U.S. BACKING REBELS IN 4 COUNTRIES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080025-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 24, 2012
Sequence Number:
25
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 12, 1986
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080025-7
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MIAMI HERALD
12 May 1986
RI! ONLY
U.S. backing rebels in 4 count
By ALFONSO CHARDY
Herat Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - A year after quietly
adopting a policy of support for anti-Commu-
nist insurgencies worldwide, President Reagan
has embraced the causes of four rebel
movements from Afghanistan to Nicaragua in a
new strategy to loosen Soviet influence in the
Third World.
Under the Reagan Doctrine, as the policy is
generically known, U.S.-backed rebel armies
are fighting Soviet-backed regimes in Afghani-
stan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua.
Reagan's rebels include 150,000 Afghan muja-
hadeen, 25,000 Angolan guerrilheiros, 20,000
Cambodian maquisards and 15,000 Nicaraguan
contras.
The number of guerrillas supported - about
210,000 - is the largest in U.S. history and the
first to be assisted since the Central Intelli-
gence Agency trained 80,000 Laotian and
Vietnamese rebels during the Vietnam War.
As in the past, the CIA again is playing a
central role. To implement the Reagan Doc-
trine, the spy agency is undertaking new
covert operations at a budgeted cost of about
half a billion dollars, according to administra-
tion officials briefed on the CIA programs.
They said that the immediate goal is to
erode Soviet interests in the Third World, but
that the ultimate objective is to deal a strategic
blow against Moscow without using atomic
weapons.
The strategy, recommended by CIA Director
William and approved by President
eagan in January 1985, rests on the premise
that the superpowers are already engaged in a
World War III of sorts involving proxy armies,
the officials said.
From that perspective, the United States is
trying to roll back Moscow's gains by aiding
pro-Western rebels in those nations.
"The way to hurt Moscow is through the
colonies, not in a frontal war which could end
the world," said one official, quoting from
briefings at which Casey's views have been
outlined.
He said Casey believes the United States is
justified in aiding foreign rebels because the
Rus-
sians fired the first shot back in
the 1960s when then-Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev pledged to aid
Third World "wars of national
liberation."
The CIA declined comment. But
when queried on the subject, it
released a copy of a little-publi-
cized May 1, 1985, Casey speech to
the Metropolitan Club of New
York.
Casey then accused the Soviet
Union and its partners of waging a
"subversive war ... against the
United States and its interests
around the world for a quarter of
a century or more."
"This campaign of aggressive
subversion has nibbled away at
friendly governments and our vital
interests until today our national
security is impaired In our imme-
diate neighborhood as well as in
Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin
America."
Primary targets
Casey noted that Moscow's
backing of leftist rebels occurred
at strategic locations aimed at
three primary targets vital to U.S.
security: Middle East oil fields, the
Panama Canal and Mexico.
As a result, U.S. officials said,
the CIA has become a virtual
"freedom fighters" bureau and
Casey a veritable vicar of the
Reagan Doctrine of exporting
anti-Soviet revolution.
The policy had its genesis in
Reagan's decision six weeks after
taking office Jan. 20, 1981, to sign
a secret finding, or report, to the
congressional intelligence commit-
tees authorizing the CIA to spend
$19.5 million to organize the first
contingent of Nicaraguan contra
rebels.
At that time Reagan also in-
creased from $100 million to $250
million the annual CIA funding for
mujahadeen rebels.
But the Afghan and Nicaraguan
programs were uncoordinated.
The idea of a comprehensive
policy can be traced to anti-Com-
munist adventurer Jack Wheeler,
known as the Indiana Jones of the
right, who last year helped the
pro-Reagan Citizens for America
lobbying group organize the first
summit of anti-Soviet insurgents
in rebel-held Angolan territory.
Wheeler says he got the idea
during a tour of battlefields in
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia
and Nicaragua in 1983. Returning
to the United States, Wheeler
briefed Casey, Secretary of State
George Shultz, then-United Na.
tions Ambassador Jeane Kirkpat.
rick and Marine Lt. Col. Oliver
North of the National Security
Council, who today serves as the
chief White House contact with
the contras.
"Now it's our turn," Wheeler
told a reporter in January during a
gala dinner at the Washington
Hilton hotel honoring visiting An.
golan rebel chief Jonas Savimbi.
