MCFARLANE'S HIDDEN HAND HELPS SHAPE FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010065-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: February 15, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010065-0
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WASHINGTON POST
15 February 1985
McBarlane's Ridden Hand
Helps Shape Foreign Policy
By Lou Cannon
W'~>h Fran Post Staff Writer
He is a hidden hand behind ad-
ministration foreign policy and the
most prominent survivor of a sec-
ond-term staff shake-up that has
brought new faces to President
Reagan's White House.
He remains deliberately obscure,
overshadowed by Secretary of
State George P. Shultz and Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger,
but has made his mark with Reagan
by helping to resolve many of the
frequent policy disputes between
the two strong-willed secretaries.
His favorite mechanism for doing
this is a private weekly breakfast at
which the three officials, minus
aides, reason together.
Robert Carl (Bud) McFarlane is a
softspoken ex-Marine who as na-
tional security affairs adviser fol-
lo,1nws seen-jingly contradictory im-
peratives, guided by a view of So-
viet power as grim and pervasive as
that of the president.
ne, 47, has quietly helped to centralize
power in the White House. He drafted po-
sition papers and chaired working groups
that helped produce a rare show 'of admin-
istration unity on arms control at last
month's talks between Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in
Geneva. Reagan later called McFarlane's
preparation for that "superb," according to
White House spokesman Larry Speakes.
Administration insiders point to two sure
signs of McFarlane's growing influence: he
is to occupy the first-floor White House of-
fice of counselor Edwin Meese III after
Meese's anticipated departure to become
attorney general, and he has gained the val-
ued approval of Nancy Reagan.
The first lady's social opinion of her hus-
band's top aides is often an interestingly
reliable barometer of their influence. At the
annual New Year's Eve party at former am-
bassador Walter H. Annenberg's home in
Palm Springs, Calif., recently, she made a
point of going across the ballroom floor to
praise his dancing.
Such incidents would never be related by
McFarlane, a tight-lipped workaholic.
Administration officials say he is willing
to sacrifice public image for private influ-
ence and to trade on the reputation he still
holds at the Defense and State departments
as an ideal staff man who poses no threat to
Weinberger or Shultz.
Skeptics say McFarlane simply doesn't
have the stature or presidential backing to
challenge either secretary in a showdown.
McFarlane is aware, aides said, of Rea-
gan's desire to have his Cabinet officers be
policy spokesmen. He may be the only high-
ranking administration official who prac-
tices the motto expressed by a sign on the
president's desk: "There is no limit to what
a man can do or where he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit."
McFarlane's expressionless manner has
produced a public image of determined dull-
ness that friends say shields a man who pri-
vately displays sharp wit and performs a
near-perfect imitation of onetime boss Hen-
ry A. Kissinger. He uses the parody to re-
mind hearers of the contrast between him-
self and the flamboyant intellectual who was
President Richard M. Nixon's national se-
curity adviser.
One reporter described background brief-
ings by McFarlane as given by the man
who wouldn't let you know if your suit was
on fire." Baltimore Sun reporter Robert
Timberg recently quoted New Right activ-
ist Paul M. Weyrich as saying of McFarlane:
"He was created by God to disappear into
crowds."
Quiet Source of Power
Friends say he relishes his role as a quiet
source of power, helping to provide a the-
oretical framework for a president who, like
McFarlane, is determined to maintain U.S.
military power. McFarlane wrote the cel-
ebrated passage into a Reagan speech
March 23, 1983, calling for creation of what
immediately was dubbed "Star Wars."
In an infrequent interview, McFarlane
described his goals, saying:
"The world lives in the constant threat of
nuclear annihilation. The president be-
lieves, and I have strongly urged that he
pursue, a fundamentally different idea, and
that is that you really can go to a defensive
strategy. That would be an historic accom-
plishment if he were able to set that in mo-
tion. And that is probably the single great-
est opportunity before us."
The interview in McFarlane's basement
office in the White House is conducted un-
der ground rules that permit no attribution
without permission. McFarlane starts, as he
often does, by sketching uses and limita-
tions of U.S. military power in the 20th cen-
tury, emphasizing what he sees as a two-
century strain of national isolationism.
