MARCHING FOR PRETORIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000200990002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200990002-3
BOSTON GLOBE
1 March 1987
O By KURT M. CAMPBELL
M ARCHING
ARTICLE APPEARED
let
OK EME 46--a
FOR PRETORI
Over the last two decades, South Africa has
assembled the most powerful armed forces on the
continent. Yet the military's most decisive t,ietaries
haze been scan not on the battlefield but u7 thin
the government bureaucracy.
The South African soldiers arrived at the banks of the Zambezi
River at dusk. They were tired and dusty after a long day's
reconnaissance mission in the Caprivi Strip, a strategic finger of
land controlled by Pretoria that juts east like a knife into the
heart of southern Africa. The troops made camp near Katima
Mulillo, the northernmost outpost of white power on the black
continent and an important staging point for South Africa's
military raids against its black-ruled neighbors. It grew dark
quickly, and each of the soldiers settled around the fire with a
helping of boerewors, the traditional Afrikaner sausage. to listen
to the evening broadcast on South Africa's state-run radio. The
lead story concerned the growing mood for economic sanctions in
the United States, and one South African commentator after
another warned the
international community of
the consequences of trying
to push the government too
far.
The news turned from
the world scene to the
results of a South African
rugby tournament, and there
was an awkward silence as
the soldiers regarded with a
mixture of anger and
exasperation the lone
American who had been
assigned to them over the
last week. Finally, a young
counterinsurgency specialist,
wearing a long beard remins-
cent of his Boer farmer ances-
tors, addressed me with the
light of the campfire blazing in
his eyes: "Don't you Americans
understand that we're fighting
the Communists here. All over
Africa the Marxists have won,
destroying what the whites
have built. But we will never go
down, not like the Rhodesians.
We Afrikaners will fight, re-
gardless of what the West
thinks, to preserve our Chris-
tian way of life." He stoked the
fire with a stick for emphasis
and continued on as the flames
leapt toward the African night
sky: "We'll take on the whole
goddamned continent if we
have to, and you can be sure
that if we ever do go down,
we'll drag the whole bloody
place down with us."
Like the foot soldiers pa-
trolling South Africa's borders,
Afrikanerdom's senior military
leaders are preparing to make a
final stand to preserve white
hegemony on the southern tip
of Africa. Over the last two dec-
ades, South Africa has assem-
bled the most powerful armed
forces on the continent. Yet the
military's most decisive victo-
ries to date have occurred not
on the battlefield but within
South Africa's decision-making
bureaucracy. While South Afri-
ca has continued 'to slip toward
civil war over the last two
years, Pretoria's military and
intelligence elite have emerged
as the dominant forces in the
formulation and execution of
government policy. In dramatic
contrast to the despair and pes-
simism found in South Africa's
business community and among
some black activists, there is an
eerie confidence along Preto-
ria's corridors of power.
Military spokesmen speak
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about a further escalation of domestic er with nearly 325,000 reservists, all
with extensive military training and ex-
repression and regional destabilization to perience, which can be mobilized in a
counter what is seen as a Communist- matter of days. Although whites make
inspired "total onslaught., against the less than one-sixth of South Africa's
last outpost of white civilization- At the up population, the SADF is made up largely
ruling Nationalist Party Congress in o of whites, and all male South Africans of
gust, South African defense minister "European descent" are conscripted
who. Magt nus Mahn
loudest n in the warned that chorus for "those into the security forces. Conscripts, who
whochano up nearly two-thirds of the regular
sanctions and condemnation should take make
forces, normally serve two years' full
note - we have not even started to use duty followed by 12 years of active re-
our muscle and capabilities." Indeed, it serve duty. One young soldier stated
is South Africa's muscle -its highly simply that ?military, service up on the
motivated armed forces, ruthlessly effi- border is now just part of what it means
dent intelligence services, extensive do- to be a South Africans"
mestic arms industry born of past sans- sheer manpower, the SADF can
lions, and even its nuclear know-how - field more soldiers than Angola, Zambia,
that will play a critical role in the widen- Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique
ing war to determine the country's des- combined. As a former British military
may' attache in Pretoria remarked, "South
Currently, South Africa's military is Africa is clearly the military superpower
waging operations on three separate in the region and on the continent. In
fronts. Elite divisions of the army and au; terms of the training and motivation of
force are staging combined operations her troops, you would need to go to Isra-
sgairebelgroups and the front-line el or Europe to see something compara-
states against
to the north with devastating re-
sults. The generals in Pretoria are like- ble."
