THREATS ABETTED CONTRAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 10, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080002-2
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
ARTICLE APPEARED * 10 May 1987
OM PAT 1?
Threats
abetted
contras
Imperiling talks
was one U.S. tactic
By Alfonso Chardy
Ingw rer Ra,htngian Bureau
WASHINGTON - The Reagan ad-
ministration in 1985 and 1986 con-
ducted a secret campaign of threats
and intimidation in Latin America
in an effort to scuttle Central Ameri-
can peace talks and win support for
the contras, according to classified
documents and interviews with U.S.
and foreign officials.
President Reagan's role in the cam.
paign is unclear, but documents and
interviews indicate that he may have
personally approved at least one of
its initiatives and possibly was in-
volved in discussions of two others.
U.S. officials said the Reagan ad-
ministration sought to disrupt the
efforts of the Contadora group of
nations to negotiate an end to con-
flict in Central America because the
peace talks complicated efforts to
persuade Congress to approve contra
aid.
According to knowledgeable offi-
cials, the campaign included:
? An effort to force from office the
head of the Panamanian defense
forces. Gen. Manuel Noriega. When
Noriega did not respond to a direct
request from then-national security
adviser John M. Poindexter that he
resign, the United States cut off aid
to Panama. then leaked damaging
classified documents about Noriega
to the New York Times and NBC
News.
? A proposal that would have had
the United States drop its support for
the government of Mexican Presi-
dent Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado,
which supported the peace talks, in
favor of a conservative opposition
party The proposal, conveyed to rep-
resentatives of the opposition Na-
tional Action Party by convicted con-
tra supporter Carl "Spitz" Channell,
came to nothing when the represent-
atives failed to give money to the
? Secret taws with the Honduran
military about ways of dealing with
then-President Roberto Suazo, who
blocked contra-aidtot the military to
1985. The approach pressure Suazo to lift the blockade
came after the United States had
failed to sway him with aid suspen-
sions and the leaking of embarrass-
ing information to the Miami Herald.
The administration campaign also
included secret support for a conser-
vative presidential candidate in
Costa Rica who U.S. officials hoped
would support the contras, and in-
tense diplomatic efforts aimed at per-
suading Argentine officials to
change their pro-peace-talks posi-
tion, administration and foreign offi-
cials said.
Some of the actions may have been
illegal.
Congressional aides familiar with
contra affairs said a provision in the
1985.86 foreign-aid law specifically
prohibited linking U.S. aid to support
for the contras.
According to officials both inside
the United States and abroad Poin-
dexter, former National Security
Council aide Lt Col Oliver L. North
and Assistant Secretary of State 1-
liott Abrams - all rominent ft ures
in the Iran-contra of air - collabo-
rated on the cam at n. Former CIA
Director 'William sey an is
Alan ri
Central America deputy,
also cooperated officials sat_.
Reagan reportedly was informed
about some of the actions:
? According to a senior Panamani-
an official present at the meeting
between Poindexter and Noriega,
Poindexter prefaced his request for
Noriega's resignation by saying he
was speaking for Reagan.
? Documents obtained by the Mi-
ami Herald from an employee of
Channell, who pleaded guilty April
29 to a federal criminal charge re-
lated to his contra fund-raising, indi-
cate that Channell met with Reagan
48 hours before telling representa-
tives of the National Action Party
(PAN) that the President would
throw his support to them if they
would agree to support the contras.
? Reagan met with Vice President
Bush, Abrams and North on March
23, 1986, the day before Abrams and
North began a campaign to persuade
Honduran President Jose Azcona,
Suazo's successor, to request emer-
gency U.S. military aid after Nicara-
guan army troops crossed into Hon-
duras in pursuit of contra forces,
according to White House records
and administration officials.
Abrams later told Congress that
Azcona had requested the aid volun.
tarily, but that version of events has
been contradicted by U.S. diplomat
John Ferch, who was ambassador to
Honduras at the time. Ferch, who
was removed from his post by
Abrams, told General Accounting Of-
fice investigators earlier this year
that Azcona signed a letter request-
ing the aid only after intense pres-
sure from Washington.
The White House and CiA dec11i1.
to comment. The State Department
denied that Abrams participated in a
conspiracy to pressure countries in
the region to support the contras.
