A SANDINISTA MISSION TO MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900093-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 93
• Publication Date: May 16, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Si Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900093-0
Al-0
-FAG T.
THE WASHINGTON POST
16 Nay 1980
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
A Sandinista Mission to Moscow
A secret agreement between the Soviet Com-
munist Party and the Sandinista Marxist Party
of Nicaragua. signed in Moscow in late March,"
points to. major new Soviet intervention and a
possible Nicaragua-Cuban military accord in the
increasingly hostile Caribbean back yard of the
United States. .; ?
"The Soviet government would be unlikely to
sign a party-to-party agreement with a foreign
country unless Moscow regarded that country as
a reliable, long-term partner,'" a leading Latin
American authority told us.
The secret agreement between the two ruling
parties is regarded by non-communist Latin na-
tions as a dangerous Soviet intrusion into the
Central American heartland:It appears aimed at
planting Soviet influence and arms smack on the
bridge between the Americas, flanked by what
used to be the peaceful lake of the Caribbean
but what is now becoming an alien sea domi-
nated by the Soviet dependency of Cuba.
What is actually contained in the secret party-
to-party agreement is not known here or by the
governments of principal Latin American coun-
tries. There is reason to suspect. however, that
Moscow is "encouraging a military link between
communist Cuba and the Sandinistas, who top-
pled Anastasio Somoza's right-wing dictatorship
?last year. That link would guarantee money, arms
and supplies for Nicaragua. Itso, Moscow would
gain automatic entree to the struggling Sandin-
ista regime through a kindly intermediary?
Cuba's Fidel Castro. Without Castro, the Marxist
revolution in strategically placed Nicaragua
could not have succeeded last summer. a
The Soviet plan is. to communize Central
America and, using that land bridge as a dagger
pointing north and south, extend its influence,
onto the two continents. What is surprising to
top policy-makers in the Carter administration is
the speed with which thisa Soviet campaign is
progressing: and the increasing boldness of the
men in Moscow and their agents in Havana.
U.S. intelligence sources are now certain, for
example. that Castro is upgrading his estimated
_ J44 SAM2 anti-aircraft missile sites on Cuba. Now
single-stage rockets, the Soviet-made SAM2 is ac-
quiring three new boosters. Some U.S. officials
believe the purpose is to provide better air de-
fenses for possible U.S. retaliation ? against a I
Soviet-Cuban decision to redeploy nuclear weap-
ons in Cuba some time in the future: '
After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Rus-
sians promised never again to move offensive
nuclear weapons into Cuba. But the Sovietinva-
sion of Afghanistan broke the back of d?nte
and?U.S.-Cuban relations are at a new low-7-poi-
soned in part by Castro's deadly missionary. work
in,Central America. Castro is clearly preparing
for new confrontation with Washington.
He now has at least 2,000 Cuban agents In Nica-
ragua, including military advisers who control a?
small training camp at Esteli and a fortified air fa-
cility at Montelemar. Some U.S. officials claim that
although the Sandinista regime is controlled taday
by pro-Castro Marxists, a political power struggle
continues within the revolutionary group.
If so; there Was no Sign of it during the four-
day, late-March Moscow summit between the,
Sandinistas and two of the highest Soviet lead-
ers, including Politburo member A.P. Kirilenko
and Boris Ponomarev, Moscow's chief liaison
with foreign Communist parties. -
The communique describing that session out-
lined several routine agreements?widely pub-
lished here and in Latin America?on consular, '
trade, air traffic and other relations. The Soviet
version of the communique then stated -in the
next-to-last paragraph: "A plan of ties? between
the Soviet Communist Party and the Sandinistas ?
''for 1980-1981 was signed." . _
It is that bare-boned agreement that U.S. and
Latin authorities believe points toward a mili-
tary arrangement of-some kind between Nicara-
gua and Cuba, with the. Soviets as middle-
man/broker. It was signed by a leading member-i
of the Sandinista junta and by ministers of inter- j
nal affairs (Nicaragua's top cop),: defense aziil 1
economic planning?the revolutionary regime's I
,high command.
The commitment to Soviet world policy by'
these four Sandinistas is breathtaking: denuncia-
tion of , the U.S.-NATO ..decision to upgrade
NATO's nuclear arms, defense of the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan (later gently repudiated by a .j
member of the _Mita) and "renunciation of the j
use of force"?notwithstanding Afghanistan. i
Such rhetoric pales alongside the possibility of a 1
made-in-Moscow military allianCe between Cuba
and Nicaragua. While President Carter fumes over ;
American hostages in Tehran and laments Af-
ghanistan, aggression of a more ominous charac-
ter is being practiced in our own back yard.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900093-0