THIS TIME THE U.S. DID IT RIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000200840002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 26, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0200840002-9
, David S. Broder
WASHINGTON POST
26 February 1986
This Time the U.S. Did It Right
As the odious rule of Ferdinand Marcos
came to an end, the greatest praise deservedly
went to the people of the Philippines, who had
demonstrated such a strong desire for freedom
and democracy that even Marcos had to under-
stand that he had played out the string on his
20-year dynasty.
But let it be said that in this imnortan in-
stance, the government of the United States,
withbipartisan cooperation among key mem-
bers of Con ress and the administration, and
support of the uniformed military an tie mte
hence agencies, delivered a unified es age-
of support forte Filipino people which helped
move a reluctant and recalcitrant Marcos
toward his inevitable exit.
In a significant test in a vital part of the
world, the United States did manage effec-
tively to exert its influence on behalf of both
our ideals and our national interests. That is
important enough-and rare enough-that it
is worth examining how it came to be.
One key was that major decision-makers in
both Congress and the administration had first-
hand knowledge of the Philippines which they
were able to update regularly. There were no
travel or language barriers to overcome. That
meant that policy makers were less reliant on
self-proclaimed (and often quarrelsome) experts.
It also meant they were less prone to impose on
the Philippine reality preconceived notions
formed from other and irrelevant experiences.
In both these respects, there were advan-
tages over our dealings with Vietnam or, cur-
rently, with Nicaragua and Central America.
We knew the history, and we knew the lan-
guage and culture of the Philippines as we did
not in these other Third World countries
where we have intervened.
Another advantage was that, in this instance,
unlike the Middle East, there was no powerful
domestic constituency group skewing the out-
come of the policy debate. Filipino Americans
form a much less influential voting bloc than
Jewish Americans, and therefore the adminis-
tration and (especially) Congress were able to
evaluate policy choices in a relatively pressure-
free atmosphere.
Third, leaders of both branches of govern-
ment found it possible not just to balance but to
merge our idealistic and practical interests.
The two giant U.S. bases represent our big-
gest concrete interest in the Philippines, but
our historical association with the Filipinos,
bridging colonial days, World War If battles and
liberation, gave us an unusually clear conmiit-
ment to the freedom and democracy of the is-
lands.
Liberals in Congress instinctively opposed
Marcos' tendency to autocratic rule. What was
significant and crucial was that conservatives in
both Congress and the Reagan administration
understood that preservation of American
bases and interests were also threatened by his
heavy-handedness. So the smart hawks and the
realistic doves both found reasons to oppose
Marcos' regime.
Special praise should go to the uniformed mili-
tary in the United States and to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, which, in this instance, rejected
the ttemptation to cut their own private deals
with their Filipino counterparts to the detriment
of American policy. They were part of the con-
sensus and a oe move policy forward.
Finally, the media coverage of events in the
Philippines, from Benigno Aquino's murder in
1983 to Marcos' blatant theft of this month's
election, made it very clear to the American peo-
ple what was at stake. Those government offi-
cials who complain that the press and television
sensationalize situations or undercut American
policy cannot make that charge in the Philippines.
The execution of the agreed policy was not
perfect. but it was a darn sight more consistent
and effective than it has been in other areas of
the world under this administration. Except for
some verbal wanderings by President Reagan in
his press-conference comments (quickly cor-
rected by his associates), the administration offi-
cials, senators and representatives of both parties
who shared responsibility for our policy exerted
steady and growing pressure on Marcos to shape
up or ship out.
Looking back over the record of the past 18
months, one can see a persistent and increasingly
focused campaign to reform the Marcos regime
--or remove it.
Don Oberdorfer of The Post has cited a
November 1984 National Security Council paper
which laid down what proved to be the correct
policy line. It said. "Reforms are likely in the
short run to weaken some bases of support for
the current government, which will resist many
of them. While President Marcos at this stage is
part of the problem, he is also necessarily part of
the solution. We need to be able to work with
him and to try to influence him through a well-or-
chestrated policy of incentives and disincentives
to set the stage for peaceful and eventual transi-
tion to a successor government whenever that
takes place. Marcos, for his part, will try to re-
main in power indefinitely."
The authors of that policy and their allies.in'
both parties on Capitol Hill deserve thanks for
providing an altogether too rare demonstration of
consistency and coordination in the development
and execution of foreign policy.
It is no easy thing for a great power to divorce
itself from and then rid itself of a client-govern-
ment leader who has outlived his usefulness and
overreached his power. The United States has
done that with Marcos--and a good thing, too.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0200840002-9