In addition to the size and fighting
wise fighting competing factions in the
government to gain control over the de- spirit of its army, South Africa has as-
cision-making process. Finally, contin- sembled a formidable arsenal for its se-
gents of the army have been deployed in curity forces. In the wake of the 1961
the townships since the first state of Sharpesville massacre of township resi-
dents by security police, the United Na-
while nearly two years ago. And lions voted a mandatory arms embargo
whHe the security forces have largely ac- against South Africa. Yet rather than
complished their objectives in the first atwo theaters of operations, it is in this succumbing in the face of international
third arena of conflict - inside the un- pressure, South Africa set out to estab-
governable black cities like Soweto - lish what is today one of the most pow-
that South Africa's military power has erful military industries in the southern
failed to quell the rising tide of black un- hemisphere. South Africa's state-sup-
rest. While South Africa has the firepow- ported arms company, Armscor, pro-
duces what is arguably the world's finest
er to meet most any regional contingen- 155mm howitzer and a wide range of
cy, there is a sense among military ana- tanks, and sophisticated electronic
lysts and diplomats that the ultimate test guns, of the military's weapons, objectives, equipment. While South Africa is by no
and tactics will be inside South Africa's means able to produce all of its military
black townships. hardware domestically, Pretoria has, in
shadowy deals with Israel and
T he South African Defense Force West Germany in particular,
(SADF) is made up of several dis- been able to acquire what it
-
tinct services, including the needs ments and from friendly international govern-
army, army, navy, air force, and the South- merchants.
West Africa Territory Force, which is The clearest measure of
responsible for military actions in South Africa's technical exper-
Namibia, as the territory is known. Of all Sou Sou can be seen the repub-tise the various branches of the defense lies clandestine nuclear
force, the army, air force, and the De-
Defense According to a Department senior
partment of Military Intelligence are the program.
nior
most important. There are currently cial, "There can be little doubt
more than 100,000 active servicemen in that South Africa possesses the
the South African armed forces, togeth- technical know-how and materi-
als to construct some sort of
crude nuclear device." South
Africa's nuclear potential raises
serious concerns, not only for
the politically disenfranchised
black population, but for the
country's neighbors and the in-
ternational community.
There has been a good deal
of apocalyptic speculation about
how South Africa might use its
bomb. Some observers have
warned that Pretoria would use
its nuclear power against the
front-line states (all the black-
ruled countries to the north),
and Nobel Prize-winner Bishop
Desmond Tutu has declared
that the white authorities
?would use any and all means,
including nuclear weapons," to
cling to power inside South Af-
rica.
Officials in Pretoria have
been conspicuously silent on the
whole issue of South Africa's
nuclear program, but as early as
1977, former minister of infor-
mation Connie Mulder ominous-
ly warned: "Let me just say
that if we are attacked, no rules
apply at all if it comes to a ques-
tion of our existence. We will
use all means at our disposal,
whatever they may be."
South Africa's military ca-
pabilities are most visible
in Namibia, a vast and
desert with a population ap-
proximately that of a medium-
sized Midwestern city. My trip
to Namibia's border, the so-
called operational area, was in a
vintage DC-3 Dakota that flew
just above the treetops. The pi-
lot, a veteran of hundreds of
bush flights in the region, ex-
plained, "Flying low is the best
defense against a surface-to-air
missile attack, and occasionally
a band of terrorists manages to
get through our perimeter and
take a shot at one of our air-
craft. I don't plan to let those
bastards have an opportunity to
squeeze off a shot against me."