Though in the middle of what aides de-
scribe as a typical 17-hour day, he does not
hurry the questioner or his answers.
McFarlane's friends and subordinates
attest to his politeness and say he never
shouts and rarely complains. He is de-
scribed as loyal to friends and protective of
his wife, Jonda, and their three children.
Much of McFarlane's humor is self-
deprecatory: he likes to tell of the time a
late-night television show producer told him
he had "the most boring face" she had seen.
He is not above a barbed shot at his crit-
ics. Following the habits of a military ca-
reer, he never criticizes his commander-in-
chief. But he recently described Reagan's STAT
new director of communications, conserva-
tive former columnist Patrick J. Buchanan,
as a "Jeane Kirpatrick in long pants."
After the November election, Kirkpatrick
was the choice of conservatives, including
Buchanan, to replace McFarlane when she
asked to leave as U.N.,ambassador. Instead,
Reagan gave McFarlane a prompt and pub-
lic vote of confidence. Kirkpatrick has re-
turned to teaching.
In an administration that has raised in-
ternal feuding to a high art, McFarlane has
collected an incongruous set of admirers,
among them former secretary of state Al-
exander M. Haig Jr. and Treasury Secre-
tary James A. Baker III, Haig's nemesis
when Baker was White House chief of staff.
Haig said McFarlane has brought a
needed "sense of order and professionalism
to the foreign policy processes of the Rea-
gan administration." But he warned that
McFarlane will face public scrutiny and crit-
icism now that he has shed his image as a
junior staff man.
Kenneth M. Duberstein, former White
House congressional liaison and Baker loy-
alist, said McFarlane has become "the hon-
est broker of the administration, giving the
president what he wants and needs in a na-
tional security adviser."
L:
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010065-0
McFarlane, son of a New Deal Democrat-
ic congressman from Texas, also has the
respect of many congressional Democrats.
Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), new chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee
and an architect of congressional compro-
mises that allowed limited production of the
MX missile at the price of administration
commitment to negotiate with the Soviet
Union, credited McFarlane with "breaking
the arms-control gridlock" because he un-
derstood House political realities.
Duberstein recalled a meeting with mod-
erate Republican Sens. William S. Cohen
(Maine), Warren B. Rudman (N.H.) and
Slade Gorton (Wash.), who said the MX
would never survive if viewed simply as "a
Republican missile." From this meeting
came a decision to consult McFarlane, then
deputy to national security affairs adviser
William P. Clark.
Out of the McFarlane-Duberstein consul-
tations, which occurred as their bosses
were feuding, arose the proposal for a bi-
partisan commission that would support the
MX and arms control. Its chairman, sug-
gested by McFarlane, was retired Air Force
general Brent Scowcroft, for whom McFar-
lane worked when Sco'.vcroft was national
security adviser to President Gerald R.
Ford.
More recently, McFarlane is credited
with a White House decision to postpone
submission to Congress of a Saudi Arabian
arms package that might have resulted in
an embarrassing foreign policy setback.
What happened, at a Jan. 23 meeting nev-
er publicly announced, is typical of the way
McFarlane exercises his influence as an
inside man.
According to administration officials,
Weinberger ardently supported the Saudi
arms sale with backing from high-ranking
State Department officials friendly to the
Saudis. McFarlane carefully prepared his
opposition and came armed with informa-
tion provided by congressional allies that
the proposal faced tough sledding on Capitol
Hill. He proposed instead delaying the sale
and developing a comprehensive arms pack-
age for the Mideast, an idea that carried the
day with Weinberger and Shultz.
"The White House saw this as a non-
starter," a knowledgeable official said.
-"McFarlane convinced everyone there was
no point to submitting something that the
Congress wouldn't buy."
McFarlane did not come easily to influ-
ence in a post held by such dominant public
figures as Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski. Less than seven years ago, he was ap-
proaching retirement as a Marine lieuten-
ant colonel and cheerfully acknowledged the
military maxim that those of higher rank
are more intelligent. He had not been to-
tally disabused of this belief when he re-
placed Clark 16 months ago in a periodic
White House shake-up.