The campaign was particularly
harsh on Mexico and Panama, the
two most active members of the Con-
tadora group of nations, which also
includes Venezuela and Colombia.
The group, founded in 1983 on the
Panamanian island of Contadora,
seeks to end the conflict in Nicara.
gua through a negotiated solution.
Argentina was targeted because it
was a member of a so-called Conta-
dora support group, which also in-
cludes Brazil, Uruguay and Peru.
Mexico. On May 13, 1986, a Abrams
be-
and other US. officials appe
fore the Senate Western Hemisphere
affairs subcommittee to denounce
the Mexican government for corrup-
tion. drug trafficking and economic
mismanagement.
But the most remarkable U.S. tactic
against Mexico involved threats to
undermine the ruling institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) by throw.
ing U.S. support to PAN before July
1986 state elections in northern Mex-
ico.
In February 1986, U.S. officials
warned their Mexican counterparts
that if they lobbied congress on be-
half of Contadora, the administra-
tion would lobby in Mexico for PAN.
In August, Channell, the convicted
fund-raiser, took that a step further:
He told PAN followers that Reagan
would help them if PAN helped the
contras, according to notes written
by Jane McLaughlin, an employee of
Channell.
Notes from McLaughlin, who at-
tended Channell's meeting at Wash-
ington's Hay-Adams Hotel on Aug. 14,
1986. indicated that Channell asked
the Mexicans for $210,000 to finance
an expensive contra-aid campaign of
television commercials on which he
was collaborating with North.
McLaughlin's notes also suggest
that the PAN meeting came two days
after Channell said he had conferred
with Reagan on Mexico.
"Spitz IChannelll met with Presi-
dent Reagan last Tuesday to discuss
Nicaragua and during the course of
their discussion, Spitz brought up
the issue of Mexico," the notes say.
Cpnjnued
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080002-2
"The President stated that he is very
upset and disappointed that de la
Madrid has not taken a stronger posi-
tion in supporting democracy in Nic-
aragua."
Two days later, according to
McLaughlin's notes, Channell told
the PAN supporters:
"If the President were to know that
you and your people were actively
supporting his policies in Nicaragua,
there is no doubt that he and the
White House would be far more at-
tentive to your plight in Mexico and
far more inclined to acknowledge
your fight for democracy."
Channell then asked the PAN sup-
porters to contribute the $210,000.
PAN official Ricardo Villa Esca-
lera, who Channell associates said
attended the meeting with Channell,
said PAN did not contribute any
money. He also said he did not recall
meeting Channell-
But two other people who attended
the meeting said Villa Escalera was
there.
Panama. U.S. efforts to force Nor-
iega from power failed, but the pres-
sures generated the worst tensions
between the United States and Pan-
ama since Panama's fight for new
Panama Canal treaties in the 1970s.
They also provoked deep divisions
within the administration.
The CIA the National Security
A enc and the Pentagon o sad
Poin exter s efforts on t e grounds
that Noriega was a valuable intelli-
gence asset and that his country,
where 10,000 U.S. soldiers are based,
wa a critical platform for monitor-
i n` events in Central America.
A senior Panamanian official said
Poindexter personally asked Noriega
for greater cooperation on contra aid
during a secret meeting between the
two in Panama on Dec. 12, 1985.
The meeting was held at the VIP
lounge of Panama City's Omar Torn-
jos International Airport, and the of-
ficial said Poindexter opened the ses-
sion without preamble or small,
polite talk and went directly to the
point.
"His attitude was arrogant, conceit-
ed and threatening," the official
said. "Toward the end of the conver.
sation, Poindexter's attitude soft-
ened, but he did remain cold
throughout the session."
Poindexter complained that the
United States did not appreciate Pan-
ama's role in Contadora because it
affected U.S. strategies for the re-
gion. the official said. Later, the offi-
cial said, Poindexter raised the issue
of American anger at Noriega's role
in the September 1985 ouster of U.S.-
backed Panamanian President Nico-
las Ardito-Barletta.
The official said Poindexter and
other U.S. officials at the meeting
suggested that Noriega restore Ar-
dito-Barletta to the presidency and
then step down himself.