The flying SADF Dakota, obso-
lete by any standards, is a good
example of the military's atti-
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tude about weaponry. "This SWAPO bases and patrols. The battalions made up of black con- After many years of enlist-
plane is nearly 40 years old," border separating Angola and scripts serving under white offi- ing tribesmen and, in general,
the pilot said, "but we make use Namibia is nothing more than cers. South Africa has been developing and perfecting its
of everything that flies until it's an arbitrary boundary on a map, careful to accentuate tribal divi- style of warfare, South Africa
either shot down or falls apart." a legacy of European efforts to sions among the black battal- has managed to curtail the mili-
In South Africa every piece carve up the continent. South ions as part of its strategy of i. tary operations of SWAPO guer-
of military equipment is utilized, African patrols on search-and- divide and rule. In South Afri- rillas. South African soldiers
whether purchased illicitly from destroy missions range with im- ca's quest for regional hegemo- boast that "we've managed to
an international patron, hi- punity far across the Angolan ny, Pretoria has taken a page do in Namibia what you Ameri-
jacked from enemy forces in the border. The "troopies," young from imperial European history. cans were unable to do in Viet-
i region, or manufactured domes- border soldiers who patrol the Just as Great Britain created nam - contain an insurgency
tically. Consequently, South Af- bush in armored vehicles that I the Gurkhas in Nepal to fight war." However, the military
rica has an eclectic armory of resemble mechanized rhinocer- its battles in Asia, so has South has adopted a chilling and dubi-
British tanks, French fighter oses, are the modern equiv- Africa, also an empire of sorts, ous measure of success from
aircraft, Soviet missile launch- alents and descendants of the established colonial armies to the Vietnam experience: the
I ers, and locally produced artil- Boer kommandos who defeated prosecute its policy of regional body count. And South Africa is
lery pieces. Yet more and more, the Zulu, Xhosa, and challenged destabilization. not shy about trotting out ma-
South Africa is moving toward the British Empire. Indeed, the On my trip through the Ca- cabre figures to illustrate the
military self-sufficiency and very term kommando was an privi Strip, our troop made military's effectiveness. Col. D.
even emerging as a major ex- invention of the Boers during camp one evening at Omega Ferreira, a regional commander
porter of some weaponry in their war with Britain at the Base, the home of the South Af- in Namibia, stated plainly that
I Third World arms markets. turn of the century, and the rican army's 201st Battalion. "since 1966 we have killed
Several months ago the govern- modern South African army The 201st is formed exclusively 10,385 SWAPO terrorists, as of
ment proudly unveiled a new at- employs some of the same of native bushmen from the and last Wednesday." By using se-
tack helicopter and a jet fighter, quick-strike tactics pioneered regions of Angola and Namibia. vere methods of interrogation
as proof of South Africa's ability by its predecessors. Like their These diminutive soldiers wear and intimidation inside Namibia,
to beat sanctions. ancestors who carried a Bible in the emblem of the white- South Africa has managed to
The South Africans have one hand and a rifle in the oth- breasted crow on their uni- secure its position and "pacify"
had many years to hone their er, the soldiers of Afrikanerdom forms (the white spot on the the territory, but in the process
fighting skills and weaponry on see themselves as custodians of crow's breast represents the it has turned Namibia into a
the battlefield in Namibia. Since a promised land, ready to use all white officer corps that com- militarized desert. Bishop Tutu
1966, Pretoria has waged what their strength without scruple mands the battalion). The popu- has called the SADF the "real
military commentators term "a against encircling foes. lar film The Gods Must Be terrorists" in Namibia.
