CARTER HELD HOPE EVEN AFTER SHAH HAD LOST HIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 25, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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J,ETc_L,L
ON p 1 AG,!_
THE WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1980
Carte'r. Held ljove, -, Even After
'Gili H '416s_
First of a series
By Scott Armstrong
During the revolutionary turmoil
,-
`,.that pulled down the shah bf Iran
P.resident Carter clung.to the belief
that the shah could be saved, even
..though the shah himself had lost
faith in his own power, a five-month
investigation by. The Washington
Post has found.
Two months before the shah fled
to exile, when Iran was aflame with
protest,, the president's national se-
curity adviser personally telephoned
the Iranian ruler, urging him to use
military force to smother the revo-
Iution.
A few weeks later, the president
was advised to abandon the shah by
a41 outside foreign policy expert--' ',
whom he called in for counsel. Tell
the shah to take a long vacation,
the president was told, and begin
preparing for a new government in
Iran. The president said he couldn't
do that to an important allied leader
and wouldn't..
Indeed, in that same period, State
Department sources say they worked
to soften the 'draft of a message from
Carter to the shah, urging again the
that no. such me>3sage was ev-
use of force against the domestic op? position, although the White House er sent. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and his top aides feared such a message would lead only to con- siderable bloodshed and possibly civil war,'turmoil that could only worsen America's position in the future of Jr-
an.-
Thepresident, held - to his hope,
..even when most of his on foreign policy advisers were urging him to,. t
he shah off his throne and be
On the transition to whatever olit-
ese are hidden details from a long'
fih-
complicated history, the slide of
which
ch led to the fall of the shah
an the establishment of a hostile gov-,
d
rent reliable what was'-once America's
Yble ally in. the Persian Goif_
CO, perceptions of that tragic a "vent.
precisely by- quick. assumptions
ly what happened. Pres-
'ident Carter, for instance, is widely' ac=
zsed of abandoning the shah prema-
a
:ierve rarely. the fact, Carter still hoped to pre-
shah's power long after in
telligence reports and top foreign policy
visers insisted, as a matter of realism,'
Advisers
the United States. must- assist the or-,
rces would folloar in -power. -In I derly transition to whatever political,
!al:weeks; -the .U.S. ambassador forces were going to.-displace. the pea-
hra *aock throne. h ? This much is certain: The fall of the
eat supporters ,'' cabled his er
to -Washington. The presi-
tion. _ shah involved a bitter though collegial
attitude; he said,; was "short-_ contest- among the president's key ad-
and did -not understand where-
he visers, contending fdr control over for-
interests. .
eign policy and veering back and forth.
s;nonth later, m'aiiy case;-the' in their prognoses for. events, stalemate,
vas s 'gone; permanently a sled. ing policy with their disaggreementa !
ethe Amencan'president was surd Zbigniew Brzezinski,'the president's
eci :by +'conflictin; counsel= on national security adviser, -appears in-
r ilia-Peacock" throne could' be ? 'transigent in this account, stoutly re-
one sisting the "unthinkable" outcome that
certainty that the span -was :lay ahead, demanding the toughest pol
d was Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi icy line and ultimately. prevailing over "._ ">*> h- others who saw the future moreclearly.
shah, notwithstanding his;.rep Vance, preoccupied with other-mat-
-as a'bloodthirsty tyrant;. dis- tars, arms talks with''the Soviet Union
ed ` eleNenth-hour' `advice~from1 for the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks, was
hgton -to -gei---,tiiugh',wit4 ;street .strangely inattentive:to:the-alarm bells::
tors and opposition leaders. I Within his own department until it was
as convinced in his own' mind tho late to make a difference.
orce could not prevail for long. end the U.S: Sintelligence commum~t
P,w that he was slowly dying of ,once agam,~seems , out-o ocus''
-IR rcer the realities ofd- opular
and-was anxious- to leave behind ~pe g
le nation that his young son could: discontent -within: an.. 'ed ?nationY
Finally, confused by conflicting Somein government did see the picture
from ? the.. United- States and, itan clearly. but their. 'perceptions'
by European leaders to ab- simply did not get through- to-"the pres- -
red
, the shah in his last month in ident and his policymakers,' especially=
moved- to-- accommodate the' ifstheir ;distasteful warnings collided
'ate opposition, to live with some witlrthe- establishecd-official view. ?
t and relinquish some, of his vast :i Still, this is not just -diplomatichis
torg_ The events. in Washington and
m
Tehran that presaged the- triumph:-of
-the; Iranian revolution remain with.' us
unresolved 'complications in. the
Me crisis anctthe future of-relations
wit,ran Until one'- knows all" the
'tl ie ' that wentwrong- then, one may
nafIY. appreciate why the hostilityvw
aieep differences continue between th Earn -n tinna :ttxlnv_ ==?-~ .~'. 1^~~I ,. ?:~
x Early in the hostage crisis, Carter';
:asked for a full compilation of the gov-
rnment documents covering, the long
'internal affairs: But;When, the.. study
c presidential
task force asked for specifi
records;:. including that personal: ores-
sage-.. drafted . one month - before the
shah's fall, the White ;House refused
to turn over anymore papers to the stu
dy grviip and the top-secret project,
vas suspended.:'' ` ``
Holding onto the. shah was a pre-
occupation in the autumn and winter
,of- 1978-79, but the story really begins
in the first year of the Carter adm
istration. Beginning today, in 'a series
of six articles, The Washington Post
will describe the questions and, com-
plications that preceded the prevent im-
passe with Iran..As in all such inquiries,,
.this account.can make no claim to om
)iiscience. This history. of the fall of;
the shah and the' U.S. 'role in it does
not presume to be the total record.'
The president and his closest foreign
iolicy adviser, Brzezinski, have xefused. l
"'the scores who have assisted -from
the White House, the National Security
:.Council, the Defense and State depart-
ments, and` the CIA - are some who.
".have /colored. their views, with -state
=meats clearly designed to serve the in-
erests of their institutions or ' them-
;-''selves.;:Others. seem -to* resent'Carter
??_ and Brzezinski's'treatment of former.
secretary of state Vance; and still oth
ers, able to tell only that part of the his-' tort' with`which they are familiar, ap-
pear' to' be rendering , incomplete ac-
:.counts.. In only a few places,.however,
_ does one person's view of events conflict-
sharply, with that- of 'another..
`.Much of this series is based on more.,
thaii 1,000 'pages of documents ob
r-tained b'y.The Washington Post. They
:''comprise a'small portion of the "Iran'
papers," collected by the State Depart-
ment study group, which describe U.S.
':rerations-'with Iran from 1941 to' last'
November when Iranian militants- took
hostage the employes of the U.S. Em-
bassy in Tehran.
'Prediction
More thana year before the shah's.
collapse,, in the fall of 1977, Theodore
Moran, a young economist on the State
Department's policy planning staff,.
drafted a secret, internal memorandum(
suggesting a new strategy for dealing`
with-the. massive new arms requests
from the 'shah of Iran. - It was. based
:on an analysis of publicly available eco-
nomic data and press: commentaries,
was totally. at variance' .with- the
and it.
conventional wisdom. It-turned-but to
have accurately predicted the events. `
Iran, Moran,~wrote m4 a 'memo dated.';
'Nov. 2,"1977;'-Will face rising social'
.and economic tensions unless it reori-
ents government spending." Now-
putt-ing 25 percent of all public funds into
theemilitary,-the'shah."will have in-
sufficient financial, resources,-.-6-head
- off _ mounting .political dissatisfaction,.
including discontent among -,-those
groups that have traditionally been. the
bedrock of. support, for. thew; monarchy.
". ; :Webothhave a common interest
in .moderating and modulating the Ir-
anian military buildup, not-because this
administration wants. to yield to.con-
gressmen who= do not like the shah,
not because the United States is unable
,to: trust. Iran with our most, sophisti-
cated- weapons .but because,we have a'
national intemt.in?insuring.the-stable
and robust evolution of a -strong and de-
pendabte-ally."
"We;.e do, not. want to simply deny,
the shah particular pieces of military,
equipment (and have him feel hurt or
turn elsewhere). Rather we'.want him
to slow down and stretch out the build-
up of his-military.- forces, to; give him
`more time and more . resources. to build
it cohesive, prosperous (and nonrepres
live)'domesticbase for, his defense ef-
L. - 1
fort." ~.,
Moran.pointed to the 'failure of. the
shah: 'to. provide adequate housing;'
transportation and energy to the people
of Iran. The shah envisioned Iran as be;
coming an industrial power on the level:'
of France by the year 2000, but Moran'
saw it as -an-unfinished Third World
-country,:: squandering : its ? wealth. on.weaponry. In addition to direct military'
spending,-. the- shah was, devoting a4 l
much as 70 percent of his public hour'
ing budget on the armed forces. Oil rev=
enues, which normally would have cov,
ered these extraordinary costs, were no
longer sufficient to cover Iran's balance
of payments.
"The shah and his advisers cannotI
avoid making the difficult : tradeoffs
among spending priorities that other')
developing countries, even richly en-'
dowed developing countries, have al;
ways had to make," Moran wrote.
While the shah was the object of con.'
tinuing public. controversy, a.-ruler ac-
cused of tyrannical repression, of lead
ing the Organization of Petroleum Ex
porting Countries to its historic oil-price
increases in 1973, he was not iri.the au,'
'increases
of 1977 the cause of great.worryi
iii'the State Department.' Other rnajor_,
matters led the agenda at State: the
'arms negotiations with Russia; the Isy
raeli-Egyptian peace talks, among oth=
era. The conventional wisdom on all lev.,
Os except for Moran and a few oth=
era -- was that the shah- was a stable',
ally and the U.S. could count on hint
in the Middle East
.The president was about to have his
first personal meeting with the shah,
10 months after his inaugural. In a se;
cret_ briefing paper prepared -for the.
meeting in November 1977, the' -rep
gional specialists in the State Depart_ .
ment advised that during the last de
cade, "the shah gained full political con1,
trol of his country for the first time
in his long rule. Not having to be. con-,,
cerned with an opposition or recalci-
trant legislature, he tends to look well
into the future/and to assess current
events-against broad historical trends.';
Moran passed his memo on to his su-
pervisor, Anthony Lake, the chief of
the planning and policy group, which
was responsible. for evaluating such
strategic concerns. Lake signed it and
sent it to Vance. The analysis was re-
jected. It went against all other reports
that were in hand..
Moran tried. another. approach He
had written his'doctoral dissertation at
Harvard Universityunder the guidance
of Samuel Huntington, a friend of Brze-,
zinski's. Huntington and Brzezinski had.
been - coauthors , and Huntington was
CUi, l ~
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currently a"consultant to Brzeeinski on
U.S.-Soviet relations. Since one of Hun-
tington's areas' of expertise was social
unrest in Third World nations, Moran
believed Huntington would appreciate
his own. appraisal of they situation in
.Iran. ,';
The two met and Huntington heard
Moran out. But he did not agree to
pass the young desk officer's views on
to Brzezinski. Huntington said he was.!
too busy on a project of his own - a ,
study on how the United States could'
capitaliaeron Soviet economic problems
- to get involved.
Moran continued to push his view
in the State Department. There were
others in the ranks that believed the
United States was taking another step
down the wrong path, but the upper
levels of the department were in agree-
ment that the "shah was very firmly
in power," as the secret memorandum ti
for the president put it. Moran, who
is now a professor at Georgetown Uni-
versity, got the distinct impression that
he was considered 'bizarre"-by the de-
partment hierarchy for even suggesting
that the' shah's future' was insecure.
