U.S. SEEKS TO ISOLATE NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 4, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080014-9
ARTIC
ON P LE APP~RFA
U.S. seeks
to isolate
Nicaragua
Military force
also discussed
By ALFONSO CHARDY
Herald Wash,n ton Bureau
WASHINGTON - The Reagan
administration is gearing up for a
new push against Nicaragua aimed
at isolating the country diplomati-
cally, according to administration,
congressional and rebel sources.
They said the eventual use of
direct U.S. military force to assist
Nicaraguan contra rebels also has
been discussed by U.S. officials
and the rebels, but no authoriza-
tion given.
One possible military scenario
would be surgical U.S. air strikes
to destroy Soviet-supplied coun-
terinsurgency helicopters and a
naval blockade to interdict fresh
military supplies such as the new
Soviet Mi-25 Hind gunships Mana-
gua received in late October.
The new administration push
against Nicaragua, the sources
said, is aimed at enhancing rebel
prospects of ousting the Sandinis-
tas before President Reagan leaves
office in 1989.
While no military action has
been approved. the sources said
the diplomatic offensive has been
cleared by a new interagency
committee that oversees the $100
million contra aid program now in effect.
As it weighs its own break in relations with
Managua, Washington also is encouraging its Central
American allies to apply greater diplomatic pressure
by recalling ambassadors, reducing embassy staffs,
severing relations and joining the U.S. trade embargo
against Nicaragua, the sources said.
The United States also is planning a campaign to
persuade European allies and larger Latin American
countries - among them Mexico and Brazil -. m
apply diplomatic pressure on the Sandinistas or, at
the least, to allow the contras to open office; in their
capitals and permit their leaders to visit and make
public statements, the sources said.
The new interagency committee mapping strategy
and overseeing the $100 million includes nine
members from the State Department, National
Security Council, Pentagon and CIA.
Michael Armacost, undersecretary of state for
political affairs, is program and committee supervi-
sor, with Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state
for inter-American affairs, the coordinator.
Other members include William Walker, deputy
assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs
and Abrams' chief aide for Central America;
Raymond Burghardt, senior director of the NSC's
Latin American affairs branch; Nestor Sanchez,
deputy assistant secretary of defense for inter-Ameri-
can affairs; and two unidentified CIA officers, one
from the covert action staff the Directorate of
Operations and another from the Western Hemi-
sphere division.
The other two identified members include one
representative each from the Pentagon and the White
House National Security Council.
The CIA officers will manage the contra war on a
day-to-day basis while Armacost and Abrams will
provide oversight and guidance.
Sources within some of the agencies Involved said
the chief goal now is to train and arm the contras and
marshal international support for their cause by
isolating Nicaragua and helping the rebels form a
genuine insurgency.
"History shows that a combination of nagging
insurgent military pressure and progressive with-
drawal of domestic and international support is what
brings down or alters an unpopular government,"
CIA Director William Casey said in a recent speech.
"This process already is under way in Nicaragua."
Collective rupture
The next step may be a U.S. break in diplomatic
relations with Nicaragua, possibly in concert with
similar action by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras
and Costa Rica, the sources said.
They said that Abrams' trip to Central America
two weeks ago was in part designed to set the effort
in motion.
According to a Latin American diplomat in
Washington, Abrams broached the possibility of a
collective rupture with Nicaragua or some other form
of isolation in conversations with regional leaders. A
State Department spokesman declined to comment.
The effort continued last week with Armacost's
first "orientation" trip to the region, the sources said,
and is expected to accelerate after today's U.S.
congressional elections.
The diplomatic drive represents a shift in plans.
Originally, the United States envisaged breaking
relations with the Sandinistas only If the contras
seized a substantial portion of Nicaraguan territory
and declared a provisional government.
iontinned
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`History shows that a combination of nagging insurgent
military pressure and progressive withdrawal of domestic
and international support is what brings down or alters an
unpopular government. This process already is under way in
Nicaragua.'
However, the sources said, the original plan was
modified when hard-line members of the National
Security Council proposed breaking ties over the
Sandinista decision to put American mercenary
Eugene Hasenfus on trial.
Hasenfus, 45, of Marinette, Wis., a former cargo
handler for CIA-operated Air America, was captured
in Nicaragua when Sandinistas shot down his
camouflaged C-123 aircraft laden with weapons for
the contras.
Ultimately, the sources said, the decision was
made to keep the embassy open but to explore the
possibility of persuading other countries to break
relations in conjunction with the United States.
Sandinista sources said Nicaragua has already
activated contingency plans for a U.S. break by
naming Carlos Tunnermann, its ambassador to
Washington, also as ambassador to the Organization
of American States.