low-intensity conflict" against The morale of the white sol- Crazy was filmed less than 100
the South-West African Peo- diers on the border is surpass- miles to the east of Omega Ithough South Africa's
ple's Organization (SWAPO), a ingly high, given the current Base, but the bushmen soldiers military has emerged as
group that is seeking. indepen- controversy on South African of the 201st, outfitted in full the undisputed dominant
dente for Namibia. The SADF campuses surrounding the combat gear, bore little resem- force in the region, the SADF's
also uses the large bases on the whole issue of conscription. blance to the gentle bushmen most impressive gains over the
Cunene River in northern Na- There is little apparent hesita- depicted in the movie. One of last several years have been in
mibia as jumping-off points for tion, particularly among young the white officers proudly ex- the policy making arena in Pre-
its annual major foray into An- Afrikaners, about fighting to plained, "Any one of my bush- toria. Two studies, Philip Fran-
gola. Beginning in 1975 with preserve their own African I men could track you down in kel's Pretoria's Praetorians
operation Savannah, South Afri- heritage. One young troopie, the open desert. steal your wa and Ken Grundy's The Milita-
ca has launched raids with exot- his skin tanned and leathery ter, and slit your throat. You'd rization of South African Poli-
ic code names like Protea, from the many hours spent on never know what killed you.' tics, have appeared in recent
Egert, and Askari across the Patrol in the desert, proudly The South Africans have years, and both describe the in-
frontier into southern Angola. proclaimed, "We are not West- also formed the 202d Battalion creasing importance of the
mill- The objectives have varied, ! erners but, rather, Africans. We from the Kavango people of tary's counsel in the formula-
ranging from so-called hot-pur- may look like Europeans, but southern Angola. Originally, the lion of state policies, both for-
suit raids against SWAPO train- we have an attachment to this Kavango was one of the most eign and domestic. The State
ing facilities to providing air land -it's like our hunting peaceful tribes of Africa, with Security Council (SSC), the
cover and logistical support for ground. The Afrikaner is the no word for "kill" in its native powerful and secretive Cabinet
white tribe of Africa.' vocabulary, but in the past sev committee dominated by senior orga- Jonas Savimbi's guerrilla for the he biggest surprise for eral years South Africa has
Total tal Independence of (Union for Angolathe) an American prepared transformed the Kavango into military officials, has emerged
T Tial actor in aecuri-
within
rectly challenging ambitiously, Angola's trasts only between for the white and stark con- black, modern warriors. Together as the cruciaplanning. l actor It all
and, most ato di- with other tribal regiments, the ty-related n at of the
soldier and civilian, is the rela- bushmen and Kavango battal- the thete S elite eeu Se Ccretariouncil that the
army along with its Cuban Cuban tively large and growing num- ions make up a sort of South Af-Sta
troops and Soviet advisers. v
In northernmost Namibia, ber of blacks the SADF has rican foreign legion, which can most. important decisions con-
the army and air force stage armed, trained, and brought be unleashed in the region with cenng national security are combined operations against into its ranks. There are whole few domestic or international madelike. the The Soviet SSC's Politburo, Secretariat,
consequences. meets
in secret, but it is known that
the military exercises its influ-
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.
ence to set the agenda and of-
ten has the last word.
Some military analysts even
claim that the generals have
gained power in Pretoria after a
bloodless and quiet coup. Peter
Vale, a professor at Rhodes
University in South Africa, de-
scribes the military as "a gov-
ernment within the govern-
ment, able to exert a dominant
influence both in the back
rooms and on the battlefield."
However, Vale argues that
"there has been no military
coup in a crude sense, because
President Botha, who was, be-
fore his rise to power, the de-
fense minister for 12 years, has
taken special care to see that
the military gets what it
needs."
Gen. I. R. Gleeson, chief of
the defense force staff and a
senior member of the SSC,
takes a different view of the
military's role in the current
situation in South Africa. The
general, of medium build, 60-
ish, and wearing the olive-green
khakis of an infantryman, has
that unmistakable air of a com-
mander who has shouldered the
burden of sending countless
young men into battle. Gleeson
is something of an anomaly in
the Afrikaner-dominated hierar-
chy of the armed forces, being
of English descent and Roman
Catholic faith, but in his posi-
tion he is largely responsible for
the coordination of military in-
telligence and operations. "It is
true that the SADF plays a ma-
jor role in foreign policy at this
juncture," Gleeson explains,
"but I don't see this as unusual
or in any way sinister. We live
in a conflict-ridden society and a
turbulent region. It is only natu-
ral that our military's advice
carries extra weight. However,
those fanciful accusations about
a military clique that runs South
Africa are most unfortunate."
When questioned about the
new-found power and prestige
of the military within the SSC,
Gen. Gleeson replies that
"there are good reasons for the
security forces to play a reason-
ably prominent role at this
stage." But he quickly adds,
"We do so with circumspec-
tion." Nevertheless, American
diplomats stationed in Pretoria
have applied the techniques of
Kremlinology to try to gauge
the influence of the new soldier-
statesmen inside the SSC. A
senior staff member on the US
Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence confirms that "we
probably know more and are in-
deed more concerned about
what goes on within the chambers of the SSC
than we currently know of the [African National
Congress]." Indeed, US intelligence operatives
routinely monitor the movements of senior mili-
tary figures and carefully evaluate the many ru-
mors that circulate through official Pretoria
about infighting within the SSC's chambers.
