POLICY MAY NOW REFLECT TOUGH TALK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201090049-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: June 5, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201090049-0
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PkGEre-
MIAMI HERALD
5 June 1983
Polic -ma I"-
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By ALFONSO CHARARDY s Preparation of - a reluctant --- Some of the Pentagon experts
By A FON,rgwn Bureau American public for increased U.S. also argue that a limited number of
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W Reagan and his inner-circle
of advisers have taken di-
rect control of U.S..policy,on Cen-
tral America in a move that may
toughen the administration's role in
the turbulent region.
A hardened position would be
clearly in tune with recent Reagan
.rhetoric about the priority he places
on stopping Marxist subversion-in
Central America. Since March, the
President has made six major
speeches that touched on the issue,
including an exceptional appear-
ance before a joint session of Con-
gress April 27 in which he warned
that the region's violence could
threaten the safety of our home-
Speculation that the tough Rea-
gan position will get tougher gained
currency May 27 with the ouster of
Thomas O. Enders as the State De- leftovers." At the same time, -ad-
partment's chief Latin American ministration officials announced a
specialist. Administration officials
said Reagan personally ordered En-
ders' dismissal.
Reagan has since stressed that
Enders' dismissal as assistant secre-
tar,- of state for inter-American af-
fairs did not mean a change in poli-
cy. "Contrary to some reports ,.. .
we are not changing the policy I
outlined to the Congress," he said
Wednesday.
But lnterWewd with half a dozen
State Department and White House
officials indicate that Enders' re-
moval could result in any or all of
these developments:
? More active and overt support
for pro-American governments in
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras
and Costa Rica, as well as the CIA-
backed rebels fighting Nicaragua's
leftist regime.
ra
ary tnvo
emen
e gwen permission
e
mi
to n advisers s
ow
ASHINGTON - President America, perhaps even including to accompany 'Salvadoran units on
the dispatch of U.S. combat troops. combat operations in guerrilla-con-
e An -end to the interagency
feuds-,on Central American policy
that sometimes created the impres-
sion both here and abroad that the
United States was confused on how
to deal with Central America.
? New tactics in dealing with
Congress, which has failed to enact
Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative,
cut part of his requests for military
assistance to El Salvador and tried
to curtail CIA assistance for anti-
Sandinista guerrillas.
-a More personnel changes.
The day ,Enders' departure was
announced, the Pentagon and State
Department released a strongly
worded background paper on Sovi-
et-Cuban-Nicaraguan, meddling in
.Central America. 'Enders was said
to have opposed it as "warmed-up
decision to send 100 additional U.S.
'military advisers to Honduras and
leaked a proposal to send 20 or 30
-others to Guatemala.
Some State Department officials
said these developments could re-
flect a desire on the part of some
White House officials to prepare
public opinion for an escalation of
U.S. involvement in the region.
Hard-line White House and Pen-
tagon officials contend that only an
increased and more active U.S. mili-
tary presence in Central America
would check.the advance of leftist
guerrillas in El Salvador and the
growing military buildup in Nicara-
gua.
Privately, these officials say they
believe that only a dramatic in-
crease in the number of US..mili-
tary advisers in El Salvador -from
the present 55 to 100 or 200 - will
bring about victory.
trolled areas.
This differs sharply with Enders'
formula for El Salvador. He sought
not a military victory, but only
enough U.S. military aid to help the
local government hold off the rebels
while it pressed for social, political
and economic reforms to eliminate
the roots of the conflict.
Although some of Enders' friends
believe his removal does not spell
any major change in policy - "It
can't go any further to the right
than it already has," quipped one of
them - many say that his depar-
ture clears the decks for harder
U.S. initiatives.
A State Department source sym-
pathetic' to Enders said that "cir-
cumstantial evidence" suggests that
Reagan may be considering deploy-
ing U.S. combat units in Central
America - not necessarily in the
actual conflicts of El Salvador or
Nicaragua but on the periphery,
perhaps Honduras - to act as a de-
terrent force.
Pentagon sources said that such a
deployment would only be likely in
the event of war between Nicara-
gua-and Honduras or a dramatic in-
,crease in the number of Cuban mili-
tary personnel in Nicaragua.
A legislative aide to an influential
Democrat on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee commented
that Enders' .removal and a Reagan
statement May '27 "clearly indicat-
ed" to him that the White House
was considering deploying U.S.
troops.
