'DISINFORMATION' USE IN U.S. PLOYS DENIED
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 28, 2011
Sequence Number:
14
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 3, 1986
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1.pdf | 81.89 KB |
Body:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1
AFMCLE APCVM
ONPACEaZA
WASHINGTON TIMES
3 October 1986
`Disinformation' use
in U.S. ploys denied
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
ence anal Sts who said standard
strategic deception apparent
was
to counter terrorist t reats.
Intelligence specialist Arnold
Beichman said he believes National
Security Adviser Adm. John Poin-
dexter may have erred in using the
term "disinformation" to describe
strategic deception - a combination
of foreign policy tools, including the
use of false or misleading informa-
tion planted overseas.
"There's nothing new in govern-
ments, democratic or otherwise,
using strategic deception," said Mr.
Beichman, a scholar at Hoover Insti-
tution in Stanford, Calif. "That's the
name of the game."
The Washington Post reported
yesterday that Adm. Poindexter rec-
ommended a "disinformation pro-
gram" last August as part of U.S.
plans to scare Libyan leader Col.
Muammar Qaddafi into calling off a
new wave of terrorist attacks.
The Post, citing a White House
memo from Adm. Poindexter, said
the administration leaked a mislead-
ing intelligence report on the Libyan
terrorist threats to The Wall Street
misleading vest rdav by intelli-
A Washington Post report of a
Reagan administration "disinfor-
mation program" to scare off Libyan
terrorist attacks was dismissed as
Journal as part of the program.
White House officials yesterday de-
nied that the Journal report was in-
accurate.
The Post article also stated that
the plan did not call for planting sto-
ries in the U.S. media, a covert action
that is prohibited by an executive
order signed by Mr. Reagan in 1981.
In addition, the Post reported that
the disinformation program in-
volved "foreign media outlets."
Analysts said propaganda may
have been one aspect of a larger di-
plomatic and military plan to intimi-
date Col. Qaddafi.
In mid-August, when the plan was
approved, U.S. military forces began
joint maneuvers with Egypt and U.N.
envoy Vernon Walters visited Euro-
pean leaders.
The maneuvers with Egypt had
been planned several months earlier.
The administration was justified
in using strategic deception to de-
fend against the perceived Libyan
threat, especially in light of intel-
ligence information at the time that
indicated newly planned-Libyan ter-
rorists attacks, analysts said.
"One could try to create the im-
pression in the minds of Qadaffi's
intelligence services, allowing them
to pick up information from their
sources in Europe or Libya, that the
United States was in fact intent on
bombing Libya again," said
Georgetown Unversity Professor
Roy Godson, who specializes in the
study of disinformation and intelli-
gence.
Mr. Beichman said, "There isn't
anything more stupid than for Poin-
dexter to have used the term 'disin-
formation' By doing that, he equated
the meager U.S. capabilities with the
massive disinformation apparatus
of the Soviet Union. Admirals should
stay at sea where they belong."
Michael Ledeen, a counterter-
rorism specialist with Georgetown
University'sCenter for Strategic and
International Studies, said he be-
lieves the threat of Libyan terrorism
justified the administration plan.
"It appears that if there was any
attempt to deceive, it was aimed at
Qaddafi, which is fine with me;' said
Mr. Ledeen.
"As far as the accuracy of the [ad-
ministration] statements in August
and September regarding Libyan
plans to pursue terrorist activities,
they are correct," he said.
The strategic deception program
appeared to have been timed to sup-
port administration sabre-rattling
against Libya last summer. At that
time, two U.S. aircraft carriers were
ordered to pass close to Libya with
the idea of alerting Soviet intelli-
gence stations, who were expected
to relay the information to the Lib-
yans, said one U.S. official who de-
clined to be named.
Officials also ordered U.S. bomb-
ers to fly to a NATO base in Italy so
Libyan agents would detect their
presence, the official said.
"The idea was that Qaddafi would
see these things and it would put the
fear of God into him," and possibly
deter him from another terrorist
strike, the official said.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1