Gen. Gleeson's spartan office is located at
the headquarters of the SADF, set off a
jacaranda- and bougainvillea-lined avenue
in Pretoria only a few steps from the state prison
that houses the convicted white opponents of
apartheid. (Ironically, racial separation is en-
forced in South Africa's prisons, just as in its resi-
dential areas.) The SADF headquarters, like all
sensitive military facilities in Pretoria, has been
surrounded by makeshift barricades and patrolled
by army detachments since an African National
Congress (ANC) bomb damaged the facade of the
air force building in 1983. The ANC bombing,
with many civilian casualties in a crowded urban
setting, ushered in a new phase in the domestic
struggle to seize power from the white authori-
ties.
Yet Gen. Gleeson does not shrink from the
challenge posed by the ANC: "The ANC is a
Communist organization, coordinated from Mos-
cow and wholly committed to indiscriminate ter-
rorist acts. The military is tasked to repel the
'total onslaught' set against us by international
communism, and to achieve this goal, South Afri-
ca is prepared - in the words of your late presi-
dent, Kennedy - to bear any burden." One of
the glossy pamphlets of the public affairs office of
the SADF has this to say about the "total on-
slaught" confronting South Africa: "The ultimate
aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to over-
throw the present body politic in the RSA and to
replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of gov-
ernment." The USSR is accused of directly insti-
gating "social and labor unrest, civilian resis-
tance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure
of the RSA and the intimidation of black leaders
and members of the Security Forces." The tract
ends ominously with a warning that all critics of
apartheid are inadvertently playing into Mos-
cow's hands.
Philip Nel, a Soviet specialist at the Universi-
ty of Stellenbosch, describes the military obses-
sion with communism as "a fervent belief that
when the men in the Kremlin sit down to discuss
global strategy, South Africa is consistently the
most important issue on the agenda, not Poland,
Afghanistan, China, missiles in Europe, or arms
control with the Americans." As a result, South
Africa is, in the words of President P. W. Botha,
involved in a life-or-death struggle "between the
powers of chaos, Marxism, and destruction on
the one hand and the powers of order, Christian
civilization, and the upliftment of the people on
the other." The bottom line is that in Pretoria's
two-camp world view, there is no middle ground
or gray area between friend and foe, and it is the
job of South Africa's military to punish the in-
creasingly vocal group of the latter in the region.
During the Reagan administration, the United
States has continued to try to build bridges to the
South African military, but with uncertain re-
sults. As one CIA analyst observed,"These.guys
just f entaly---distrust foreigners and par-
ticular encans. 1i 19$-3, senior military
members of the SSC were flown to Washington
to hear a generally more balanced CIA assess-
ment of Soviet ambitions in South Africa. Howev-
er, the officers who participated in the briefing
left thin ing that "'even-Reagan had gone soft on
the communists." As the anti-apartheid move-
ment, has gained momentum in
the United States, contacts be-
tween Washington and South
Africa's military have become
less frequent.
few days before the ew with en. Glee-
- o~'tate
George Shultz, in response to
allegations in the,.,.&ress that
over the Vearc th . A b? i
_3t]ded^ Scut Africa with pL-
`marign on the . NC.. publicly
stated that there, were no mili-
tary _ or intelligence links be-
tween Washington and Pretor-
ia. Gleeson had strong words
for the State Department dis-
claimer: "As you no doubt
know, American support has
been quite uneven, and it is be-
coming more and more difficult
to do business with your coun-
try. There are even some
among us who argue that South
Africa should break with the
West to avoid the unwanted in-
trusions into our internal af-
fairs. Of course, there has been
a degree of security cooper-
ation between our countries,
and the message the US sends
when it denies these contacts is
not lost on us. South Africa has
been burned before by the US,
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and we will continue to be
wary.
Indeed, the failure of the
United States to support South
Africa's invasion of Angola in
1975, after Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger had privately
pressured Pretoria to intervene
in the conflict, is deeply etched
on the military and oversha-
dows every American initiative.
In the wake of the recent Sen-
ate vote for mandatory sanc-
tions, President Botha declared
that South Africa was now fac-
ing a new, insidious challenge
from the capitalist West rather
than the communist East.
However, despite the mutu-
al suspicion and distrust, South
Africa and the United States
I are currently cooperating to as-
sist Angola's Jonas Savimbi.
