EMBASSY SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100370002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 5, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: C
Y
Face the Nation
CBS Network
April 5, 1987
Embassy Security
MS. LESLEY STAHL: Welcome to Face the Nation. I am
Lesley Stahl.
It's the oldest trick in the spy game, sex for secrets,
and it still works. The loss of secrets from the spy
scandal at the American embassy in Moscow is said to be
devastating.
REP. OLYMPIA SNOWE: And, probably one of the most
serious breaches of security in the history of this
country at any particular U.S. embassy.
MS. STAHL: The first Marine ever charged with
espionage, Sergeant Clayton Lonetree, was seduced by
what spies call "a swallow," a beautiful Soviet woman,
Violetta, who worked in the America embassy.
The other Marine in the case, Corporal Arnold Bracy,
was also seduced. According to the charges, the two
Marine guards repeatedly let Soviet agents into the
embassy at night, with Bracy, the lookout, shutting
down security alarms. They were accused of handing
over names and addresses of covert U.S. agents as well
as the contents of burn bags with classified documents.
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A third Marine has been arrested and at least two more
have been implicated.
REP. DANIEL MCA; We built padlocks around the back
door, and we built stronger windows while they walking
people in the front door.
MS. STAHL: IJ.S. negotiating positions at the Reykjavik
summit may have been compromised, and when Secretary of
State Shultz goes to Moscow, he may have to work out of
a mobile home.
REP. SNOWE: And, he'll be reduced to negotiating
foreign policy in a Winnebago.
MS. STAHL: The new American embassy under construction
in Moscow is considered a giant antenna courtesy of
Soviet workers.
In the old embassy, bugs were found in the typewriters
two years ago.
MR. DAUID MARTIN (Pentagon Correspondent): Tiny
listening devices were implanted inside this aluminum
bar to pick up the movements of the ball as the letters
were struck.
The signals were relayed through the power cord, and
somewhere outside the embassy a typewriter was printing
out exactly what was typed in here.
The Soviets were able to install these bugs simply by
intercepting the typewriters as they were shipped in
and out of Moscow for repair.
MS. STAHL: Why did security lapses go on undetected
for so long? We'll ask former Ambassador to Moscow,
Arthur Hartman, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and
John Barron, author of several books on the KGB. And,
we'll hear from Sergeant Lonetree's lawyer, Michael
Stuhff.
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Stealing American secrets, how easy is it? An issue
facing the nation.
(commercial)
MS. STAHL: Marine guard, Clayton Lonetree, is being
held at the brig at Quantico marine base awaiting his
court martial.
His attorney, Michael Stuhff, told us the alleged
security breach is not as serious as has been charged.
MR. MICHAEL STUHFF (Defense Attorney): Well, one of
the things that he was charged with was giving some
obsolete fire escape plans to this agent Sasha. Those
fire escape plans had been posted by the elevator doors
at the Vienna embassy.
All of the Soviet Bloc nationals had access to those.
It reflected a floor plan that was obsolete, in that,
walls and doors had been changed. He did give those to
Uncle Sasha, as he's called, for the purpose of gaining
Uncle Sasha's confidence. But certainly, that's not
anything that, even if they had been current, would
have compromised the security of the United States.
MS. STAHL: What do you mean, to gain Uncle Sasha's
confidence?
MR. STUHFF: We11, Clayton Lonetree believed that if he
obtained the confidence of Uncle Sasha, he would be
able to bring in the person behind him. Uncle Sasha
had indicated that he was friendly with a General who
was on the Central Committee, and who was a member of
the KGB.
And, Clayton Lonetree had a desire to distinguish
himself, to go above and beyond the call of duty. He
was trying to do what he'd been counseled to do, to
take some initiative.
I'm not going to say that this was a very wise course
of action on his part at all. But certainly, it is not
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the sinister thing that we're being led to believe by
the news reports.
f~S. STAHL: So, basically, your client is denying that
he gave away any secrets, that he led any KGB agents
around an embassy where they might be able to plant
bugs, or gain information about our encrypting
machines.