Z
'The Perfect No. 2 Man' clear victory" not through war but by ex-
panding its influence in Europe and the
"He is the perfect No. 2 man or maybe Third World as a result of achieving nuclear
No. 21/2," a White House insider said after parity. McFarlane, concerned that the Unit-
McFarlane arrived there in 1981 as deputy ed States was turning inward after the Viet-
to Clark, a longtime Reagan insider. nam war, strongly criticized what he saw as
McFarlane's experience appeared to con- U.S. strategic and political weakness since
firm this assessment. He was a military as- World War 11.
sistant to Kissinger in the mid-1970s and "We must not allow bad policies to take
impressed his boss with his diligence. In on legitimacy simply because they were not
1976-77, he served as Scowcroft's staff accompanied by a holocaust," McFarlane
man in the White House, and his low-visi- wrote. "Having superior military might has
bility approach today is reminiscent of the provided an enormous hedge for flabby
approach used by Scowcroft, arbiter of dis- thinking. We could afford less-than-optimal
putes between the flamboyant Kissinger strategic planning because push was never
and a strong-willed defense secretary, going to come to shove. We have had the
James R. Schlesinger. . luxury of being able to be foolish."
In both positions, McFarlane earned a McFarlane, who served two combat tours
reputation as a hard worker who made up in Vietnam, wrote that he saw the war
for a supposed lack of conceptual brilliance there as a disaster in which the Soviets,
with extraordinary preparation. without firing a shot, "watched while the
McFarlane joined the staff of the Senate United States was brought to its knees in a
Armed Services Committee, headed by foreign war after an investment of more
then-Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), now an than $100 billion." But he continued to fa-
administration arms-control negotiator. vor using the military to support diplomatic
McFarlane played a role in decisions that objectives, provided that its period of in-
led to committee rejection of SALT II, the volvement was limited.
arms treaty that President Jimmy Carter "I'd never now say that we should have
withdrew from Senate consideration after sustained a conflict over five years," McFar-
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in De- lane told The Wall Street journal last Mon-
cember 1979. When Haig became secretary day. "Five years is simply incompatible with
of state, McFarlane became his counselor American values and the American atten-
and trouble-shooter until he entered the tion span. The most relevant lesson I
White House as Clark's deputy. learned is what is and what isn't sustainable
Clark delegated by inclination and neces- by the American people."
sity because he had little background in for- In 1983, as Clark's deputy, he was sent
eign affairs, so McFarlane often became a to Lebanon where he negotiated a critical
sort of surrogate national security adviser cease-fire and became deeply immersed in
who briefed his boss and the president and that war-torn nation's politics of conflict.
negotiated with Congress. McFarlane looked on the Lebanese sit-
"If Bud had been a civilian instead of a uation as a textbook example of the low-or-
military man, his experience would have der confrontations he had anticipated in his
seemed terrific,"' a current administration 1979 article. He saw the Soviets working
colleague said. "In fact, he has more expe- through Syria and others to destabilize the
rience and foreign policy knowledge than Mideast, and he joined Shultz in advocating
any other official in the administration, and deployment of U.S. Marines to help shore
he bears a greater burden than Scowcroft up Amin Gemayel's shaky government.
did because the president has no one around McFarlane took over as national security
like Kissinger and Schlesinger." adviser one week before the Marine head-
Haig, who left the administration after quarters compound in Beirut was demol-
clashes with White House officials and Cab- ished in a suicide truck-bombing in October
inet colleagues, said he believes that 1983. More than 240 U.S. servicemen died,
McFarlane has restored professionalism to and Reagan's policy was also left in ruins.
an office that had fallen into disrepute. ' In subsequent months, McFarlane sided
"Bud has provided a mandate of sub- with Shultz, favoring armed retaliation for
the bombing and resisting withdrawal of
stance rather than populism," Haig said in U.S. forces from Lebanon. They lost on
an interview. "The secretary of state has both counts to the combined opposition of
been the spokesman, as he is supposed to Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
be. The payoff is a consistency of policy and public opinion as reflected through key Re-
a degree of predictability that is stabilizing. publican senators in conversations with
The Soviets appreciate a tough, predict- Reagan. McFarlane never discussed the
able, consistent set of policies." withdrawal publicly but confided to friends
These policies are based on a grim as- his bitterness about the Pentagon opposi-
sessment of Soviet power, which, McFar- tion to deployment.
lane wrote five years ago in the naval jour- "Our processes have failed," one official
nal Proceedings, is capable of winning a "nu- later quoted him as saying.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010065-0
Siding with Shultz on Lebanon cast
McFarlane for a time as an adversary to the
Pentagon. On that issue, he was not a con-
ciliator but an advocate who periodically
gave optimistic assessments about the qual-
ity of the Lebanese army, which disinte-
grated at a crucial moment.