Although Reagan had steadfastly
ruled out the possibility of sending
combat troops -to Central America,
he seemed to change his stance in a
chat with reporters just before the
Williamsburg summit at the end of
May.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201090049-0
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. Asked it ne was constoenng.tne
use of combat troop`,. Reagan re-
plied: "So far; there has been no in-
dication, or no hint-from any of
those. countries that this is what
they want." Pressed on what would
happen if some country asked for
troops, he said: "You're getting into
an area where?I just don't think we
should be openly discussing."
One National Security Council
aide acknowledged that some rank.
ing Central American military offi-
cers have suggested that the United
States send combat units, but have
made no formal request.
"They have told us that, private-
ly, they would cheer the dispatch of
the Marines, but that publicly they
would have to condemn the United
States," the aide said.
The source also noted that Rea-
gan has been-asked by two influen-
tial persons, Sen..Barry. Goldwater
(R., Ariz.), and Gen. Wallace Nut-
ting, the recently departed chief of
the U.S. Southern _.Command, -to
stop ruling out the possible use of
U.S. combat troops and leave his
options open. -
It is not known whether Enders
opposed the open-ended commit-
ment to Central America that Gold-
water and Nutting suggest. But
there appear to have been sufficient
other differences between the as-
sistant secretary and Reagan's aides
to have triggered his dismissal.
Administration officials said En-
ders was ousted because Reagan's
national security adviser, William
Clark, and U.N. Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick were dissatisfied with
the way he implemented policy on
Central America.
"Tom was simply too pragmatic
and wanted to explore the possibili-
ty of a negotiated settlement in El
Salvador," said one aide. "He was a
moderating influence between the
left in Congress and the right in the
White House, and finally he fell on
his face."
The aide said Clark and Kirkpa-
'trick, both conservatives, believe
that the only solution in El Salvador
is to crush the guerrillas and not to
talk to them.
Enders' aides said he was not a
liberal who wanted victory for the
guerrillas. Rather, they said, he be-
lieved that the Salvadoran govern-
ment should be encouraged to settle
the conflict politically by attracting
the more moderate rebel leaders
into negotiations.
lieved, that further confrontation
with Congress over military aid to
El Salvador could be avoided.
Administration officials said the
immediate result of Enders'-remov-
al will be a shakeup of the State De-
partment's Latin American policy-
making division.
"There will be ambassadorial
changes, changes at the policy-mak-
ing level, all of it designed to bring
in people the White House can
trust," said one White House
source. "No longer are we going to
leave our policies in the hands of
people who are only interested in
their careers and who undermine
our interests in Central America."
Enders will be replaced by Lang-
home Motley, a Republican, former
.lobbyist, one-time land develover in
Alaska and current U.S. ambassa-
dor to Brazil. Motley emphasized at
a news conference last week that
he was "going to be working here
for George Shultz."
The U.S. ambassador to El Salva-
dor, Deane Hinton, was replaced
Thursday. It had been expected that
Hinton would be replaced by Gerald
Thomas, a retired Navy admiral
now serving as the ambassador to
Guyana and reportedly a close
friend of Clark's.
Thomas' consideration. however,
apparently triggered open discon-
tent among the State Department's
career diplomats who took their
case to Shultz. The result was that
Thomas Pickering, a veteran diplo-
mat now serving as ambassador to
Nigeria, was named to replace Hin-
ton.
Others who are leaving or have
left in recent days include Francis
McNeil, the ambassador to Costa
Rica, and Gen. Nutting, who moved
from the Panama-based U.S. South-
ern Command to the U.S. Readiness
Command at McDill Air Force base
near Tampa.
Officials said Motley may change
the ambassadors to Nicaragua, An-
thony Quainton, and Guatemala,
Frederic Chapin, when he assumes
Enders' job and could choose new
assistants for himself.
"What we are trying to do is re-
vitalize our polities toward Central
America, to give them a sharp focus
and a clarity which they did not
have before," said a National Secu-
rity Council source.
"We need to speak with one
voice in the administration so that
our friends in Central America feel
confident that all our actions are
designed to help them, not under.
mine them," he said.
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O.S. Decision-Makers on Latin Policy
Ronald Reagan:
Taking increasing personal role
in?formulating Central
American policies. Most visible
effort April 27,rn rare
appearance before joint
session of Congress aimed at
convincing lawmakers and
American public U.S. credibility
and national security at stake.
Reportedly took personal role
in-recent realignments of key
administration personnel
involved with Central American
policy: -
Langhorne A. Motley:
Reagan loyalist currently U.S.
ambassador to Brazil.
Administration choice to
succeed Thomas Enders as
State Department's top Latin
America specialist. Informal
style and fluent Portuguese
gained for Motley. 44. during
two years in Brazil. Born and
raised in Brazil, son of a
half-Brazilian mother and
American petroleum executive.