~1R. STUHFF: Absolutely. The allegations about leading
people around the embassy, opening doors, taking KGB
agents in, obviously, are very, very troubling
allegations. Those are allegations to which there is
just absolutely no basis whatsoever.
~1S. STAHL: And, he never admitted to any of these
charges in his interrogation.
~1R. STUHFF: No. That is completely and totally a
fabrication of 8racy's, and only came to the attention
of anybody through Bracy.
mS. STAHL; But, your client is not denying he had an
affair with Violetta.
i~1R. STUHFF; No. There is no question at all about
that.
CIS. STAHL: But, that was a breaking of the rules.
f1R. STUHFF; Well, that's something that is open to
some question. This young lady, Violetta, was invited
to embassy functions. She came to the f~arine Ball at
the Ambassador's house.
~1S. STAHL: As Lonetree's date?
mR. STUHFF: That's correct. And --
(nS. STAHL: And, the Ambassador saw them together?
f1R. STUHFF: Well, I would presume that -- I don't know
that the Ambassador was there at the Marine Ball. I
assume that he was, but certainly, all of the embassy
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staff was there. This is just not that unusual a
circumstance at all.
The young lady, for example, that Bracy is accused of
having an affair with, she was not only a former
embassy employee, she was a live-in baby sitter for one
of the American diplomats.
mS. STAHL: How widespread was this fraternization from
what you can tell between the Marine guards and Soviet
women who either worked in the embassy or didn't?
mR. STUHFF: It appears to be a rather common
occurrence, one that was fairly well accepted. It was
not unusual for the marines to have women come into
their barracks, the Marine House, as it was called. It
wasn't uncommon at all for the marines to go out to
some of the hotels where the local women were known to
hang out.
And, as a result of that, they were encouraged to
relieve their tensions, we might say, in rather
promiscuous types of liaisons, and to --
mS. STAHL: They were encouraged -- wait, what do you
mean?
mR. STUHFF: Well, for example, the commanding NCO at
Moscow, when these young men were snapped in, as the
phrase is, given their initial orientation to the duty
station, were told that it's where the young ladies can
be found, and that it's all right to go to use
prostitutes.
If they were going to check out past curfew, for
example, in Uienna, or if they were to stay out all
night, all they had to do was check in with the gunnery
sergeant. And, that's the procedure.
MS. STAHL: Let me ask you. You are saying that they
were told that it was all right to have relationships
with Soviet prostitutes.
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MR. STUHFF: They were told that they should have
relationships with prostitutes.
MS. STAHL: And, if you live in Moscow?
MR. STUHFF: Where are you going to find them?
MS. STAHL: Right, where are you going to find them?
MR. STUHFF; And, what nationality are they going to
MS. STAHL: Did he ever think that Uioletta might be a
spy?
MR. STUHFF: To this day, he still feels that if
anything at all, she herself was, at most, used by the
KGB, that she certainly didn't set out to do this, and
I certainly admire his faith in that young lady. I'm
not quite sure that I share it.
MR. STUHFF: I think that would be a pretty accurate
assumption.
MS. STAHL: And, as you say, to this day, he does not
believe that she set him up.
MR. STUHFF: I think he's starting to have some doubts
about that.
MS. STAHL: Defense Attorney, Michael Stuhff. We'll be
right back.
SEN. PATRICK LEAHY: Our embassy in Moscow is a huge,
tempting target. It's the candy store of espionage as
far as the KGB is concerned.
(commercial)
MS. STAHL: Joining us now, Arthur Hartman, former
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Senator Patrick
Leahy of Vermont. Welcome, gentlemen.
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Senator Leahy, you have had some briefings on this.
This whole area of security at the American embassy in
Moscow has been something that you have been
concentrating on for quite some time.
In your view, how much damage has there been?
SEN. PATRICK LEAHY: Well, assuming that the charges
are correct that have been brought against these
Marines, then there has been considerable damage. The
charges say that they allowed a -- well, the charges,
among other things, say that they opened up the
communications area.
Now, if the KGB are going to go to the effort of
mounting an operation of this nature, they want to get
something for it. If they came into the communications
area, then they had probably brought a crypto expert in
there, and you have to assume that our codes have been
violated, and that they can go back and find out what
has been said using those codes.
