THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKELY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201650001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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This Week with David Brinkley
ABC TV
November 17, 1986
DAVID BRINKLEY: Coming next, Moshe Ahrens, Israeli
Cabinet Minister; and shortly, the Senate Democratic
leader and the Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Intelligence; and Robert McFarlane, formerly President
Reagan's National Security Assistant who went to Iran.
[Announcements]
fvR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Ahrens in New York, thank you very
much for coming in. We're glad top have you with us
today.
MINISTER AHRENS: Nice to be with you.
BRINKLEY: Here in the studio are George Will of ABC
News and Sam Donaldson, ABC News White House
correspondent.
Now, Mr. Minister, tell us as much as you can, or as
much as you will about Israel's involvement in our
dealings with Iran.
MINISTER AHRENS: Well, I think you won't be surprised,
David, if I'm not in a position to add anything to what
has already been said by the President.
But I think the important thing is to realize that
there are two aspects of this issue on the arms
shipments to Iran and the release of the hostages.
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One is the attempt to find or make connections with
more positive, moderate elements in Iran, if there are
such, the thing the President talked about. I think
that's a legitimate objective.
Two, is sending arms in an attempt to reach that
objective. I think that's not all bad. There's no way
of affecting that crazy slugging match between these
two crazy countries, Iraq and Iran. It's not going to
change the balance of power. Maybe it will produce the
result of making a connection that the President was
looking for.
The other is the release of the hostages. And I think
that has not been realized here, as far as I can tell
from the media, is that these hostages are being held
on Syrian controlled territory in Lebanon in the Bekaa
Valley.
Now, Syria is the foremost terrorist state. They were
just apprehended in trying to blow up an airliner and
kill -- possibly killing -- with the intention of
killing over 400 people. Nobody gets released in the
Bekaa Valley except with the express approval of the
Syrians.
MR. SAM DONALDSON: Mr. Minister, may I ask you if
Israel would ship arms to Syria?
MINISTER AHRENS: I think that is the United States had
decided to make this arrangement -- I will answer your
question quite generally -- and if --
iviR. DONALDSON: No, to Syria I said.
Would Israel ship arms to Syria in order to improve
contacts?
MINISTER AHRENS: Well, no, Sam, that's very unlikely,
and you know that. Israel and Syria are in a state of
war.
MR. DONALDSON: Well, I asked that because you are
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suggesting that if the President shipped arms to
Tehran, to Iran, in order to try to improve contacts,
that somehow that's okay?
MINISTER AHRENS: I'd say, if the impression here by
the people who are dealing in this matter -- and I
don't know the details -- was that this would
facilitate the objective of making contact with
moderate elements there, I don't see that that's all
bad. Because as I said, you could not affect the
balance of power in that war that's being carried out
between Iraq and Iran.
MR. DONALDSON: But it would be bad if Israel tried to
ship arms to Damascus In order to make contact with
moderate elements there, is that it?
iVNINISTER AHRENS: Well, for the very clear reason,
Sam, that we might get hit by the Syrians the following
day in a full-scale war. That's quite different,
isn't it?
MR. DONALDSON: But of course Iran might use the
weapons to attack, let us say, Saudi Arabia for the
express purpose, let's say, of protecting that kingdom
against Iran.
MINISTER AHRENS: Sam, that's not very likely, either.
For the past six years Iranians have been straining all
their resources, everything they've got, in this crazy
war with the Iraqis. They're not about to turn on
anybody, I don't think.
MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Ahrens, let's leave aside for a
moment the question of whether or not the United States
gave encouragement, a wink, a nudge, whatever. Has
Israel been sending arms from whatever source, for
whatever reason, to Iran?
MINISTER AHRENS: And I haven't come here to appear on
this program to give you an authorized declaration on
the policy that Israel follows on the sale of arms.
As a matter of fact, our policy is not to reveal
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MINISTER AHRENS: And I haven't come here to appear on
this program to give you an authorized declaration on
the policy that Israel follows on the sale of arms.
As a matter of fact, our policy is not to reveal
extensively just what is done and why it's being done.
I don't think that that is the question at issue in
this case here.
