ANTITERRORIST POLICY A CASUALTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010057-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: June 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010057-9
`v7ASHINGTO^1 POST
ARTICLE iF"P1.ARED 24 June 1985
ON PAGE_
LOU CANNON
f__
Antiterrorist Policy a Casualty
W hile President Reagan struggled
successfully last week to
maintain U.S. unity and his
prestige in the face of the Mideast
airplane hijacking, his administration's
widely heralded antiterrorist policy
became a casualty of the hostage crisis.
The big loser was Secretary of State
George P. Shultz, who for the past eight
months has been telling any audience
willing to listen that the United States
"must be willing to use military force"
to combat terrorism.
On Oct. 25, 1984, Shultz kicked off
the antiterrorism campaign in a speech
at Park Avenue Synagogue in
Manhattan in which he said, "The public
must understand before the fact that
there is potential for loss of life of some
of our fighting men and the loss of life
of some innocent people."
A few weeks later, Reagan
reportedly approved a covert operation
directing the Central Intelligence
Agency to tram counterterrons units
for strikes a ainst sus ected Mideast
terrorists, a o is avore u tz
and -national secunt r affairs adviser
Robert c Farlane.
This policy blew up March 8 along
with a car bomb in a Beirut suburb that
killed 80 persons and wound 200.
The bomb was directed at Mohammed
Hussein Fadlalah, leader of the
tt~
e
Hezbollah (Party of God), a militant
Shiite movement that at this writing has William Caseey. director of central
custody of five or six of the passengers inte genre. a Y has is
taken off Trans or Airlines t shortcomings, but it is probably a
847. romantic view to eve that the CIA is
Fadlalah survived the explosion 50 likel to have muc success in
yards from his home, although several penetrating militant to groups in
of his bodyguards reportedly died in the w is a recruit may ordered to carry
t assassination to prove is
an
blast. Fadlalah has been tied by U.S.
intelligence to several attars at n.
inc u g e
facilities in the Mideast,
Oct. 23 1983, suicide bomb attack on
the Marine coin in irut that
killed 241 U.S. servicemen.
The attack on Fadlalah was directed
by a runaway group of Lebanese and
others. Although the bombin was not
authorized by the CIA, the implications
of the incident were so rmin for
U.S. policy that Reagan dig n the
covert support operation.
Nonetheless, McFarlane continued to
insist in subsequent speeches that the
United States has the will and the
ability to act against terrorist groups.
Shultz and McFarlane are firm allies on
this issue, as on many others. Both
were architects of the ill-fated U.S.
policy in Lebanon, and both insist on the
need for antiterrorist operations, in part
because of the reluctance of Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger to use
conventional military force against
terrorist groups.
It is one of the internal ironies of the
Reagan administration that the
"conservative" Weinberger has been
most realistic on the limitations of
combating terrorism while "moderates"
Shultz and McFarlane have been most
insistent on pushing a policy of
retaliation that in emotional appeal
makes up for what it lacks in probability
of success.
One of McFarlane's persistent
advocacies is that the administration
needs improved intellience in the
st an implied rebuke to
Middl
ou
fidelit .
More realisticallsome national
security, o icials sa that the United
States lost muc o its inte ence
ca it wit the srae invasion of
Lebanon on June 1982, and tile
subse uent ex ulsion om t e country
of the Palestinian ration
prgtion. The PLO, for all its
terrorism, was far more susceptible to
U.S. penetration than the militant Shiite
factions now trying to fill the Lebanese
vacuum.
So far, the real moderate in the
administration has proven to be the
president, who somewhat plaintively
expressed his frustration at the news
conference Tuesday when he said he
had "pounded a few walls" and added:
" .. You have to be able to pinpoint
the enemy. You can't just start shooting
without having someone in your
gunsight."
The question now is how long Reagan
can sustain this statesmanlike approach
in the face of demands from prominent
advisers to "do something"
terrorism.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201010057-9