MS. STAHL: At this point, though, it is all
assumption, isn't that correct? We are not absolutely
sure that these Soviets were allowed to --
SEN. LEAHY: That's right. I don't think we know how
much damage has been done. But, I just want to turn it
around and say, if we had been able to do that to the
Soviet embassy here in Washington, I would assume that
we would -- the CIA would have brought in crypto
experts, code experts, and we would have to consider it
an intelligence coup by the same token. It's a major
coup for the Soviet Union.
MS. STAHL: Ambassador Hartman, you know what happens
in that bubble if they were allowed into that very
secure area. I assume that you thought -- assume that
other parts of the embassy were bugged. Everything in
Moscow seems to be bugged.
AMB. ARTHUR HARTMAN: That's right.
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(nS. STAHL: But, what about the bubble? How much did
they get if they were allowed to get in there?
AmB. HARTmAN: Well, we assume that there are places in
the embassy we can go where we were secure, and that
our communications were secure. And, therefore, if
this has happened, if these men allowed people to get
into the embassy, it's a quite serious breach, and
things were heard that we didn't want heard.
(~S. STAHL: Oo you think that it's possible that our
communication codes all around the world have been
compromised?
AmB. HARTmAN: We11, I don't want to get into the
details of that, but you don't compromise codes
totally. They are random selections, but it is a
serious thing that would happen. They would know
certain communications that have been passed.
mS. STAHL: Well, I'm intrigued by how top officials in
our government are saying they don't think that the
worldwide communications codes were broken. Why? They
have sophisticated computers. If they could figure out
what we were doing in Moscow, do we still think that
they are not technologically up to this, or what,
Senator?
SEN. LEAHY: Well, there are certain things that nobody
is technologically up to, and if you have a code for a
certain transmission, you can go back and decipher
that. But, with the way we work codes on some types of
transmissions, especially data, without the specific
code for that specific transmission, you can't decipher
it.
CIS. STAHL: Well, cannot a computer decipher it? Why
can't --
SEN. LEAHY: Some are almost impossible to crack, but
once you have a key for one, you are a lot closer to be
able to crack them.
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MS. STAHL: All right. How did this happen? There
have been warnings that something like this could
happen for two, three years. Senator, how did it
happen?
SEN. LEAHY: Well, you know, it's a difficult
situation. ':Je have been trying very, very hard to get
the State Department to make some changes.
Now, there are two missions you have there; a
diplomatic mission, and Ambassador Hartman is probably
one of the best diplomats we have in our service. But,
every embassy also has an intelligence gathering
function, and there seems to be this dichotomy between
the State Department and the intelligence people, and
the State Department, I don't think, has given enough
attention to the intelligence gathering aspects of a
number of our embassies, including Moscow.
MS. STAHL: Ambassador Hartman, you are said --
AMB. HARTMAN: Can I just comment on that?
MS. STAHL: Yes, but I want you to incorporate the
notion that you were sort of pooh-poohing the idea that
more precautions had to be taken. You argued against
getting all those Soviet workers out of the embassy.
Why?
AMB. HARTMAN: That's right. That's the one issue, I
think, where I have differed with others on this
subject.
The question of whether you enhance security by the
total removal of all Soviet employees from our site in
Moscow, and then have to bring in more Americans, many
unskilled Americans, to do the same kinds of jobs, who
would be equally vulnerable, I mean we are seeing in
this Marine case, I fear, what happens when you bring
in people who are not motivated to be in Moscow as a
kind of professional interest. That is, they know
Russian. They are there because they know what the
risks are.
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And, by the way, the defense lawyer is a good defense
lawyer, but that is not true that these people were
encouraged to have this kind of affair. It is not true
that they were briefed in this way. Every Marine was
briefed about the dangers when they came in. They were
week -- they went to weekly school to tell them about
these dangers, and, unfortunately, it's very difficult
to convince young men that -- and not all the Marines,
I may say, went in for this type of activity.
MS. STAHL: Well, the lawyer said that Lonetree brought
Uioletta to your house to a Marine Ball as his date.