At that point, the fervent critics of
the shah were mainly on Capitol Hill,
questioning the regime's repressive pol-
icies and especially the -continuing
abundance 'of U.S. arms sales. -Many
at State regarded the congressional crit-
ics as merely uninformed, a public re-
lations problem. After Congress re-
quired a detailed study on the impact
of the arms sales on regional stability,'
.one classified, internal memorandm-
at State, dated Nov, 2, 1977, summa-
rized options-for evasive tactics.
Since Congress would likely criticize
the shahs-request for an additional
1,10 F16 fighter planes, Alfred Ather-
ton, assistant secretary for the region;
suggested at a meeting that sale of the
planes could be secretly approved but
the public announcement phrased "so.
the shah willunderstand the sale is ap-
proved but-we will tell Congress that
`no decision has been made.'." The De
fanse -Department- demurred. It sug-
gested approval of the sale but, instead"
of deceiving Congress, the sale should
not be submitted to Capitol Hill "until
timing is propitious."
In fact, Moran's view was supported
in one corner of the State Department
- an ally who would have surprised
Moran had, he known about it. Am-
bassador William H. Sullivan, recog-
nized generally then as an enthusiastic.
supporter "of. the shah, disagreed with'
Moran's bleak prognosis for the regime.'
But he discreetly recommended .to
Vance that. the way to rein in the-
shah's more egregious spending habitsl
was to begin more joint U.S.-Iranian
planning. It was the only way to recoup'
the leverage over the shah that had
been lost when his oil revenues made
him virtually independent of U.S. in-
fluence. -
But Sullivan's analysis, like Moran's,
,was rejected. Either one would require,
' closer, short-range identification with
the shah's regime. It became apparent
to Sullivan that no one in the admin-
istration wanted to get that much closer
to the shah.,
Meeting the Shah
It was` not until the . president and'
the shah met for the first time; at the...
White House in November 1977, that-
Jimmy' Carter fully appreciated that.
he must have a special 'relationship
with the shah of Iran. Until then, Carter
seemed ready to maintain cordial terms
with Iran but at the same-time he was.
willing"'to,' impose, when necessary,
sharp reminders of his advocacy of hu-
man- rights throughout. the world and
his desire - to limit the sale of arms..
These policies, originally at least, were
meant6 apply to the shah's kingdom
as much -as elsewhere. .
The human rights criticism, in fact,
had hit home. Ambassador Sullivan re-
ported on July . 18, 1977, only six,
months after Carter took office, that
"the United States' policy in human'
rights has been a central feature of
nearly every conversation I've had with
senior Iranian officials on whom I've
called during my first six weeks in Ir-
an." Sullivan said he had discussed it
twice with the shah, once at. length
with the empress, and with most of
the shah's cabinet members. . i "
"The assumption appeared to be that
we are opposed to monarchical systems
of government and seek to have them
.replaced,". by democracies," . Sullivan
complained. This, he said, he had set
straight.
But-Sullivan was-unhappy with the
commentary that"was-coming out of
Washington on Iran. Much of it "seems
to focus on the fact that the shah is'au-
tocratic'` or 'undemocratic,'"' he re.
.Ported. "This is interpreted here as an
attack 'upon Iranian institutions and
obfuscates the fact that we are con-
cerned about practices rather than per-
sonalities.or systems of government,'
Sullivan- said. '
The Carter administration and "the .
shah were. at odds over the question
of armaments as well. Carter had prom-
ised to keep the worldwide sale of U.S.
arms from growing any larger but, as
the press.
he prepared to meet the
ident had. on his, desk a request from
Iran that would put him. over the limit
by many billions of dollars each yeas
for the rest of his term.
But Iran was not just any. country
seeking weapons, and the shah not just
any power-hungry leader. The presi-
dent's briefing paper cited a.rearrd of
assistance provided by the shah to the
United States over the years that war'
unique. Few nations anywhere had
been as loyal as Iran, and few leaders
as willing to assist the United State,
as the. shah, the ; designated peace
keeper in the Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean.. : .. .
, . The shah had intervened militarily:
on behalf of the United States in Oman-:
He had provided jets on short notice;
when the United States needed them.
in Vietnam. He had secretly provided
-weapons to Somalia -for use against
Ethiopa when the United States asked
him to. He personally persuaded South
Africa, which was almost-totally reliant
on Iranian oil, to stop shipping oil to
.Rhodesia when the United States sup-
ported an embargo of that nation.
The shah had established peace with.
neighboring Iraq at the request of the
-United States although- such a move,
was unpopular among many in Iran;
he personally brokered the resolution
of conflicts between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. He had agreed to consider be-
ing the secret conduit to provide arms
to Chad when the.United States asked
him to. '
The shah provided U.S. bases along
his border with Russia so that t e CLLk
could monitor Soviet missile programs
and roop movements; he had helped
U.S. 'counter- - ionage against oviPt
operatiq s in the region. He helped as-
sure an adequate ow of oil to the Unit-
ed 'States and he alone in the Middle
East supplied oil to Israel. --
Going into their meeting at the
White House, Carter wanted even more
assistance from the shah. He asked for
and got the shah's pledge to try to
freeze oil prices when OPEC met in De-
cember.
In addition, the shah answered many.;
of. the "president's concerns about hu-'
-man rights violations in Iran. According
to records obtained by The Washington
Post, the shah explained that what ap-
-peared to be violations stemmed from
an Iranian law outlawing the commu
nist party in Iran. Iran's law, the shah
noted, was similar to U.S. statutes,pro-
hibiting membership in groups that
planned the violent overthrow of the
government
' - -
The shah said that he, too, was a hu-
man rights advocate. He had personally
broken the traditionally rigid male
domi)nance in Iranian society. He had .
opened the ballot, the classroom and'
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the work place to women, who . previ-
ously had been severely restricted by Is
lamic custom. If Iranian politics were -
not totally open, then a little patience
'gas in order;-the shah said. The pres-
ident was inclined to grant it..
From before that first meeting, the-
shah was regarded by Carter with such
trust that, according to the briefing-J
memorandum, the. shah. was kept -in
Y ormed of secret negotiations apd close=''
.y held policy, dec ision_ s that were shared
normally with only the closest allie"
The shah was told the most' intimate-=
details-of the SALT talks with the So---
..viet Union; he was told of-US. ne* g-62 ;
tiations aimed at keeping France from
supplying Pakistan with material to de-
-velop a nuclear reprocessing capabili?y`
despite U.S. assurances to Franie-
that no other government' would 'be
told of the sensitive talks.
In return for his friendship, the s'hah'
-wanted to- continue the ."special reti
tionship" under which President Nicon '
in 1972 had ordered that the ' United
States would agree to sell Iran whatever,
the shah requested from the arsenal
of advanced weapons syst1ms.':'
The president told the shah that lie-'
would continue to have the U.S.'s iin'=
conditional support but, given the liiii"'
ited resources of each country, that sqp
port must be more systematic. There-
fore, he asked the shah to prepares
.''five-year plan for military expenditures; -
one that would help regularize the gur'
chases.* State's - bureau- of political;"
'military affairs had sugeested'that't ii
-.`upbeat language" would hold'off a full
commitment to the shah's shopping Est
and at.the same time "not anger fua~'-;
or spoil his visit"
Washingtonians may remember draft.'..
*..day fora different reason.,..The shah-
hen -
.and, the president, along- with t
wives and a small entourage, stood 6W: side the White House for a brief arriX.
ceremony.. Across., the street a
Lafayette Park and on _, the Elipse .tai-,
the south,. the shah. was being, dq,,
nouriced by Iranian students wearing --
masks and cheered by. Iranian -sup=.'
porters. The demonstration turned--bit;;
.ter, and ! police lobbed- tear , gas : carip
Asters into the crowds, .
The gas wafted into the eyes of the
;president and the. shah. They, wi^ cj
4heir,eyes, and.-the president.made.a.;
small . joke about the; incident
Dissent Frorn-the CI
After that-first meeting between the_
shah and president, the polite argument ,
over arms sales, in effect, continued?at .
she-bureaucratic levels. As the various,
agencies of national security began to
meet to prepare the "Military Balance.
in . Iran" report. required by- Congress,.,
another contingent of dissent emerged:
from an . unexpected quarter - tha
Central_Inteiligence- Agency. .
Junior CIA analysts attending tlia-
meetings joined in arguing that the-Ir.:
anian military could not absorb any ad-; !
ditional modern equipment:. The Iran.
ians simply did not have the trai :e6 -
manpower to operate or maintain what-
they had. already received. Half 6- ;'
people flunked-out of helicopter school,
the rest had the equivalent of'a sixth?
grade education. They-barely had the;,
pilots to operate their sophisticated j;
aircraft. "Iii order to operate. the even .
more sophisticated ,F16s. the . shah-
wanted, those pilots would have to
mediately shift to the F16s. And -each..
new advanced-weapon system took they
few skilled technicians -.away from in-
dustry: ;; -
Virtually the entire Near East bureau
..-.Of the State ? Departrnent,. disagreed f;
Henry Precht, the director. of the rg,
gional affairs desk concerned with Iran-
(and later the head of the L-an desk), -
was critical of the shah but he believed,
the current U.S. policy dictated mc;r
arms. A tenacious bureaucratic infizht? 1
er, Precht challenged the CLA preen ;
tation. , . .. %..
The CIA analysts held their ourdL-
g
State promised a bureaucratic battle.
The matter would be.taken.to Vance..*
The director of the. CIA would becalled.:
A.week later, the CIA: opposition .tci
.the. draft folded. The young. analyst
would say nothing more on the subj '.
Only State's human rights office corn;.:
.tinued to oppose the massive sales; but
without any effect. `The language of
the report on Iran was modified to fit
the official view. A public show of sup=
port for the shah; would be the policy,:
all-sales would be explained to Congress
and defended..
Today, .'l'ed , Moran 's' memorandum:
'
4 part of the huge file that has become
the record -of this nation's relationship,
with .' Iran.'' Here` ? and there' may be
'found' other documents -not many
that'had the prescience to say that
the United States' Policy in Iran.%
headed toward a fateful turn, that the..
,active ' elements for : disasters were -?
present. , ..: , ,. ?.:.. :r a,w;., ;
..Moran was depressed but not over.,.
..whelmed. A colleague in the State Qe;
partment likened the high-level spurn-'
ing of his advice to the bureaucracy's
handling of the Vietnam war: Factua ""
analysis was put 'aside when it ccir -
flictedwith high-level government dal
-cy. ,'
Moran agreed
They. should both resign- in protest-,,4
the colleague suggested.
No, Moran said, they'd get arioti t;l
chance to change the policy, ;.,
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u;set proto and ellart The Washington Post. above plwto, A.sso,tated Press IJl SSei l ! Y', l i'
disrupted his ~vetcome. Above, U.S. flag burns at Tehran er?,lbassy. O1I1 the ~.11 1
I azn as becoming
1w the 17ea-r 2600
11,r i11jS eL r, if
its wealth on 3 Tea.e'xnr?yr.
? After that first meeting betr;een the
shah and president, the polite arg1irtlent
over arms sales, in effect; continued at
the bureaucratic levels. As the various
agencies of national security hegan,,t~
i,l:et. to t11-eltt1'e the "1\lilitary ,technological devices the tape cas-
sette - to snuggle his message of rev-
olution back into Iran..
. Constantly railing against the shah
and urging Iranians to rid themselves
of foreign influence, Khomeini's taped
:diatribes in the closing months of the I
year could be heard in-nearly every.
mosque in the country. By the time
of the Rex Cinema fire,'Khomeini was
the recognized symbol 'of resistance.
