'DISINFORMATION' USE IN U.S. PLOYS DENIED

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 28, 2011
Sequence Number: 
14
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 3, 1986
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1.pdf81.89 KB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1 AFMCLE APCVM ONPACEaZA WASHINGTON TIMES 3 October 1986 `Disinformation' use in U.S. ploys denied By Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES ence anal Sts who said standard strategic deception apparent was to counter terrorist t reats. Intelligence specialist Arnold Beichman said he believes National Security Adviser Adm. John Poin- dexter may have erred in using the term "disinformation" to describe strategic deception - a combination of foreign policy tools, including the use of false or misleading informa- tion planted overseas. "There's nothing new in govern- ments, democratic or otherwise, using strategic deception," said Mr. Beichman, a scholar at Hoover Insti- tution in Stanford, Calif. "That's the name of the game." The Washington Post reported yesterday that Adm. Poindexter rec- ommended a "disinformation pro- gram" last August as part of U.S. plans to scare Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi into calling off a new wave of terrorist attacks. The Post, citing a White House memo from Adm. Poindexter, said the administration leaked a mislead- ing intelligence report on the Libyan terrorist threats to The Wall Street misleading vest rdav by intelli- A Washington Post report of a Reagan administration "disinfor- mation program" to scare off Libyan terrorist attacks was dismissed as Journal as part of the program. White House officials yesterday de- nied that the Journal report was in- accurate. The Post article also stated that the plan did not call for planting sto- ries in the U.S. media, a covert action that is prohibited by an executive order signed by Mr. Reagan in 1981. In addition, the Post reported that the disinformation program in- volved "foreign media outlets." Analysts said propaganda may have been one aspect of a larger di- plomatic and military plan to intimi- date Col. Qaddafi. In mid-August, when the plan was approved, U.S. military forces began joint maneuvers with Egypt and U.N. envoy Vernon Walters visited Euro- pean leaders. The maneuvers with Egypt had been planned several months earlier. The administration was justified in using strategic deception to de- fend against the perceived Libyan threat, especially in light of intel- ligence information at the time that indicated newly planned-Libyan ter- rorists attacks, analysts said. "One could try to create the im- pression in the minds of Qadaffi's intelligence services, allowing them to pick up information from their sources in Europe or Libya, that the United States was in fact intent on bombing Libya again," said Georgetown Unversity Professor Roy Godson, who specializes in the study of disinformation and intelli- gence. Mr. Beichman said, "There isn't anything more stupid than for Poin- dexter to have used the term 'disin- formation' By doing that, he equated the meager U.S. capabilities with the massive disinformation apparatus of the Soviet Union. Admirals should stay at sea where they belong." Michael Ledeen, a counterter- rorism specialist with Georgetown University'sCenter for Strategic and International Studies, said he be- lieves the threat of Libyan terrorism justified the administration plan. "It appears that if there was any attempt to deceive, it was aimed at Qaddafi, which is fine with me;' said Mr. Ledeen. "As far as the accuracy of the [ad- ministration] statements in August and September regarding Libyan plans to pursue terrorist activities, they are correct," he said. The strategic deception program appeared to have been timed to sup- port administration sabre-rattling against Libya last summer. At that time, two U.S. aircraft carriers were ordered to pass close to Libya with the idea of alerting Soviet intelli- gence stations, who were expected to relay the information to the Lib- yans, said one U.S. official who de- clined to be named. Officials also ordered U.S. bomb- ers to fly to a NATO base in Italy so Libyan agents would detect their presence, the official said. "The idea was that Qaddafi would see these things and it would put the fear of God into him," and possibly deter him from another terrorist strike, the official said. Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440014-1