THE FIRST-TERM CAST WOULD PROBABLY PLAY IN THE SEQUEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 8, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020005-5
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WASHINGTON POST
8 October 1984
e First-berm Cast Would Probably.
Play in the Sequel
In the days when Ronald Reagan was
typecast as a B-movie actor, Hollywood
followed a simple casting formula that
Reagan never forgot.
The formula, which saved time and cre-
ative thought, was to make a sequel of any
commercially successful movie, preferably,
using the same cast. Reagan and many
others wound up in some real clunkers
that way, including four films in which he
played an improbable Secret Service
agent named Brass Bancroft.
In real life, Reagan has stuck to the
same basic script since he first ran for
governor of California in 1966. Aspiring to
be a two-term president, he is still running
against government and its supposed
waste, fraud and abuse. Over the years,
his supporting cast has changed from time
to time but has always included a trusted
and identifiable cadre from Reagan's for-
mative years as governor.
In the absence of specifics from the
White House, Reagan's habits of sticking
to old scripts and the same team provide
the most useful clues to what is likely to
happen in a second term.
in the first term, with no one making a
point of it, some of the new crowd became
a part of the old. Within the White House,
chief of staff James A. Baker III and Rea-
gan's closest aide, deputy chief of staff
Michael K. Deaver, formed a firm alliance
that ultimately disposed of all rivals. By all
accounts, Reagan is now comfortable with
Baker, who once managed the presidential
campaigns of Gerald R. Ford and George
Bush, and with most of the people Baker
has brought on board.
There are right-wingers organizing
against Baker, a chief of staff they regard
with about as much affection as they do
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gro-
myko. Their opposition isn't likely to sway
Reagan, who understandably resents the
suggestion that he is the captive of a lib-
eral cabal
By any normal definition, the struggle
within the Reagan administration has been
between conservatives who differ on pro-
cess rather than on goals. Reagan recog-
nized as much two years ago, during a pe-
riod of White House feuding, when he
cracked that his administration was one
where "the right hand doesn't know what
the far-right hand is doing."
JiuCarinon_
ond term he has yet to win. In deference,
White House and campaign aides ritually
warn each other not to become overcon-
fident. After a rare prediction of victory at
a Gulfport. Miss., rally last week, the
president returned the next day to his bro-
mide that "President Dewey warned me
not to get overconfident."
Behind the scenes, however, the stars
and bit players of the first term are cast-
ing for the sequel at the White House. If
REAGAN&CO.
Ideology aside, the conventional wisdom
in Washington is that Reagan, if reelected,
would have a short "window of opportu-
nity" to accomplish something in the hon-
eymoon phase of a second term and a
large "window of vulnerability" thereafter.
He would be a lame duck at the moment of
reelection. His chances for political suc-
cess would diminish as mid-term elections
approached and could vanish if economic
recession replaced economic recovery.,
This argument that Reagan must strike
quickly is also an argument against a new
cast. Keeping Baker and his team, with
their experience and political skills, would
enable Reagan to avoid on-the-job training
in the honeymoon phase and be quick off
the mark in dealing with Congress. This
argument is likely to be even more appeal-
ing if Deaver, chairman of the shadow-in-
augural committee, decides that it is final-
ly time for him to take a more lucrative job
outside the White House.
Nor are large changes foreseen in a
Cabinet that, with a few conspicuous ex-
ceptions, has earned a reputation for me-
diocrity. Reagan is not one to emulate the
example of Richard M. Nixon and ask for
everyone's resignation so he can shuffle
the political deck.
In large measure, it is the cast that de-
termines the performance. Keeping Baker
would be an augury of budget. compro-
mise. Keeping Defense Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger, who can probably stay as
long as he wants, is a sign that arms-con-
trol agreements with the Soviet Union will
not come easily in a second term. Keeping
William J. Casey as CIA director, as Rea-
_gan bAsoromised to doLand UN Ambas-
sador leane 1. Kirkpatrick in a high-level
post -as Reagan desires, are signs that he
will -not.-abandon his_goals_m Central
America.
None of this is necessarily cast in con-
crete, partly because Reagan is too super-
stitious and too prudent to focus on a sec-
-Reagan wins, it's likely that you'll recog-
nize both the plot and the players.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020005-5