The theater fire in Abadan seemed
not only to unite dissident: groups in Ir-
an but to have a deep, unnerving effect
on the shah as well. Sullivan had just
returned= from, Washington'. where he
had --lobbied' on behalf of'-the shah's
pared-down :, "wish- list" of..$10. billion
in U.S.,military- hardware. To Sullivan,'
the shah ' suddenik seemed filled with
,self-doubt,. a man. who .believed that
nothing could work,:who was.'no longer.,
able to analyze events. The shah; ?ac-`
cording to Sullivan's reports to--.'the
State Department in Washington,. was
-IRAN, From Al
wrote :a dissenting footnote to the draft.
While -the CIA estimate agreed with
the conclusions drawn' by Ambassador
.William Sullivan, the embassy staff in
Tehran and the State Department lead- I
rship, to- Griffin it seemed : simplistic
and wrong., Not only had press reports;
been painting a different picture of life'
in,-Iran,- but`embassy cables and intel='
ligence reports- since June, had cited a
growing alliance between the Islamic-
traditionalists and the other, growing
dissident segments of Iranian society.
Griffui.con'sulted an' old:.hand on Ir-
an, Kermit Roosevelt, the Clk agent
who had.coordinated the. U.S. partic
ipation' iri: the .1953. "coup" that kept.
'the Pahlavi dynasty in power. Roosevelt
~to1d.Griffiri_that the shah vas,,in fact,:;
'a weak man, ; a "defective , personality, ,
who would- fold under pressure in a
"failure of will"
Faced with;disagr'eement, .the CIA.,
analyst in charge of the draft with eww
it from circulation. The? issues would
be reexamined again later.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
becoming ~'U_nhiriged.
z1
r According t6 one report;. the shah
'.told Sullivan that be had tried to sup
press' dissent with repression'and that
hadn't worked; he had tried to put in
place a civilian government and that
hadn't worked either.
-Bitterly, the shah asked whether he,.
'should appoint- a' corrupt civilian gov-
eritment that would. turn the populace;
Against it and make it. clamor for a
m6re- authoritiarian military governz.
ment with himself back in full tom-r.
mand. "t have to demonstrate the_bank
ruptcy _ of the moderate, option."., the r
shah told, Sullivan, "so people will see
that a government is necessary to pre-
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CARTER AND -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3 ,let
S
tates gov-
Sullivan what the United
ernment wanted him to do, and Sul-.
livan passed the question on to Wash-
ington.
On Sept. 4, the largest demonstra-
tions yet broke out across Iran. Three
.days later, the shah declared martial',
.law in Tehran and 11 other cities.
On Sept. 8, Black Friday as it came
to be called, the shah's troops fired in-
to ; a crowd of demonstrators at Jaleh
Square in Tehran. By the government's
account, 86 people were killed; the op-
position put t.he' toll'"at 'more than -a"
thousand. The demonstrators had not
learned of the newly imposed curfew.
Jimmy Carter got news. of the Jaleh
Square massacre at Camp David, where
he, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin
hats begun meeting to negotiate a peace.
between Egypt and Israel.
:Carter was briefed-on the incident
by Harold Saunders, assistant secretary
of state for the region. Secretary of
'State Cyrus R. Vance, according to a
.number of department sources, knew
.few of the details because he was nearly
totally, absorbed in the Egyptian-Israeli
discussions and in 'nuclear arms limi-
tation. talks with the Soviet ,Union.
According to accounts of Saunders'
briefing for Carter, the shah was still
firmly in control of Iran. The skepticism
that was beginning to spread among
low-level State Department. aides had'
not worked its way up. When Saunders
finished, the president's national secu-
rity adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, joined
the briefing and declared that the shah
.needed a strong statement of U.S. sup-
port - it would boost his morale and
that of allies in the region. Sadat had
already called the shah to pledge his
support and suggested that Carter do
likewise. The president agreed.
SPAINO-
-
METRINKO
.JULY S-
CONTRADICTS
WHITE HO
USE
NEW YEAR'S"
. SULLIVAN
v11IWS ON
MEETING:
SHAH'S "
WISH
CARRTATERERTT -OASTS
C
SITUATION
-
LIST" CON
-
SHAH IN
i
SIDEREO
TEHRAN
3 ~
JUNE I-
E-
JAN
OPTIMIST
IC,
.
TROOPS FIRE
SUWVAN
'
RnatT.
ON CROWD
PROTESTING
MARCH
TI
-
AN
STATE DEPT.
KHOMEINI .,
MElTiNG~
ARTK3E -
"TIME IS
NOT ON SHAH'S
SIDE"; ADVICE
IGNOROD,
g(x)d sign. Sullivan noted that the dec-
laration.of martial law was an indication
of renewed self-confidence on the part
of the shah, and predicted that, despite
reports of morale problems {n the army,
the shah and his military could handle
In the region unless the United States
would make a show of strength. What
the Saudis wanted, it was clear, was
U.S. military intervention on behalf of
the shah.
The Saudis' concern seemed exag-
the situ ation:,
The Pentagon agreed, with its De-
fense Intelligence Agency issuing a re-
port. at. the time' that said the shah is
"expected to remain actively in power
over the'next 10 years.
Unrest mounted in Iran during the
rest of September and into early Oc-
tober. Faced with the new violence in
Tehran, the CIA's National Intelligence
Estimate was quiet y al aside. iew-
points.would have to be reconsidered.
The State' Department - would- redraft
it. .
The shah appointed a new, more
moderate prime minister and decided
to take action against Khomeini by for-
mally asking the government of Iraq
to expel him, to move him further from
Iran. Agreement came. quickly; Kho-
meini had been stirring up Shiite Mos-
lems in Iraq as well.
Immediately, however, the shah took
back his request. As dangerous as Kho-
meini was in Iraq, he might prove to
be more dangerous in a European cap-
ital where he could get world press at-
tention and maintain even better com- JI
municatior, with Iran through more
modern, long-distance telephone con-
nections.
In early October the aging ayatollah,
denied admission to Kuwait and Syria,
'went to France, taking up residence in
a suburb of Paris.
The shah renewed his attempts to
:defuse turmoil and divide the.moderate I
opposition from the radical Shiites
through reform, promising amnesty for
1,500 prisoners. But on Oct.- 24, vir-
tually,: every city in the nation was hit
-by massive outpourings of protest, call-
ing for the ouster of the shah. or the re-
turn of Khomeini.
Sullivan, only recently so optimistic
about'the' shah, once again feared that !
events were getting beyond control. In
October, a small Pentagon group, led
by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Dun-
can Jr. (now secretary of energy), met
in Tehran with-the shah and his mil-
itary leaders and was informed that rr-
an was now willing to scale down its
arms request - "postpone," not "can-
cel" - because it would be unable to
pay' for it all. Sullivan told Duncan.
that the shah was in dire straits but
still might act decisively to resolve his,
problems. .
The Pentagon group had just left:
Saudi Arabia where the-royal family{
was deeply concerned about what it'
perceived as a ' failure by- the United;
States to support its allies in the Per-'
sian Gulf. t - , . , .. J
gerated and their requests - for U.S.-
assistance with covert subversion in,
South Yemen -' reckless. But as an
absolutely vital ally, the Saudi percep-
tion of U.S. assistance was as important
as the reality of it.
The shah's problems were internal,
however - and did not fit the Carter
administration's criteria for direct in-
tervention, since there was no real
threat from- outside.
Iranian generals began talk of taking
matters into their own hands on behalf
of the shah. Some wanted to "round
up 10 mullahs and shoot them," one.I
of Sullivan's aides said at a staff meet-
ing, and 300 army officers had peti.I
tioned their leaders for- permission to i
crack down on demonstrators.
Gen. Manuchehr Khosrowdad, the
commander of Iran's air force, wanted
to clear the streets once and for all.
If intimidation didn't work, then mass'
arrests and bloodshed would. -
When Sullivan and British Ambas-i
sador Anthony Parsons went to call on
the shah, they found the shah unnerved
once again, incapable of action, unwill-1
ing to make decisions, ravaged by the,
deaths in the streets.
Less the arrogant emperor and more
like a befuddled bureaucrat, the shah
pleaded for advice. Who should he ap-
point to what positions? Should he in-1
stall a military government? Should he
allow the military to use force, should
he crack down? More and more "crack
down" came into play in conversation.
The shah told Sullivan and Parsons
that his ambassador. to the United
States, Ardeshir Zahedi, was urging him.i
to take a hard line, to crack down as
the troops had done the month before
at Jaleh Square. According to the shah,
Zahedi had come to Tehran with the
word of Brzezinski that the Carter ad-
ministration would support every action
necessary to preserve order in Iran. i
But where was the direct U.S. support
that was due him, the shah wanted to
know.
The shah told 'Sullivan to ignore Za-
hedi. He was, the shah said, trying to
relive the dreams of his father, a key-~
figure in keeping the shah on the throne 1
in 1953. The shah was uncertain about i
what to.do, but he had come to a de-v
cision about what he would not. do:
There would be no "crackdown." If he-1
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r I serT.
BLACX FRIDAY:-
TROOPS OCT. 2A-
EARLY AUG.- MASSACRE
SULLIVAN DEMONSTRA--SUWVAN
LOB8IES FOR TORS CONCLUDES
-f
SHAH'S "WISH , T JALEH SHAM WILL
T-- IN
UST" I SQUARE FALL
AUG_ _. L
i_4
_ h
I'M in iCn " " t TSHRAN
ABADAN GOES TO, IBURNS .
AUGUST
CIA I
REVO., -"t- SHAH, URGES
LUTIONARY FORCE I
RUTION- OCT.24-MAS- SHAH APPOINTS
ART -S V DEMON. - MILITARY
STRATIONS GOVT
k illed thousands of his countrymen, he
would have to rule by force for the
rest of life and would be unable to
pass the throne on to his son.
According to some accounts, it was,
at this point that Sullivan and the Unit-
ed States first learned that the shah:
had cancer. By then, Sullivan already
knew that the shah believed he had'
no more than a few years to live.
Violence continued to grow. In Amol,
near the Caspian Sea, dissident student
groups took control of the city. For
the first time, the' shah's families and
friends spoke of a revolution in prog-
ress.
In Tehran, ' 10,000 students at the'
university marched in protest; in the
south 30,000 oil field workers walked
off their jobs.
The shah continued to offer conces-
sions. He dismissed 34 senior SAVAK
officials who had' been accused of tor- 4.
ture and other abuses. At what was,
said to be Sullivan'- suggestion, he,
agreed to grant amnesty to the political,
prisoners on his birthday, Oct. 26. He,
said there would be no future political`
arrests.
"Feeding, the, crocodiles," Sullivan-
called it, unconvinced that the shah's:
reform gestures, which transferred-no
real power, were sufficient to quiet the
opposition. Sullivan concluded that the
shah's new prime minister, Sharif-
Emani, was doomed and once more
the shah would turn to him for advice.
home to get tougher, to appoint a mil-
itary government and turn it loose on
the opposition. Gen. Hossein Rabii, who
feared most of all the threat of com-
munist subversion, complained to an
embassy official: "His majesty is simply'
not being himself. He has got to assert
himself or we'll make him assert him-
self."
By.the the end of October, the news
coming out of Iran had begun to divide
the Carter administration. One view-
point, shared by desk officers through-
out the government familiar with daily
events in Iran, maintained that the
shah could not survive. The other camp,
most forcefully represented by Brze-
zinski at the White House, believed
the shah could stay in power and that
the United States must make every at
tempt to keep him in power. `
But Sullivan was concluding that the.
shah could no longer guide events as'.
the all-powerful ruler. Leaving the Ir-
anian military to its own instincts, he
feared, would mean chaos - either
blocdy repression or mutinous troops.