MR. GEORGE WILL: In October, 1982, you were quoted in
the Boston Globe as saying that Israel was indeed
supplying arms to Iran, and that this was coordinated
with the United States at almost the highest level, and
had as its purpose to establish good relations with
officers, particularly, who might be moderate elements
in Iran. That's four years ago. Were you quoted
accurately?
MINISTER AHRENS: Quoted accurately. And I confirmed
the statement that was made by the Minister of Defense
of Israel at the time.
There were attempts being made to make these kind of
contacts. To the best of my knowledge they were not
successful.
As we know, Iran today is run by the most extremist
fanatical elements. My understanding of the recent
case is that here was a renewed attempt, now by the
United States, to make that kind of contact.
MR. WILL: Your argument is, in part, that nothing sent
-- not that we're going to acknowledge that anything's
been sent -- but nothing that's been sent will tip the
balance in the war.
Is there not a danger, however, that the Chinese, to
take just one example, and there are others, seeing now
that the United States, which urged people not to send
arms to Iran, has sent arms to Iran, could unleash a
flood of arms to Iran, and indeed tip the balance in
that war?
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MINISTER AHRENS: You know, this is a full-scale war,
with a very large number of soldiers and tanks and
airplanes participating.
It must be clear that both Iraq and Iran are geting
massive shipments from China and various other places.
And I don't think that the recent shipment of the
planeload that the President talked about can change
that by an iota, in my opinion.
MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Minister, you mentioned, as has been
mentioned frequently this week, moderate elements in
Iran. And you raise the question if there are any.
I would like to ask you, is there any reason to believe
there are any? And if there were any, wouldn't they be
shot if they were found dealing with Israel and the
United States?
MINISTER AHRENS: Iran's a big country. And my guess
is that Khomeini's people don't have total control.
There probably still are some remnants of the previous
regime.
I'm sure there must be many Iranians who do not like
the present regime, who would like to see it changed.
But as I said before, I think the chances of contacting
these elements, and finding them in some kind of
position of power at this stage of the game is really
very small.
vR. WILL: So the implications of that, then, is that
it would be imprudent for the United States to risk as
much as it did risk on a probability as small as you
see this to have been.
NIINISTER AHRENS: I didn't say that. I think it was a
legitimate objective. And I think the price that was
paid is really not very significant.
MR. DONALDSON: Well, then, what you're saying is that
you think the Iranian connection is over, that there
will be no more progress made in trying to renew those
sorts of contacts?
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MINISTER AHRENS: No, I didn't say that either.
And unfortunately, I don't know enough about that to be
able to tell you if it's over or not. I said I think
the likelihood of making that connection and finding
moderate people in that country at the present time is
not very high.
MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Ahrens, thank you. Thanks very much
for being with us today. Enjoyed having you.
Coming next, Senator Byrd of West Virginia, the
Democratic leader in the Senate; and Senator Leahy,
Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence;
and shortly, Robert Mc Farlane, who should know as much
or more about this than anyone else who went to Iran.
In a moment.
[Announcements]
MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Byrd, Senator Leahy, thank you
both very much for coming in today.
Now, there's been a good deal of critical comment from
Congress -- various members of Congress, about the
dealings with Iran. Now tell me, what are you so
unhappy about? That it happened, or that Congress
wasn't informed?
SENATE MINORITY LEADER BYRD: I'm unhappy because I
think this was a massive political blunder that
undermines the credibility of the Administration and
the nation, and puts at risk not only the getting back
of hostages but also our future overall strategic
objectives in the world.
MR. BRINKLEY: The President says he was not dealing
for hostages. Are you not persuaded on that point?
SENATOR BYRD: No I'm not persuaded on that point. I
think that was one of the components of the objectives
that was to be reached.
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NR. BRINKLEY: Senator Leahy?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, I think it's been devastating.
We've been trying to put together an anti-terrorism
policy. This has set it back immeasurably.
And no matter what they say, there were three shipments
of arms into Iran. And after each shipment, a hostage
came out. It sends a signal to terrorists anywhere: if
you want to get American arms, seize an American
hostage.
But more importantly, it's a case where they were
running the State Department, the CIA and the Defense
Department out of the basement of the White House
without any kind of congressional oversight. And they
end up with a disaster.
