U.S.-IRANIAN DEAL COULD TILT BALANCE IN PERSIAN GULF WAR

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000201630002-1
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RIFPUB
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K
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2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 20, 2012
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 9, 1986
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OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000201630002-1.pdf177.78 KB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201630002-1 ~ oMneE WASHINGTON POST 9 November 1986 U.S.-Iranian Deal Could Tilt Balance in Persian Gulf War Talks Come at Critical Point in Stalemate T By Michael Dobbs Washington Pat Foreign Ser, ce BAGHDAD, Iraq-Recent dip- lomatic overtures by the United States toward Tehran have coin- cided with a crucial phase in the grueling six-year-old Persian Gulf war between Iran and Iraq, in the view of analysts here. As White House envoys report- edly shuttled between Washington and Tehran, the pace of the world's bloodiest and most expensive on- going war has been speeding up. Strapped for men, money and war materiel; both sides have been forced to make some hard decisions that could affect the outcome of the conflict. Important developments over the past few months have included the capture by Iran of a significant chunk of Iraqi territory, more ag- gressive tactics by the Iraqi Air Force, and an unprecedented de- gree of military mobilization. All this has taken place against a back- ground of political and economic strains on both sides. "Both Iraq and Iran seem to have reached the conclusion that time is running against them," commented an independent military analyst in Baghdad. "The war cannot be sus- tained at its present pace indefinite- ly, so the key question now is which side is going to run out of energy first." Added a senior western diplomat, "When historians look back and an- alyze this war, I think they will view the year 1986 as an important turn- ing point" The make-or-break quality of the present phase of the war makes Washington's reported contacts with Tehran particularly sensitive. American arms supplies to Iran, whose armed forces were equipped with U.S. weaponry under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, could al- ter the strategic balance of the con- flict in Tehran's favor. Begun in September 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran, the war has pit- ted the political forces of Arab na- tionalism and Islamic fundamental- ism against each other. It has also developed into a personal clash of wills between two very different dictators. Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has vowed to continue the war until Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, is overthrown and put on trial. After a series of military set- backs, Iraq is now conducting a largely defensive war. The best that Iraqi leaders can realistically hope for is an honorable draw. An Iranian victory, on the other hand, remains a possibility. Such an outcome could help destabilize and ultimately bring down moderate Arab states from Kuwait to Egypt. The present, more intensive phase of the war dates back to last February, when Iran seized the Faw Peninsula in southern Iraq. The am- phibious assault across the Shatt al Arab waterway caught the Iraqi Army by surprise and was a major blow to Iraqi morale. In reply, the Iraqis seized the central Iranian bordlr town of Mehran on May 17 but were forced to give it up less than two months later. Western analysts here believe that, combined with a growing eco- nomic crisis, the losses of Faw and Mehran prompted the Iraqi leader- ship to rethink its approach to the war. It became clear that it was no longer possible for Iraq to wage a war that sheltered the civilian pop- ulation from the conflict. According to Iraqi figures, which are accepted as accurate by west- ern military analysts here, the size oQff the Iraqi Army has been in- creased by at least 275,000 soldiers over the past 10 months. This means that well over 1 million Iraqis-60 percent of the eligible male population-are now in active military service. A similar surge in military man- power has occurred in Iran. Iranian leaders claim to have trained 500 FILE ONLY new battalions-roughly 250,000 men-in preparation for their much-vaunted "final offensive." Iran's population of 45 million is three times the size of Iraq's, re- flecting a much lower degree of mo- bilization. The population difference may be one reason why Iran is more willing than Iraq to put its soldiers into highly dangerous situations. The willingness of poorly educated Iran- ian Shiite Moslems to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the Is- lamic revolution is also the one clear strategic advantage enjoyed by Tehran. It also may explain why Iraqi leaders appear frightened of incurring large numbers of casual- ties. "To put it crudely, the death of an Iranian is not the same in military terms as the death of an Iraqi," said a western military attache in Bagh- dad. "The Iraqi soldier is better equipped and less easily replaced. The Iraqis cannot afford a kill rate of anything less than 3 to 1.* In order to offset Iran's popula- tion advantage, Iraq has been com- pelled to use its technological su- periority. In the past few months Iraq has followed a much more in- tensive pattern of bombing raids against Iranian military and eco- nomic targets. As a result, Iranian oil production is estimated to have plummeted in September and Oc- tober to below 1 million barrels a day. Some analysts believe the 1- million mark is the level necessary to sustain the Iranian war effort. "Iraq is paying a heavy price for maintaining a constant state of readiness to withstand a large-scale Iranian attack. It is trying to alter the picture by increasing the eco- nomic price of the war for the Iran- ians," said a western diplomat here. The fighting has extended into the Persian Gulf, the outlet for 20 percent of the oil exports to the noncommunist world. Iraq is en- forcing an exclusion zone around Kharg Island, Iran's main oil termi- nal. Iran, for its part, has stepped up its gunboat attacks on tankers headed for Kuwait and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. According to western shipping sources here, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find crews prepared to enter the gulf these days. Contino'4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201630002-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201630002-1 Although the highly publicized Iranian offensive has not yet mate- rialized, both Iraqi and western an- alysts are convinced that a large- scale Iranian ground attack is inev- itable. In order to be effective, the Iranians are being careful about us- ing their ultimate weapon: surprise. Because it is impossible to hide large numbers of soldiers at the front, the Iranians must wait until The enemy relaxes his guard. Both western and Iraqi military 'analysts in Baghdad have been ex- pecting an Iranian ground attack since last September. The conven- tional wisdom until recently was that the offensive ' would come be- fore the rainy season, which is just beginning. Muddy terrain and heavy cloud cover could, however, favor , the Iranians by making it more dif- 'fiicult for the Iraqis to use their tanks and airplanes effectively in the battle. Many observers believe that the Iianians could gain some ground if they launched a large-scale offen- sive. A major breakthrough, how- ever, seems unlikely given the, strength of Iraqi defenses. Opinions are divided over which country is better placed to sustain a Jong, drawn-out war. Iraq has huge debts-estimated at about $50 bil- lion-but it also has vast oil re- serves and wealthy friends. Iran has little debt, few friends and a signif- icantly reduced capacity to pump oil. Iran also has a population that seems more willing than its Iraqi counterpart to endure economic hardship. Gasoline and heating oil rationing, recently introduced in Tehran, is a long way off in Bagh- dad, however. The Iraqi hope is that, if an Iran- ian offensive fails to achieve the de- sired results, the war will gradually wind down. But Iraqi officials con- cede that it is likely to drag on in one form or another as long as Kho- meini is alive. "It has become a kind of personal thing with Khomeini," said one well- placed official. "He has toppled the shah. He has humiliated America.' That leaves Iraq as his last enemy." Baghdad * ?. Vehran IRAQ , : Enlxnd SAUDI ARABIA MILE IOMAN Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201630002-1