When Sullivan cabled the State De-
partment asking for advice, he made
two suggestions: Urge the shah to begin
to truly accommodate his moderate op-
position by allowing the creation of a
real parliament and prime minister, re-
taining for himself only foreign policy'
and the military. And suggest that the
shah leave the country for at least long
enough to allow the new administration
to restore order.
Sullivan's request for instructions
were urgent. He talked directly with
David Newsom, undersecretary for po-
litical' affairs and the No. 3, man at
State, who was typically passive. New-
som told Sullivan of the difficulties of
getting instructions cleared through the
White House and Brzezinski.
But Vance and some of his aides
were struck by the picture Sullivan had
painted. Sullivan was on the scene; his
views should be considered.
On Oct 27, when Iranian experts
from all departments met at State for
an all-day session, the consensus of
Farsi-speaking analysts was that nei-
ther more liberalization, which Persians
would perceive as weakness, nor re-
pression, would save the shah. Someone
suggested a straw poll. Of 30 or 40 peo-
ple there, only four believed that the
shah would be on his throne a year lat-
er.
Aides to Vance met with Brzezinski's I
Iran specialist, Navy Capt. Gary Sick,
to itrespond to Sullivan's request for ad-
vice. Sick said that BrzezinskI wanted
stronger language making it clear that{
the shah should not' capitulate- in any
way to his opposition. Nevertheless,
Brzezinski, through Sick, ''agreed on'!
sending Sullivan a cable suggesting that
the shah should be encouraged to re-
linquish some of his domestic authority;
-.l ICOVO nn sn,tinn c.,.. I
It seemed, for the moment, to be a-
major shift in U.S. policy, albeit a secret
one. But it lasted only for a moment.
The Pressure
On the day that cable was sent, the
president received the shah's song
Crown Prince Reza Shah, at the White
House. The young Iranian was a stu-
dent at the U.S. Air Force Academy,
and it. was his 18th birthday. He was
accompanied by Zahedi, now back in
Washington.
"Our friendship and our alliance with
Iran is one of our important bases on
which our entire foreign policy de-
pends," the president said in a public
statement during the meeting.
Zahedi, who had learned that new se-
cret instructions were on their way to.
the U.S. ambassador in Iran, was al-
ready busy trying to regain lost ground
for the shah with a new expression of i
support from Carter. He got in touch-
with Brzezinski to complain. He warned!
other powerful American friends of the 1
shah:as well, including David Rocke-~
feller, Henry Kissinger and John J.1
McCloy.. , . --
Rockefeller and Kissinger began call-
ing contacts in the press and on Capitol
Hill' to bring pressure on the admin- !
istration, warning that an Iran without;
the shah would rapidly turn commu-
nist.
McCloy went further than that. The
former high commissioner to Germany i
after World War II, former president'
of the World Bank and chairman of
the Chase Manhattan Bank, McCloy,
at 83 years, of age,. was a partner in
the law firm that represented the shah,
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy,
one of the most prestigious law firms:
in the United States. -
In letters and phone calls, McCloy
urged Vance to support the most hard-
line aid for the shah, and to make iti
known that such support was corning.
According to one State Department
source, McCloy made it clear to Vance
that he had also been in touch with
the president. r~, ~~+
According to one source with access
to intelligence - information, Zahedi
opened another line of pressure, less4
subtle, to force a stronger endorsement
from the president. Zahedi arranged
for someone to contact Barbara Walters.
of ABC News and reveal Sullivan's:
new doubts about the'-shah and that-
U.S. support seemed to be declining.:
When Walters called Zahedi on the sto;
ry, he at first seemed reluctant to talk
CO1,2~ `i~~;fl
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- then depicted the shah as debilitated
by his lack of U.S. .support. Sullivan,
was portrayed as taking a "go easy".
line, meeting hahind the shah's back i
with the opposition. The report warned
of a communist. takeover, in which of
supplies might be lost, U.S. arms might
fall into the "wrong hands."
"Without the belief that Jimmy Car-
ter will support him, the shah sits and t
waits," Walters reported on the evening
of Nov. 2, which, it turns out, was one
of the most accurate news accounts dur-
ing this period.
The White House issued a denial.
The president was not abandoning the-,
shah. This is. ,part. of what Zahedi:'
wanted. to happen.,The other part was
a private communication from the
White House, guaranteeing that Wash-
ington would not get cold feet if the-
shah embarked on Military action to:
take over the oil fields and break up de-
monstrations. Zahedi wanted the shah
to know, with certainty, that the United
States . would.not shrink away if the
TV news _began' showing American
made tanks rolling against Iranian cut
In fact; the president had not yeti
made up his mind about how far to'
go in supporting,the- shah or deserting
him. He was not sure whether Sullivan's
analysis made sense. And Brzezinski
was offering an alternative view of the
revolution in Iran, one which ultimately
persuaded Carter to stand by the shah
- to the very end.
With a background as a lifelong ac
ademic before joining the Carter ad-.
ministration, Brzezinski mustered serious intellectual arguments in behalf of
his position. Revolutions are not won'
by the will or might of revolutionaries,.
Brzezinski maintained.. Instead, they-
succeed because of the absence of an ef-
fective authority--in controL
Brzezinsk had .copied- and gave to
Carter a few pages by historian. Crane
Brinton, who argues-that successful rev--
olutions?are- marked-;commonly by. the
ineptitude of the government's use 'of
force rather than the skillful use of
force by ' the,-oppositiort-,While a ma
jority of the populace may be unhappy -
and wish the existing government over-
thrown, only A :minority takes part in '
the actual clash of forces. The govern.
men' that iawgrrown'is one which
does not exercise faglit control over its
troops, which has military commanders'
of little- intelligence, which loses its
troops to the, opposition. -::
n ~Y4`
Kt
Xsw .'s
IRAN, From Al
the National Security Agency, in the
-Defense Intelligence Agency? Aside
from a few references about the un-
htappiness of religious groups and rad-
acal opposition members with the shah,
;-ono one had warned him that things,
-.;were this serious.
The president scrawled out a note
-'to Brzezinski for each of his advisers
Secretary of State Cyrus R Vance, I
Defense Secretary Harold Brown, CIA
'Director Stanfield Turner and the {
head of the National Security Agency, j
:Adm. Bobby Inman.. Why had intelli-
gence on Iran been so inaccurate? Or
On the afternoon of Nov. 13, Carter
-met with Brzezinski, his White House
-chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, and .
Turner.
"
CIA
: Turner offered an explanation.
;resources had been cut so badly that
they could not cover both the Soviet
threat in the region and domestic pol
itics. In addition, he mentioned the de-
=cision in the 1960s to rely on SAVAK,
-tlie shah's secret police, for information
.about the domestic. political opposition
.n1 Iran. But mai:nly'rner-blamed the'.
mysterious aloofness of the Shiite cler
gy. The- embassy political staff had
been largely handling those contacts,`
he explained, and they had totally mis-
interpreted events:'In short; the failure
.of intelligence was principally Sullivan's
,-
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
Mixed Repo its
.'Through November and into Ue
:camber of 1978, American intelligence
reports and appraisals of the situation
id Iran continued to be marked by
what had become a steady pattern: the
outlook for the shah was stable one
day, his collapse imminent on the next.
Bizezinski remained constant on the
need to stand by the shah; advisers in
the State Department were split.
Despite Sullivan's strongly worded!
cable, many members of his own staff!
in Tehran were unaware that their boss
had lost confidence .in the shah's
chances of survival. They continued to
send in reports that conflicted with Sul-
livan's own appraisals and, anxious not
to-create panic by broadcasting his own
drastic shift in position, Sullivan did
not stop them.
On Nov. 15, for instance, embassy
political officer George Lambrakis and
A ,visiting intelligence analyst from the
State Department filed an encouraging
reJOrt on their visit with the head of
-1he 400,000-member teachers' union.
-71%ey 'told Washington that this mod-
:+ rate opposition leader "would dearly
love to follow conciliatory course which
would permit shah to remain and reign,
not rule, but government has closed
-down all efforts he and his group hav
made to publish or be politically active.'
The cable warned of a "crypto-
4ommunist" organization, a rival for
teachers' loyalties.
This was the sort of evidence that:
Brz'ezinski regularly called to the pres
ident's attention - a dispatch suggest-
ih that the shah was not in as much
trouble as the State Department was
claiming and that communist influence
was a major threat.
' The shah had his own supporters
chiming in on the Washington debate.
King Hassan H of Morocco, a strong
ally of the shah who was himself locked-
in conflict with Soviet-backed guerrillas,
arrived in Washington and urged the
president to give the shah his complete
support, including military intervention
on his behalf if necessary. How else
could other allies be assured" of U.S.
support, Hassan asked.
The president took Hassan to be in--
timating that if the shah did not receive
full U.S. support, -Hassan and others
could be expected to work against the a
administration's Arab-Israeli peace ini-
tiative. Carter sidestepped Hassan's
suggestion, but assured him that all al-
lies could count on the United States
in time of crisis. I
The same day, the president asked
Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd
(D-W.Va.) to stop in Iran on a trip
he was making to the Middle East and
North Africa at the end of the month.
Byrd's son-in-law was Iranian and the
president could count on Byrd for a
candid appraisal of the shah's position.
Later that day, the president also
asked Treasury Secretary Michael Blu-
menthal to stop in Iran and make his
own appraisal.
Sullivan had still not received a re-
sponse to his "Thinking the Unthink-
able" cable. He continued the contacts
1
3M
METRINKO
JULY S- '
CONTRADICTS
WHITE HOUSE
SULLIVAN
MEETING--
NEWYEAR'S
VIEWS ON
SHAH'S "WISH
DAY,1978-
-SITUATION
LIST" CON-
CARTER TOAST;
!
SIDERED
SHAH IN 1
TEHRAN
I
``
JUNE 1-
JAN.8-
OPTIMIST
IC
TROOPS FIRE
SUWVAN
REPORT
ON CROWD
PROTESTING
MARCH 31-
ANTI
- --
r STATE DEPT.
KHOMEINI
MEETING:
ARTICLE
"TIME IS
NOT ON SHAH'S
SIDE"; ADVICE
IGNORED
ation might be."
with the opposition on his own au-
thority. Each week he authorized con-
tacts with opposition members that
were closer to the clerics and harsher
on the shah. But his reporting still
drew no response from Washington.
Lambrakis filed another hopeful re-
port on the possibility for a moderate-
solution-to the crisis:
"There are a variety of elements in
the population who would dearly like-.
to see some sort of compromise solution
which would keep the shah and avoid
a total victory for the Khomeini forces.
Many of these people are convinced]
communists will eventually manage to
take over any successor government de-
spite their relatively low posture in the
opposition. Others want to avoid what
they see as religious fanaticism." -
The cable, signed as a matter of pro-
tocol by Sullivan, closed with an ob-
servation. "All recognize [the] key role
to be played by the armed forces what-
ever. the outcome of the present situ-
When Blumenthal lunched with the
shah Nov. 21, he was a bit taken aback.
The State Department briefing papers
had told him the shah "remains in firm
control and has stated categorically that
he will not step down." But Blumenthal
found the Iranian leader sullen and list-
less. As the cabinet officer tried to re-
assure the shah about American atti.
tudes, the shah seemed not to hear.
When Blumenthal's gloomy report
reached Washington, Undersecretary of
State David Newsom decided to try
again at the White House. He assem-
bled three analysts who had recently
briefed him on their tour of Iran and
sent them to enlighten Brzezinski's staff I
on how bad things really were. The.
group, accompanied by Iranian desk of
ficer Henry Precht, met with Brzezin- ;
ski's deputy, David Aaron, and the
NSC specialist on Iran, Navy. Capt.-
Gary Sick, in the situation room- of the
White House.