AMB. HARTMAN: Yes. He did not. There were Soviets
invited to the Marine Ball, employees who, during the
year, had helped organize functions and that kind of
thing, and they came. The cook who had worked for the
Marines came, and the people, the secretary in my house
came, but they were not there as dates, and the
question of --
MS. STAHL: They were at a dance.
AMB. HARTMAN: They were there at a dance, along with
nannies and others, but the Marines were briefed. Each
week they had a session with the Marines about who they
could see, and who they couldn't see, and under what
circumstances.
SEN. LEAHY: My concern is that in our government there
has always been this kind of double standard in dealing
with the Soviet Union.
The Soviets are allowed to play by entirely different
rules than we do. Examples: our embassy over there, a
new embassy is being built, it is in a swamp surrounded
by buildings controlled by the KGB; their embassy is
sitting up on Mt. Alto here in Washington, with
antennas that can go into the Pentagon, the White
House, the Treasury, CIA, everything else. They have
about a dozen or so U.S. citizens working at the
embassy here. At the time, we had 200 Soviets working
in ours.
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~1S. STAHL: There is a report today that we allowed a
Soviet engineer to join the team that designed the new
American embassy in the Soviet Union. I mean, isn't it
in a way our own stupidity that we have now a new
embassy over there that is riddled --
SEN. LEAHY: You know what we did in effect? You know
what we did in effect with our embassy over there? Our
general contractor is the KGB for our embassy over
there. When you come right down to the bottom line,
that's what it is.
mS. STAHL: Well, aren't we then to blame in many ways?
AmB. HART~1AN: I don't know. On the question of the
building - -
~1S. STAHL: What do you mean you don't know?
A~18. HART~1AN: No, no. On the question of the
building, I think that's one that ought to be
thoroughly looked into. There are clearly problems
with that building, and our ex- Secretary of Defense is
going to look at it and make recommendations.
CIS. STAHL: mr. Ambassador, do you, even in hindsight
after what's happened, not think that maybe you were
wrong about --
AmB. HARTmAN: About the Soviet employees?
~1S. STAHL: Yes, and about not taking the security
warnings more seriously.
AmB. HARTI~AN: No. On that, I don't accept that
charge. I have one disagreement, and that was about
removing all Soviet employees, as if that would solve
the total problem.
I've had many cases during the time that I was there,
where people met Soviets in the hotel. We used to find
out that they thought they were Finnish girls. In
order words, you don't solve the problem by just the
removal. You've got to get well motivated people.
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You've got to brief them constantly. I think probably
we need a more mature force there.
mS. STAHL: Well, you know, one of the --
AmB. HART[nAN: And, what we ought to be looking at are,
perhaps, retired NCOs, retired policemen, married
people.
mS. STAHL: -- marines who has been arrested is
married, and had his wife over there. So, I don't know
that that's going to salve the problem.
SEN. LEAHY: No. I agree with the conclusions that
Ambassador Hartman has reached, but I also feel that
there are still people within the State Department who
just do not understand that we have a dual mission in
the Soviet Union. One is a diplomatic mission, but it
releases no secrets, and say that we also have to have
an intelligence mission in the same way the Soviet
Union does here in Washington.
mS. STAHL: We don't do what they do?
SEN. LEAHY: Well, we certainly, apparently, don't do
it anywhere near as well as they do.
~~1S. STAHL: Well, if you don't -- why don't we do it as
well?
SEN. LEAHY: We don't do it as well, because we still
have this kind of dual standard.
mS. STAHL: Do we have swallows?
SEN. LEAHY: And, we assume that just because we have
-- we assume that because it's a time of maybe easing
of tension, detente when we made the agreements for our
embassies, that somehow they are going to give up what
they have historically done, that is, have the KGB
operate against us continuously.
~1S. STAHL: Let me ask you very quickly.
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SEN. LEAHY: Yes.
mS. STAHL: Do you agree, I know the Senator has said
publicly that he thinks we should tear down this new
embassy that's just been built, that we now know is
wired for sound. Do you agree that we should just tear
it down and start all over again?
AmB. HARTmAN: I don't accept that conclusion yet. It
seems to me that we've got to look and see what the
building contains, and what the possible counter
actions are, and I would certainly want to wait for
that report before tearing down a building that's cost
that many millions of dollars to build.
