AIDES PROPOUND SCENARIOS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: July 31, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: C
A
WASHINGTON PCST
31 July 1983
VISIONS DIFFER
Aides Propound Scenarios for Centro America
By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer
As the Reagan administration
struggles to defend its Central
American policies to the country
and the Congress, it finds itself far
more united on supporting the
government of El Salvador than
on what to do about the leftist re-
gime in Nicaragua.
Some officials lean toward de-
stabilizing the Nicaraguan govern-
ment and say that by the end of
the year U.S.-backed guerrillas will
develop the military capability to
challenge and eventually over-
throw the Sandinista regime. But
others suggest that the United
States could accept a Yugoslav-
style communist government in
Nicaragua if that country stopped
supporting Salvadoran guerrillas
and did not serve as a Soviet or
Cuban military base.
One high-ranking official said
that it is "a shot in the rain barrel"
to predict what the situation in
Central America will be in six
months.
But, he said, "there's a softening
and a great nervousness in Nica-
ragua" and the "contras," the
counter-revolutionaries, were ral- '
lying more troops to their side
than they could arm or feed.
An army of 25,000 insurgents,
about double the number now con-
templated, could take over Nica-
ragua, he said. A force of that size
could be organized, equipped and
sustained over time, he added, be-
cause the Sandinistas "have a de-
teriorating economy and lack the
support of the people.
Such a scenario presumes that
Congress will not cut off funds for
the CIA-supported covert opera-
tion in Nicaragua. Though the
Senate is not expected to support
Thursday's House vote for a cutoff
of covert funds, House leaders be-
lieve that they may be able to
block funds for fiscal 1984.
The expectatation of an eventual victory
for the rebels in Nicaragua is one of several
conflicting outcomes visualized for Central
America by high-ranking administration of-
ficials, most ofwhom talked on the condition
that they not?be quoted by name.
Several officials expressed the view that
the United States would settle for a situation
in which the Nicaraguans were frightened or
pressured into withdrawing their support for
leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.
"I would hope six months from now that
El Salvador would no longer be facing an
enemy that is trying to shoot its way into
power," said Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger. "I hope that Nicaragua will have
stopped trying to resupply a guerrilla force
and export their distorted brand of revolu-
tion. Then Nicaragua can do what it likes."
Some officials conceded that the insurgent
forces in Nicaragua will try to take advan-
tage of the "military shield" created by U.S.
forces during, their six months of training
exercises in neighboring Honduras and off
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central
America. But they said the contras and the
Reagan administration do not have identical
aims.
"We have minimal and maximal goals in
Nicaragua. And I truly believe that they are
not identical with the contras'," said U.N.
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick.
Reagan administration officials appear to
be united on "minimal goals," primarily stop-
ping Nicaragua from serving as a base or
supply center for the leftist guerrillas in El
Salvador. But the "maximal goals" provoke
disagreement.
The stated goal of the Reagan adminis-
tration, proclaimed many times by the pres-
ident, is that Nicaragua return to the prom-
ises of the Sandinista revolution, grant es-
sential freedoms to its citizens and carry out
its pledge to hold free elections.
But some officials have said that the Unit-
ed States would settle for much less, such as
a regime that followed the principles of "na-
tional communism" similar to that of Yugo-
slavia or the People's Republic of China and
was not a Soviet or Cuban military base.
A source confirmed that a high-level U.S.
official had explored this possibility with a
high-level Cuban official at two meetings.
The Cuban reportedly did not respond. But
last week Fidel Castro proposed an agree-
ment in which all parties involved in Central
America would agree to end supplies of
weapons and military advisers to the rival
forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Reagan said Friday that he is willing to
give Castro the "benefit of the doubt in any
negotiations."
The seriousness with which the president
took the offer of a communist leader whom
he has frequently denounced raised specu-
lation that the United States and Cuba may
be seeking to reduce tension in Central
America on the eve of the U.S. military ma-
neuvers in the region.
Reinforcing this view, high-ranking offi-
cials said that they see no sign that Cuba is
prepared to invest combat troops in Nicara-
gua, which Reagan has publicly described as
the base of a Soviet-Cuban "a war machine."
Officials who agreed to discuss the activ-
ities of the U.S.-backed forces in Nicaragua
only in the most general terms said that they
,do not anticipate that Cubans would enter
the-conflict in response to stepped-up activ-
ities by the contras.
On Thursday, CBS News reported that a
number of senior CIA officers have objected
to the plan of CIA Director William J. Casey
to expand contra activities against the Ni-
caraguan government.
The report was officially denied. But
sources Friday confirmed part of it, which
said that some CIA officials felt that the ex-
panded covert operation was likely to pro-
voke "a dangerous military response" and
that Casey had no contingency plan to deal
with Cuban intervention.
.CONYLVVED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020025-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020025-3
There are those in the administration who
say they fear that an overall coherent strat-
eby on Central America is lacking.
"Everyone is saying now that the peace
offer from Nicaragua and the new approach
from Cuba shows the hard tine is working,
and it may be," said one official who sup-
ports the military exercises but is dubious
about the covert activity. "But we've raised
the stakes by deciding to make the contras
more than a nuisance army."
It is not clear that this "nuisance army"
can be easily disbanded by its U.S. sponsors.
Adolfo Calero, a member of the contra ruling
council, said recently that the "shield" pro-
vided by the U.S. exercises will serve as a
barrier against Cuban intervention or pursuit
from Nicaragua into Honduras.
"Everything adds up for the downfall of
the Sandinista government," Calero said. "It
has to happen, if not by the end of this year,
then by the beginning of next year."
U.S. officials agree that the contras, who
are building to a level of about 12,000, could
not currently pose a serious military threat
to the Nicaraguan government. Beyond a
U.S.-trained core of commando forces, num-
bering perhaps 2,000, the contras are report-
edly poorly equipped and more willing than
able.
Administration officials refused to re-
spond to questions about whether the U.S.
troops that will train in Honduras will leave
equipment behind for the contras. They did
confirm that some captured PLO equipment
that Israel is providing Honduras will wind
up in contra hands.
The question of the contras is a troubling
part of an overall strategy aimed at pressur-
ing Nicaragua and rescuing the embattled
government of El Salvador.
While the 19-ship U.S. force is officially
being deployed for a training exercise, U.S.
special envoy Richard B. Stone was quoted
last week as telling Salvadoran legislators
that the flotilla could be used for "attack."
The report that Stone had made that remark
was denied by U.S. officials, but no one is
denying that the ships could be used for at-
tack purposes.
"What's troubling me," said one mid-level
official late last week, 'is that everything
we're doing suggests we've thought out the
consequences of our policy and know where
we're likely to be down the road. I'm' not
sure that's really happened."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020025-3