The group from State explained that
the question was not who was opposed
to the shah, but who was for him, be-
cause that list was much shorter. But
Aaron seemed unconvinced. He wanted
to know who was organizing the trouble.
It was clearly a small group that could
be mollified or eradicated. - j
After the State Department group'
had spent an hour describing the total
deterioration of support for the shah,
Aaron interrupted Precht to ask a ques-'
tion.
"Tell me, Henry, exactly who is the
opposition'?" Aaron asked.
"The people, David, the people,"
Precht responded tartly.
The State Department team left to-
tally discouraged. They felt the White
House was losing touch with reality in
Iran. 4
'-Sullivan's cables from Tehran, mean-
while, took on a sarcastic quality that
did not increase his influence at the
White House, as he noted the comings
and goings of Ardeshir Zahedi and the
out-of-channel communications by !
Brzezinski. Who is the American am-
bassador, he wondered at one point. '1
From the White House viewpoint,
Sullivan's ego undercut his effectivenessI
as an advocate for U.S. policy. One
White House staffer said the president
was tired of Sullivan's "smart-ass atti-
tude and smart-ass. cables."
But Byrd's personal report did not
brighten the picture either. He in-
formed the White House that he found
the shah impotent to alter the course
of his slide.
Cp': i~ :+`3~D
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
1 tth-Hour Efforts
While the president absorbed these
reports, tremendous international pres-
sure was being applied for a last-ditch
effort to keep the shah in power.
The principal allies of the United
States had an enormous stake in en-
suring that Iran remained stable. Japan,
Israel;: South Africa and several of the
Western European nations were heavily
dependent on Iran for their oil. Kho-
meini had announced that after the rev-
olution Israel would get no oil from Ir-
an and that all contracts with foreign
firms would be canceled. That created.
a special scare in Japan, which ..was
building a huge petrochemical complex
in Iran. French firms had even larger
contracts for construction of nuclear
power plants. (Strikingly, the shah
planned to make Iran independent of
oil and.develop a nationwide network
of nuclear power plants by the turn
of the century.) In all, the western Eu-
ropean nations were said to have begun
-r--T
BLACK FRIDAY:
TROOPS
EARLYAUG.-
MASSACRE
MASSACRE
OCT. 26
-
SUWVA
N
LOBES FOR
T
SHAH'S
I!cR
_
~
UST"
FALL
AUG. 19
- 11 1
/I
REX ONE
MA -
OCTOBER NOV.S-
FIRE IN
KHOMEINI TEHRAN_
ABADAN
GOESTO
BURNS
FRANCE
AUGUST
CA III
ESTIMATE: NOV.
IRAN BRZEZINSKI
NOT IN CALLS I
A REVD- SHAH.UROES
LUTIONARY FORCE
OR PRE-
REVOLUTION. OCE
Z4-MAS-
.
ARY SITUA--SAVE DEMON. - SHAH SHAH APPOINTS
TION" ST RATIONS MILITARY
I I GOVT.
work on contracts calling for $12 billion
in development at the time of the fall
of the shah.
Because of their need for oil and
their investments, some in the- State
Department felt, the Western.. powers
believed the most likely method of
maintaining stability was to keep the
shah propped up.
In the same period, Energy Secretary
James Schlesinger was worrying, not
only that crippling strikes in the Iranian
oil fields might interrupt the flow of
oil, but would create another, more se-
rious problem for the shah. Without
oil revenues he could not pay for the
recently promised wage increases.
Without the wage increase, there would
be more strikes. And intelligence re-
ports warned that oil workers were now
planning strikes over political demands,
not wages and benefits. In short, eco-
nomic collapse could bring down the
shah.
Decision Time
From all the competing voices, the
president had to choose. What was the
reality in Iran? And what could the
United States do at this point to gain
control over events?
When Blumenthal returned at the
end of November with his personal re-
port, he also had a business-like sug-
gestion for resolving the internal debate:
get an outside opinion.
Blumenthal told the -president he
had been shocked by the shah's de-
moralized appearance. He said Sullivan
had told him to expect the shah to be
downcast, but, at the same time, State
briefing papers were declaring that the
shah could regain control of events.
Blumenthal questioned whether the
latter opinion was sound. He advised
the president to seek an outside ap-
praisal, and recommended that Carter
appoint George Ball, a former unders-
ecretary of state and now a partner in
a New York investment house, to con-
duct it. -
Blumenthal's advice was seconded
by Brzezinski, who told colleagues he
was sure Ball would see things the
same way he did. Ball arrived in Wash-
ington immediately and Brzezinski in-
stalled him in the Executive Office
Building where he began sifting through
all the intelligence reports he could
find.
Ball, then 68 years old, had known
many among the Iranian elite for 30
or 40 years and had traveled frequently
tIran. Years earlier, he had heard frst-
hancLof the frustration with corruption
under the shah and had thought the
shah's penchant for advanced weaponry
to be irrational.
Whatever new evidence Ball needed
to reinforce his suspicion that the shah's
days.were numbered, he got from a se-
ries of confidential briefings from an-
alysts at the State Department and
elsewhere. The portion of Sullivan's ca-
ble traffic that Ball was allowed to see
yielded a similar view:. ,Iran analysts
from State passed onother cable traffic
and memoranda that.thev knew Ball
From the reports he read and con-
versations with administration aides,
Ball rapidly came to the conclusion
that the shah could not be saved. He
seized on the possibility of installing
the National Front in power, despite
the CIA reports citing the weakness of
the Front.
On Nov. 30, the CIA issued a top se-
cret intelligence report on the shah's op-
position, dealing mainly with the Na-
tional Front, which it referred to as "'a
wide range of parties from moderates
to radical leftists but not communists."
The Front was described as too divided,
probably to provide Iran with effective
administration.
Correctly, the CIA noted that "it is
Khomeini who has the largest backing
among the demonstrators and. rioters
who have plunged Iran into chaos,"
and that "most leaders of the Front
have moved closer to the hardline
views" of Khomeini. "It is the,religious
leadership that can bring out the dem-
onstrators and mobs, not the National
Front." But the CIA added that the Ir-
anian military would "play the pivotal
role in future political developments in
Iran."
Ball chose to ignore the CIA warning
that "ideological and personal feuds,
I1RZEZINSKI
NOV. 9,197E-
SUWVAN I
URGES
MI 11NG WITH
CONVINCES
CARTER BALL'S
PLAN WON'T
WORK; URGES
U.S. SUPPORT
VANCE OPPOSES
CARTER DRAFT
LETTER
TO SHAH
OPPOSITION
SHAH
SUWVAN
CALLS
BRZEZINSKI
PUTS MEETIN
-
G
CARTER'S
POSITION
l
ON HOL
D
"SHIT -
l SIGHTlS1"
a
r
V
1
SHAH GETS
DEC.10-
THROUGH
HOLIDAY
GEORGE BAIL
MEETS WITH
CARTER
SAY
.
CRIAS ,
c~>i r>'
MANDS
,
SHAM'S I
SITUATION
VAN O
SETTLES ON
j
HoPEIFSs
I I -t
.
-
-
-7
Off1OA
REPRIM
1
some decades old, weaken its cohesion
and have damaged its ability to nego-
tiate during the current disorder. The
National Front has not put forward a
formal program other than calling for
the return of the 1906 constitution
[which would make the shah a Conti-
tutional monarch with limited pow-
ers],"a top secret intelligence memo-.?
randum said. - 1
had not yet seen. Even Brzezinski's
C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
DUb 11 LLI. ?: LUAU aa:w.....-
a was also the safest alternative. For
Ball, the National Front consisted
largely of constitutionalists, human
rights advocates, committed to self-
determination over Iran's oil assets, and
nonaligned in their foreign policy. No
doubt the rhetoric of anti-Americanism
would outstrip any statements of sup-
port for U.S. values. But Ball reasoned
that American support for their inde-
pendence would swing them back into
the U.S. camp.
The Iranian specialists at State were
pleased that Ball also concluded that
the shah could not continue in full au-
thority; they were disturbed at Ball's'
recommendation that the shah retain
his throne and control over the military.
The CIA had ust reported that Kho-
mem- wo never accept ept th at arrange
ment. Brzezinski was unhappy for other
reasons.
Citing recent intelligence predictions
that Iran would almost certainly be
overwhelmed by violence during the
Moharram holidays and the shah prob
ably would be toppled, Brzezinski
stressed that such bleak reports could
not be trusted. The violence hadn't oc
curred. The shah hadn't fallen. His
point was supported from an unex-
pected quarter - Sullivan cabled that
the shah had survived the worst. "The
immediate political crisis has passed,"
it said, according to sources.
At a presidential news conference
Dec. 12, Carter expressed the same out-
look. "I expect the shah to maintain
power in Iran and for the present dif-
ficulties to- be resolved," the president
said. "The predictions of disaster that
came from some sources have not been
realized at all. The shah has our support
and he also has our confidence." The'
president added critical remarks about
Khomeini and Soviet ambitions in the ~
region.
When Ball asked for a meeting with
the president, Brzezinski was slow to
push the request through, apparently
hoping to delay the report's arrival on
the president's desk until he had had
an opportunity to append his own re-
marks to it. Ball could not turn to
Vance, who was in the Middle East des-
perately pushing for a peace treaty,
but, wise to the ways of White House
politics, Ball arranged his own appoint
'Finally, on Dec. 13, Ball met with
Carter. He told the president that the
shah, like Humpty Dumpty, could nev-
er be put together again because there
had been a "national regurgitation by
the Iranian people." Even the profes-
sional. and middle classes were now
against him.. What the United States,
had to do, Ball said, was work out the,,
transfer of power to "responsible handsbefore Khomeini comes.' back and
messes everything up.'--,
of Notables" be established, consisting
of prominent citizens from all sections
of the opposition except the Marxist
left. The council, not the shah, would
pick the leaders of a new government.
Ball offered a list of 40 to 50 "notables,",
mostly elderly, moderate leaders from
the early 1950s, when the National
Front was at its most powerful.
Ball warned that Brzezinski's hard-
line "crackdown" approach could not
succeed. Army troops might refuse to
fire at demonstrators, he said, leading
to the disintegration of the military. If
the military did hold together, then';
there would be massive, bloody con-
frontations leading to prolonged civil
war.
One way or the other, Ball told Car-
ter, the shah should be told he ought
to leave the country for awhile and be-
gin to share power with others. It was
the only way he could avoid letting
the country fall into the hands of com-
munists and religious extremists. Ball,
did, however, recommend that the shah
could continue as regent and as com-.
mander-in-chief of the armed forces.
"I can't tell another head of state
what to do," Carter responded.
"You can tell a friend what you
think," Ball retorted. "One of the oh-
ligations of friendship is to give advice,
particularly to a man who is cut o ff . from the normal sources, who is sur-?,
rounded by syncophants and out of
touch with his people."
Carter wouldn't budge. Ball departed
for a. Florida vacation.
A Proposal
Afterward, Brzezinski, unhappy with
Ball's recommendations, once again
made his case for standing by the shah.
The shah had made it through the
most dangerous holiday period; he
could ride out the protests. The "Coon-\
Prze-'
bles" made no sense
il
f N
t
,
o
a
o
o
zinski said, because the National Front
leaders were weak, had no popular sup-
port and no respect from the military
leadership. The result, Brzezinski said,
would be a crumbling at the first push
from Iranian communists or an aggres-
sive move by the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, Brzezinski said, only
the military could meet a threat from
Khomeini, and, from all appearances
and intelligence reports, the military
was still intensely loyal to the shah.