McFarlane suffered on other issues dur-
ing his first months on the job, but from an
excess of the self-effacement that ultimate-
ly would prove his greatest asset.
"One of Bud's adustments was the sudden
leap," said a friend. "It was a fairly short
time between when he was lieutenant col-
onel and national security adviser. It was a
year or two before his talents could be re-
alized and he recognized that deferential
thinking no longer served his job. It speaks
well he adjusted so quickly, but there was a
Through this process and over time, i
McFarlane also overcame Pentagon suspi-
cion that he was a mere handmaiden of
Shultz. In fact, on "Star Wars" and Central
America, McFarlane's position was much
closer to that of the Pentagon than State;
and he did not let his friendship with Shultz
interfere with policy. An administration of-
ficial who favors the "Stars Wars" plan cred-;
its McFarlane with converting a skeptical
Shultz into a supporter
The plan, which has preoccupied Reagan,
is the one issue that has built McFarlane's
relationship with the president. McFarlane
has regularly briefed reporters on the issue,
emphasizing not the improbable dream of an
"impenetrable shield," as does Reagan, but
the value of a less-than-perfect missile de-
fense as an element of deterrence.
As the revamped Reagan team starts the
second term, no one is talking about McFar-
lane as a No. 2 man. But after Meese and
deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver
leave this spring, McFarlane will be the
White House's ranking senior official:
New chief of staff Donald T. Regan has
told McFarlane that he will not interfere
with McFarlane's time with the president,
which averages about four hours a week,
considerably more than the amount Reagan
spends with Shultz or Weinberger.
In recent months, a White House official
said, McFarlane has become confident
enough that he "feels free to tell bad jokes
to the president." The joke to which the
official referred was related by McFarlane
during a planning meeting for this spring's
Bonn economic summit.
It was about a cricket afraid he would be
stepped on who asked an owl what he
should do about it. The owl suggested that
the cricket become an eagle. The cricket
asked how he should make the change.
"That's logistics. I'm in planning," the owl
replied. And so, at the White House, is
McFarlane.
3,
period when self-deprecation and modesty
got in his way."
McFarlane's qualities as a conciliator and
his political understanding as much as his
substantive background helped him make
the adjustment in 1984.
Publicly, the administration had been em-
barrassed by several accounts of disarray
that characterized arms-control processes
during the first term. Frequent divisions
between Shultz and Weinberger on a wide
range of policy issues added to the impres-
of an administration that could not get
sion
toegther on foreign policy.
Reagan s litical advisers also ex ressed
anxiety pnvate y, especially after the dis-
closure last April that the Central intelli
f
nuning
gence Agency had directed the
Nicaraguan harbors These advise
they distrusted CIA Director William I
Casey and were worried that some agency;
adventure would put Reagan on the defen-
sive during his reelection campaign.
But Baker, consistently at odds with
Clark and Case had formed a close work
in- relationship with McFarlane, who,
wound up meeting regularly with Casey and-
invFin him to periodic lunches with Shultz
ar. rein erger. Some thought that move.
would provide an early warning of sur-
prises, but none materialized.
To defuse Shultz-Weinberger tensions,.
McFarlane began weekly breakfast meet
ings with them in which they could air
grievances and make policy recommenda-
tions in confidence that what they said
would never leave the room.
`Always Asking Good Questions'
A White House official described McFar-,
lane as "using the Socratic technique of al-
ways asking good questions, never pushing"
in meetings with Shultz and Weinberger and
in National Security Council meetings
where all are present. On many issues, this
has produced compromise subsequently
approved by Reagan.
Staff writers John M. Goshko, Fred Hiatt
and Don Oberdorfer and staff researcher
James Schwartz contributed to this report.
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