SEN. LEAHY: I think that we ought to do what Senator
Chiles and I said a couple years ago, and require
payment from the Soviets for the damages that have been
caused in that, or not allow them to go into their own
new embassy here in Washington.
mS. STAHL: But, do you think they'll pay us?
SEN. LEAHY: Well, do they want to go into their new
embassy? I mean, it comes down to that. The fact is,
this embassy can never, ever be made secure, ever.
mS. STAHL: The one -- ours?
SEN. LEAHY: The new one that is --
AmB. HART~1AN: Our agreement is that we go in
simultaneously. We will not go in separately.
mS. STAHL: Should Secretary of State Shultz not go to
Moscow to protest?
SEN. LEAHY: I think he should go, because the states
of arms control transcend any other state.
(~S. STAHL: Okay, thank you.
AmB. HART(~AN: And, this is part of our diplomatic
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business that the Senator was referring to, and he
certainly should go.
~~IS. STAHL: Gentlemen, I thank you both very much,
Ambassador Hartman, Senator Leahy. We will be back
with more.
(commercial)
mS. STAHL: With us, John Barron of Reader's Digest,
author of several books on counter intelligence.
John, in your view, how much has the damage been?
SIR. JOHN BARRON (Author): If we accept the allegations
as factual, if the (urines allowed the KG8 into the
communications center and to the cryptographic spaces,
then we have to assume that the KG8 was able to analyze
our machines, the keys, to enter some of our most
secret systems. _
We have to put that into the context of the
Walker/Whitworth case, the two Navy men who for 17
years gave all our cryptographic secrets to the
Soviets.
Now, after the arrest of John Walker in ~1ay of 1985, we
began to make repairs, to change, revise and try to
undo the damage. If they, beginning in January, 1986,
were able to look at our systems, then they would see
what we had done, they would acquire more knowledge, we
would be under attack all over the world.
~1S. STAHL: You bring up the Walker's. There have been
26 espionage convictions in this country in the past
three years. Why is this happening now in this
country?
~1R. BARRON: I think there are two reasons. The
magnitude and the intensity of the clandestine assault
being waged against us by the Soviet Union are greater.
We have become more effective with counter intelligence
also. And, the KGB is under great pressure from the
Public Bureau to leave us our technology, to subvert
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people, and, therefore, it has become a little bit more
reckless too.
mS . STAHL : But, why are so many of our people, you
just think that the pressure on our people is so much
more intense, pressure on our intelligence people to
turn is just much greater? It's nothing within our
system, within our country, within our laws?
f~R. 9ARRON: An open and free society always is going
to be vulnerable to clandestine assault. As I say,
this assault has been intensifying steadily for the
past 20 years.
mS. STAHL: Do we do it to them, or explain how we do
it to them? The Senator said that we don't use the
same techniques. Why not?
mR. BARRON: Well, for one reason, we are precluded
from doing so in a_closed tyrannical society. We can't
roam around over there as they can here. We can't
station hundreds of CIA officers in Moscow as they do
here.
mS. STAHL: Well, let me ask you. Have we wired their
embassy here, the new embassy they just built here?
Have we wired that for sound, in your view, in your
opinion?
~1R. BARRON: Well, I'm not competent to say, but I can
say that the Soviets controlled the construction here
in Washington. They had their inspectors overseeing
the prefabrication of basic structural components. We
allowed them to prefabricate the major structural
components off site in Moscow, and they seeded them
with electronic devices.
~1S. STAHL: What should we do? What steps should we
take to counter, to fight back?
I~R. BARRON: The first is to recognize that we have a
problem, and I do see signs of bipartisan support now
for an effective democratic rational security system.
That's the biggest thing, to understand that we are
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going to be assaulted again, and again and again
incessantly by the Soviets.
Once we make that recognition, then it follows that we
can do a lot of simple, rational things.
~1S. STAHL: I'm very sorry, Jahn Barron, we have run
out of time today. I do appreciate your being with us.
That is our broadcast. I am Lesley Stahl, have a good
week.
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