THE OTHER FACE OF CARTER'S DEFENSE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900088-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 88
• Publication Date: August 27, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900088-6
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ARTICLE APP: ARL"f)
ON PAGE __,q ,
Rowland 'Eb* nr`s and Robert Uovak
THE WASHINGTON POST
27 August 1980
The Other 'Face of a 'ter.' s
- - - ~~? ?__~?? ~~?,~.,. 't %U respunses to press -most important-to put warheads on
dent Carter has privately ordered a inquiries about. special nuclear materi- new(
ew nuclear weapons for Europe to com-?
delay in one of the most sensitive areas als should be low-key and.:.limited. ' Pete with existing Soviet systems
of national policy: an overdue increase Brzezinski's memorandum went to "Carter has approved these new sys-,,
in the production of nuclear explosives the secretaries of state and defense, the - terns with much fanfare," one defense
for warheads to power America's ex- CIA, director an the Joint Chiefs o expert told us, "but the delay in new
panding arsenal. tat . t mtorme em t at a orma ... production of weapons-grade fuel does
In response to Ronald Reagan's tough Esion", to expand nuclear fuel pro- not give the Joint Chiefs a Chinaman'
rhetoric, the president has given maxi- duction will be ";deferred" until an in- chance in hell to put warheads on
's
mum publicity to the new "Stealth" air- -ternational. conference on nuclear them."
craft and the new nuclear targeting proliferation in Geneva has ended. In its report on the authorization bill
policy to show progress against Soviet That will.not be for weeks. - for the production of warhead fuels-
power.. The delay over expanding nu- The decision to delay means the deten- last May, the House Armed Services
clear fuel production suggests procrasti- tists have won the backstage debate he- Committee said that Carter was plan-
nation in hopes that the Soviet threat tween them and the defense community, ning major new nuclear weapons for
will somehow ease. That raises questions a debate. waged in Congress and within which there would be no explosives. "Is
-about how much the Carter team's view `the administration. Their victory means there a commitment to a nuclear weap.
of the Kremlin really has changed. in essence that there is a high probability ons program?" the committee asked.
This-other face of the administration's . of running out.of nuclear explosives for Pentagon officials' have tried to
defense policy also points to an election- the new weapons systems. The adminis- argue this case in congressional testi-
year political dilemma. The delay in nu- tration is- authoriiing rifles but not the . mony short of publicly breaking with
clear explosives production betrays a -'bullets they canfite:,. the White House. On June 18, James P.
fear that expanded production would an- The "bullets". necessary were. spelled Wade, Brown's assistant for atomic
tagonize the anti-nuclear and environ- out last spring in a classified document energy, testified cautiously that "addi-
mental lobbies. But the delay itself gen- written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for tionalresources" are needed.
erates fear about the reaction of defense- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, set- Congress has, been unsuccessfully
oriented congressmen. ting production targets for new weap- pressing Carter for several years to gear
That second fear was reflected in a ons-grade materials. These targets were nuclear plants in Hanford and Richland,
"top secret" directive on Aug; 7 signed required by Carter's recent decisions to Wash., for production of modern, weap?:;;
by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's na- build the M U. mobile missile and the Tri- ons-grade nuclear fuel. But when, after
months of procrastination, Cart er finally
.rook the lead in modernizing NATO nu
clear weapons and ordered full speed on
theMX and Trident missiles, defense-on ..
ented congressmen believed the impasse,
was broken. t?t
Btzezinski's directive makes clear.
they' were wrong:rIt r~ve~led that' 'a",
July 24 session of =the. Presidential Re
view Committee formally decided to
defer new production facilities.
The directive went on to warn that'
"responses to press inquiries .-.:should,.
be low-key and limited to the following
points":. present prodiction -is ."ade-
quate for the near.-term';;..''long-term,
requirements are under review but are
'difficult to predict'; if higher produc
tion is needed, "appropriate-programs .
will be requested.'.',, -,~
"1n yet another gesture to politic's, the
directive orders that all'i responses -"to congressional''' inquiries, "should -be
cleared" by the Defense-and, Energy de-
partments, the. NSC` and' the Office of'.
Management and Budget. Having put
the development of "Stealth" on the
,network news, Jimmy Caner want to
,keepF?his'other defense f,=161
rottded
`from publfe,viety. C ` .4
efense' Policy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900088-6