"In the 1960s, we had this endless
succession of Marxist guerrilla
heroes: Mao Tse Tung, Fidel
Castro, Che Guevara; all the Che
posters on all the college dorm
walls in the 1960s. Now there are
anti-Marxist guerrilla heroes."
Dreams made policy
In late 1984, the White House
translated Wheeler's dreams into
policy.
According to officials, the secret
Restricted Inter-Agency Policy
roue, made up of NSC, CIA,
Pentagon and State Department
representatives and known as the
208 Co =et-because it meets in
room 8 of the Old Executive
Office Building, met and recom-
mended a coordinated policy of
supplying lethal and "humanitari-
an" aid to four insurgencies.
They are:
? The Islamic Unity of Afghan
Mujahadeen made up of seven
rebel factions in Afghanistan.
? The National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, led
by Savimbi.
? A coalition of Cambodian
rebel groups led by Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk that also includes
Pol Pot's murderous Khmer
Rouge. U.S. officials say, however,
that no American money reaches
the Khmer Rouge.
? The United Nicaraguan Op-
position headed by Adolfo Calero,
Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo.
In early 1985, Reagan endorsed
the committee's proposal.
Shortly after, Congress handed
Reagan a major victory that
greatly advanced his freedom
fighters' program, lifting a 1975
ban on aid to the Angolan rebels.
Congress also approved assistance
to the Cambodians.
The only glitch was that Con-
gress refused to renew military aid
to the Nicaraguans, approving
instead $30.1 million in nonlethal
assistance, communications gear
and CIA aid to finance contra
expenses and projects.
This year, the 208 Committee
upgraded the Reagan Doctrine by
escalating CIA operations in Af-
ghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and
Nicaragua.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080025-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080025-7
According to congressional
sources with access to classified
data, Reagan approved committee
proposals to provide sophisticated
portable anti-aircraft Stinger mis-
siles to the Afghan, Angolan and
Nicaraguan insurgents; compre-
hensive war plans to the Nicara-
guans and encrypted radios and
logistical aid to the Cambodians.
The sources said Reagan signed
secret findings in early 1986
authorizing the CIA and other
agencies to administer $523 mil-
lion in new assistance to the four
insurgencies.
According to the sources, the
breakdown includes:
? $400 million in military and
humanitarian aid to the Afghan
mu/ahadeen, Including 150 Sting-
ers.
? $100 million in military and
logistical assistance to the Nicara-
guan contras, including SO Sting-
ers.
? $15 million in military and
nonlethal aid to Savimbi's UNITA
in Angola, along with 50 Stingers.
? $8 million in nonlethal aid to
the Cambodians, including uni-
forms, medical supplies, food,
communications equipment and
intelligence data.
Plagued by problems
Only the Angolan and Cambodi-
an programs are proceeding
smoothly. The Afghan and Nicara-
guan operations have been plagued
by logistical and political prob-
lems.
CIA officers delivered the first
12 Stingers to Afghan guerrillas in
April. But Andrew Elva of the
Federation for American-Afghan
Action, a Washington group that
lobbies for mujahadeen aid, said
11 Stingers fired by the rebels at
Soviet aircraft missed because of
"training mismanagement."
As for the Nicaraguans, the
Stingers intended for them were
never delivered because of the
continued resistance in Congress
to approve their aid program. The
administration has since decided
not to supply Stingers to the
contras.
Dissension within the adminis-
tration also has been reported.
In a Feb. 24 letter to Reagan,
CIA deputy director John McMa-
b9n_ resigned, citing"perso f
reasons.' However, intelligence
sources said McMahon quit to
protest the 208 Committee's rec-
ommendation for stepped-up co-
vert actions on behalf of the
foreign rebels. McMahon has de-
nied that assertion.
Reagan has authorized
` aJ ce to the following four insurgencies:
and ht ar tartan aid to the Afghan
7.50 Stingers.
and logistical assistance to the
Ni aaraguan' ng 50 Stingers.
l LLON and nletlaral aid toJonas Savimbi
~y J a #a, t6`50 Sti +ers.
in _
$$ w lethal aid to Latin Cambodia
s Incl
ud
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medical supplies, food, communications
qc t and intelligs a data,
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080025-7