
By PeIsr Ford
Speciel to The cnnsiiarr science Monitor
Merwqu4 Ni wa"
Nicaraguan "contra" rebels are near
to collapsing as a serious military force,
according to government officials and
Western observers here.
The contras' hopes for survival ap-
pear to hang on United States congres-
sional approval of
President Reagan's re-
quest for $100 million
more in aid.
But even with that
money, Nicaragua's
ruling leftist
Sandinistas are confi-
dent that the contras
will pose little real
threat to them.
Managua is "very
close to dealing a stra-
tegic defeat to the
contras, if they
haven't done it al-
ready," agrees one Western diplomat.
"The government can deliver irrevers-
ible military damage to the contras in
1986 if they get no military assistance."
This view contrasts starkly with the
situation 12 months ago, when heavy
contra presence in northern Nicaragua
was taking a direct economic toll: The
threat of ambushes prevented workers
from reaching many farms to harvest
Nicaragua's key export, coffee.
Then, Sandinista Army spokes-
woman Rosa Pasos recalls, there were
some 4,000 troops from the rebel Nica-
raguan Democratic Force (FDN) in the
area. Today, there are no more than 50.
In the south, meanwhile, guerrillas of
Eden Pastors G6mez's Democratic Revo-
lutionary Alliance (ARDE) have lost
their main base camps in Nicaragua,
near the Costa Rican border, which were
destroyed last Au-
gust. Weakened by
desertions, ARDE has
been reduced to occa-
sional forays against
government troops.
The only major con-
centration of contras,
estimated at 1,500, re-
maining inside Nica-
ragua are in the prov-
inces of Boaco and
Chontales. But they
are far from supplies
in Honduras and un-
der heavy pressure
from the Sandinista Army.
Government leaders are proud of the
past year's military successes, during
which US aid to the contras was limited
to $27 million in "nonlethal" assistance.
In the past 12 months, the Sandinistas
have gained and consolidated their mili-
tary ascendancy with two major offen-
sives in the north and south. Observers
cite several reasons why these offen-
sives struck home with particular force.
Most importantly, government troops
are more experienced. "Our men are
much more effective now, after four
years of fighting," says Ms. Pasos. "And
we know the contras better because our
intelligence has improv At the same
time, says a senior Western diplomat, Cu-
ban trainers "have been walking the
Sandinistas up the learning curve. The
best you can say for the contras is that
they have bumped along on. a plateau."
At the tactical level, government
forces have made powerful use of Soviet
built MI-24 attack helicopters and a grow-
ing fleet of troop transport helicopters.
"Their air support is strong and well-
organized," comments one Western mili-
tary expert. "This means that the contras
can no longer move in large groups."
Having used more and better-trained
troops to drive most of the rebels into
neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica, the
Sandinistas can now concentrate on inter-
dicting cross-border infiltrations by reb-
els. This task has been made easier by the
recent creation of special border units
posted along a 250-mile stretch of the
frontier with Honduras.
The question that now arises is: What
use could the rebels make of any aid that
Congress might approve?
"The Americans' problem is who they
use to fight this war," says the military
expert. "You need decent human re-
sources as well as aid itself." Aside from
supplies, the contras' main challenge is
lack of training, foreign observers say.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920016-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920016-3
a
But training a competent officer corps
is a long-term proposition, and may not
show clear results for many months, dip-
lomatic observers say. It would also re-
quire the involvement of US advisers in
rebel bases near the Nicaraguan-
Honduran border, if not inside Nicaragua.
Mr. Reagan's request that Congress
give him complete discretion as to how
the aid is used has reinforced suggestions
that this is what he has in mind.
The costs of training the rebels would
be paid from the $70 million of the pro-
posed package, as would weapon Shp-
plies. But logistical support, ranging from
helicopters to boots, could come from the
proposed $30 million "humanitarian"
portion of the aid. Should Congress agree
only to this amount, it would be of dubi-
ous value to the contras' aims Thmiah
keeping the contra forces alive, the aid
would not be enough to offer hopes of
positive gains needed to boost morale.
"It cannot be easy to be a contra sol-
dier, fighting for four years and having
nothing to show for it," comments Pasos.
If the contras are not to disintegrate,
they need the full $100 million to "keep
them together as a military force" long
enough to at least carry out training pro-
grams, the Western diplomat says.
Sandinista leaders are upbeat about
their military prospects in the face of
anything short of a direct US invasion.
Hopes that US aid "can save the merce-
nary forces from total defeat" are "illu-
sory," Defense Minister Humberto Ortega
Saavedra said last week. "We are opti-
mists. We are going to win, and we are on
the right road."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920016-3