MR. BRINKLEY: So your view is, it has been one
shipment of arms, one hostage; a simple equation.
SENATOR LEAHY: No I'm not. I'm saying that that is
the impression that is given to terrorist nations.
Iran is a terrorist nation, as is Libya and Syria. And
I wonder what this does to the ability of the United
States to put together a credible anti-terrorist
policy, one that we would be joined in by the other
NATO countries.
R. WILL: Let's assume you'd been told about this in a
timely manner. And you had said, as you're implying
you would have said: don't do this; this is folly. And
then they went ahead. How would that have changed
things
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, I think that's hypothetical that
we don't even get to reach, because nobody was told.
There is a provision in the law which says that they
must notify certain members of Congress of a covert
action in a timely fashion.
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MR. WILL: Is this timely?
SENATOR LEAHY: No, this is not timely, in my
estimation. The people who were notified were the new-
found friends of the Administration in Tehran, not the
Republican or Democratic leadership of the Congress.
MR. WILL: Either Senator can speak to this.
i~ The Casey Accords, so-called, which worked out how the
Intelligence Committee would be informed, appear to
have been violated, as well as some other laws
pertaining to the shipments of arms.
There are going to be hearings, I gather, into this.
What should happen if the law is broken? Should people
resign when laws get broken If so, who?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, the law is very, very ambiguous.
It says, in a timely fashion. Eleven months is not
timely.
Senator Byrd has some suggestions for that, and I'd
rather yield to him on that issue.
SENATOR BYRD: Well, I think that there will be plenty
of options.
I think the important thing here now is for the
President to move as quickly as he can to repair the
damage that has been done. And one way you can do this
is to state publicly, and act unequivocally, to stop
arm shipments not only to Iran but to any terrorist
state, and to terrorists.
And secondly, I think the Administration ought to move
quickly to mount an intensive, high level, sustained
effort in the Middle East to get the peace movement
back on the track.
R. DONALDSON: Senator Byrd, will there be hearings in
the Senate, and if so, when?
SENATOR BYRD: Yes, there will be hearings,
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immediately. I understand that the Intelligence
Committee will hold hearings this coming week.
SENATOR LEAHY: Friday.
MR. DONALDSON: One of the principal actors in this
appears to be Admiral John Poindexter, the President's
National Security Adviser. Presidents have not allowed
their National Security Adviser to come to Capitol Hill
to testify. They have invoked Executive Privilege if
necessary. If Mr. Reagan does that, what's your
answer?
SENATOR BYRD: I think one of the problems with the
Administration is that it's acted in secret. And it
seems to feel that winning is winning the PR battle.
I think that what we've got to do -- I think of winning
as developing a comprehensive geopolitical foreign
policy strategy that promotes the best interests of
this nation. And we're ready to help the President.
But at some point or other, the Administration is going
to have to be accountable for its actions.
SENATOR LEAHY: I think it's immaterial in a way If
Admiral Poindexter does not come up. The Director of
the CIA will come up and will talk to us.
MR. DONALDSON: Well, on that point -
SENATOR LEAHY: And the matter will be explored at
great detail.
I've talked with Admiral Poindexter, as have a number
of the rest of us. I don't know what he might add to
what goes on. They've got a --
MR. DONALDSON: He ran the operation, did he not?
SENATOR LEAHY: And it was a fiasco. And I think that
the facts of how bad the fiasco was have come out.
Very much.
MR. DONALDSON: There is a report, if I may, that
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President Reagan in writing ordered Director Casey of
the CIA to break his contract with you, which he had
given you in writing, that he would notify you on any
covert operation within 48 hours -- the President of
the United States, if this report is true, ordered the
CIA Director to shut Congress out. What then happens?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, there's two ways of responding to
that. One, if that happened, Mr. Casey will tell us.
Because he does have to respond to the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
MR. DONALDSON: Under oath?
SENATOR LEAHY: And secondly would be --
MR. DONALDSON: Under oath? Under oath, Senator?
SENATOR LEAHY: That's a decision the committee makes.
But he would respond on this question.