Motley became Alaska's
biggest real-estate dealer in
1970s. Gained lobbying
experience before Congress
during Alaskan land debate.
-Active.in Reagan's 1980
election campaign. Close to
Reagan, Shultz and National
Security Adviser Clark.
Fred Ikle:
Swiss-born undersecretary of
defense for policy. Sanchez'
immediate boss. Ikle, 59, came
from Hoover Institute.
California think tank known for
emphasis on studies of
communism. Regarded by
critics as hardline ideologue.
Emerged over past year as
major force behind evolution of
administration policy toward
Latin America.
George P. Shultz:
As secretary of state, Shultz
said to be handling personally
day-to-day supervision of
Central American policy in
wake of personnel reshuffling.
Shultz, 62. previously devoted
major attention to Middle East
and Europe. Hold key cabinet
posts in Nixon Administration.
active in Reagan's 1980
election campaign. Replaced
mercurial Alexander Haig as
secretary of state in June
1982.
William Casey:
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. World
War II veteran of old Office of
Strategic Services (OSS),World
War II veteran of old Office of
Strategic Services (OSS).
forerunner of the CIA.
Reagan's campaign manager
during presidential bid. Also
headed transition team once
election won. As CIA chief.
Casey, 70, heads Reagan's
secret agenda in Central
America. Reportedly supervises
personally CIA covert program
for anti-Sandinista forces in
Nicaragua.
Gen. Paul Gorman:
Gorman, 55,-new commanding officer of U.S.
Southern Command, headquartered in Panama.
-Responsibilities include U.S. military activities in
Central America. As assistant to chairman of
Joint Chiefs of Staff before Panama assignment.
Gorman their principal briefer on Central
America. West Point graduate with master's
degree in public administration from Harvard.
Member of delegation to U.S.-Vietnam peace
talks in Paris 1970-71. Detailed to CIA 1979-80.
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William Clark:
Reagan's national security
adviser come long way since
1981 when he unable to
identify prime ministers of
South Africa and Zimbabwe in
congressional hearings on
nomination as-undersecretary
of state. Member of tight circle
of Californians that surround
Reagan. Clark and U.N.
Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick
considered among most
influential advisers in
formulation of Central America
policy.
Thomas Pickering-
Career.diplomat and
ambassador-designate to El
Salvador. Currently
ambassador to Nigeria,
formerly to Jordan. No Latin
American experience but
Pickering, 51, described by
colleague as "among the
brightest, most capable and
widely respected foreign
service officers." Reportedly
administration's second choice
for Salvador post after a
political appointee. Expressions
of rising discontent and sagging
morale in State Department by
ranking officers caused
reconsideration.
Nestor Sanchez
Deputy assistant secretary of defense for
inter-American affairs and Pentagon's top Latin
American policy official. Strong advocate of more'
"military aid for El Salvador and is directly involved
in supervising it. Sanchez, 57, a longtime CIA
officer in Latin America before taking Pentagon.,
post. Served as CIA station chief in Venezuela,
Colombia. Guatemala.
Jeane Kirkpatrick-
U.S. ambassador to United
Nations. Kirkpatrick, 57,
attracted candidate Reagan's
attention with article for
Commentary magazine on
"U.S. Security and Latin
America." Was professor of
political science at Georgetown
University and resident scholar
at conservative American
Enterprise Institute. Emerged
in recent months as one of
administration's most
influential officials on shaping
Central America policy.
Believed to be at least partly
responsible for removal of
Thomas Enders as assistant
secretary of state.
Richard Stone:
Former conservative
Democratic senator from
Florida, Stone picked by
Reagan as special
trouble-shooting ambassador
for Central America. Stone. 54,
started 10-nation
"fact-finding" tour in El
Salvador Thursday. Stone
easily confirmed by Senate
although questions raised over
earlier role as paid lobbyist for
Guatemalan government of
President Romeo Lucas Garcia,
widely condemned for human
rights record. Special envoy
position created at urging of
Rep. Clarence Long (D., Md.),
chairman of a powerful House
subcommittee, who set it
condition for approving
administration emergencny aid
request.
John Negroponte:
Ambassador to Honduras. A
hard-charging career diplomat
with reputation as can-do man.
Reportedly oversees
not-so-secret-war against
Nicaragua funded by CIA.
Educated at Exeter and Yale.
Negroponte, 43, a political
officer in Saigon during height
of Vietnam War. Member of
U.S. delegation to Paris peace
talks.
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