South Africa has for many years
provided the charismatic Sa-
vimbi with the lion's share of
his military assistance, and it is
in Angola that the United
States and South Africa have
joined to establish a limited
strategic alliance. With South
Africa's assistance, UNITA has
been waging a guerrilla war
against the ruling Marxist re-
gime, which is supported by
25,000 Cuban combat troops.
In March 1985, the Reagan ad-
ministration announced that the
United States would provide
Savimbi's troops with $15 mil-
lion worth of military equip-
ment, including advanced, hand-
held, surface-to-air missiles
(Stingers). To ensure that the
high-tech cargoes arrived safe-
ly, the US government has of-
ten relied on South African in-
telligence or logistical support
for the arduous journey to Sa-
vimbi's camp. (Ironically, al-
though South Africa has helped
,
s
n
facilitate the supply of Stingers of the so-called verligte (en
to Savimbi, US law forbids any li
ned) wing of the National-
ht
g
e
transfer of US military equip- ist party. Although Crocker's
ment to South Africa.) efforts to bring about Namibia's
Angola's brushfire war is independence have gone
another conflict that alterna- unrewarded, the strategy ap-
tively has raged and dragged on ; _rew to be F the fruit after
LDAA~
u
due e to to ~. the lack of Western re- the signing of the Nkomati ac
due between apartheid South field of instability in the black ca, believe that the SADF will
porting from the scene. The ruled states to the north, with be required to serve in the
Contittuad
military is openly encouraging a
greater US commitment for Sa-
vimbi. One South African field
officer concluded that "with
just a little more materiel sup-
port for Savimbi, we can hit the
Russians where it hurts in An-
gola and put Savimbi on the
throne in Luanda." Yet Pretoria
appears to be mindful of the
risks of overcommitment, at
this time choosing to destabilize
the existing regime rather than
install its own. Or, as another
intelligence officer translated it
to Africa's circumstances, "It's
easier to be a poacher than a
gameskeeper." Regardless, it is
the current limited clandestine
cooperation and the hopes,
though fading, of a US-South
African axis against communist
encroachment in the region
that keep the military talking to
American visitors.
Africa and Marxist Mozambique
in 1984. Each country Pledged
'to discontinue its support of ef-
forts to destabilize the other.
However, South Africa has con-
tinued to arm the antigovern-
ment rebels inside Mozam-
bique. There is also continued
speculation that South Africa
was somehow involved in the
death of Mozambique's presi-
dent Samora Machel, killed in
an airplane crash last October
in the northern Transvaal.
It was the view of the South
African Defense Force chief,
Gen. Constand Viljoen, and the
head of military intelligence,
Gen. Piet van der Westhuizen,
that South Africa had no busi-
ness making deals with Marx-
ists to suit "Pik Botha's cock-
tail-party friends." Willem
Steenkamp, the respected de-
fense correspondent at the
Cape Times, offered that "the
W bile the world's atten- military was absolutely repelled
tion has focused on with the notion of South Afri-
the fighting in the ca's defense being somehow de-
townships over the last two pendent on the goodwill of
Communists. there has been a tender- ... The officers'
increasing involvement was
cy to overlook the fierce bu- spurred from a profound belief
reaucratic battles in Pretoria I that the politicians and diplo-
between the uniformed military mats have been giving away too
and the pinstriped diplomats at much."
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Tom Lodge,
Assistant secretary of state for lecturer in politics at the Uni-
African affairs Chester Crock- vturer of Witwatersrand,
er's embattled policy of con- "Whrsity ile just a few months ago
structive engagement was in- there were those who publicly
tended to coax Pretoria away
from an indiscriminate policy of spoke of the possibility of sit-
destabilization aimed at sur- ling down at the negotiating ta-
rounding states. Crocker as- ble there with are no the ANC, currently
prominent govern-
plied what he terms a "sus-
inert figures calling for modera-
tained and nimble diplomacy" tion, compromise, or accommo-
toward the region, trying to dation." Indeed, there are no
f its
t
J,
devastating results. South Afri
can koiasaxdas have in the I
last year raided each of the
fmnt4ine states, sabotaging oil
refineries, transport links, and
military facilities. In addition,
Pretoria stepped up its support
to a collection of" rebel groups,
including Savimbi's forces,
which have wreaked havoc in
the surrounding region. As one
US diplomat in Zimbabwe ob-
served, "The region has paid a
steep price for its anti-South
African rhetoric. The front-line
leaders have tended to get
caught up in the excitement of
the sanctions movement, and
they have most certainly under-
estimated Pretoria's ability to
hurt them. What's more discon-
certing, we haven't begun to
see the worst of it."