That way, if Washington breaks relations the
Sandinistas can still keep their top diplomat
functioning in the U.S. capital as a liaison with
congressional leaders and journalists.
Paralleling the U.S. diplomatic offensive, dis-
bursement of the new $100 million for the contras
also is beginning with automatic assault weapons,
ammunition and uniforms reportedly being delivered
last week to contra camps along the Nicaraguan
border with Honduras.
Diplomacy ending?
President Reagan two weeks ago signed the
paperwork activating aid. Documents sent to
Congress include a 20-page White House report
suggesting that diplomacy has come to an end and
that the only avenue left is armed struggle.
Reagan also sent Congress a finding notifying the
House and Senate intelligence committees that the
CIA has resumed management of the contra war for
the first time since the suspension of covert aid in
October 1984.
The finding is secret, but congressional aides with
access to classified information said the administra-
tion has several military goals for the contras.
These include training small units to spread the
war throughout Nicaragua, seizing and holding
territory, staging actions in large Nicaraguan cities,
bringing down Hind helicopters and capturing Cuban
military advisers. The strategy, the sources said, is to
create the perception that the contras are an
alternative to the Sandinistas.
U.S. officials said the first step in creating a
bandwagon effect for the contras, is to give them a
sturdy vehicle on which to ride to victory.
To do that, they said, U.S. military trainers will
train contra officers. But honing them to crack
performance levels will take some time.
"The Sandinistas have had seven years to
construct and impose their totalitarian apparatus,"
Abrams said in Miami Sept. 15. "The Nicaraguan
people cannot be expected to tear that apparatus
down overnight. The next several months will be,
CIA Director William Casey
above all, a time for preparation, for developing
effective political organizations, for active diplomacy,
and for military training. The months immediately
ahead are not likely to bring major military victories,
much less the end of Communist rule."
Sources said the plan is for the contras to conduct
a four-front war, staging attacks along the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts as well as along the southern and
northern borders. Gradually, units would move
inland toward Managua and other large cities, the
sources said. Harassment or capture of the Atlantic
coast ports of Puerto Cabezas or Bluefields would be
welcome but not necessarily a high priority.
The contras also are expected to attack economic
targets such as the oil refinery and storage depots in
Managua as well as oil tanks in the Pacific port of
Corinto. The strategy is to further disrupt the
battered Nicaraguan economy.
Other possible targets reportedly given to the
contras by U.S. intelligence include provincial
military barracks, storage facilities, highways, elec-
tronic listening posts, radar facilities and artillery
emplacements.
Sources said targets were acquired from spies and
from high-resolution pictures taken by military
aircraft and satellites over Nicaragua and analyzed at
the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation
Center.
Those pictures show the exact parking location of
the Hind helicopters at Sandino international airport
and Punta Huete airbase near Managua.
Similar pictures reportedly have been incorporated
into briefing books that U.S. combat pilots would
receive in case the president orders an aerial stnxe, ?
the sources said.
A congressional source frequently briefed by,,.
military planners said contingency plans for opera-
tions in Nicaragua were first drawn up in 1983 by the
Panama-based Southern Command. The source said
the plans are now ready.
Separately, rebel and administration sources said
that in recent weeks there have been discussions at
the Pentagon about the possibility of activating at.,
least two components of the contingency plans: ,
precision air strikes and a naval blockade.
A Pentagon spokesman confirmed the existence of
Nicaragua contingency plans, but added that "there.:
are no plans" to activate them.
A White House source said Pentagon military
leaders are resisting the use of force in Nicaragua.,
especially a blockade, because it would be too
expensive and require diverting many ships and-,
sailors from other parts of the world.
A May Defense Department study titled "Pros
pects for Containment of Nicaragua's Communist-
Government," said a Nicaragua "quarantine" wouI44
cost about $8.7 billion for the first year and force th
Navy to deploy several destroyers, hydrofoils, patio
aircraft and carrier battle groups.
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Several administration sources said that while
discussion of military action in Nicaragua may be
premature, they noted that those in favor of it appear
divided over whether it should occur before Congress_
returns in January or later next year to give the
contras a chance to show their capability.
The sources said some hard-line administration
advisers have suggested taking action before the 1988
presidential campaign begins so that if the operation
is successful the Republican candidate can use it as a
campaign weapon.
Administration sources said that while policy-
makers wish to avoid the use of American force, they
are conscious that the U.S. intelligence community
continues to feel that only U.S. forces could truly
resolve the Nicaraguan conflict militarily.
They are also aware that Reagan wants a
"liberated" Nicaragua as one of his foreign policy
legacies and as proof that a Moscow-backed regime
can be rolled back, the sources said.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080014-9