"Ardito-Barletta did not believe in
Contadora," the Panamanian official
said.
Within days of Poindexter's return
from Panama, the National Security
Council chief told subordinates that
"an alternative" to Noriega needed
to be found, officials said.
Poindexter's first anti-Noriega ac-
tion was approval in January 1986 of
an NSC proposal to transfer to Guate-
mala most of $40 million in economic
assistance that had been promised to
Panama. At the time the decision was
disclosed, U.S. officials attributed the
move to budgetary problems.
Poindexter also authorized a cam-
paign to discredit Noriega. Part of
that campaign, administration offi-
cials said, was an April appearance
before Congress by Abrams, who de-
nounced Panama for money-launder-
ing, drug trafficking, differences
over Nicaragua, relations with Cuba
and lack of democracy.
Poindexter's aides, including
North and then-NSC Latin American
affairs director Constantine Menges,
also personally briefed several
American journalists with informa-
tion aimed at embarrassing Noriega,
the U.S. officials said.
ington when he was a presidential
candidate to discuss Nicaragua and
the contras. Calderon told U.S. Offi-
cials that if he was elected president,
Costa Rica would support U.S. Policy
in the region.
A U.S. intelligence source, an ad-
inistration o icia who ea s with
contra affairs and a well-in ormed
contra officer said t at a ter a e-
ron s visit to Was iington, VIAL'
cials spread the word that the
looked favorably on his candi acy.
They said Calderon obtained funds
from conservative U.S.-based organi-
zations after that visit.
Honduras. Perhaps the most
ironic conflict between the U[tit~d
States and its Latin American neio-
bors was with Honduras, Washing-
ton's closest Central Americatr.a(}y
and chief regional contra base.
Problems with Honduras began In
October 1985 when President Suazo
blocked.: contra aid after an Ameri-
can supply aircraft landed in Hondu-
ras with an NBC television crew
aboard.
Honduran officials said the crew's
arrival angered Suazo because its
presence compromised what than
was the official Honduran policy of
denying that the contras operated
from Honduran soil.
But U.S. officials said Suazo used
the incident as a ploy to pressure the
United States into backing a secret
plan to call off presidential electioTis
and allow him to stay in powers tWo
more years.
Ferch and North rejected Su4ze(s
proposal. and the NSC and the State
Department decided to punish * the
Honduran for holding up contra aid
by blocking payment of a $67.5 mi4-
lion economic assistance package.
Suazo was not moved
Two weeks before the Nov. 24, X986,
vote, Suazo showed up at a
funded military base, borrowed ;a
U.S. Army helicopter with an Amet3i-
can pilot and used it to drop political
leaflets over a town.
After the U.S. pilot reported the
incident to superiors, U.S. Embassy
officials, embarrassed by such use of
U.S. military equipment, cabled
Washington with the news and
hoped the affair would not worsen
relations with Honduras.
But an official in Washington who
had access to embassy cable traffic
used the incident to chastise Suazo.
He leaked the story to the Miami
Herald.
Asked recently why he leaked the
story, the official said it was part of a
U.S. effort to retaliate against Suazo
for blocking contra aid.
telligence 4gency led to June stories
in the New York Times and on NBC
notin None as a legeginV ve
ment in dru traffic in and moo
aun g. The stories also sug-
gested that he had had a role in, tae
death and beheading of a prominent
opposition Panamanian politician.
The news stories coincided with %a
visit to the United States by Noriega.
North and Poindexter could nbt 1Se
reached for comment, but Menges
denied leaking any information.
Costa Rica. The effort on behalf
of conservative Costa Rican presi.
dential candidate Rafael Angel `C41-
deron underscored a far wider cam-
paign of pressure aimed primarily Lt
persuading Costa Rican officia;s to
allow the ostensibly neutral cou try
to be used as a base for contra Opera-
tions, administration and contra
sources said.
The efforts failed. Calderon lost to
a decidedly anti-contra opponent, Os-
car Arias, and the Costa Rica-based
contras have yet to succeed in creat-
ing a major army in southern Nicara-
gua.
Calderon spokesman Victor Vargas
acknowledged that Calderon met
with several U.S. officials in Wash-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201080002-2