Secondly,
if
he was so ordered by the President,
the
way the
law
is written, the ambiguous way the law
is
written,
he
would have to follow the orders of
the
President
in
that case. The law says that we must
be
notified
in
a timely fashion.
That was put in there in case something happens at 3
o'clock on a Sunday morning. You're not going to bring
the congressional committees together at 3 o'clock on a
Sunday morning. But 11 months? Nobody can call 11
months timely.
MR. WILL: Is there some kind of legislative history in
this? This is sort of negotiated, I gather.
SENATOR LEAHY: There is some.
MR. WILL: A lawyer from your committee sat in Mr.
Casey's outer office for hours waiting for this to be
signed. Might they not say, well, timely means ina
manner that would not jeopardize national security, and
therefore it could be 11 months? Are we going to have
an argument about this?
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SENATOR LEAHY: No. No, that could not be.
In fact, we have had matters where the Democratic and
Republican leaders of the House and the Senate are
notified of far, far more critical than this in a very,
very short period.
The fact is that the Administration was more willing to
trust their friends in Tehran that they somehow feel
are moderates, than they were leadership here. But
they were also doing their best to cut out the State
Departent and the Defense Department --
1R. DONALDSON: But Senator Byrd, may I ask you on that
point --
SENATOR LEAHY: -- and they somehow want to run it out
of the basement of the White House.
N'R. DONALDSON: On that point, Secretary Shultz, we are
told, wasn't for this. But in fact he carried it out
in the sense of telling our allies that we wanted them
to impose an arms embargo in Iran, when he knew that
the United States was breaking its own embargo. What
position does that put Shultz in? Can he effectively
represent the United States now?
SENATOR BYRD: I think it puts him in a very difficult
position.
But I think what we see here is just another symptom of
the confusion and the disarray that's within the White
House in the -- in connection with the formulation of
foreign policy.
And I think what needs to be done quickly is for the
President to order a complete review of the foreign
policymaking process from the top down, and move toward
improvements that would bring in the knowledgeable
departments and the responsible officials and the
members of Congress. And we stand ready to be
supportive. If we're going to have an effective
foreign policy, it's going to have to be bipartisan in
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nature, and it would be supported bipartisan.
MR. DONALDSON: This is the President's policy.
SENATOR BYRD: If the Administration will be open with
MR. DONALDSON: What do you mean, review? This Is the
President's policy.
SENATOR BYRD: I know, but -
MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Reagan ordered, we are told -- Mr.
Reagan authorized it.
SENATOR BYRD: Oh, yes, on this. Yes.
I'm talking about the overall foreign policy. The
Administration has no comprehensive, coordinated
foreign policy anywhere in the world. And this latest
fiasco in the Middle East merely underlines that.
''R. BRINKLEY: We've got one minute left.
I would like to ask you this. You say you are not
presuaded by the President saying he was not bargaining
for hostages. In your judgment, then, what was he
doing?
SENATOR BYRD: I think -- in the beginning, I think
that that was the central thrust. But I think as it
developed, all of these other purposes came in. Some
of them legitimate, such as long-term improvement of
relatons with Iran. It's all right to have a dialogue,
but we should not send arms to Iran in violation of our
own policy.
SENATOR LEAHY: I think when this fiasco started to
unroll, they rectroactively tried to find all the
reasons why they did it. And they're having an even
more difficult time doing that.
MR. BRINKLEY: We understand that Secretary Shultz, who
is on the air somewhere, I don't know where, has just
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MR.BRINKLEY; Right. No more.
SENATOR LEAHY: Could I say this?
R. BRINKLEY: Please.
SENATOR LEAHY: I gave the respoonse to the President
yesterday on the radio response. And I said, we do
want to have a bipartisan foreign policy.
There's two years left in his Administration. We have
some enormous terrorist problems facing us. We need a
bipartisan foreign policy. I'd hope that the
Administration would realize what a disaster they have
now, and acccept that offer from leading Republicans
and Democrats in the Congress.
MR. BRINKLEY: Senatopr Leahy, and Senator Byrd, thank
you. Thank you both for coming.
Coming next, Robert McFarlane, formerly National
Security Assistant in the Reagan White House, who, as
I've said went to Iran.