What the shah needed from the pres-.:
ident was a clear signal that the United
States would back him to the end.
That would serve a double purpose: It
would let the allies know that the Unit-
ed States kept its commitments, and
it might prod the shah to seize the op-
portunity to crush the opposition.
According to sources in the State De-?
partment, Brzezinski then drafted a let-
ter for the president to send the shah,
which unambiguously urged him to use
force to put down the demonstrations.
The letter, three sources said, spoke of
issues of greater importance than lib-
eralization of Iranian society.
A draft of the letter was sent to
Vance for State Department comments;_
,
key aides to Vance were shocked by
? it. The result of the letter, one aide
feared, might have been "1,000 deaths."
Others thought in terms of tens of thou- .
sands of deaths.
Vance spoke to the president imme-
diately, according to these sources, and
said he wanted to be sure that Carter
understood that language of the draft .
would likely be interpreted by the shah
as an invitation for massive violence
against his people. According to State
Department sources, Vance told Carter .
that the idea was dangerous on several
counts. If the shah accepted the advice,
a confrontation with civilians could turn
into a lengthy civil war or lead to a ;
breakdown of the Iranian military, if,
troops balked. Vance feared these pos-
sibilities could only play into the hands,;
of Iranian communists and perhaps the;
Soviet Union as well. .
And if the shah did not accept the
advice, but abdicated, the letter could
create a disaster' for U.S. interests
should it fall into the wrong hands.
Carter, according to State Depart-
ment sources, told the secretary of state
that he was willing to take the respon-
sibility. He felt it was important for
the shah to know that the United
'States was unambiguously behind him.
According to these source, the president
believed that the shah had a new lease
on life and should take advantage of
it immediately.
Vance suggested changes in the draft. :
to make it slightly more ambiguous,'
which were accepted. The White House
now says the message was, never sent. :
At one point in early 1980 during
the hostage crisis, Carter asked for the
compilation of a documentary history
of U.S.-Iran relations, in preparation
for Iranian demands for an accounting `
on the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf na-
tion. But when the study task force
asked for presidential documents, the
White House refused certain docu-
ments, including the draft letter. The
gathering and analysis of the "Iran pa-
pers" was shifted to Brzezinski's office
and suspended. Vance's copy of the re-
visions is now missing from his office
files at the State Department.
In any case, advice from Washington a
had no impact on the shah's decisions..
He did not order any crackdown.
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
A Retort
In Tehran, Sullivan was not con-
stilted about the draft letter, but he,
was infuriated by Zahedi's representations of U.S. policy, by the president's j
refusal to approve contacts with the op-
position, by Brzezinski's persistence in?.
backing the shah.
. Having pushed for overtures to be
made to Khomeini's representatives
and for Washington to ease the shah
out of power, Sullivan fired off a cable
home saying that the president's policy
was "shortsighted and did not under-
stand-where.the U.S. interests lie," ac-
cording to a State Department source.
For months, State Department offi-
cials had warned Sullivan that he was
on thin ice with the White House, that
Brzezinski and to a lesser extent the
president felt that his cables were im-
pudent and improperly critical of the
National Security Council and Carter.
The new cable got Carter's attention.
"Pull him out," the president ordered
Vance, according to State Depart-
ment sources.
Vance objected. Firing'Sullivan
would make it appear that the Unit-
ed States was deserting the shah.
Carter was adamant; he said he
wanted Sullivan's "ass."
Vance suggested that, instead,
undersecretary Newsom be sent to
Tehran to give Sullivan an official
but private reprimand. Finally, the'
president relented.
As -it turned out, Newsom was l
too busy. to` make the trip. Sullivan
stayed on the job, unaware that the
president wanted him fired, as
events in Iran headed toward the:
climax. .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
AF;'~ri. )
Ali
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1980
specific shortcomings. Often aides from.
?State were outranked at meetings with,
the hierarchy of other agencies of govt
ernment. Assistant secretaries and their,
deputies, trying to put forth-the Statei
Department position, were no match
for national security adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski or Defense Secretary Harold
Brown in matters over which. there was
disagreement. And on Iran, there had:
been growing disagreement. - ,
During the ? tall of 1978, low- and.:
mid-level State Department aides triedi
repeatedly .to get Vance's ear' on-Iran' ~;
!failing that, they urged his ranking as41
+sistants,, Deputy* Secretary ' Warren
Christopher and Undersecretary fork
Political Affairs David Newsom,. to im-
.preys upon Vance the urgency oft
he sit-
:uation.
Vance, however, had added a second
high priority which preoccupied Jhim
-- the peace talks between Egypt and
-Israel. After the Camp David meeting;
among Carter, Anwar Sadat and if"
Begin had ended in pre-;
:liminary accord in October, Vance was:,

fiercely loyal to the shah, was becoming
it question mark. Some leaden wanted
Khomeini's hlotxl, but others wer
thought to he making overtures to him.`
As arrangements were being made
for the shah to leave [ran and for
Bakhtiar to take the reins ofa new gov-
ernment, one general, air force.chief-'
Manuchehr Khosrowdad, asserted : that
once--the shah left, the communists
were sure to take over. He said that'
no figure from the old National Front,"
such as Bakhtiar, was acceptable as.a:
leader. Kho srowdad spoke openly of.
plans for a "coup" to keep the shah
in power.
Bakhtiar moved to make himself ac-
ceptable to the military, but was unable:
to persuade Gen. Fereydoun Jam to re-
turn from exile as defense minister..
Talk of coups continued. Khosrowdad
and Ceti. Gholam All Oveissi wanted
it push that would destroy all opposition
to the shah. Gen. Hossein Rabii and
some-of the younger generals were pre-
pared to let the shah go but. they
wanted to wipe out his opposition and
leave Bakhtiar .fullyAn-~t"6:-:?Souie `
wanted the military to take full charge,
and keep the, shah as a figurehead.. 5
#; By' Scott `A7tnstrong
On New Yeai?'?'Bve- 1978;' Iranian
Ambassador-'Ardeshir Zahedi threw a
party for the western reporters gathered
in Tehran to cover events as they ap-
proached their climax' in 1979. Zahedi-
toasted the prospects for the 'shah's
new government formed by' Shahpour
Bakhtiar and 'said it was "ready - to
roll," stocked' with, such well-qualified
people that the opposition forces would
accept the new, regime..
One year before, .Timmy Carter had
raised a New Year's toast to Shah 1V1o-
hammad Reza Pahlavi as an "island
of stability. Now the shah was yielding
authority to Bakhtiar and would leave
the country for a while, in the hope
that things would settle down and the
revolutionary forces; would be satisfed.
7.ahedi was,'nonetheless, already un-
dermining the Bakhtiar regime by em-
phasizing the continuity of the shah's
regime. Bakhtiar. begged Ambassador
William Sullivan - not to weaken-his
chances further by a? public U.S. en-
dorsenient. Sullivan forwarded there
quest to Washington but it was ignored.:
The next day, Bakhtiar received a..pub
,the White House:
lit blessing from
For the? American governntent,the
new administration in Tehran offered
fragile hopes and, once again, 'for Pres-
ident Carter,-tt, brought a swirl`0Q, iw
tlicting'advice and inere-asingly-limited-
choices.
Originally, Carter was told by his na-
'tional security adviser, Zhigniew Brze-
'zinski, to stand by the shah to the bit-.
'ter end. Brzezinski had been supported
by the secretary of defense, the secre
tary of energy and a number of intlu-
Iential American friends of the shah.
But Carter's secretary of state, others
ini the--'State Department and some
whose private counsel he had sought
had argued that the United States must]
begin to establish relations with the po-
litical forces displacing - the Peacock
'T'hrone, including even- the aged aya-
tollah, Ruhollah Khomeini: According
to: Americans who had called on the !
ayatollah exiled in France, Khomeini
might he willing to work out a peaceful
! transition.
,The shah remained only as an im-1
portant symbol. The underlying ques
tion, the one crucial goal left for Anieri
can policy makers, was to make certain'
that the Iranian military remained in-
tact and powerful, able-to insure that:
the Iran of the future would continue,
with a uro-American outlook. ti
C0.52IIgU' D
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
Each" -sc:dltari(4 by-the" generals re- -1
quired U.S. support,'and, one by odder j
tlie,military high, commanders turned .ii
to the United States for assurances.
Meanwhile, throughout Iran, trosp:s..
were being restrained les.l an(t_ less in
dealing with demonstrators, .
Back, in. late. December, Hrrezinski_
had proposed thati the USS ?('onstel
lation with its till aircraft and 5,000 sail-
ors And aviators be brought into the ar-
ea to denusttstrate: a. IJ,S. presence and
conimitnient.-The. national. security, aad-
viser was articulating his "arc of crisis
thesis on Islamic unrest which reversed
an interagency- analysis originated by
the State Department. Even if the State
Department argument was correct thatl
the soviets-were-n4 the-e''nuse-of-.the
(domestic ferment in' Iskiiiile cixnttries,
the United States must stilt act--to in
sure that Russia would not capitalize
on it.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance ar-
gue(l that bringing forward the Con-
stellation would simply reinforce the
Soviet radio broadcasts to Iran that The United States needed to know
were predicting U .S. military interven- more about the' shah's'. military high
tion on behalf of the shah. Defense Sec- command, Brown .noted. So he recom-
retary Harold Brown came down in mended sending ?i ,general of our own
the middle - the carrier would he use- to Tehran,--one with sufficient rank to_!
ful for evacuating Americans from Iran impress the Iranian fop brass. Brown's
it' that was needed but he too appre- specialist,,: Robert' J. "Murray, who is
rioted the provocative nature of the ges- now undersecretary of the Navy, picked
hire: In the end, Carter sent the Con=a ('en. Robert (Dutch).` Huyser; deputy
tellatiun to the western Pacific an(C coiuntander.to_tlen. Alexander Haig iii
held; it near. Singapore charge 'ot U;:'forces in Ettrope. Huyser
President Carter had other problems had beetr- in Iran t(i'c(x)rdinate joint.
oil his agenda, including political prob- NATO and ,irania'n defense plans. He
lenttls, Press Secretary Jody Powell pre knew=the members of the Iranian mil-
pared a nieino,rioting that January was nary hierarchy personally, and Brown
supposed to. have been a month. of tri-I thought he? could act as-a-.-consultant--
urnphs,-but coinplicatiiins with SALT to the: general,. '
negotiations and the new Israel-Egypt Haig objected strongly, saying. that
treaty and the shahs troubles were he- Huyser;was-not qualitied for a political..:
ginning to mar the image of progress. mission "and` threatening to), resign t'l
The commitment to the shah was being Huyser was .sent. At the White. House.
widely questioned, the course of events Efaig s, objections were ".ignored Haig
in Iran being read a s weakness. Powell was t? retire .al)ortty anyway, and his
had no remedies to propose, but sent Iregvent criticism of the Carter admin
a copy to Brzezinski. i,tration was finding It way mto the
res re
ularl
d
V
t
h
D
p
y
g
ance an
,,
epartmen
At t
e. State
his,. deputies' g'enerally'. tried to block. Brown told : the president that he,
the more provocative suggestions" con- . should-put aside an earlier idea of send-
ing from Brzezinski and the National ing a Cabinet-level,envoyto bolster the
Security Council, but usually they re- shah; it - anyone went, - it should be i
garded Defense Secretary Brown as an l Huyser: Carter approved the choice.
ally' in caution.- Vance was,. surprised, After instructions-, were brokered
therefore, when- Brown took the inita- I back and forth among departments,
tive and proposed an entirely new ap- the general was told to assess the sit-
preach of his own. nation in Iran and make two requests:
of the : shah's high command: Above.
all else, it should hang together, and,.;
if at all possible, it should avoid a "mil-
itary solution" ;and negotiate with the;
shah's , oppositiitn.r:,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20 :
SPRINO-
I
CONTRADICTS WHITE HOUSE
~
J
- -
NEW YEARS
: MEETING
iUlt{VAN==' =
VIEWS ON SHAH'S "WISH
DAY 1978-
- SITUATION-a LIST" CON--
TER
'CA
R
TOASTS
SIDERED
SHAM IN
-TEHRAN 4
-V___ 1- - i
JUNE T-
I f
JAN.8-
OPTIMIST
IC
TROOPS FIRE
SUUIVAN
REPORT
r I
ON CROWD -
-
PROTESTING
MARCH 31-
ANTI- -
STATE DEPT
KHOMEINI
.;
ARETING
ARTICLE
"TIME IS
NOT ON SHAH'S
SIDE"; ADVICE
IGNORED
Huyser. arrived'' in Tehran on Jan.
