STINGERS FOR SAVIMBI
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890039-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 25, 2012
Sequence Number:
39
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 31, 1986
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890039-2.pdf | 81.25 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890039-2
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WASHINGTON POST
31 March 1986
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
Stingers for Savimbi
A secret decision to send Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles to Jonas Savim-
bi's anticommunist rebels in Angola is
a breakthrough for the Reagan 'Doc-
trine.
It marks the first time in the long
history of U.S. clandestine operations
that a president has decided that top-
of-the-line American weapons, not for-
eign-made castoffs, can be used to ad-
vance U.S. interests. The Stinger is at
the very top. The shoulder-fired
weapon can penetrate titanium-pro-
tected cockpits of Soviet MI-24 Hind
helicopters, the gunships that control
the battlefields of Angola as well as
Nicaragua and Afghanistan.
The fact that previously skeptical
Secretary of State George Shultz now
is as enthusiastic about the Stinger as
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinber-
ger and CIA Director William Casey
signals an end to prior restraints. That
opens an important new chapter in the
long struggle between the West and
the Soviet Union where the ideological
tide long has flowed for Moscow.
.No other decision points up Reagan's
heightened intent to bring to life his
rhetoric that the West should be as
committed to widening democracy as
the Krenthn is committed to the spread
of communism. Just how seriously this is
taken is shown by the secret dispatch of
the director of Central Intelligence to
Pretoria to make sure the white South
Africa government is not connected to
covert U.S. help tor Savinibi.
If the Stinger neutralizes the MI-24
"flying tanks" in Angola, it almost
surely will be sent to anti-Sandinista
guerrillas in Nicaragua once Congress
finally approves Reagan's contra aid
plan.
This represents a long path traveled
by George Shultz. who started out
skeptical about the whole idea of covert
aid. When the secretary early in March
journeyed up Pennsylvania Avenue for a
crucial closed-door discussion of the aid
program with Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole and several other Republican
senators, he had previously agreed to
the principle of anti-aircraft and antitank
weapons for Savimbi.
Now, Shultz insisted that whatever
covert aid was given, it must guarantee
"sustainability" for Savimbi's rebellion.
That is, it would do no good to give the
rebels weapons that did not prevent
their annihilation by some 30,000
Cubans and their Soviet advisers.
In a scheduled 45-minute session,
which lasted twice that long, the sena-
tors persuaded him that only Stingers
would do that. They correctly argued
that the most valuable part of the MI-
24 gunship is its Soviet-trained pilot,
who would become vulnerable to the
Stinger. Shultz agreed, and Reagan
signed off on it.
But the president expressed special
concern about what has always wor-
ried Shultz: the sub rosa alliance be-
tween South Africa and Savimbi. Rea-
gan sought ways to insulate the U.S.
aid program, particularly if sweetened
with the potent Stinger, from any con-
nection with the apartheid regime. He
wanted South Africa, as one official
told us, to be "hermetically sealed off"
from any possible connection with the
U.S. program.
That job, administration insiders
told us, was accomplished by Casey
himself. Although CIA officials never
confirm or deny anything about their -
chief's travei schedule, it is known
that Casey in mid-March spent several
days in South Africa making Reagan's
ase.
Neither the Pretoria regime nor any
South African nongovernment body
will have any connection with the new
U.S. program. No U.S. covert aid will
now to Savimbi across the border of
South Africa or Pretoria-controlled
Namibia, which separates South Africa
from Angola. That makes Zaire, a
longtime friend of the United States,
the necessary gateway for new weap-
ons into Savimbi-controlled eastern
Angola.
It is far too soon to know whether
the famed Stinger will prove effective
in the African bush against the flying
tanks. But if it pays off, the decision to
break a 40-year ban on the use of top-
grade American weapons in covert
competition with the Soviets could be
of historic importance in pumping life
into the Reagan Doctrine.
td.News America Syndicate
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890039-2