the mili-
et even with all
tary's prowess, there
are clear signs of trouble
ahead for the soldiers of apart-,
heid. The one major Achilles'
heel in the otherwise Herculean
dimensions of South Africa's
military power is the continuing
need for the SADF to police the
townships. For instance, the
army has been deployed in
Crossroads, the sprawling and
miserably poor township out-
side of Cape Town, for nearly a
year. In stark contrast to the
esprit de corps apparent up on
the border, the young soldiers
that patrol the squalid streets of
South Africa's besieged town-
ships are angry and confused.
"Every day the children throw
rocks at our vehicles, and we
constantly worry that one of
these rocks will turn out to be a
o
break South Africa ou
longer any doves in the Nation- hand grenade," confided a new
isolation on the continent. alist Party government for the conscript Members of the mili-
Crocker's principal interlocutor United States to court, only the
in Pretoria has been Foreign tart' are uncomfortable with
traditional hawks and the soar-
role as township sol-
h
i
r new
t
e
ter Pik Botha
i
the leader , in eof the SADF.
Mi
dim and ' Gen. won states
g eagles
place of a US-favored
bluntly that "we wouldn't want
policy of regional dialogue and to see the army in the black ur-
domestic negotiation, South Af- ban areas indefinitely." Never-
rica has instead chosen to bring thekm, many observers, such
to bear its military power, both as professor Dean Fourie of the
at home and beyond its borders. department of strategic studies
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200990002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200990002-3
townships for the foreseeable
future: "The police are incapa-
ble of handling the magnitude of
the disturbances among the ur-
ban blacks. Presently, the army
is the only force prepared to
deal with that sort of thing."
However, even the vast ar-
senal available to the SADF
along with its new-found power
and prestige in Pretoria has not
helped to quell the mounting
unrest among black South Afri-
cans. The ANC, the principal
opposition to the white govern-
ment, would be no match for
the security forces in any direct
clash, but the urban guerrillas
snipe away at key government
and military targets, undermin-
ing confidence in the regime to
maintain order. The tanks and
jets of the security forces are
ill-suited for fighting an internal
war. Even South Africa's nucle-
ar bomb has little or no military
utility inside the country apart
from a desperate and suicidal
use of nuclear power in a final
act of white revenge. As one "
military expert in Pretoria re-
marked, "You cannot use a nu--
clear bomb as you would a scal-
pel, cutting away
don't want and leaving the rest
unaffected."
In response to the growing
international condemftion and
internal turmoil, the govern-
ment has threatened with in-
creasing frequency and urgency
to form a laager, a legacy of the
military tactics employed by the
voortrekkers. The early Boer
pioneers who left the British-
controlled cape to settle South
Africa's interior would circle
their ox wagons when attacked
by hostile natives. This forma-
tion that helped a handful of de-
termined Boers stave off the at-
tacks of vast African armies has
come to represent the attitude
of Afrikaners toward adversar-
ies. Not long ago, South African
foreign minister Botha threat-
ened that the government
would react to sanctions and do-
mestic strife by forming a late
20th-century equivalent of the
laager. This time, South Africa
faces a hostile world not with
ox wagons and flintlock rifles
but with the most powerful and
feared security forces on the
continent. However, the great-
est challenge to the preserva-
tion of white minority rule
comes not from external
threats, but rather from inside
the circled wagons formed by
the SADF. When and if the
laager is ultimately drawn, the
defense forces have the will and
capability to pulverize the sur-
rounding states. But it is inside
this militarized perimeter, in
the townships and the cities,
that the SADF will face its de-
ciding test. ?
KURT M. CAMPBELL IS A FELLOW AT THE
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT HARVARD'S
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT. HE RECENTLY RETURNED
FROM THREE MONTHS IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA. INCLUDING A MONTH OBSERVING
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY
6.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200990002-3