.
~3. Almost immediately, he found 'that'
seven Iranian generals were set to take
over the government as soon as the
shah left. He met with all seven indi-
vidually and then as a group. They ex-
pressed fear that Bakhtiar would not,
be strong enough to protect their in-
terests and, in the face of more violent
opposition, their lives. They planned
to restore order. Huyser argued that the only way
the military could remain intact was
to support Bakhtiar. The United States
would stand by the -generals, he, said, -'
only if they stood by Bakhtiar. They
had no choice.
Several of the generals = Oveissi,
Khosrowdad and Rabin-.-were diffi-
cult to dissuade. They. had -no:faith in -1
Bakhtiar; he would accomnxxlate the
opposition at their expense. They felt
eventual communist takeover. The mil-
itary,, they said,.was prepared to wipe
out the oppositiorr^leadership-and;_-,
necessary, to kill .100,000 Iranians. ,
'l liey would not need Bakhtiar, they .
could put the shah hack-; in power, if
they chose, or run the country them-.
selves. What they needed, they told
Huyser, was the support of the. United
States.. -
Huyser was convinced the Iraniatt-
generats.were afraid that a new regime
would initiate investigations into cot
ruption. Like many officials close to
the shah, they . had. prospered Band
soinely under hint. Huyser told them
they would be allowed- to leave the
country if they chose, hut that the Unit-"
ed States was not ready to support mil-
itary action. He warned that if they {
did act, they would he on their own.
To avoid the turmoil that could lead
to the dreaded communist takeover,
they, must support Bakhtiar.
Huyser staved at Sullivan's embassy
residence while in Iran. Unhappy with
his assignment-and receiving death
threats almost every day, the general re=
maimed cloistered with Sullivan mcnt
evenings, arguing about the strength
of the,:Iranian military.
-
Auy' er was persuaaeu ttiat the gem-
orals were powerful and could be kept
together in charge of .a unified force.
But, Sullivan was skeptical. He said
that the military: was. on the verge of
reasonably.-. rely,;;on; 8Q' percent ?f the I
collapse, and that ordinary Iranian
troops would probably not respond to
commands tc> shoot their countrymen.
Each evening, after dining with Sul-
livan, Huyser called Washington, where
it was still afternoon, and spoke to De-
fense Secretary Brown or the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David
Jones. He reported that the shah's com-
mand structure was intact, that it
could
troops or suppof rt,aid-that if the gem
orals were-unlea3hed they could -Crusk.I `-v
I-ha nnnnc:tv,.,
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3 ;';
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
Brown and Jones, in turn, told the
president that, the military could be
used at any time on behalf of Bakhtiar,
or the shah or on behalf of another lead-I
er. The military option should be kept'
open.
But; at the same time, Sullivan re:
ported to his superiors at State (or on,
occasion to Brown, and Jones at the:
Pentagon) and presented a conflicting,
?view. Sullivan was skeptical that the Ir-
anian military would do anything in a.
crisis but fold. The time for a successful
"crackdown" had long since passed.
(.arII)heat1 Meeting
On Jan. 5 and. 6, 'Carter met in
Guadaloupe . wit , French : President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, British Prime
Minister James-.Callaghan and West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.
The French president recommended
SEPT. 8-
-,BLACK FRIDAY: _
-TROOPS
EARLY AUG.-
SULLIVAN
,--MASSACRE I OCT.26-
DEMONSTRA. --- SULLIVAN
LOBBIES FOR
SHAH'S "WISH
OR PRE--
NOV.S
~nrnn~n~ GOVT.
Carter; :uncomfortable with the
French proposal, said he.would not en
cixirage the shah to o or stay but,
that he would. work with the British.
to facilitate the shah's departure in the
near future i_.Callagharr'-and Schmidt
agreed with Carter.
The Guadaloupe meetings lasted twoV
(lays. Carter and Brzezinski stayed on
for a third day and, discussed Iran fur-
ther, particularly -the encouraging re-
_ports coming from Gen. Huyser. Brie-1
zinski put heavy emphasis on Huyser's
report that-the Iranian military com-
manders remained powerful. He urged
that plans to use-force-not be discarded. I
Brzezinski again argued against com-
municating with Khomeini, saying 'it.
would be perceived as a-rejection of.1
1
the new Bakhtiar government and
might panic the Iraniari'military lead- I
ers.. The generals would never back
Bakhtiar if the United States made a
move toward Khomeini, and no meet-
ing between U.S. officials and Khomeini
could be kept secret, Brzezinski warned.
Khomeini, would announce it or leak
it privately to show that America was
capitulating to him.
Only a few days earlier; Vance had
persuaded Carter to swing over and
J
give permission for the private contacts
with Khomeini. Now Brzezinski per-
suaded him it was a bad-idea. There
was no rebuttal: from: Vance; he was un-s
aware of the discussion. The secretary
of state was upset when he learned of
the- reversal but accepted it. Sullivan
thought it was insane.,
-
I{e ii.ue Cfil1. L )sin
Sullivan passed on Beheshti's views
to Washington, figuring the offer was
not entirely rhetorical. The proposal
was discussed over breakfast by Carter,
Vice President Walter Mondale, Vance,
Brown, Brzezinski and presidential aide
Hamilton Jordan. The answer was -no;
Carter would not"ayk the shah to ab-"
d icate.
On the night of'Jan. 1.3, with the
shah set to leave Iran any clay, with
the Bakhtiar government near collapse
and with some. Iranian generals on the- i
verge of taking- action on their' own,
Huyser once again filed his report to
Washington, speaking to. Harold
Brown. When they were. done,; Brown-
immediately called Brzezmski.
Defense Secretary Brown, reported*
that the arguments for the "military opJ
tion," as he called it; were mounting'
quickly. Not only would it reassure al-'
lies on American steadfastness but it
would solve another problem.
For one thing, ' Brown said Huyser
was no longer sure he could prevent
a coup. At best; Huyser felt he could
stop some officers from taking part,
and the result of;_that would be for
the action to fail.' The United States
would then be in an absurd position
- it would surely be blamed for start-
ing the coup, when in actuality it would
have been responsible for the coup's
lack of success.
It made sense for Huyser to give
the 'officers a go-ahead, Brown told
Brzezinski.
Brzezinski then called Sullivanand-
Huyser at the ambassador's residence.
Huyser assured him that the military
could round up all the opposition lead-
ers. Whether the commanders could I
he restrained from shooting them im-
mediately was another question. One
way or the other, further mass demon-
strations would be, unlikely, Huyser
said. Sullivan, once again, took the op-
posite view..
For Brzezinski, it seemed' only a
question of timing and: tactics: Should
the military he:unleashed with the shah
in or Out of the country'? Should it he
clone to secure, the Bakhtiar regime or
clone later to restore the shah as regent?
in, 'T'ehran, the situation was growing
more confusing each clay. The Bakhtiar
regime, installed on Jan. 3, was already
falling apart.
On -Jan. 12, Sullivan turned clown
an aide's request to meet with Ayatollah
Mohammad Behesti the principal
Khomeini contact in Tehran, on the
grounds that it would violate the pres-
ident's instructions against bargaining
with Khomeini.
The next day, however, as things rap-
idly deteriorated, Sullivan desperately
sought information on how Khomeini
viewed the military. Without checking
with Washington, he gave his approval
to contact Behesti.
The embassy=aide met with -Beheshti -
(today head of the Islamic Republican
Party, he was confused' by the CIA
with a merchant in the bazaar in a se-
cret. report published only six weeks
earlier.). The mullah was offered a deal.
The United States would guarantee
that there would be no coup or military
crackdown if Khomeini would appeal
to strikers to return to their jobs and
call an end to the demonstrations, al-
lowing Bakhtiar to rule. '
Beheshti was direct. He said Kho-
meini would not bargain until the shah.
leftzl`san. If the United States could
guarantee that the shah would abdicate
- and it' he did actually abdicate -
then and only then would the strikes
and demonstrations end, he said.
Beheshti said the . shah's generals
were not a real threat. They could have .
had a coup earlier or they could stage
one later on - except, he said, no coup
would. succeed. The revolution would
prevail regardless of the military.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20 :
Sullivan pointed out that n3 one out
side the White House believed. the,`
Bakhtiar...government could ,stay in`
power, and that the shah's "chances?;
were even more hopeless. He said that'
everyone had given up on the: shah
-- Vance, CIA Director Stanfield
'T'urner, every - even e., shah]
hacTgiven up on -the shah. But Brze-I
zinski wanted one more try. t . ?,.`j
Sullivan insisted as well that the nil.
itary was `too. confused to be effective. 'i
It would self-destruct. Leto the shah
leave-and' then see-what happened; Stil- J
livan suggested Brzezinski, for the time,
being,. seemed; mollified.- .'...
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3 1D
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3 ;
fr l BRZEZINSKI I
'-I !!!! ttt CONVINCES VANCE OPPOSES
r50V .' 1978 kCARTER BALL'S; CARTER DRAFT. I
SUWVAN , F PLAN WON'T ;-LETTER
_
URGES I WORK; URGES TO SHAH
MEETING WITH -.~ U.S. SUPPORT ----
OPPOSITION SHAK
mil =_;:_ :.,....-
GEORGE BALL
MEETS WITH
CARTER, SAYS
SHAH'S
SITUATION
HOPELESS
SULLIVAN
CALLS
CARTER,5
POSITION
"SHORT-
SIGHTED"
CARTER DE-
REPRIMAND.- -
Since no one knew how Khomeini
viewed the Iranian military,.Vance au;!~
thorized Paris embassy officer, Warren.
Zimmerman to renew his secret contact
with Khomeini's de facto .chief of staff,
Dr.. Ibrahim Yazdi. So volatile was the
struggle for influence around Khomeini,
that Yazdi insisted Zimmerman meet
him secretly at an inn away from Kho-'
meini headgarters. Each time Zimmer--1
man contacted Yazdi, he used a pre-
arranged signal, identifying himself as
a reporter named Shoemaker, (his
mother's maiden name).
In a series of seven conversations,
Zimmerman posed questions to Yaz(Ii,
who relayed what he said was Kho
memni's answer in their next meeting;
Khomeini would sell oil to any buyer
at the "just" price, Yazdi reported. He
would allow U.S. investment, although
he would be antagonistic toward the
United States. But- he would be even
more antagonistic to the "atheistic' and
"anti-religious" Soviets. '"
Yazdi had unsettling news. While-
Khomeini knew little about the Iranian
military leadership, he was extremely !
hostile toward it.