[Announcements]
MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. McFarlane, in Chicago, thank you
very much for coming in today. Glad to have you with
us.
Now, you have heard what has gone before in this
program, including two Democratic Senators, who, not
surprisingly were quite.critical. Would you like to
respond to some of their complaints? Which one?
1R. ROBERT McFARLANE: Well, David, I think there are
two very legitimate questions to be asked by the
American people and your own panel there.
And that is, number one, was it sensible policy. And
number two, was it properly carried out.
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I think that it is pretty straight forward, when you
look at Iran, to understand how important it is for the
West, for Japan, for all of us to restore a measure of
stability in our relations with Iran, if that is
possible.
As to whether it was properly carried out or not, that
turns, importantly, on a single issue, and that is, are
there elements in Iran or not who wish to reorient Iran
if that is possible.
As to whether it was properly carried out or not, that
turns, importantly on a single issue, and that is, are
there elements in Iran or not who wish to reorient
Iran's policies?
Now if there are, and I think that should be argued,
then dealing with them, strengthening them, reorienting
Iran's policy through them is a very sensible policy
goal.
Now, before, there are facts on the table to reach pre-
judgments as I think many in the press are, is a little
bit to indicate a predisposition, I think. And I think
for the Congress to conclude, before having all the
facts in front of them, is a little bit a source of
dismay.
\R. DONALDSON: Mr. McFarlane, why was it necessary toi
send arms to accomplish the goals that you have just
outlined?
MR. McFARLANE: That's a very good point, Sam.
I think if you ask yourself, if you were a person in
Iran who wished to reorient Iran's policies, and you're
in a climate over there which is not very hospitable to
trying to change things. You are vulnerable.
What is it that you would like to do, if you were in
their shoes, to survive, to assure your own position,
and over time, change the policy?
Well, you ought to have a constituency, oughtn't you?
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And that constituency would ask you, show me some
evidence. Show me you have some influence, some
standing. And these very modest levels, or so I'm
told, could not have had any effect other than perhaps
to strengthen those elements who wanted to steer a
different course.
MR. DONALDSON: Well, is it your position then that if
moderates in Iran wanted to porove that they could do
business with the United States, the way to do it was
to ship them arms, and they could say: see, we've got
some arms now. The United States is in fact in contact
with us.
MR. McFARLANE: Well, I think the point -- and I'll
make it again -- is that if people truly want to change
the policy in Iran, that's going to be opposed by
radicals, and they are going to be at great risk.
In order to secure themselves, it wouldn't surprise me
if they needed to go to elements of the army, the
Revolutionarty Guard, or the police, to demonstrate
their bona fides. Now if modest levels of arms made
that possible for them to carry on in this moderate
direction, it seems to me a reasonable price to pay.
MR. DONALDSON: One more question on this subject.
Is that then the view that we ought to carry forward
with other states when we're trying to contact moderate
elements. Moderates levels in the Soviet Union.
Moderate elements in Syria. Moderate elements in
Libya. We ought to have said that there is an
opposition to Colonel Qadafi. Ought we to send them
arms, Mr. McFarlane?
'vR. McFARLANE: Well, Sam that?s a very good point. It
is peremptorily posed. But I think this: One has to
have some judgment abvut whether there are moderate
elements or not.
Now I would say that thus far I've seen no evidence
that there are in Syria, in Libya. And so you don't do
that.
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But where you can find people who, because of the
general decline of the economy in Iran, when they look
to the north, they see 26 divisions; to the east,
100,000 Russians, to the west, the loss of a million
people in a war. And all around them in Tehran,
general deccline of their economy. It isn't surprising
that moderate elements do emerge, unlike these other
countries that you mention.
MR. WILL: Mr. McFarlane, no one's doubting that
there's dissent, dissatisfaction, and some moderate
elements.
What I'm having trouble understanding is how you get to
talk to them. That is, if you're going to deal with
people who believe that there should be a fundamental
change in Iran's policy, you're dealing with people
radically at odds with the existing government of Iran.
You fly into Iran, and start talking to them? Is that
the kind of society that it is? And you come in and
you deliver them what you call a modest supply of
defensive arms, and you say, go start working against
the policies and the -- really the core values of this
regime, how does this work? It sounds preposterous.
1R. McFARLANE: Well, I think that the history of
evolution in other countries, George, is analogous,
that countries recognize that when their strategic
interest would be served by a relationship with the
United States, they reach out and try to start that
kind of conversation. So that is the way it happens.
MR. WILL: Mr. McFarlane, are you saying then that the
Ayatollah is reaching out, or people fundamentally
opposed to him? And if they're fundamentally opposed
to him, how do they get away with it?
R. McFARLANE: Well, carefully. But basically --
MR. WILL: They meet you in hotels. Planes land;
planes that take off from Israel.
I mean, all kinds of things here that I would think
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would alert the security forces under the Ayatollah's
control that someone, at a high level, is working
against his policy.
MR. McFARLANE: Well, George, I think the issue as you
cast it generally portrays what is a very sensitive
process. And it is always sensitive, whether one talks
about China, or change in other countries. Yes, you
are at risk when you decide to change from bad to good.
But that doesn't mean you ought not try it.
MR. WILL: Mr. McFarlane, I guess what I'm suggesting
is that you're not dealing with dissident elements;
that the logic of this is that you're dealing with the
regime itself, that is leading you to believe that
you're dealing with moderate elements; but since
they're moderate elements who have to be doing this at
the sufference of the Ayatollah, are they not?
,,vR. McFARLANE: Well, I think certainly, we wouldn't
begin in the first place if the people involved hadn't
demonstrated their bona fides. And it has nothing to
do with hostages. In other actions, in risks that they
took which made clear their own good faith.
But you're quite right, the central issue here is were
there really moderate elements or not. Will they over
time change the policies or not? Will they over tiume
change the policies or not? If there are not, that's a
bad idea. If there are, it's a good idea.
R. BRINKLEY: While you were there, did you talk to
anyone you believe to be a moderate, that is, not a
fanatic follower of the Ayatollah
ivR. McFARLANE: Yes, I did. I talked to a number in
that turn of mind.
MR. BRINKLEY: Aren't they now in danger of being
hanged for talking to you?
VR. McFARLANE: Yes, they are.
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MR. WILL: Was Mr. Ahrens right in 1982 when he told
the Boston Globe that Israel had been sending arms to
Iran in coordination with the United States at almost
the highest levels in order to woo the oifficer corps?
ivR. McFARLANE: I don't know. I honestly had never
heard of such a thing. And I doubt that it occurred.
MR. DONALDSON: Mr. McFarlane, in the summer of 1985,
we are told that the United States condoned a shipment
of arms to Iran that did not come from the United
States but a third country. Israel has been
identified, but not publicly. Who authorized that
condoning of that shipment of arms?
MR. McFARLANE: Well, you assert something which is
hypothetical, Sam. The fact is that no American nut,
bolt, or any other item from anywhere in the United
States went anywhere in 1985.
MR. DONALDSON: Excuse me, Mr. McFarlane, it is not
hypothetical.
The Chief of Staff, Mr. Regan, on the record has
admitted that in 1985 a shipment of arms went to Iran
that was not from the United States. But he agrees
that the US condoned. He says it happened because we
were asked whether we had any objections, and we said
we had no objections.
My question to you is, who condoned it? Was it
President Reagan, or someone beneath him?
YR. McFARLANE: Well, you should pursue that with him.
~iR. DONALDSON: You were the National Security Adviser,
MR.McFARLANE: The issue, Sam, is that at no time did
we send, did we authorize, did we otherwise encourage
anything to a terrorist anywhere.
RR. DONALDSON: Mr. McFarlane, are you denying that the
United States condoned a shipment of arms in the summer
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of '85? Are you arguing with the Chief of Staff?
MR. McFARLANE: Sam, I think that that kind of
portrayal doesn't match my own understanding of the
issue.
And in checking, as I have said, no American item, nor
to the best of my knowledge, the scenario that you spin
out, went forward as you portray it.
M2. DONALDSON: It's on the record, sir.
M2. BRINKLEY: Well, we have to end it on that note.
Mr. McFarlane, thank you. Thanks very much for being
with us today.
MR. McFARLANE; Thank you.
M2. BRINKLEY: Enjoyed having you with us.
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