. :'I'1 Shah I)eparis
On .Jan. 16, 1979, the shah left Iran.
't'here were massive demonstrations {
and dancing in the streets of Iranian
cities. Originally planning to go to the
United States, where he was to reside
at. the estate of Walter Annenberg in
Palm Springs, Calif., the shah's flight i
was re-routed to Aswan, Egypt, where
President Anwar Sadat had invited him
for a stopover. '
Faced with continuing chaos in Iran,
Vance and Brzezinski finally agreed on
something - the United States should
maneuver to keep the shah in Egypt.
Vance felt that the shah's presence in
the United States would intensify anti-
American feeling in Iran and serve to
further damage the Bakhtiar govern.
ment.'
Brzezinski, however, felt the shah
was still the key to rallying the Iranian
military and that it was best for him
to be nearby when the time came.
Indeed, Vance and Brzezinski were
still offering the president fundaTnen-.
tally different ideas about what the fu-
-ture laokedlike in Iran. Brzezinski em-
phasized as he had in the 'past, the
threat of a communist takeover-if Kho-
meini's religious fanatics should attain
power. Vance, in contrast,. argued that-
despite increasing concern over leftist
radicals in neighborhood and worker or-
ganizations, Khomeini himself was
staunchly anti-communist. The ayatol-
lah might. provide the best bulwark
against a communist regime, even the ;i
possibility of cooperation with Wash-
ington.
Even after' the shah's departure,
Brzezinski's staff continued to discuss
the possibilities for- military action to -I
keep the Khomeini forces from taking
power. They had been in touch with Ir-
anian generals who only awaited a fa-
vorable signal in order to launch a take-
over of the government.
On Jan. 17, the day after the shah
left Tehran, Capt. Gary Sick, Brzezin-
ski's specialist on Iran, summoned State
Department and CIA aides who had re=;
cently returned from ran to the White
House to see whether any of the various
ideas for coups had any chance of suc-.
cess. .
Brzezinski's aides were not'prepared-
for the response they got. Support for
the shah did not : exist An Iran, they
were told. In all probability, it would
never exist. The key to weakening Kho-
meini's grip on the country was to let
hint take power.,The populace would'.
then learn that Iran's problems. were
not so easily solved. In the meantime, '.1
it made no sense-to install or support
a provisional_- government no'- one .7
who might be'ahle,to.,leadIran u.
seriously attempt to take power without
;
backing from Khomeini`t'he country
was, his.-N; t IR' . z: , >R."s
The United States, these analysts be
lieved, should concentrate now on cul-
tivating moderate Islamic clergy, such,
as Ayatollah Sayed Kazem Shariat-
madri, and other middle-of-the-road el-:
ements in Iran, looking toward a co-
alition of military, social democrats,
moderate clergy and supporters of the
shah that would counter the more ex-
treme groups surrounding Khomeini.,'
This would take time, they added. be-
cause reliable links with these groups
had been lost in the years that the
CIA had depended on the shah's
PTK,for intelligence on Iranian dis-
sent.
When Khomeini ran into' trouble,
this coalition of moderates could form
the nucleus for a future government
friendly to America. In addition, once
the shah was gone, there was the po-9
tential for considerable internal strife
from the; various -ethnic and regionals
groups, with whom the United States
DEC.25-
US EMBASSY
IN TEHRAN
DEC. 17-
KENNEDY & BALL
- ~K - ATTACKED
URGE VANCE -
US DIPLOMAT , DEC.29-
TO GET
MEETS SEC. SHAH ASKS
INVOLVED IN
RETLY WITH BAKHTIAR
IRAN POLICY
KHOMEINI TO BECOME
CHIEF OF PRIME
STAFF MINISTER
LATE DEC. -
I DEC20- _ CARTER
t SULLIVAN APPROVES
i
URGES DIRECT DIRECT
CONTACT KHOMEINI
WITH KHOMEINI CONTACT
1
POST- { .?
'
CHRISTMAS-
VANCE/BRZEZ-
_
INSKITENSION VANCEGOES
RISES OVER TO CAMP DAVID;
SOVIET ----~- GETS CARTER --:---
RELATIONS OK TO TELL
SHAH TO TAKE
-
r -
"
I .
VACATION
-
IF HE ASKS
had lost contact during its years of
close- identity with the shah.
Meanwhile, Harold Brown at the
Pentagon had a new idea for offer his
personal representative, Gen. Huyser,
who, was pleading for permission to
.leave the country because of the death
threats against him. Brown thought
that restoring order in the southwestern
oil fields was a priority and he proposed
that Huyser organize a military take-
over of the oil fields. With strikes in ev-
ery sector of the econoihy from the civ-
il service-to the oil fields, Bakhtiar was
.presiding over a frozen societv,.his cred-
ibility rapidly evaporating. If the gen-
erals could, get' things running 'again,
it would,strengthen confidence in,-the
regime.
n -#.I T. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
Huyser tried to persuade the generals
to proceed with Brown's mission, even
if it meant putting troops at work on
oil wells, but he couldn't get agreement.
As soon as Huyser convinced one gen-
eral, another would hack. off and insist
on an alternative project.: f..
Philip Gast,.head of the TJ.t+. military
assistance group in Tehran, arranged
a meeting with. i.MIedhi Bazargan. a
member of the -National Front who
Was: Close to Khomeini, and-asked him
for help in ending. the strikes, Bazargan
was unsympathetic.
Meanwhile; aen:-Haig continued to
advise the-Joint Chietsat. thePentagon
that the military should he pushed into
action, with or without.Bakhtiar. If the
militarydid notmove soon; before Kho-
meini's return 'it would be:toQ.late: Sec-
retary. Brown. again queried: his man
in the field:.was now the time-for a mil-
itary takeover? ^ti
But Huyser was beginning-' to. change
his mind"about the, Iran iam generals,
having failed::to.--get effective` help on
the oik tieldsak'he- military;:he reported,
had the,powerto.takeover tae country
-- but not the-goveinmentdrexpertise
to run it.`It woir~a _beetf-`er to hack
Hakhtiar. He was propping up the gen-
erals more than the other way around.
khLnneiiii .'t(' airnl?tl
On l1, Ayatollah Khomeini ar-
rived triumphantlrin Tehran,: greeted
by tumultuous demonstrations. '
After a final effort to insure the mil-
itary's loyalty'tikhe shaky government,
Huyser finally got permission to return
homes .: 3
Events began escalating out of con-
trot' Sullivan 'cabled that the.fallo
Bakhtiar wi' imminent-
At State, they worried what to. say
publicly. Bakhtiar was no longer viable,
but to~say su would precipitate his.im-
mediate. fa1. Huyser was briefing Pres-
ident Carter, Bro". and Vance, insist-
ing the mlitary tcommand was still in-
tact and1ready't6 put down demon-
strationsif:Ba_khtiar gave the orders.
But elsewhere in government, sources
were telling reporters that the regime
was doomed:
When:;that story appeared on the
evening- riewsJody,,Powell promptly
denied" it' The,president does not be-
lieve the Bakhtiar government will fall,
Powell told;`CBS < -
From -the_ White; House viewpoint,
r it was another instance of leaks making
policyx-Once-the'word was out to the
press, the admuustration had- to live
with the-' results ?whether the president
liked. it
Carte> told his appointments secre-
tary.. to get. a- list from Brzezinski of
the top State Department people and
have- them at the White House the
next morning. Sixteen top-level officials
appeared; in the Cabinet Room the
next day ' ;
After praising' Vance, Carter turned
to his:'-real concern. Leaks. He could
noonger, let those who had lost the pol-
icyoirgu;Tlents carry on their battles in
the re5-.Ahe president told them.
"L'his ileaking: has got to stop and
what Darn; going to do is this," Carter
said... If'there-are any leaks out of your
area;4liatever the area may be, I am
going to`tire you. Whether or not that's
fair,`and I,-'can'see where some of youl
might-, not`think it fair, this has just;
got to stop , Sc1.; Leaks from your area,;
regardless who`s aL.fatalt, and you're
I e&
atter , Appointed
ISater that same day, in Tehran, Aya-
tollah Khom eini appointed a prime
minister for his provisional revolution-
ary government: It was Bazargan (as
Sullivan had earlier predicted). Gen.
Rabii, reminding everyone that the mil-
itary did -girt wish to he left out of
the final arrangement of power, had he-,
licopteirs; and aircraft flying over Teh-
ran.
Bazargan recognized that he most es-
tablish authority over the military and
he began meeting with some of the gen-
erals. Gen. "darn, whom Bakhtiar had
tailed. to "entice into his government,
was offered a cabinet post. Gen.
Gharabaghi.talked.with the revolution-
ary prime minister, then went to see 1
the failing one, Bakhtiar. The general I
said the military's only hope of acting iI
cohesively was to shift allegiance to Ba-'I
zargan;
Bakhtiar now turned to Sullivan for
advice. So the ambassador cabled
Washington for instructions, proposin
that he tell the- fading prime ministe
to begin the peaceful transition to th
new -regime.
But the word came back: stay wit
Bakhtiar; tell. Gharahaghi to withdraw
his--resignation-, the United States still
suppiirt% the shah's prime minister.
Three days later; a group of air force
officers' and enlisted- men mutinied,
took control of some tanks and attacked 4
-'the headquarters of Bakhtiar's armed
forces. Nineteen American military ad- I
visers were trapped inside., They were.,
:freed at 5 am. the next morning, only
after Bazargan and Yazdi personally ar-
rived' to rescue them
JAN.3,1979-
BROWN SENDS--
HUYSER TO FEB 14.15-
-CONSULT WITH j-- JAN.31- -MILITARY IRANIAN KHOMEiNi
CRUMBLES;
JAN 6- - WHITE a
,
GUADALOUPE_HEVALUATES
SUMMIT
CARTER
SKI AND,
-!
BRZEZINSK4:..
CELSKHOMEINI. RISE FEB.5- - I NOV.4,1979-
EMBASSY
CONTACT - HUYSER SAYS -
O
VERRUN:
MILITARY IN
x I HOSTAGES
CONTROL; ARE TAKEN
BAKHTIAR I I
Zen.
MC- it was preparing to launch I
`a coup and take .control of the gov- 1
ernment. in the name of the military.,;
Sullivan -got a; call from Washington
that night, relaying a - message from'l.
Brzezinski. Would a military coup suc-
ceed? Could they hold power against
the revolution?
The ambassador responded with an 1
unprintable expletive and asked: do
you want me to translate that into Pol.
ish?
With no clear lines of authority, no'
reliable estimate of whose troops were
loyal and 'whose had joined the revo-
lution, Rabii and the others quickly de-
clared their neutrality after only mild"
resistance- Most were arrested. The rev-
olution had won.
Two days, later, the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran was overrun by supporters,
of Khomeini.,`Againonly personal ; in-
tervention by Yazdi freed-the Ameri=
cans.
On1 Feb.. 7,:Sullivan sent a' cable to
Washington saying: that the embassy
could no longer be protected, that anti-
American sentiment was: at a fever
pitch. At least four of'the most expe-
rienced Foreign ' Service officers'' sta-
tioned' in? Iran, wrote memos saying
that, '.considering' "the risk - of 'attack,
there were too many people stationed
at the embassy. One suggested that
the staff be reduced to six officers and
a vicious dog N,
The embassy staff was reduced to
40br-so1 though it later grew again in,
,size. On Nov. A 4, 1979, revolutionaries,,
heeding a- plea- from Khomeini to rid
the country ?& U.S. influE"nce, overran,
othe-embasyad- took'-hostage all f
the Amerii inside. Fifty-two ofthem
are stilt'ther&i?`
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210017-3
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